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ABSTRACT
The Internet has been viewed as a revolutionary means for including individuals in 
public deliberation on an equal basis. However, there is insufficient empirical work on 
applications of computer mediated communication to public deliberation under non- 
democratic social circumstances. This thesis explores the potential of computer- 
mediated communication in constructing the public sphere in post-Communist China 
and focuses on the current affairs discussion on Qiangguo Luntan (QGLT), one of the 
most popular Internet bulletin boards in China.
The production-content-reception study shows that: 1) Internet bulletin boards in 
China are not ‘online dissident avenues’ without administrative surveillance. In 
addition, self-censorship works in a long-term and covert way in restraining the 
democratic potential of online discussion; 2) Internet bulletin boards enable ordinary 
Chinese to have their identities as politically activated citizens constructed in 
cyberspace. Their enthusiasm in voicing differentiated political standpoints proves 
that online public opinion could enrich the political discourse in China, and has the 
potential of leading to tensions between the public and the state; 3) QGLT SARS 
postings display the growth of a public critique that ventured to touch upon a taboo 
issue that was originally banned from public discussion. Non-localized and dialogic 
forms of communication among the users have created an alternative form of 
publicity outside the mainstream media’s agenda and could potentially check the 
government’s policy-making.
The Internet may work to undermine public deliberation by increasing inequalities of 
access, fragmenting public discourse, and accommodating non-progressive rhetoric. 
Nevertheless by enlarging the scale of civic participation, advancing alternative and 
oppositional public discourses, and tackling problems at a global level, Internet 
bulletin boards could make a significant contribution to the construction of an 
alternative public sphere representing divergent political views. In summary, under 
the articulated forces of commercialisation, democratisation, and globalisation, the 
virtual public sphere in China today has been put in tension between democratisation 
and degeneration.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
On 9 May, 1999, I was one of the many peaceful demonstrators marching in Beijing. 
We were protesting against NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade 
during Kosovo Conflict. Three journalists were killed in this bombing, which stirred 
fervent public opinion in China condemning the USA’s military hegemony. 
Nevertheless, street demonstrations were only allowed for one day in major cities by 
the Chinese government. A few days later, I heard for the first time the name of 
Kangyi Luntan (the Protest Forum), later Qiangguo Luntan (QGLT thereafter), which 
was sited on the Communist Party’s organ the Peoples Daily's website. QGLT 
became known as a replacement venue for street protests in cyberspace and the 
expression of public opinion.
The literal meaning of QGLT in Chinese is ‘strong nation forum’ or ‘strengthening the 
nation forum’.1 The connotation of this name reflects an ambivalent attitude towards 
‘Western powers’ among Chinese intellectuals, which can be traced back to the 
nineteenth century. From 1842 to 1£45, China was colonised by various European 
powers and also Japan. Chinese intellectuals emphasised the importance of learning 
advanced technologies and democratic polity from the Western colonisers in order to 
‘strengthen’ their own country and win national independence. By promoting ‘Self- 
Strengthening’, Chinese intellectuals have emphasised China’s ‘autonomy and 
initiative’ in learning from the West (Fairbank 1987:100).
Since 1999 I had attended several conferences when Mr. Yaping Jiang, the founder of 
QGLT and the Deputy President of people.com.cn, was the keynote speaker. In those 
conferences, he spoke about his experience of managing QGLT, and those talks were 
also covered by various media. As Jiang saw it, Chinese people wanted to express 
their ideas to the government and the government wanted to know what the people 
thought and an online forum was the ideal tool to bridge these two ends (Turner 
10/04/2000). Jiang admitted QGLT moderators delete postings and as he said no ‘sex’, 
‘libel’, or ‘state secrets’ are allowed on QGLT (Gilley 24/05/2001). At the same time, 
he also admitted the management of the bulletin boards could not be too strict so as to
1
prevent a true reflection o f public opinion occurring online. The critical public 
opinion on QGLT shows that ‘the top leaders appear willing to tolerate a certain
amount o f frankness that would otherwise be stamped out’ in traditional media
(Turner 10/04/2000).
Because o f the critical public debate fostered on its bulletin boards, QGLT has been 
referred to by the foreign media as ‘a Trojan horse filled with angry citizens right 
inside the party gates’ (Gilley 24/05/2001), ‘an avenue for dissent’ (Turner
10/04/2000), or ‘a hint o f the challenge’ to the Chinese government (Hewitt
26/07/2001). At the same time, QGLT also displays nationalistic features in its online 
discussion, which is regarded as ‘a source o f comfort to the Communist Party’ (Cohn 
21/07/2001).
I was fascinated with reading the political discussion on QGLT, which provides a 
totally different content from what I could find in the traditional Chinese media. 
Voices from ordinary people, rather than government officials, could be heard here; 
different ideological and political preference could be found within this online 
community, and discussion and debate on current issues might not necessarily lead to 
agreement. QGLT accommodates more critical public opinion on politically ‘sensitive 
issue’ than the most daring Chinese newspapers. This general impression o f QGLT 
became a concrete question when I considered writing a PhD research proposal: does 
online political discussion construct the public sphere in non-democratic societies 
such as China?
In the past decade, there has been an increasing growth of online political projects 
promoting civic participation promoted through ‘two-way conversations’ between 
citizens and the state by government, citizen groups or academia . Much has also been 
debated in the academic world about the possibility of the Internet enhancing 
deliberation and democracy. However, most research and debate is situated in the 
context o f democratic societies. There is insufficient research on the deliberating 
potential o f the Internet and how it construct the public sphere through the discursive 
space generated by online interaction in non-democratic countries.
Research concerning deliberation through the Internet sometimes finds disheartening
results (Noam, E. M. 2005). There have been arguments that online discussion cannot 
move beyond simple opinion-sharing (White, C. 1997) or that online democracy is 
configured through contestation and conflict rather than consensus and rational and 
legal procedures (Dean, J. 2003). However, other evidence indicates a positive 
relationship between Internet use and users’ communal and civic involvement (Katz et 
al. 2001; Katz and Rice 2002). In spite o f all limitations, the ‘reciprocal dynamics’ 
generated from talks among online participants ‘is the catalyst for the civic cultures’ 
that features a new democratic politics in cyberspace (Dahlgren 2005: 159). 
Interactive text-based computer-mediated communication is central to the idea of 
electronic deliberation. Engaging in online discussion exposes participants to a variety 
o f opinions they otherwise might not encounter and encourages self-reflection over 
the issues at debate (Weger and Aekhus 2003) and thus a public can be created from 
online discursive interaction. The merit o f using the deliberative approach to study 
Internet democracy according to Lincoln Dahlberg, lies in the fact that it heeds the 
‘multiple differences between subjects within pluralist societies’ (Dahlberg 2001a: 
616). The deliberative democracy approach acknowledges the difference in subjects 
and provides a basis for discursive interaction among participants who represent 
different political viewpoints and opinion. This helps to explain the democratising 
potential o f the political talk on QGLT bulletin boards.
In this study, ‘Internet bulletin boards’ (or ‘bulletin boards’) is used as a general term 
that addresses any facility on the World Wide Web for holding interactive discussion 
among users, though I acknowledge that there have been many other terms used for 
online discussion. According to the Columbia Encyclopaedia (6th Edition), ‘discussion 
groups’, ‘newsgroups’, and ‘bulletin boards’ are all used interchangeably to refer to 
users posting messages and looking for responses on the Internet. The online 
encyclopaedia Wikipedia points out that in current usage (primarily in China and 
Japan), ‘bulletin boards system’ is used interchangeably with ‘Internet forum’ which 
may also be phrased as ‘web forums’, ‘message boards’, ‘discussion boards’, 
‘discussion forums’, ‘discussion groups’, ‘bulletin boards’, ‘fora  ’ or ‘forums’ in other 
contexts3. The similarity between bulletin boards and Internet forums is obvious: they 
both allow users to post and interact with each other, and usually virtual communities 
are formed from such interaction. Internet bulletin boards are usually split into 
individual boards that deal with particular topics. The object o f study for this PhD,
QGLT, is an online forum for political discussion about current affairs. ‘BBS’, 
‘Internet forum’ and ‘web forum’ have been used by Chinese media and users when 
describing it.
This thesis aims to examine the potential of online political discussion to foster 
deliberation in Post-Communist China. To be specific, this thesis examines the 
possible realisation of the deliberative approach to Internet democracy through a case 
study of QGLT. By comparing existing online discursive interaction on QGLT to the 
set o f criteria for the public sphere developed by Jurgen Habermas (1989), this thesis 
evaluates whether the online rational-critical public discussion constructs and then 
extends the wider public sphere in China.
My main argument substantiates the theoretical argument that rational critical 
discourse in the public sphere can be found in the discursive space on Internet bulletin 
boards. The Internet can enlarge the scale of civic participation, advance alternative 
and oppositional public discourses, and tackle problems at a global level. Internet 
bulletin boards construct a public sphere with divergent political views represented. 
This alternative public sphere online has the potential of freeing civil society from 
state control, and cultivating critical public opinion that is able to check on an 
authoritarian government’s policy-making. In this sense, online deliberative forums 
play a more important role in non-liberal societies in extending the public sphere than 
their counterparts in democratic societies.
1. Research Background: Digital Media Ecology in China
The discursive space generated on QGLT is not an exceptional case and is rooted in 
the socio-economic changes in China. The Communist Party’s ultimate control over 
media was thwarted after economic reform in 1978. Since then, China has witnessed 
the commercialisation of its media and the opening of the media market to foreign 
companies. Joining the WTO’s Information Technology Agreement in 20034 further 
opened the Chinese telecommunications industry to both western capital and western 
ideology. Since the early 1990s, the Internet has developed quickly in China and the 
country boasted 8% of the population online in January 2006 (CINIC Report XVII). 
In this section, I intend to map the digital media ecology in China in order to provide
readers with the context in which rational critical public debate emerges online. By 
‘digital media ecology’, I mean the institutional framework that dictates the Internet 
media and the users it creates. I will look at the political economy, control, and 
regulations o f the Internet media; and the growth of online communities based on 
bulletin boards in China.
1.1 The Political Economy, Control and Regulation of the Internet
The Chinese government has been the driving force behind the explosive 
development in information and communication technologies (ICTs) in China. The 
Chinese government believes that ICTs are crucial factors for building a strong 
economy and overcoming interregional development gaps at home. In fact, by the 
mid-1990s, China became the leading force among Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) countries in efforts to promote the development of ICTs (Giese, 
K 2003:38). In terms of the political economy of digital media, state ownership is not 
the only form. The Internet has been transformed from sole state ownership to a 
variety o f ownerships in the 1990s. However, in spite of the changes in the media’s 
political economy, stringent administrative regulations still have been imposed on 
Internet media.
The Internet was first used as a data network that enables scholarly exchange of 
information in China, and ‘generally fell under the auspices o f the education and 
academic sectors of the central government’ (Harwit and Clark 2001:384). The first 
commercial Internet Service Provider (ISP) ChinaNET, was affiliated to the Ministry 
o f Posts and Telecommunications5 and was opened to the public in January 1996. As 
Harwit and Clark comment:
The company was licensed as one of the government’s major interconnecting networks 
and acted both as a wholesale provider of Internet bandwidth as well as a brand name for 
the regional provincial telecommunications administrations to offer their own retail 
service provision. Early ChinaNET customers were to be state corporations, private 
companies, or wealthy individuals who could afford connection fees (2001: 384).
The launch of ChinaNET heralded more State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the 
telecommunication and information industry over the following years. SOEs, which
5
operate like private companies, are owned entirely by the Chinese government. More 
importantly, ISPs which are SOEs control China’s international bandwidth connection. 
As a consequence, at least in theory, any information exchange between personal 
computers in and out of China has to go through the state-controlled information hub.
At the same time, the Chinese government gave financial support and favourable 
policies6 to state-controlled tradition media as an encouragement to ‘go online’. From 
1995 to 1998, five major central media, namely the Chinese Central Television, 
Peoples Daily, Xinhua News Agency, China Radio International and China Daily all
*7
launched their websites . By April 2000, 273 Chinese newspapers, 68 radio stations, 
and 128 television stations had their websites (Wang, Y. 2001: 203-204).
Moreover, private Internet companies in China live under the double pressure of a 
state monopoly over telecommunication resources, and state control of online content 
(Jiang, Q. 17/03/2005). Private ISPs have to rent telephone lines and optic cables from 
the government-controlled China Telecom, which leaves them vulnerable to SOE’s 
manipulation of the market through a connecting fee (Jiang, Q. 01/09/2000; Wei, C. 
15/08/2005). The Information Office of the State Council also formulated regulations 
as early as in 1999 to ban the private Internet Content Providers (ICPs) from 
publicising their self-gathered news. All journalistic content on commercial Internet 
portals, according to this regulation, has to be sourced from the state-controlled 
traditional media.
China has opened itself to transnational media organisations’ capital and 
entertainment content, but closed itself to any accompanying democratising ideas in 
Journalistic practice. In 1999, the Zhonghua Network became the first NASDAQ- 
listed private Chinese Internet company, setting the trend for its peers to attract US 
capital by listing on the stock market. Up to 2005, a number of NASDAQ-listed 
Chinese Internet portals such as Sina, Sohu, Netease and the search engine Baidu all 
have gained profit. At the same time, AOL Time Warner, News Corporation, 
Microsoft, and Yahoo are allowed to enter the Chinese market. However, the 
government’s control over online content has never been relaxed and as early as 1996,
6
hundreds of overseas-based English and Chinese web sites were blocked in Mainland 
China. The Los Angeles Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, and 
CNN and the BBC, as well as ‘those sponsored by the Taiwan government and 
overseas human rights and dissident groups’ (Zhao 1998:177) have all been blocked 
from public access.
Apart from explicit administrative measures, government bodies such as the Public 
Information Networking Security Surveillance Bureau8 were created in 1998 to 
monitor online communication. According to the Independent reporter David Eimer 
(16/11/2005), around 40,000 ‘technocrats’ have been employed by the government to 
watch over Internet users’ online talk and dampen dissident opinion. China’s Internet 
filtering system, named the ‘Golden Shield’ by the government, ‘is in the front line of 
the Chinese authorities’ attempts to maintain control of an increasingly fractious 
society by preventing the spread of political dissent’ through blocking overseas 
websites (Eimer 16/11/2005).
The structural dimension of the Internet in China reflects an ambivalent attitude from 
the Chinese government. The Communist Party has been trying to explore the 
economic potential of the Internet while restraining its deliberating potential.9 Xiudian 
Dai believes that the Chinese government attempts to ‘marry the opportunities and 
dynamics of the global communications revolution with the country’s unfinished 
process of industrialisation’ (2003: 24). The Chinese government regards the arrival 
of the Internet as a new channel for economic development and supports digitalisation 
in commerce, banking, and other industries.10 In the meantime, the Internet has been 
put under tight control to prevent the spread of democratic ideas that might challenge 
the Communist Party’s ideology. In terms of online content control, the Chinese 
government actively supports state-controlled mainstream media to use the Internet as 
an extended information platform. On the other hand, the Chinese government 
discourages commercial Internet Content Providers (ICPs) from providing 
informative content other than entertainment-oriented popular culture (Jiang, Q. 
17/03/2005). Worth noticing here is a hidden assumption in the Communist Party’s 
digital media strategy: news and current affairs reports from non-official sources,
7
especially from overseas media, can challenge the Party’s governance but ‘soft’ 
content online, such as popular culture and entertainment, is not contained in the 
public sphere. Nevertheless, as Habermas says:
The institutional core of the public sphere comprises communicative networks amplified 
by a cultural complex, a press and, later, mass media; they make it possible for a public 
of art-enjoying private persons to participate in the reproduction of culture, and for a 
public of citizens of the state to participate in the social integration mediated by public 
opinion (1987:319).
Through this argument, Habermas draws attention to the cultural public sphere which 
is also ‘the environment relevant to generating legitimation’ {ibid.) The combined 
forces o f the emerging middle class, urbanisation, wide spread of knowledge, and 
popularisation of culture can provide the environment for the emergence of a critical 
public.
1.2 The Rise of the Chinese Public Online
In spite of control from the government, political communication in China 
nevertheless involves public scrutiny into its fairness, completeness, pluralism of 
views, and ideological tendencies. The Internet has played an active role in this 
process and enables users’ interaction with digital media and with their peers online at 
local and global levels. Such interaction makes it possible for little-known individuals 
and politically marginalised groups to reach out to each other and re-structure public 
affairs (Ferdinand 2000). The discursive and interactional process in online 
communication helps the ‘public’ to emerge in China.
Long before the arrival of the Internet, the communal practice of reading newspapers, 
listening to the radio, and watching television existed in Communist China (Lull 
1991). James Lull notices that Chinese audiences were not passive mass receivers of 
media content, and ‘read [...] between the lines in order to pick up the less obvious 
messages’ (1991: 216). Such interaction with media sees audiences interpret media’s 
‘symbols and semiotic structures to create their own meanings, promote their own 
understandings, and develop their own ideological coalitions’ (Lull, J. 1991: 216). 
However, these practices in the mass communication age were inconsistent, sporadic,
limited to a small number of population, and lacked channels for public opinion 
expression.
The Internet has created a new form of interaction among Chinese people and started 
to challenge the sense of political community traditionally represented by official 
meetings, neighbourhood or organisation study groups, or intellectual elite-dominated 
salons. The first bulletin board in mainland China, Dawn BBSU, was launched in May 
1994. ~ Major steps were made towards building online communities when the 
influential Tsinghua University-based Shuimu Tsinghua BBS was set up in Beijing in 
August 1995. More campus-based BBSs moderated by students have been set up ever 
since. Campus-BBSs have become the primary forum for students to air complaints 
about the rising costs of university education, official corruption, and even criticism 
of party policies. By the end of 1996, the number of bulletin boards in Mainland 
China reached 62 (Huang and Ding: 2001: 610-614). There is no updated number of 
bulletin boards in China, but one can tell with certainty that bulletin boards, along 
with other online interactive facilities such as web messenger, discussion groups, chat 
rooms, personal webpages, and blogs proliferate among more than 123 million users 
in China (CINIC Report XVII 2006). CINIC Report XVII (2006) reveals that 
interactive communication facilities enjoy great popularity among Chinese users: 
42.7% of users use web messengers, 43.2% use Internet forums, bulletin boards, 
discussion groups, and 19.9% use web-based chat rooms13.
Even since the early days of Internet development in China, online interaction has 
encouraged users to talk over issues of common concerns at a global level. The 
CINIC Report XI (2003) found that 53.1% of Chinese users identified their primary 
reason for accessing the Internet as ‘to get information’ and ‘keep informed’. 
Overseas Chinese language sites account for 7.0 % of all information obtained by 
Chinese users from the Internet, and overseas English language sites account for 5.6% 
(CINIC Report XIV 2005). On bulletin boards, overseas postings first appeared on 
campus-based BBSs and became an important alternative information source. 
However, this interaction among Chinese people across national boundaries also led 
to administrative intervention from authorities. In 2001, postings about the ‘1989 
Tiananmen Square massacre’ from overseas alumni appeared on the Baiyunhuanghe 
BBS based in the Huazhong University of Science and Technology. This campus-
based bulletin board was shut down by the local government and was later taken 
under control by the university in September.14 Nevertheless, since every individual 
who can read postings and reply in a discussion group ‘is also potentially a publisher’ 
(Rheingold 1993)15, the dispersed information sources online make censorship much 
more difficult to perform. Postings such as news from overseas Chinese media (e.g. 
the United Morning News in Singapore), overseas users’ translation of news stories 
from foreign language media, and original eye-witness reports from diasporic Chinese 
can still circumvent the surveillance and appear on major China-based bulletin boards, 
including the official QGLT.
Because o f its autonomous and grassroots nature, the Internet has the essential quality 
of allowing the general public to decide how and which issues are structured in the 
public sphere. This character of online communication has a revolutionary effect on 
public life in China. Traditional media forms in China are responsible for moulding 
public opinion by setting official agendas and promulgating the Communist Party’s 
instructions. As a consequence, traditional Chinese media are mainly representations 
of the dominant ideology from ‘above’. The Internet media, on the contrary, opens 
alternative channels for ordinary people to voice their political concerns and interests, 
which involves public contribution to the plurality of viewpoints in political 
communication. Topical discussion on bulletin boards covers a range of ‘hard’ issues 
such as current political affairs, international relations, environmental protection, 
education, or unemployment. However, it would be simplistic to assume the ‘soft’ 
topical discussion which looks ‘nonpolitical’ is always ‘apolitical’. For example, 
homosexual relationships were regarded as a ‘psychological disease’ before 2001 or 
labelled as anti-social behaviour in China and sexual minorities’ rights are not 
officially protected. In this sense, online discussion about gay rights usually appears 
on bulletin boards themed as ‘Romance’ or ‘Relationship’ is revolutionary in putting 
this ‘taboo’ issue on public agenda. Another example is public discussion on bulletin 
boards themed as ‘Car Fans’ or ‘Property Owners’. Evidence shows that consumer 
organisations actively use bulletin boards to unite their members online and defend 
consumers’ rights against big corporations. Some online communities such as Jie Ban 
(Volkswagen Jetta owners’ bulletin board) accommodate public dialogue on drunken 
driving, road safety awareness, and air pollution.16
10
Online discourse on the Internet is not necessarily always subversive. However, the 
Internet can broaden the scope of public agenda, mobilise the politically marginalised 
or suppressed social groups, and provide a space to unify them into critical publics, 
thus constructing a paralleled dimension in the public sphere offline. In this sense, the 
Internet is intrinsically a radical media form that changes political culture in China.
2. Significance of This Study
This thesis aims to examine the role of Internet bulletin boards in constructing 
alternative public discourses and fostering rational critical public debate in China. 
This project intends to explore a currently under-researched topic addressing the 
possibility of deliberative democracy being realised in cyberspace. Lincoln Dahlberg 
suggests that:
A more rigorous analysis of the intersection between the Internet and deliberative 
democracy would not only be sociological fruitful ... [but also] offers a powerful vision of 
democracy that is in step with the needs of contemporary pluralist society: the 
deliberative model recognises difference between individuals and the importance of 
rational deliberation to build strong citizens (2001c: 157; 170).
This research, based on the empirical study of political discussion on Chinese bulletin 
boards, aims to contribute to the ongoing scholarly debate on online deliberative 
democracy, and also explore deliberative forms in the democratising process in China.
Debates on electronic democracy can be roughly divided into four camps: the liberal 
individualism; communitarianism; post-modernism; and deliberative democracy. The 
concept of liberal individualism, promoted by Alvin Toffler (1981), Christa Daryl 
Slaton (1992), Mitchell Kapor (1993), and others, celebrates the digital frontier as 
assisting the expression of individualised interest (Dahlberg 2001a: 616). Cyberspace 
is regarded as increasing direct democracy and facilitating emerging free-willed 
online citizens exempted from the authoritarian domination in the offline world. This 
view, however, overlooks the fact that the Internet has been increasingly integrated 
into governmental policy-making and employed for military, educational, public, and 
commercial use (Loader, B. D. 1997: 6). Communitarianism (see Rheingold 1993;
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Doheny-Farina 1996; Wilbur, S. P. 1997; Healy, D. 1997; Smith and Kollock 1999) 
emphasises the communitarian ethos of cyberspace in uniting people together. 
Nonetheless, this view runs the risk of enhancing the Internet’s role as an 
undifferentiated communal spirit, and thus fails to heed the ‘multiple differences 
between subjects within pluralist societies’ (Dahlberg 2001a: 616). The post­
modernist approach (Lyotard, J-F. 1984; Harvey, D. 1989; Poster 1995, 1996, 2001 
[1995]) links post-modern culture with the socio-political changes caused by the 
decentralised communication facilitated by digital media. Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard 
(1984) defines the postmodern age as ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’ by which he 
implies that individuals are unable to understand their current circumstances. Whilst 
all social groups have a right to speak their authentic and legitimate voices (Harvey 
1989:48) in a many-to-many fashion, the post-modernist narratives ‘ha[ve] ... more 
in common with [...] sound-bite politics which epitomise [...] the commodification of 
political discourse rather than informed political dialogue’ (Loader, B. D. 1997:9). 
Contrary to the three theoretical frameworks detailed above, the deliberative 
democratic approach tends to view cyberspace not only as an extension of the 
Habermasian public sphere, but also as a discursive space in which individuals arrive 
at ‘informed’ decisions about public concerns through democratic interaction.
Compared to the above three approaches, the merit of the deliberative democratic 
approach (Buchstein 1997; Coleman, S. 1999, 2004; Femback 1997; Hauben and 
Hauben 1997; Kellner 1995, 1998, 1999) in studying political discussion on bulletin 
boards lies in the following aspects. Firstly, the deliberative democractic approach 
emphasises the reflexivity and rationality in online dialogue among its participants. 
Participants of open and free online dialogue put forward their own arguments, ‘lay 
aside particular interests and opinion’, and debate common problems of public 
concerns until they are swayed by reasons ‘in deference to overall fairness and the 
common interest of the collectivity’ (Miller 1992:56). Participants of deliberative 
dialogue ‘attempt to come to an understanding of their interlocutors and to reflexively 
modify their prediscursive positions in response to better arguments’ (Dahlberg 2001c: 
167). Secondly the outcomes of deliberative dialogue, the informed choices, are not 
exclusive to the differences among its participants. The source of both liberal 
individualism and communitarianism are rooted in notions of a self-determining 
subject (Habermas 1996: 103) while deliberative democracy relies upon
intersubjectivity (Dahlberg 2001c: 168). In the deliberation process, legitimate 
(rational) decisions are reached through a process by which each individual’s will is 
formed as opposed to pre-given collective wills being expressed (Manin 1987: 351-2). 
Thirdly, the deliberative democratic approach does not view cyberspace as a 
disjuncture of the offline world, and does not negate the discursive space generated 
from the existing offline world. Hubertus Buchstein says, ‘the use of the Internet has 
to be carefully situated within the context of already existing democratic institutions’ 
(1997: 260). The Internet is regarded as a facilitating medium for both online and 
offline discursive interaction, through which individuals coalesce into publics. For 
these reasons, a deliberative democratic approach is employed as the theoretical 
framework for this study on text-based public discussion online and its socio-political 
influence in China.
Several factors help to explain the lack of research on electronic deliberation through 
online public discussion in China. Firstly, the structural dimension of Internet media 
in China still seems hostile towards democratic public discourse. Dahlgren comments 
that ‘a society where democratic tendencies are weak is not going to give rise to 
healthy institutional structures for the public sphere’ (2005:149). The infamous online 
speech control, surveillance and censorship from the Chinese government (see for 
example, Kalathil, S. and Boas, T. 2003; Wacker, G 2003; Zittrain and Edelman 
2003a; 2003b) block researchers’ insight into the digital resistance from Chinese users. 
Secondly, the anonymity and volatility associated with online political communities 
makes the study of the critical public’s composition very difficult. Jean-Luc Nancy 
dismisses the significance of online participants as ‘multiple, dispersed, mortally 
fragmented existences’ (1991: xi) and the ease of joining and withdrawing online 
political engagement also makes it difficult ‘to estimate what portion of the citizenry 
is actually involved’ (Dahlgren 2004: xiii). Thirdly, online public opinion is not 
always democratic in its nature and is hard to evaluate in terms of its influence on 
official agendas and policy-making. Scholars also lament that online democratic 
deliberation is overshadowed by consumerism, entertainment, non-political 
networking, and apolitical chatting (Ferdinand 2000; Dahlgren 2005). In China’s case, 
the extreme nationalism demonstrated on some bulletin boards (Hughes 2002; Rosen 
2003) tend to eclipse the rational and deliberative potential in online public opinion.
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An ethnographic approach is employed in this research in studying the media 
organisation (QGLT), users (a combined role of traditional producers and audiences), 
and online content (postings). This approach is central in providing an insider’s 
perspective and understanding of the gate-keeping process, the identity-construction 
of users, and the textual component of online political discourse. As Teun A. van Dijk 
says:
All features of discourse [...] are systematically related to the many features of the socio­
cultural context. This means that we also need detailed ethnographic observations about 
the production ad (sic) uses (participation) of communicative events in the media, both 
for communicative events [...] ‘in’ the media, as well as those ‘by’ the media, i.e. with 
media users als (sic) participants (van Dijk, T. A. 1985: 7).
My ethnographic work involved being a registered user since 2003 and also consisted 
of a more than two month ‘internship’ with QGLT in 2004. The empirical experience 
of being a user and a moderator helped me to grasp the culture, lexis and norms 
concerning political discussion within this online community and also helped me to 
build a rapport with other users and moderators. By utilising these connections, I 
conducted participant observation of the gate-keeping process, semi-structured in- 
depth interviews with both moderators and users, and textual analysis of postings. 
Through such research, this thesis endeavours to address the deficit in empirical 
studies concerning electronic deliberation on bulletin boards.
This ethnography-oriented qualitative research approach aims to reveal QGLT 
participants’ online practice of constructing, interpreting, contesting, and changing 
their understanding of political identity. At the same time, it also intends to examine 
how public interest and sense of social reality are represented online through 
deliberative dialogue. The exchange of political viewpoint in online discussion is in a 
sense a signifying practice and needs to be linked with ‘a much wider series of 
questions concerning the overall ideological, cultural and political significance of 
media institutions in relations to the social formation as a whole’ (Connell and Miles 
1985: 36). Thus, it needs to be examined not only from a linguistic perspective but 
also an approach that emphasises the social contexts within which texts are 
constructed and used (Fairclough 2003). Based on this belief, this research 
emphasises the social contexts within which texts of online public discourses are used.
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Online public discussion brings together diverse actors to communicate in a virtual 
space, and is often of a transnational character. Textual analysis of online postings 
reveals that although online public opinion can be formed outside of dominant 
political institutions in China, online discussion still largely evolves around policy­
making political actors in the offline world17. As a result, the deficit in electronic 
deliberation is eventually pre-determined by the existing offline ‘democratic deficit’ 
(Schlesinger 1999:264).
3. Structure of the Chapters
Chapter 2 examines a range of conceptual developments of the public sphere and 
focuses on the democratising role of media, especially the Internet’s role in expanding 
the alternative public sphere. This chapter argues that the Internet plays a central role 
in political deliberation in contemporary Chinese society through enhancing 
participation, enlarging the scope of political discussion, and fostering rational critical 
public opinion.
Chapter 3 explores the historic development of the public sphere in China. By 
analysing the contextual factors affecting the role of media in political communication, 
this chapter argues that the ‘alternative public sphere’ and ‘the oppositional public 
sphere’ are expanding as a response to the public call for civil participation in 
contemporary China since media reform in 1978.
The 4th chapter maps out the research methods employed for this PhD project. I adopt 
multiple qualitative research methods which involves analysing gate-keeping, 
production, representation and reception. To be specific, my research methods include 
a two-month participant observation with QGLT as an intern moderator; in-depth 
interviews; and textual and discourse analysis of QGLT users’ online identity and 
postings during the SARS crisis in 2003.
Chapter 5, 6 and 7 respectively examine the production-content-reception in the 
online political communication environment. Chapter 5 looks into the gate-keeping 
process within QGLT - how online political discussion is moderated, filtered, and
censored. This chapter argues that digital technologies are not free from 
administrative surveillance in China and censorship muzzles criticism and dissident 
opinions online, which limits the deliberating role of the Internet. Chapter 6 explores 
the community nature of QGLT and investigates its potential to cultivate a critical 
public in China. This chapter reveals that a strong sense of political participation, 
which has been suppressed in offline life, connects individuals on QGLT bulletin 
boards. At the same time, along with political clusters formed online, QGLT users’ 
online behaviours support the argument that online identities should be examined in 
offline social-political contexts. Through a case study of QGLT postings during the 
SARS crisis, Chapter 7 demonstrates that bulletin boards can create an alternative 
means for users to resist, negotiate, rectify or reinforce the official interpretation of 
the SARS crisis. However, rationality in online discussion can also be weak and lead 
to the spread of rumours, extreme nationalism, and public panics.
Chapter 8 investigates the global nature o f the virtual public sphere in Greater China18. 
This chapter also discusses how Internet bulletin boards bring the global Chinese 
diaspora together to share information, discuss political issues, and coordinate actions. 
Global participation in Chinese-related public debate can contribute to solving 
problems such as environmental protection or human rights abuses at an international 
level.
In the concluding chapter, this study argues that the public sphere can be constructed 
in cyberspace in non-democratic societies. In spite of the limitations of perpetuating 
inequalities o f access, fragmenting public discourses, and accommodating 
conservative rhetorics, the Internet can enlarge the scale of civic participation, 
advance alternative and oppositional public discourses, tackle problems at a global 
level, and construct an alternative public sphere. This alternative public sphere online 
has the potential to free civil society from state control, and cultivate critical public 
opinion as a check on the authoritarian government’s policy-making. In this sense, 
online deliberative forums may play a more important role in extending the public 
sphere in non-liberal societies than their counterparts in democratic systems.
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review: the Public Sphere in the Digital Age
The concept of the public sphere has triggered discussion and debate among scholars 
worldwide since The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere was translated 
into English in 1989. Should the public sphere be understood as a fact or as a political 
ideal never quite realised? Does the public sphere only exist in liberal democratic 
society or does it exist in different forms under different social realities? Does the 
public sphere exist today in mediated forms or did it exist in the past on the basis of 
face-to-face communication only? Is the public sphere singular and comprehensive or 
is it multiple and complex? Will media consolidate or undermine the public sphere? 
Debates over these questions became more divisive when the Internet started to play 
an important role in public communication.
This chapter looks at a range of conceptual developments o f the public sphere with a 
focus on the democratising role of media in general, and the Internet more specifically, 
in consolidating and extending the public sphere in cyberspace. Though Jurgen 
Habermas blames commodified mass media for the decline of the public sphere 
(1989), media in fact have functioned as a social institution in connecting people, 
enhancing participation, enlarging the scope of political discussion, and fostering 
rational critical debate (Gamham, N. 1992, 2000; Hartley, J. 1992; Sparks, C. 1998, 
Curran, J. 2002). The deliberating role of media has become more effectual with the 
arrival o f computer mediated communications (CMC). CMC has the potential to 
provide ordinary citizens, especially traditionally marginalised and deprived social 
groups, with a more comprehensive access to proactive political engagement at a 
global level. By comparing the conceptual criteria of the ideal public sphere with the 
civic activities on Internet bulletin boards, this chapter concludes by holding up the 
argument that the Internet is playing a central role in political deliberation in 
contemporary society.
1. The Habermasian Public Sphere and Its Development
This section outlines the conceptual development of the public sphere proposed by
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Jurgen Habermas (1989). The Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere has 
triggered scholarly debate on the relationship between state and civil society in 
various socio-political contexts ever since its English translation was published. The 
public sphere, as Habermas proposes, appeared in late eighteenth century Europe and 
referred to a homogeneous public space which was ‘casting itself loose as a forum in 
which the private people, come together to form a public, readied themselves to 
compel public authority to legitimate itself before public opinion’ (Habermas 1989: 
25-26). The public sphere, as Habermas depicts, is the locale in bourgeois societies in 
which common actions from citizens were ‘coordinated through speech and 
persuasion’ (Benhabib 1992: 78).
However, the public sphere depicted by Habermas neglects some other forms of 
public discourse and activities which were not included in or even opposed to that of 
the dominant bourgeois sociability. This negligence leaves much room for other 
theorists to develop the public sphere concept in explaining the emancipatory nature 
of non-bourgeois socio-political activities, resistance, or movements. Among these 
theorists are Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge (1993) who argue for the ‘proletariat 
public sphere’ that demonstrates an ‘experience specific to workers’ (1993:28); Nancy 
Fraser (1987), Joan Landes (1988), and Mary Ryan (1990, 1992) explore the 
possibility of a feminist public sphere; Geoff Eley (1992), Fraser (1992), and John B. 
Thompson (1993) contest the existence of multiple public arenas and competing 
publics; and Karol Jakubowicz (1991), Ole Norgaard (2001) and others (Chatteijee 
2001, Metzger 2001, Lee H. 2001) examine social emancipation and democratic 
enlightenment in non-liberal societies. These critics argue that even in the absence of 
formal incorporation into political participation, suppressed social groups still work 
out their own political identities and had their interests represented. The public sphere 
in reality is constituted of exclusion, a multiplicity of public arenas, contesting 
meaning and competing publics (Eley 1992; Fraser 1992; Thompson 1995; Keane 
2000).
1.1 The Ideal Bourgeois Public Sphere
The Habermasian public sphere deals with a specific moment of history (eighteenth 
century) in the rising bourgeois society in Europe. The public sphere is a realm where
citizens can exchange views over important issues of the common good, foster 
rational critical debate and form public opinion. As a part of the civil society, the 
public sphere evolved from the ‘intimate sphere of the conjugal family’ (Habermas 
1989: 29) to the tension-charged field between state and society. The ideal public 
sphere is characterised by equality in public discussion, autonomous public 
participation, and rational critical public debate. The physical existence of the public 
sphere was independent from church and state, and embodied in places such as coffee 
houses where public discussion over literature criticism later extended to include 
economic and political disputes.
Equality by which ‘nobility met with the “intellectuals” on an equal footing’ 
(Habermas 1989:33) is a key feature of the bourgeois public sphere. That is, in 
principle, class differentiation became less significant in the public sphere. The coffee 
houses ‘embraced the wider strata o f the middle class, including craftsman and 
shopkeepers’ (1989: 33), which helped to transform the relationship between the 
aristocracy and the newly emerging bourgeoisie. As such, the public sphere was not a 
space for meritocracy and competition among political elites. Rather, it was regarded 
as the ‘creation of procedures whereby those affected by general social norms and 
collective political decisions can have a say in their formulation, stipulation, and 
adoption’ (Benhabib 1992: 87).
To get access to the public sphere however, autonomous individuals needed to be 
‘propertied and educated’ (Habermas 1989: 37). Those who ‘did not have at their 
disposal the buying power needed for even the most modest participation in the 
market of cultural goods’ (Habermas 1989: 38) were thus excluded. These two criteria 
were developed by deliberative democracy theorist Rawls (1993) as the two 
dimensions in substantive equality -  namely the equality of resources and the equality 
of capacity. The former implies that the individuals have to own ‘a minimum 
threshold of primary goods’ as a basis for ‘the means of freedom’ (Rawls 1993:183). 
The latter implies that citizens ‘do have, at least to the essential minimum degree, the 
moral, intellectual, and physical capacities that enable them to be fully cooperating 
members of society over a complete life’ (Rawls 1993:183). Other relevant political 
capacities include the capacity to formulate authentic preferences, the effective use of 
cultural resources, and some basic cognitive abilities and skills (Knight and Johnson
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1997: 298-9).
Autonomous public participation is the basis for political reasoning in the public 
sphere and is central to the conception of modernity (Benhabib 1992: 85). Coming out 
of the liberal tradition, the Habermasian discursive model has the merit of openness 
and indeterminancy, which neither restricts individuals’ access to public space nor sets 
the agenda for public debate (Benhabib 1992). Theoretically, the public sphere is open 
to all citizens in an un-coerced and non-manipulated fashion. To achieve this goal, 
‘the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and 
publish their opinion’ is needed as a normative framework (Habermas 1996: 369). 
Habermas vigorously defends the legal protection of basic human rights as the 
legitimacy from which political orders draw their recognition (2001: 113). Habermas 
particularly criticises the authoritarian model of development in East Asian countries 
(such as China and Singapore) ‘according to which the freedom of the individual is 
subordinated to the “good of the community”’ (2001:125). He argues that basic 
human rights such as freedom of speech, association, religious practices and so forth 
‘institutionalise the communicative conditions for a reasonable political will- 
formation ... [and] make the exercise of popular sovereignty possible’ (2001: 117). 
Therefore, constitutional and legal frameworks of human rights protection are needed 
to prevent the public sphere and civil society from deformation.
The autonomous role of ordinary citizens in liberal politics according to Habermas 
(1989), is mainly determined by their negative rights with reference to the state and 
other citizens. With the growth of the press, public meetings, and political 
associations, an antagonistic public arose as a political force against the state in 
Britain at the turn of the nineteenth century. This antagonistic public resulted from 
organised public involvement in critical debate of political issues, and broke the 
‘exclusiveness of Parliament and evolved into the official discussion partner of the 
delegate’ (Habermas 1989: 66).
The ongoing public discourse in the public sphere addresses issues of common 
concerns among citizens. Because of the autonomous nature of participants in the 
public sphere in liberal societies, topical orientations of the public discussion and 
debate can reach some areas that used to be limited to the monopolistic interpretation
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from the church and the state authorities. In such manner, the public sphere performs 
its role as a regulating factor of the civil society (Habermas 1989:52). The relation 
between the ideal public sphere and the state is that the public sphere mediates 
between the society and the state through critical public opinion formation:
With the rise of a sphere of the social, over whose regulation public opinion battled with 
public power, the theme of the modem [...] public sphere shifted from the properly 
political tasks of a citizenry acting in common [...] to the more properly civic tasks of a 
society engaged in critical public debate [...] (Habermas 1989: 52).
The deliberative model of the public sphere implies that public good will be achieved 
through rational critical debate rather than simple aggregation of private interest. 
Deliberative politics acknowledges the conflicts and difference in individuals’ social 
choices, and believes negotiation and bargaining can be involved in searching for a 
collective interest. The discursive model o f the Habermasian public sphere originates 
from the Kantian tradition of freedom of speech and universal human rights. Freedom 
and human rights guarantee that ‘each individual requires to be convinced by reason 
that the coercion which prevails is lawful’ (Kant 1991:85). Habermas’ model of 
rational critical public debate captures the essence of the ‘dynamic and renegotiable 
aspects o f such distinctions as that between the right and the good’ (Benhabib 1992: 
84-5).
Because of its intrinsic nature of being open to all citizens, the bourgeois public 
sphere consists of different ideologies based on autonomous individuals from 
different social strata. As Habermas contends, ‘class interest was the basis of public 
opinion’ (Habermas 1989:73), and the public sphere is consequently in need of a 
negotiating mechanism which can resolve the collision of interests from various social 
groups. A public discourse of argumentation and persuasion, in which participants are 
expected to communicate reasons with each other, can be a means to reach collective 
choices. The set of fundamental ideals in public reasoning such as reciprocity, 
publicity and accountability can also be found in the works of Gutmann and 
Thompson (1996) and Rawls (1997). Public reasoning among equal citizens, as is 
believed to start with freedom of expression, implies a respect for ‘reasonable 
pluralism’ and the equal deliberative standing of those with whom one disagree 
(Cohen 1996:105). Joshua Cohen (1997) points out that public reasoning should be 
harnessed under deliberative and legitimate norms in democracy, which implies that
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participants ‘recognize one another as having deliberative capacities, i.e., the 
capacities required for entering into a public exchange of reason and for acting on the 
result of such public reasoning’ (1997:73). Otherwise, public reasoning would be an 
unguided ship on the rough sea of conflicting currents.
1.2 The Plebeian and the Proletariat Public Sphere
Habermas’s The Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere fails to account for 
the ‘plebeian public sphere’, an element that constitutes a contrast to the bourgeois 
elite public sphere on which Habermas focuses all of his attention. The plebeian 
public sphere, according to Habermas (1989), briefly appeared during the French 
Revolution and was subsequently suppressed. In his later reflection, Habermas (1992) 
cited Lottes in addressing the emancipatory nature of the plebeian public sphere:
The emergence of the plebeian public sphere thus marks a specific phase in the historical 
development of the life relations of the petite bourgeoisie and the strata below it. It is, on 
the one hand, a variant of the bourgeois public sphere, for it takes it as a model. On the 
other hand it is more than a mere variant, since it develops the bourgeois public sphere’s 
emancipatory potential in a new social context. The plebeian public sphere is, in a 
manner of speaking, a bourgeois public sphere whose social preconditions have been 
rendered null (1992:426 citing Gunter Lottes).
Geoff Eley (1992) highlights the radical nature of the plebeian public sphere by 
arguing that people from lower social strata fought for the ‘same emancipatory 
language’ during the French Revolution as the bourgeois class. ‘The liberal 
desideratum of reasoned exchange also became available for nonbourgeois, subaltern 
groups, whether the radical intelligentsia of Jacobinism and its successors or wide 
sections of social classes like the peasantry or the working class’ (Eley 1992:304). 
Contrary to Habermas’ belief that the plebeian public sphere could be easily 
suppressed, Eley points out that the liberal public sphere was faced at the very 
moment o f a ‘radical’ plebeian public sphere which was ‘combative and highly 
literate’ (Eley 1992:305).
Oscar Negt and Alexander Kluge (1993) employ public sphere theory in explaining 
the practice of proletariat movements. They emphasise the role of media (especially
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the electronic media at a global level) in grasping the raw material of working class 
people’s experience (Hansen 1993:xii). Negt and Kluge argue that the ‘proletariat 
public sphere’ crystallises the unique experience of the working class, and 
distinguishes itself from the bourgeois public sphere. Stemming from classic Marxist 
theory, they believe that bourgeoisies ‘force’ society into a unity based on its value of 
commodity exchange and private property (Hansen 1993: xlvii). The working class 
expresses its own politically proletarian interests in its own forms of public sphere 
through ‘the autonomous, collective organisation of the experience specific to 
workers’ (Negt and Kluge 1993:28). The reconciliation between the bourgeois and the 
proletariat public sphere is impossible as:
The proletariat public sphere negates the bourgeois one because it dissolves, partially 
destroys, and partially assimilates the latter’s elements. In serving its opposing interests, 
the bourgeois public sphere does the same to every form of the proletarian, which is not 
supported by the powers opposing it and thus cannot protect itself from attack (Negt and 
Kluge 1993:35).
There have been theorists who view the Marxist tradition as not being compatible 
with the ideal of civil society because Karl Marx views individuals as isolated and 
aggressive due to the demise of feudal societies (Femia 2001). Marx views the 
relations of individuals in feudal society as connected to the state through various 
forms:
The elements of civil life, for example, property, or the family, or the mode of labour, 
were raised to the level of elements of political life in the form of seigniory, estates, and 
corporations. In this form, they determined the relation of the individual to the state as a 
whole - i.e., his political relation, that is, his relation of separation and exclusion from the 
other components of society (1844:19).
The bourgeois emancipation brought about the dissolution of the old feudal regime. It 
also released egoism among individuals and caused human alienation ‘from his 
community, from himself and from other men’ (Marx 1844:10). However, what Femia 
neglects is Marx’s strong argument of human beings’ emancipation through which 
men can ‘re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen’ and ‘recognised and organised his 
social-powers’ (Marx 1844: 21). Such emancipation is not incompatible with the ideal 
of civil society.
Another criticism of Marxism’s inability to co-exist with the ideal of the public sphere
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came from Andre Corz. Gorz argues that a Marxist controlled economy requires 
growth of the state apparatus which ‘gives society precedence over the individual and 
assumes their common subordination to the state’ (Gorz 1982: 77). In this 
understanding, individuals are viewed as inapt to form an antagonistic public against 
the state. However, Ernest Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s (1985) exploration o f ‘radical 
and plural democracy’ proves that ‘new antagonisms’ are expressions for alternative 
resistance towards hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe develop the Gramscian notion of 
‘counterhegemony’ and suggest that civic activities have broad political relevance 
through institutions and practices that exist as an alternative to a hegemonic bloc in 
society. Instead of being a direct attack on, or engagement with, the dominant political 
discourse, ‘new antagonisms’ ‘manifest themselves through a proliferation of 
particularism and crystalise into a demand for autonomy itself (1985:164). The 
dominant public discourses are indirectly challenged through the alternative civic 
discourses that valorise ‘differences’ and create new identities.
Pluralism is radical only to the extent that each term of this plurality of identities finds 
within itself the principle of its own validity, without this having to be sought in a 
transcendent or underlying positive ground for the hierarchy of meaning of them all and 
the source and guarantee of their legitimacy. And this radical pluralism is democratic to 
the extent that the autoconstitutivity of each one of its terms is the result of 
displacements of the egalitarian imaginary (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 167).
Therefore, the radical and plural democracy implies the struggle ‘for a maximum 
autonomisation of spheres’ on a basis of ‘equivalential-egalitarian logic’ (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985: 167). Such an argument enriches the complexity of the public sphere 
debate and emphasises the autonomous nature of the alternative resistance to the 
commodification, bureaucratisation and increasing homogenisation of social life in 
the post-war era.
1.3 The Gender-Specified Public Sphere
Scholars point out that one significant problem in Habermas’ account of the public 
sphere is its masculine character (Fraser 1987; Landes 1988; 1998; Eley 1992). 
Though theoretically the public sphere is open to all, in practice it is predominantly 
restricted to men (with the consequent exclusion of women). Habermas overlooks the
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association of women’s discourse and interests with ‘particularity’ (which is usually 
labelled as ‘private’ and treated as inappropriate subjects for public debate), and the 
alignment of masculine speech with truth, objectivity, rationality, and reason’. Thus 
the Habermasian public sphere ‘rule[s] out all interests that would not or could not lay 
claim to their own universality’ (Landes, J. 1998: 142-3).
Habermas is not unaware of the exclusion of women from nineteenth-century politics. 
The lack of depiction of gender differentiation in his narrative was because women 
were largely suppressed in their social political life (Eley 1992). The concept of the 
public sphere, articulated in the political discourse, is not free from the male- 
dominance of the private sphere. When women were still subject to male authority in 
the private sphere, their equal status in participating in politics in the public sphere 
would be fictional, as Habermas argues:
The independence of the property owner in the market and in his own business was 
complemented by the dependence of the wife and children on the male head of the 
family; private autonomy in the former realm was transformed into authority in the latter 
and made any pretended freedom of individuals illusory (Habermas 1989: 47).
Thus the bourgeois public sphere was ‘essentially, not just contingently, masculinist’ 
(Landes 1988:7). Women’s suppression in public life, as Landes (1988) argues, was 
the ‘new symbolic order’ of the eighteenth century French Republic which legitimised 
the domestication of women. The Republican ideology of motherhood, which tied 
women’s service to the polity to their maternal duty, meant that ‘the most likely 
consequence was to offer women political representation in a mediated fashion’ 
(1988:138). The ethos o f the Republican public sphere in 1780s to 1790s France was 
constructed in opposition to that of a more woman-friendly feudal salon culture. 
Contrary to the ‘artificial,’ ‘effeminate,’ and ‘aristocratic’ salon culture, the 
Republican promoted a ‘rational’, ‘virtuous,’ and ‘manly’ style of public speech and 
behaviour. Masculine speech or the language of reason are believed to be opposite to 
femininity in the rhetoric ‘if by the latter we mean [...] pleasure, play, eroticism, 
artifice, style, politesse, refined facades, and particularity’ (Landes 1988: 46). 
Consequently, the gender-specified Republican public sphere ‘was constructed against 
women, not just without them’ (ibid'All). The exclusion of women from the 
bourgeois public sphere ‘was given conceptual form by the Enlightenment and
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institutional realisation by the French Revolution’ (Baker 1992:199).
Gendered exclusion in eighteenth century political life in France, England and 
Germany, as Geoff Eley (1992: 308-18) argues, was linked to other exclusions 
originating in class formation. Therefore, ‘simply invoking traditional patriarchal 
structures to explain the exclusion of women from politics is perhaps too easy’ (Eley 
1992:311). Drawing on Davidofif and Hall’s work Family Fortunes: Men and Women 
o f  the English Middle Class, 1780-J850, Eley argues that when middle-class men 
fought against the privilege of the aristocrats from the 1790s to the 1840s England, 
they sought to translate their economic weight into politics via ‘associational 
trajectory’ relating to other classes. However, their activities ‘strictly demarcated the 
roles o f men and women via a mobile repertoire of ideologies and practices, which 
consistently assigned women to a non-political private sphere’ (Eley 1992: 312) and 
to playing a supportive role to their men. This separation between the public and the 
private spheres, ‘between the masculine realm of public activity and the feminine 
realm of the home’, was replicated in the situation of the working class movement 
such as the Chartism in Britain (Eley 1992:313). The Peoples Charter, as a successful 
outcome from the movement, guaranteed full suffrage for men over 21 but did not 
include women.
The exclusion of women administratively from the public sphere also spurred the 
development of a feminist consciousness. Drawing on the findings of the women’s 
movement in the 1970s and 1980s, Seyla Benhabib believes that the traditional modes 
of drawing distinction between the public and the private have been part of a 
‘discourse of domination that legitimises women’s oppression and exploitation in the 
private realm’ (1992:93). The reproductions in the private realm more often result in a 
‘patriarchal-capitalist-disciplinary bureaucracy’ (Benhabib 1992:98) which 
disempowers women in terms of participating in public debate.
Before the second wave of the feminist movement which started in the 1960s, 
women’s access to the public sphere was denied in almost every aspect of the 
bourgeois civil society, for example, paid work, state administration, and citizenship 
(Fraser, N. 1987: 45). This gendered inequality in socio-political life can be regarded
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as rooted in the private sphere, in the domain of familial relations which is 
characterised by ‘sexual inequality, unremunerated work, and seething discontent’ 
(Landes, J. B. 1998: 1). Women’s virtue in a socio-cultural sense has long been 
associated with being submissive to their men, taking on unpaid household work, and 
childrearing instead of addressing their own interests and desires. This institutional 
inferiority of women in bourgeois societies allows ‘the social and political 
construction of masculinity’ (Eley 1992: 309) as the dominant power in both the 
private and public spheres. As long as social inequality persists, ‘deliberative 
processes in public spheres will tend to operate to the advantage of dominant groups 
and to the disadvantage of subordinates’ (Fraser 1992:122-3). In this sense, even if 
women are officially admitted into the public sphere, they are still not guaranteed 
equality in expressing their own interest through deliberation.
Women’s disadvantaged role in socio-political life will be aggravated in a singular 
comprehensive public sphere and alleviated in a heterogeneous public sphere (Fraser 
1992: 122-3). In the singular comprehensive public sphere, socially oppressed groups 
have no venue for deliberation among themselves (Fraser 1992: 123). Public 
discourse in the public sphere, if there were any, is under the supervision of the 
dominant social group. Under such circumstances, public speech can be more easily 
distorted systematically by social repression and ‘it is not likely that open debate in 
the public sphere would eliminate that distortion’ (Poster, M. 1995: 103). In such a 
case, social repression might even be reinforced in communicative process. Since the 
mid-twentieth century, feminist movement advocates have stood side by side with 
other social agents on the political stage, for example, students, racial and ethnic 
minorities, gay rights advocates, and environmentalists. The existence of these 
multiple counter-publics striving towards emancipation of various socially oppressed 
groups can help to expand the feminist discursive space and change the disadvantaged 
position of women in political life.
1.4 Competing Publics
By focusing his attention on the elite-dominated bourgeois public sphere, Habermas 
neglects some other forms of the public discourse and activities which were not
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included in or even opposed to bourgeois sociability from seventeenth to nineteenth 
century Europe. The bourgeois public sphere was never ‘defined solely by the 
struggle against absolutism and traditional authority’ (Eley 1992: 306) and was 
always constituted by conflicts and contesting meanings. The public sphere in reality 
never appears in ‘isolation’ (Keane 2000:7), and consists of multiplicity of public 
arenas and competing publics (Eley 1992; Fraser 1992; Thompson 1993; Keane 2002).
‘A plurality of competing publics’ (Fraser 1992:125) implies a multiplicity of publics 
whose identities are slighted and whose interests are under-represented in the official 
structured settings. Those publics from a disadvantaged social status, however, can 
have their identities constructed and voices heard in alternative venues through the 
‘subaltern counterpublics’. The subaltern counterpublics ‘are parallel discursive 
arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate 
counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, 
and needs’ (Fraser 1992: 123). Such ‘subaltern counterpublics’ have been present in 
the every stage of the history of the public sphere.
In nineteenth century North America, women were excluded from formal political 
incorporation through suffrage and were still denied access to political life. However, 
as Mary Ryan (1992) shows, women ‘worked out their own political identities, 
opened up the public to a vast new constituency, and enlarged the range of issues that 
weighted into the “general interest’” (1992:283). The notion of a multi-tiered, 
interconnected public sphere is particularly central to understand the contemporary 
politics. In a contemporary context, the competing publics can be found in ‘new social 
movements oriented to peace, ecology, feminism, and social justice’. Their struggle 
towards constructing ‘subaltern counterpublics’ has often been ‘sought or been forced 
into confrontation rather than accommodation with the capitalist state’ (Dryzek 
2000:23). The wider public domain consists of the contesting subordinated groups in 
contemporary society, which may involve women, workers, farmers, peoples of ethnic 
minorities, environmentalists, gay rights activists, and even non-progressive forces 
such as ‘fundamentalist religious movements, nationalists, or anti-abortion groups’ 
(Dryzek 2000:23).
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Iris Young (1999) argues for difference as a necessary resource for democratic 
communication. By ‘difference’, Young implies that ‘social groups do not themselves 
have substantive, unified identities, but rather are constituted through differentiated 
relations’ (390). It is the differentiated structural relations and individuals’ multiple 
group affiliation, rather than the internal common attributes among group members, 
that determine the character of social groups. Difference gives democratic participants 
‘some shared perspectives on social life’ in the process o f cooperating, understanding 
and doing justice (1999: 385). As the democratic process is ‘a form of practical reason 
for conflict resolution and collective problem solving’ (Young 1999: 400), the 
participants are required to attend to their particular differences in order to 
‘understand the situation and perspectives of others’ (ibid: 402). According to Young, 
such plurality o f perspectives in deliberation serves the health of democracy through 
following purposes: Firstly, it motivates individuals to express ‘their proposals as 
appeals to justice’ rather than ‘mere self-interest or preference’ (ibid: 402); secondly, 
‘confrontation with different perspectives, interests, and cultural meanings teaches 
individuals the partiality of their own’ (ibid: 403); thirdly, ‘expressing, questioning, 
and challenging differently situated knowledge adds to social knowledge’ (ibid: 403). 
Through such a mediated understanding, participants in democratic discussion can 
‘gain a wider picture of the social processes in which their own partial experience is 
embedded’ (1999:404).
1.5 The Public Sphere in Non-Liberal Societies
Because of different histories, geopolitics, culture, development of time, and security 
concerns, the relationship between individuals and the state might take different forms 
in individual countries. The conception of the public sphere has been developed by 
scholars to explain the social emancipation under different political circumstances.
Kaviraj and Khilnani (2001) argue that European colonisation worldwide in the 
nineteenth century created a need for people in colonies to search for a concept for the 
spheres o f social activities left out o f state control. Outside of Europe, public
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deliberation started in European colonies for the following reasons. Firstly, the 
European discourse of ‘civil society’ was disseminated in colonies, though originally 
this concept was used as a justification for a colonial administration’s intervention 
into the colonised societies. Secondly, colonisation, though unintentionally, ‘brought 
in institutions which had a certain type of discursive field associated with them’ 
(Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001:4). Thirdly, ‘modem elites in colonies often absorbed 
Western influences and emulated forms of behaviour based on these distinctions’ 
(ibid).
Studies on the literary public sphere in postcolonial Bengal (Chatteijee 2001) and the 
integration of Confucian utopianism and Western democratic ideas in China (Metzger 
2001) proved the adaptation of a democratic ideal among elite intellectuals from 
colonised societies. Lee’s study of the literary public sphere in the first two decades in 
twentieth century China exhibits that experience in the literary public sphere 
‘provided members of the bourgeoisie with a measure of progressive self- 
understanding and an unprecedented awareness of their rights and duties in society’ 
(Lee, H. 2001: 322). Zubaida’s (2001) study on the Middle East intellectuals’ 
engagement in ‘voluntaristic aspects of organisations’ out of state control 
demonstrates the contesting meaning-making between Islamic advocacy and secular 
response.
A major merit of public sphere theory is that it can be employed to explain problems 
and practices in constructing democratic institutions in countries ‘with little or no 
historical traditions of democracy to call upon’ (Gamham, N. 2000:169). Though 
Peter Dahlgren argues that a society ‘where democratic tendencies are weak [...] is 
not going to give rise to healthy institutional structures for the public sphere’ 
(Dahlgren 1995:12), discursive spaces for deliberation prove to be in existence in 
such non-democratic societies and contribute to constructing the public sphere. Karol 
Jakubowicz (1991) uses ‘three public spheres’ to describe the multiplicity of the 
changing public discourses in post-Communist Poland. Though the Communist 
Party’s control over civic life constructed the ‘official public sphere’ as the dominant 
tier in socio-political life, the alternative and oppositional public spheres are 
constructed through public engagement with informal channels. What Jakubowicz
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(1991) finds in the ‘alternative’ and the ‘oppositional’ are wide-ranging and 
influential spheres that may include all manner of reformist groups seeking to either 
coexist with, or replace, the existing partisan hegemony. Norgaard noticed in 
authoritarian countries, even if the majority of people ‘apathetically accept the 
arbitrary exercise of power’, there are still ‘islands of resilience’ under dictatorship. In 
less controlled non-democratic societies, ‘islands of autonomy in civil society’ can 
survive, and the ‘competing factions’ within the governing authority more or less 
connected with structures of civil society (Norgaard 2001: 12-3). These ‘islands of 
resilience’ refer to non-official spheres of civic activities, which is outside of and 
usually oppositional to the authoritarian government’s discourse. In China’s case, the 
alternative and the oppositional public spheres exist in the form of wall newspapers 
(Dazibao, see more detailed discussion in Chapter 3), underground literature, 
nonofficial journals, private associations, and salons organised by liberal intellectuals. 
Alternative media such as wall newspapers are not only an index of Chinese people’s 
struggle for free speech, but also a measure of their struggle over the public sphere 
(Downing, J. 2001: 172).
All the above research illuminates a variety of ways of accessing public discourse in a 
stratified society. Such arguments are potent and eloquent in explaining civic 
participation in contemporary authoritarian societies such as China where freedom of 
speech is not possible and political parity has not yet been achieved.
2. Media and the Public Sphere
On the role o f media in the public sphere, Habermas attributes the decline of the 
public sphere to the emergence of mass media. Carrying on the Frankfurt School 
tradition, Habermas (1989) believes modem mass media (especially the commercial 
broadcast media) isolate individuals from each other and constitute a threat to the 
physical existence of community in public life. By transforming citizens into alienated 
consumers of homogenised commercial culture, mass media create obstacles for 
citizens to raise critical questions, discuss commonly-concerned issues, and form 
opinion collectively.
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This rather pessimistic view of media in contemporary public life has been challenged 
by other scholars. The constructive role of media in the public sphere can be summed 
up as: modem media can expand political participation for the general public (Laclau 
and Mouffee 1985; Douglas 1988; Downing, J. et. al. 2001; Curran 2002); media can 
reflect, shape and direct public opinion (Curran 1991; Hartley 1992; Morley 1992: 
Dahlgren 1995); and media can facilitate and promote rational critical public debate 
(Hall 1977; Thompson 1990; Eley 1992; Fraser 1992; McQuail 1992; Sparks 1998). 
By displaying and deliberating conflict and consent in an international arena, media 
contribute to ‘processes of democratic deepening’ in contemporary world (Cottle and 
Rai 2006: 163).
Habermas correctly points out the market suppression of the deliberative role of 
media in the public sphere. Nevertheless, by emphasising the market and government 
control over media, he overlooks the media’s central role in constructing and 
consolidating the public sphere. By examining major arguments from both camps in 
this section, I argue against Habermas’ conceptual understanding of media either as an 
extension of ‘face-to-face’ communication or as an alienating and dismantling factor 
in public life. The large scale and the complexity of decision-making in modem 
society limit the extent to which the public can meet, debate, and deliberate in person 
on a share locale (Thompson 1990). Media thus constitute an inseparable part in 
contemporary political structures in building channels of dialogue among citizens and 
between the civil society and the state, through which deliberation can be achieved 
and public opinion can form. By disseminating knowledge to the general public, 
media also enlarge the scope of political participation and enrich the content of 
political deliberation.
2.1 Media and the Decline of the Public Sphere
Habermas’ view of the print media is shaped by a model of oral communication and 
bears the imprint of the classical Greek conception (Thompson 1990; Gamham 1992). 
Print media are regarded as a continued extension of face-to-face conversation which 
is interwoven with the life of other social institutions in the public sphere (Habermas 
1989: 42). What is problematic about Habermas’ argument is that he fails to realise 
that the scale and the complexity of decision-making in modem society limits the
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extent to which public can be organised in a participatory way (Thompson 1990: 120). 
Thus, he also fails to recognise the constructive role of mediated communication in 
the public sphere.
Lamenting the failure o f the press in transmitting and amplifying ‘the rational-critical 
debate of private people assembled into a public’ (Habermas 1989: 188), Habermas 
attributes the collapse of the public sphere to mass communication in that ‘the public 
is split apart into minorities of specialists who put their reason to use nonpublicly and 
the great mass o f consumers whose receptiveness is public but uncritical’ (1989:175). 
His central argument lies in the transformation of the public from ‘reasoning’ to 
‘consuming’ in the mass production age in the cultural sphere, an argument which is 
steeped in the conceptual influence of the Frankfurt School on his thinking (Benhabib 
1992). Frankfurt School scholars such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno 
(2002) are known for their critiques of mass-production, commodification, and 
standardisation in the culture industries and how these developments influence 
individuals’ integration into the ideology of capitalism. Habermas developed the 
Frankfurt School’s conceptual legacy and argues that commodified cultural industries 
transform the public sphere into the sphere for the publicity of private interest 
(1989:171-2) and the rational critical public into ‘consumers’:
The mass press was based on the commercialisation of the participation in the public 
sphere on the part of broad strata designed predominantly to give the masses in general 
access to the public sphere. This expanded public sphere, however, lost its political 
character to the extent that the means of ‘psychological facilitation’ could become an end 
in itself for a commercially fostered consumer attitude (Habermas 1989:169).
Habermas believes that since the mid-nineteenth century, ‘the institutions that until 
then had ensured the coherence of the public as a critically debating entity have been 
weakened’ (1989:162). Profit-seeking media in the modem age prioritise 
entertainment and leisure content in their mediated communication and bring about 
the de-politicization of content in public communication. Panel discussion 
programmes prevailing on radio or television ‘assume [...] the form of a consumer 
item’, and ‘the conversation itself is administrated ... [and] ... loses its publicist 
function’ (Habermas 1989:164). Within the ‘manipulated public sphere’ and the 
‘manufactured public sphere’ (Habermas 1989: 217), the media both represent 
political ideology and are used as vehicles of advertising (Habermas 1989: 215-217).
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Citizens are transformed into consumers and released from the obligation of forming 
public opinion through rational critical political debate. These changes in public life 
brought about by the commercial mass media have a tendency towards an eventual 
collapse and disintegration of the public sphere (Habermas 1989:168).
Mediated mass communication in capitalist societies today contributes to the 
deconstruction of the public sphere in the following ways:
Firstly, mediated communication in public life limits public access both to channels 
and means of communication. Isolated individuals’ access to the channels and means 
of communication ‘depends upon the mobilisation of scarce material resources, the 
distribution of which is dependent upon the very structures of economic and political 
power that democratic processes of debate were intended to control’ (Gamham 
1992:365). Applied to political news reporting, this structure of economic and 
political power is specified by Lewis et al. as a ‘top-down structure’ which has an 
intrinsic inability to construct active citizens (2004: 163).
Secondly, authenticity in the content and subjects of public debate (i.e. the lifeworld 
experience) has been sacrificed in the mediated mass communication. By ‘the 
lifeworld’, Habermas (1987) means an environment structured by shared 
understandings, attitudes, and values through face-to-face contact in various social 
groups. In mediated communication, market-driven media play a key role in 
interpreting the real lifeworld and providing citizens with ‘objects of consumption’. 
Such practice largely limits individuals’ lifeworld experience to ‘the system of 
economic production and exchange’ (Gamham 1992: 365-6).
Thirdly, because of the ‘the cognitive division of labour in science’, a kind of expert 
knowledge has been produced with content which rarely can be tested or evaluated by 
‘laypersons’. Such a division of labour deteriorates the mediated public sphere, since 
information provided and passed through by the experts dominates communication 
channels (Bohman 1999: 590-607). Ordinary citizens, or a lay public, have little 
chance to contribute to public discourse. Even worse, this communicative division of 
labour can even ‘introduce distortions and manipulation, [...] since the goals of the 
mass media are [...] to shape communication in order to achieve greater market share
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or to further the goals of their paying customers’ (Bohman 2000: 47-48).
In the last decade of the twentieth century, the whole world witnessed a wave of 
deregulation in the media economy, liberalisation in media law, and horizontal and 
vertical integration in the communication industry. This industrial trend makes it more 
noticeable that mediated communication today is shifting away from involving people 
as critical political citizens towards involving them as consumers in a corporate world. 
Changes brought about by the conglomeratisation in media industry do not empower 
the public with sound information for deliberation. On the contrary, as Herman and 
Chomsky argue, concentration in socio-political control over media makes media 
‘effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive 
propaganda function’ (1988: 306).
2.2 Media’s Role in Constructing the Public Sphere
Though Habermas convincingly presents a case for the role commercial media play in 
weakening rational critical debate, he overlooks the fact that in contemporary 
societies ‘face-to-face communication can be only a small part of the process of 
democratic deliberation’ (Chambers and Costain 2000: xii). Through their 
comprehensive coverage of world events, media have the power to create among their 
viewers a sense of belonging to a national or even international community, thus 
redefining the boundaries o f societies in physical forms (Dayan and Katz 1992).
Scholars are not unaware of media’s limited role in constructing the public sphere 
under market suppression and governmental control. Nevertheless, ‘there is more 
going on in the communication of news than the manipulation of news agendas by 
powerful strategic interests or the circulation of power semiotic codes and discourses’ 
(Cottle and Rai 2006: 164). Media still play a central role in deliberation in the 
contemporary world. In fact, John Hartley (1992) makes a persuasive argument that 
media are the public sphere. Media, as key political institutions in contemporary 
political structures, can construct, consolidate, and expand the public sphere (Curran 
2002; Gamham 1992, 2000; Sparks 1998). It is argued that electronic media, 
particularly public service broadcasting, open systems of dialogue between the public 
and authority, enhancing representation of collective interests of citizens (Dahlgren
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1995; Curran 2000). Peter Dahlgren concludes that contemporary notions of the 
public sphere ‘point [...] to the issues o f how, and to what extent, the mass media, 
especially in their journalistic role, can help citizens leam about the world, debate 
their responses to it and reach informed decisions about what courses of action to 
adopt’ (1991:1).
To summarise the main arguments in terms of the relationship between media and the 
public sphere, three main threads can be detected. Media, especially the 
popularisation of electronic media, can significantly expand political participation for 
the general public. Media are able to create a new means of ‘locality’ in reflecting, 
shaping and directing public opinion. By representing various interest groups in the 
society, media may also enrich the content of public dialogue, facilitate debate among 
conflicting social groups, and enhance the multiplicity of the public sphere.
2.2.1 Media expand political participation for general public
Popularisation of the media can expand public engagement in politics by 
disseminating information and knowledge, and proliferating communication channels 
to ordinary citizens. James Curran (2002) believes that the modem media have 
assumed the role o f the church in the Middle Ages, ‘in a more secular age, of 
interpreting and making sense of the world to the mass public’ (2002:77). By making 
information about public affairs more widely available to more people, the media 
have expanded political participation and promoted a culture o f democracy.
Laclau and Mouffee admit that the ‘expansion of means of mass communciation’ has 
‘the undeniable effects of massification and uniformation’ (1985:163). However, they 
also notice that:
This media-based culture also contains powerful elements for the subversion of 
inequalities: the dominant discourses in consumer society present it as social progress 
and the advance of democracy, to the extent that it allows the vast majority of the 
population access to an ever-increasing range of goods {ibid..)
Mass media have played a significant role in changing the subject and content of the 
public sphere. As Robert Damton (1997) notices, before the French Revolution there 
was a general culture of multi-connected media:
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Dozens of publishing houses sprang up all around France’s borders. Hundreds of agents 
operated an underground system, which brought the books to readers.[...]In eighteenth- 
century France, books [...] circulated in a society that overflowed with gossip, rumours, 
jokes, songs, graffiti, posters, pasquinades, broadsides, letters, and journals (xx, xxii).
As a consequence, the media helped to stimulate public opinion as a preparation for 
the French Revolution. The media fixed public disaffection in print so that the word 
was preserved and spread to a wider public. They also fit public opinion into 
narratives which transformed loose talk into coherent discourse (Damton 1997: 191). 
The practices of popularisation of mass media rescued them from social elite control 
and enabled a connection between information (including both serious public 
discussion and pleasure and entertainment) and ordinary citizens (Curran 2002: 22)
In Great Britain, as James Curran argues, the growth and development of the press 
contributed to ‘the expansion of the political community’ (2002: 5). By establishing 
themselves in many places, and by increasing their circulation and political coverage, 
the press started to include those in peripheral areas distant from London and from 
lower social strata into their readership (Curran 2002: 5-6). Since the Second World 
War, the electronic media have gradually become the most popular media form for the 
general public. Because of its ‘levelling effect on the status and power’ (Douglas 1988: 
210), electronic media avail themselves to the majority of the public. Public service 
broadcasting, particularly, could diminish the knowledge gap between the elites and 
the general public ‘because it made informing the public an institutional priority’ 
(Curran 2002: 6). Radio and television also avail themselves to the general public 
through phone-in programmes and talk-shows, which have provided new channels for 
public participation in (political) dialogue and deliberation. As Livingstone and Lunt 
argue, television talk-shows offer opportunities ‘for minority groups, protest groups 
and ordinary people to gain access to mediated communication’ (1994:176).
Media populist narrative believes that the popularisation of the media is a democratic 
triumph. ‘Popular preferences were acknowledged to have validity’ and ‘an increase 
of social egalitarianism eroded the values of hierarchy’ (Curran 2002: 14). In this 
sense, by providing the majority of the public with an easy access to information,
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knowledge, and dialogue, mass media broaden the scope of political participation in 
the public sphere.
2.2.2 Media can reflect, shape, and direct public opinion
Habermas criticised electronic media for eroding people’s sense of place, which is the 
basis for public opinion formation (1989). This argument is flawed in that Habermas 
overlooks the fact that electronic media has changed our understanding of 
‘neighbourhood’ and ‘communities’ through mediated political communication. 
Media become a new social domain where the public construct their own identity, 
negotiate their relationship with each other, and have their opinion expressed.
Habermas acknowledges that by representing critical public opinion to the 
government, the print media empowered the public by subjecting authority to scrutiny 
in the eighteenth century. Critical press and independent journalism helped to 
introduce political public opinion into the British Parliament. This historic moment 
took place with the growth of urban culture in eighteenth century England and the 
public sphere was regarded as growing from:
The novel arena of a locally organized public life (meeting houses, concert halls, theatres, 
opera houses, lecture halls, museum), to a new infrastructure of social communication 
(the press, publishing companies, and other literary media [...]), and to a new universe of 
voluntary association (Eley 1992:291).
As David Morley suggests, the media create a ‘psychological neighbourhood’ within 
which ‘experience is both unified beyond localities and fragmented with them’ (1992: 
280). The mediated experience in the electronic age challenges the traditional locale 
of a ‘neighbourhood’ and re-assembles people together beyond the proximity. 
Meanwhile, certain media function in particular ways for certain groups of people, 
which results in specific consequences with political character. Thus Morley argues 
that ‘we must attend to the need to construct a properly postmodern geography of the 
relations between communication and power’ (1992:282). Meanwhile, Hartley boldly 
states that, ‘television, popular newspapers, magazines and photography, the popular 
media of the modem period, are the public domain, the place where and the means by 
which the public is created and has its being’ (Hartley 1992: 1).
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Through his study of British political development in the seventeenth to eighteenth 
century, Habermas reveals that the reporting of parliamentary proceedings from the 
independent media constructed extra-parliamentary social interaction among the 
public. Circulation of debates in the newspapers constructed public opinion outside 
Westminster, and exerted pressure on the Parliament to adapt to changing 
circumstances (Reid, C. 2000):
It was calling every day on the public to judge of the proceedings of parliament. By these 
daily publications the people were taught to look upon themselves as present at the 
discussion of all the proceedings of parliament, and sitting in judgment on them (Cobbett, 
cited in Reid, C. 2000: 25)
The critical press directed public opinion and ‘knew how to assert itself against the 
government and that made critical commentary and public opposition against the 
government part of the normal state of affairs’ (Habermas 1989: 60 citing Kluxen). By 
doing so, the critical press welded the social strata together (Habermas 1989: 51) and 
gradually established its role in facilitating the process of public opinion formation, 
expression and dissemination. This role of media in constructing critical public 
opinion and an antagonistic public is best summarised as the ‘fourth estate’ by 
Thomas Carlyle:
Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, 
there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. [...] Printing, which comes 
necessarily out of Writing, I say often, is equivalent to Democracy: invent Writing, 
Democracy is inevitable. [...] Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation, 
becomes a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in law-making, in all 
acts of authority. It matters not what rank he has, what revenues or garnitures: the 
requisite thing is that he have a tongue which others will listen to; this and nothing more 
is requisite (Carlyle: 1993 [1841]: 141).
The media’s role as the ‘Fourth Estate’ in socio-political life has not diminished with 
the arrival of broadcasting media. Instead, the electronic media provide new means 
for citizens to engage in conversation with the entire nation, or even the entire world. 
Dahlgren (1995) categorises talk shows as ‘elite’ and ‘vox-pop’. The ‘elite’ talk shows 
are featured with politicians and professional experts; while ‘vox-pop talk shows’ 
made the voice ‘from ordinary people’ heard (1995:63). Such new locality in the 
mediated public communication provides ‘an independent forum of debate’. A more 
recent study of terrestrial and satellite television news in six different countries comes
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to a more deepened understanding of television news in constructing deliberative 
discourse at a global level. Simon Cottle and Mugdaha Rai (2006) argue that there are 
universal structures organising the formations of television news within liberal 
democracies. In the process of international television news production, ‘a repertoire 
of identifiable communicative frames [...offer] differing possibilities for the public 
elaboration and engagement of contending interests, issues and identities’ (2006:185).
2.2.3 Media can facilitate the rational critical public debate
By publicising information in the public sphere and representing various interest 
groups in society, the mass media not only bring issues concerning public interest to 
the public’s attention, but also require the public to scrutinize critically the issue in 
question (Chambers 2000: 193). Consequently, mass media have a positive role in 
generating and facilitating the rational critical debate within the public sphere. 
Through representing rational critical public opinion, media can ‘enable the people to 
shape the conduct of government by articulating their views’ (Curran 1991:29).
The public sphere, as an ‘institutional mechanism’ for rationalizing political 
discussion, mediates ‘between society and the state by holding the state accountable 
to society via publicity’ (Fraser 1992:112). This publicity consists of two dimensions. 
Firstly, it requires that ‘information about state functioning be made accessible so that 
state activities would be subject to critical scrutiny and the force of public opinion’ 
{ibid.). This implies a public vigilance over the network of institutionalisation of the 
communication process in government. Such practice involves an institutional 
mechanism that holds the state accountable to citizenry. Secondly, this publicity 
implies the ‘general interest’ of ‘bourgeois society’ to the state via ‘forms of legally 
guaranteed free speech, free press, and free assembly, and eventually through the 
parliamentary institutions of representative government’ {ibid.). Such practice 
involves a discursive interaction of bargaining and argumentation among an 
enlightened public aiming at a consensus in decision-making. Both dimensions in the 
process of publicity rely today on strong and democratic media in easing access to 
information, providing interaction between public and elites, improving feedback 
mechanism, and promoting rational critical public debate in decision-making.
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As Hall says, the media help us know about the world as well as help us make sense 
of it by ‘offering the maps and codes which mark out territories and assign 
problematic events and relations to explanatory contexts’ (Hall 1977:341). This 
informative role of media in providing public ‘explanatory contexts’ is critical for 
diminishing the influence of political parties and formulating ideas from citizens 
representing different political interests. Curran argues that public service 
broadcasting cultivates social unity which ‘fosters a feeling of mutual identification 
that breeds concern for others’ (2002: 207), so that it ‘facilitates debate about common 
social processes’. Through ‘an open and reciprocal dialogue between sections of the 
community’ (Curran 2002: 207), public deliberation over issues of common concerns 
can be achieved. Furthermore, media’s live broadcasting of certain socio-political 
events crystalises latent trends in public opinion and triggers debate. By giving voice 
to ‘formerly inarticulate or dormant proposals’, media can contribute to the openness 
in politics and diplomacy (Dayan and Katz 1992: 200-203).
Such features of facilitating public debate made the mass media ideal tools for 
deliberative democracy which, as Cohen argues, has the virtue of recognising and 
representing differences while aiming at a consensus (Cohen 1989). In addressing 
how mass media represent diversified public interests, McQuail says:
Paradoxically, diversity can also help in resolving social conflict and promoting social 
peace. Without the possibility of pluralistic solutions, many conflicts could not be 
resolved...In general, media diversity contributes to social order by promoting free 
expression of discontent or disagreement and by offering pathways to compromise 
(McQuail 1992: 143-4).
This mediated discursive process, however, does not necessarily take place in a shared 
locale in contemporary time. Various forms of communication in modem society 
provide the public with information, power, knowledge, and awareness of rights so 
that rational critical public debate can be exercised. The original idea of the public 
sphere as bound to a print medium or face-to-face interaction cannot be applied to the 
conditions created by new technical media (Thompson 1990: 120). A mediated public 
sphere detached from sharing a common locale can extend the audience for political 
debate, change the registers of political rhetoric, and widen the scope of the political 
public sphere (Sparks 1998: 112).
41
3. The Public Sphere Reconstructed in Cyberspace
Scholarly debate on electronic democracy has resulted in a polarisation of arguments 
on the emancipatory potential of digital media uses regards to online public 
deliberation.
A pessimistic approach views the Internet as inhibiting rather than facilitating public 
deliberation. According to this belief, the Internet does not help to improve parity in 
political participation, quality and rationality of public discourse, constructing critical 
publics, or overturning political hegemony. Critics believe that the Internet creates a 
‘digital divide’ and reinforces inequality and domination in the offline world (Schiller, 
H. 1996). Meanwhile, online rational critical debate is often weak, limited to a small 
number of participants (Noveck 2000; Cammaerts and van Audenhove 2005) and 
discourages challenging opinions (Gurak 1999; Wilhelm 2000). Thirdly, the atomising 
effect of the Internet can erode common understanding among the public which is the 
basis for deliberation (Boyer 1996; Noveck 2000; Muhlberger 2005). Furthermore, 
commercialisation of the new media can turn the Internet into another privately 
controlled commodity (Boal 1995; Gamham 1992; Patekis 2000; Schiller 1996), 
creating an ‘apolitical’ culture online (Ferdinand 2000; Dahlgren 2005). Finally, the 
Internet is not free from online gate-keeping (Bennett et al. 2004) and administrative 
surveillance (Russell 2005).
However, in spite all these limitations, the Internet as a new media form is still a 
potent tool for deliberation. The emancipatory role of the Internet especially poses a 
threat to authoritarian rule in regimes such as China where the traditional media fail to 
perform their role as a democratic institution in the public sphere. To be specific, the 
Internet facilitates deliberation in the following aspects:
Firstly, digitalisation brings down the hierarchy in the offline world and leads to 
decentralisation, harmonisation and empowerment (Rheingold 1993; Castells 1996, 
2001). The horizontal structure of citizen networking online (Castells 2001) and the 
autonomous role of users (Taylor and Saamen 1994) makes the Internet an ideal tool 
for ‘ffom-below’ politics. Such quality of the Internet avails itself as a weapon to 
challenge authority in totalitarian regimes (Kalathil and Boas 2003).
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Secondly, computer-mediated communication provides an ‘uninhibited and 
nonconforming’ way of communication (Reid, E. 1999) and creates a new sense of 
community in which individuals are reunified (Poster 2001 [1995]; Ferdinand 2000). 
Public discourse online represents a diversity of opinion (Poster 1996) and users’ own 
experience (O’Regan and Goldsmith 2002), which makes the Internet an important 
device in forming public opinion (Dahlgren 2000; Dahlberg 2001a, 2001b).
Thirdly, as an electronic agora, the Internet is rooted in a culture that credits openness 
and strong reasoning (Castells 2001). Through an interactive ‘conversation’ model 
(van Dijk 2000) users enlarge their horizons, exchange ideas, and test their own views 
by exposing to alternative outlooks (Sunstein 2001). Such features make the Internet 
an ideal mechanism in facilitating rational critical public discussion.
Finally, the Internet is inherently a global media (Downing et al. 2001). It can 
construct transnational forums for rational debate and enhance cosmopolitan 
democracy through citizen networking and opinion mobilization at an international 
level (Calabrese and Borchert 1996; Calabrese 1999; Sparks 2001; Ferdinand 2000; 
Dahlgren 2005).
3.1 Electronic Democracy: Dystopian View
Scholars have raised many critiques about electronic democracy in terms of the parity 
in participation, the quality of the political discussion content, the atomising effect of 
the Internet, the growing commercialisation of the new media, and the availability of 
digital technology for online surveillance and control.
Participation parity in online political debate depends on both physical material (such 
as computers) and social capital (such as the knowledge in CMC, or computer literacy, 
and political consciousness). Difference in the possession of social wealth, education, 
and expertise largely affect procedural equality in electronic deliberation. Political 
discussions online are mainly limited to those with access to and knowledge of 
computers and the Internet, while exclude those who would benefit most from the
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democratising potential of the Internet (Papacharissi, Z. 2002: 19). The gap between 
the information rich and the information poor existed before the arrival of the Internet. 
According to Nicolas Gamham, the information rich are provided with specialised 
information and cultural services, while the information poor are given increasingly 
homogenised entertainment services on a mass scale (1992:362). However, such 
differences, as Herbert Schiller envisioned a decade ago, would reinforce rather than 
reduce in cyberspace when the Internet became more and more under the control of 
private and corporate enterprises (1995). As results feed on their own course, the more 
‘homogenised entertainment services’ the information-poor receive, the more 
disadvantaged they are in political participation. The digital divide can exacerbate 
participatory parity and strengthens ‘the age-old scourges of the market system: 
inequality and domination’ (Schiller, D. 2000: 209).
The increasing availability of information on the Internet will not necessarily benefit 
the public by empowering them with knowledge and wisdom for deliberation. The 
Internet brings an overwhelming amount of information to public attention, but it also 
draws the public into ‘irrelevancies’. Rational online discussion ‘is easily derailed by 
individuals pulling the conversation off its fulcrum’ (Noveck 2000:23-25). In 
cyberspace, an ‘economy of attention’ drives individuals into competing with each 
other for the attention resources of the public (Muhlberger 2005). The result of this 
might be ‘a hyper-speed cacophony of dissonant shouting voices’ (Noveck 2000: 19) 
online instead of public debate featuring interaction among participants. Wilhelm 
(2000) comes to the similar conclusion that online discussion lacks rationality, 
tolerance towards oppositional ideas, and interaction in civil manners. In fact, the 
degree of interactivity or rational critical debate is often weak and limited to a small 
number of male participants (Cammaerts and van Audenhove 2005). This feature 
suggests that limitless data on-line will not necessarily mean information and 
connections that lead to public reasoning, as Noveck predicts the demise of virtual 
public sphere: ‘There is much information, but no guarantee of knowledge; a lot of 
chat but little debate. Seemingly transparency and openness lead to but a loss of 
privacy, rather than the emergence of a virtual public sphere’ (Noveck 2000: 20).
Though the Internet can give socially marginalised groups a ‘voice’, it can also 
reinforce the offline ideological hegemony. Scholars notice that within online
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discussion groups, uniformity in the community ethos might discourage the 
expression of questioning, dissenting, or challenging opinions (Gurak 1999). Dale 
Spender (1995) argues that instead of being a liberating weapon for women, the 
Internet can actually reinforces male domination and female suppression in offline 
communication. In the anonymous online environment, men attack women’s posts by 
flaming, intellectualising, intimidating, harassing, or posting lengthy line-by-line 
rebuttals of women’s messages, which distresses women to retreat into silence (1995: 
193-199).
The atomising effect of the ICTs can erode the common ground of public knowledge, 
experience and understanding, which is the basis for deliberation (Noveck 2000: 18). 
M Christine Boyer writes in Cybercities that ‘cyberspace pulls the user into the 
receding space of the electronic matrix in total withdrawal of the world’ (1996:11), 
thus frequently ‘fragmentise political discourse’ (Papacharissi, Z. 2002). The fluid 
character of web-based political engagement and the ease of joining and withdrawing 
makes it even more difficult ‘to estimate what portion of the citizenry is actually 
involved’ (Dahlgren 2004: xiii). Individualisation of media consumption online makes 
public interest articulated through meaningful discussion hard to achieve, and thus 
‘makes resistance to tyranny increasingly difficult’ (Noveck 2000:29).
An increasing tendency to deregulation and privatisation in the media industry 
worldwide is shifting media from ‘a public good’ to ‘a privately appropriable 
commodity’ (Gamham 1992:363), and the Internet is no exception. The political 
economy of the Internet suggests that it is developing rapidly towards intensified 
commercialisation which characterises the traditional media model (Patekis 2000). 
With such a development, virtual space is being ‘fenced off’ for multinational 
corporations’ interest and citizens are being forced into being ‘slaves of consumerism’ 
(Boal 1995: 5). Information Content Providers (ICPs) and Information Service 
Providers (ISPs), as they are privately constructed and profit-driven, will ‘of necessity, 
[...] embody the fundamental features of a private enterprise economy: inequality of 
income along with the production of goods and services for profit’ (Schiller, H. 1996: 
96). One effect will be that the Internet becomes more and more vulnerable to direct 
control by those with economic power:
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Some good political sites exist but there is no simple way to find them or to happen upon 
them, especially when richer commercial sites can afford to buy priority on the major 
search engines and to purchase eyeball-catching advertising time on other media, 
including television and newspaper, to attract people to their sites (Noveck 2000:30).
Scholars thus lament that in cyberspace, democratic deliberation is overshadowed by 
consumerism, entertainment, non-political networking, and apolitical chatting 
(Ferdinand 2000; Dahlgren, P. 2005).
Meanwhile, cyberspace can also spread Far Right ideologies such as neo-Nazis, 
xenophobia, racial hatred and radical nationalism and even terrorism. Michael 
Whine’s (1997) study of neo-Nazism bulletin boards in North America and Europe 
proves that German neo-Nazi groups have explored computer mediated 
communication (CMC) technologies since 1980s. Bulletin boards and discussion lists 
have been used to propagate racial hatred ideologies and also ‘allows those who 
would previously have been “observers” to become more active’ (Whine 1997: 209).
Finally, digital technologies can also enhance monitoring and surveillance, which puts 
the public directly under censorship and endangers press freedom. The electronic 
public sphere is not free from gate-keeping by professionals. Bennett et al.’s study 
shows that journalists ‘actively maintain the boundaries of different social and 
political encounters by expanding or restricting the degrees of recognition and mutual 
response opportunities among the participants’ (2004: 452). Through such practice, 
socially privileged groups still play a key role in the online gate-keeping process. The 
Internet can also be put directly under administrative surveillance. According to 
Russell, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks government monitoring of Internet activities in 
the name of national security became part of the online routine in the US. Firewalls 
and copyright law are also employed to limit access to information (Russell 2005). In 
authoritarian countries such as China, arrests and prosecutions of Internet users and 
activists prove that the Internet can be used as a tool of repression. Global digital 
media conglomerates can even facilitate the authoritarian government to quench down 
the liberating voices in order to gain their market share in China19.
To sum up, the Internet cannot solve the problems in offline political deliberation, and
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online political discussion cannot be a substitute for the offline experience. 
Technology itself is intrinsically neutral -  it is neither democratic nor autocratic. The 
Internet can be shaped by civic forces to serve democratising purposes while it also, 
as Theodore Roszak believes, ‘has the obvious capacity to concentrate political power, 
to create new forms of social obfuscation and domination’ (1986: xii).
3.2 Internet and Electronic Deliberation
Electronic democracy rhetoric has been through a few stages. Early celebratory views 
of the CMC as a challenge to the existing political hierarchy were proved to be over- 
optimistic. At the turn of the new millennium, scholars argued that the application of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to media provides an 
alternative means to enhance citizen political participation rather than ‘a replacement 
for traditional “analogue” political practice’ (Hacker and van Dijk 2000:1). The recent 
theoretical approaches of ‘digital resistance’ (Russell 2005) require analysts to pay 
attention to relationships between the online and offline political engagement of 
differentiated social groups. Digital resistance, according to Russell, has come about 
through ‘a combination of necessity and opportunity’ for those who:
have been denied access to information and media products and/or the power to convey 
and control their message. They resist by moving around and through the barriers to and 
filters of mainstream media and by hacking technological and legal restraints on 
information, delivering alternative messages to expanded audiences and making new 
media or using existing media in new ways in the process (Russell 2005: 514)
Therefore, in spite of all its limitations, the Internet is still regarded as an important 
channel for political participation and deliberation. Three defining qualities distilled 
from the Habermasian public sphere- access, recognition, and responsiveness - can be 
used to evaluate media’s role in deliberation (Bennett et al.2004:438). According to 
this argument:
The conditions for audience deliberation are best established when news accounts: (a) 
report diverse voices (access), (b) identify and comparably value those voices 
(recognition), and (c) invite those with opposing views or claims to respond directly to 
each other (responsiveness) (Bennett et al. 2004: 439).
In the following sub sections, I will look into how these qualities and the global nature 
in online political discussion are documented in existing literature and examine to
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what extent the Internet provides users a rich set of qualities with which to deliberate.
3.2.1 Access: citizen network online fitting into the (from below’ politics 
The grassroots tradition of the Internet bulletin boards creates a horizontal structure 
which involves direct participation and interaction among individuals. This feature 
enables the Internet to represent various voices from ordinary citizens, which 
resembles the Athenian ‘direct democracy’. Citizen networking among ordinary 
people also enables a type of sociability outside the dominant discourse and an 
ensemble of an antagonistic public towards political authority.
Though the Internet was first created for military research and communication, the 
development of the Internet in its early stage coincided with the culture of individual 
freedom upsurge in the university campuses of the 1960s and 1970s. Such libertarian 
culture is an ‘ideology based on the uncompromising defence of individual freedom 
as the supreme value - often against the government’ (Castells 2001: 33). ARPANET 
(Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), an infant network sponsored by the 
Pentagon, was first installed in the University of California, Los Angeles in 1969. 
ARPANET quickly rolled out its designed goal of long-distance computing in 
collaborating on projects and became an electronic venue for its users (mainly 
scientists and graduate students at the time) to meet up and know each other. 
Researchers were using ARPANET to trade notes on work, and eventually, to 
downright gossip and network each other. Manual Castells (2001) argues that the 
involvement of graduate students in the design of ARPANET incorporated the campus 
culture which values individual freedom, independent thinking, sharing and 
cooperating with peers into the ideas and the software they designed.
This student culture took up computer networking as a tool of free communication, and in 
the case of its most political manifestations, as a tool of liberation, which, together with 
the PC, would provide people with the power of information to free themselves both from 
governments and corporations (Castells 2001:25).
The Internet came into existence, from a technical point of view, when the National 
Science Foundation in the US started to operate a university based wide area network 
(NSFNet) in January 1983. The commercial use of the Internet faced the public first 
in 1985 and became popular in the early 1990s. Celebration of Internet technology in 
constructing ‘a new Athenian Age of democracy’ (Gore 1995, cited in Buchstein, H.
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1997:249) and thriving ‘a sort of cyber-Jeffersonian renaissance’ (Wilbur 1997: 14) 
along with decentralisation can be heard from both politicians and academics. 
Rheingold (1993), Negroponte (1996) and Castells (1996, 2001) are only a few 
among many who agree that digitalisation brings down hierarchy in offline world and 
brings about empowerment through the unrestrained expression of opinions from 
ordinary citizens. The shared locale on Internet bulletin boards, discussion lists, 
electronic mail and teleconferencing, electronic town halls and other interactive 
communication also implies a dismissing of a ‘centre’ in the virtual space as to what 
is in the real world. By ‘relatively levelling the ground of symbolic manipulation, and 
by broadening the sources of communication’, the Internet provides the general public 
an electronic public agora to meet and talk (Castells 2001: 165).
The Internet provides a means of public communication that features by its 
‘horizontal’ structure ‘from one-to-one as well as from one-to-many’ communication 
(Castells 2001:157), which helps to bring up diverse voices from ordinary people. 
This structure of communication forms a contrast to the traditional highly controlled 
vertical structure of social organisations, which lacks interaction among ordinary 
citizens. Users are transformed from ‘passive consumers’ to ‘active producers’ online 
(Taylor and Saarinen 1994). Ordinary citizens are freed from the restraints that 
prevent their access to the mainstream media and start practicing networking among 
themselves through ‘self-publishing’ and ‘self-organizing’ (Castells 2001). As a 
consequence, the Internet inspires the proactive use of media among the public to seek, 
share, and express their interest, concerns, and lifeworld experience that ignored by 
dominant media. Specialized bulletin boards, news groups, discussion groups, etc. 
bring people with similar concerns together, so that they are more likely to facilitate 
group-oriented communication.
The most distinctive feature of online political discussion groups is its grassroots 
network quality. The information and communication technologies, such as the 
Internet, can ‘advance the interests of oppositional social groups and movements that 
have been excluded from mainstream media and political debate’ (Kellner 1999:101). 
Every individual can become a political actor and through a connected means, 
disadvantaged social groups can get their voices heard, interests represented, and
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identities constructed:
Every form of wired opposition, regardless of efficacy or ideology, is now part of the 
information web, available for copy and adaptation by the vast majority of users 
everywhere. In the face of fears of a rising authoritarian and homogeneous global culture, 
these projects underline the independence and plurality that exist in the new media 
environment (Russell 2005: 514).
Social movements today -  human rights, feminist, environmental protection, labour, 
religious and the peace movements -  often take place from the grassroots and tend to 
call for coordinated global action. A strong ‘community ethos’ found within online
90groups, as Gurak (1999) points out, makes the Internet an ideal means of 
communication and organisation for social movements. This new context for social 
movement ‘from below’ makes the horizontal structure of public communication on 
the Internet ideal for collaborating actions across nation-states boundaries:
It is obvious that social movements and the political process use, and will increasingly 
use, the Internet as well, making it a privileged tool for acting, informing, recruiting, 
organizing, dominating and counter-dominating. Cyberspace becomes a contested terrain 
(Castells 2001:137).
Bulletin board-based online groups have already actively participated in social 
movements at both national and international levels. In democratic societies, the 
Internet is becoming integrated with the established system of political 
communication and is used to challenge the established power structure (Dahlgren 
2005:151). Online practices such as ‘electronic townhalls’ enable citizens to inform 
themselves about policy-making and submit comments directly to the government 
online (Coleman 1999). ‘Teledemocracy’, which implies the application of ICT in 
citizen networking, is regarded by two American scholars Ted Becker and Christa 
Daryl Slaton as a solution to the ‘increasing domination of so-called representative 
governments by tiny cliques of economically powerful and well-organised interests 
who are, by and large, sexist, racist, and Social Darwinists at heart’ (2000:6). In 
totalitarian countries, though the authority can guide Internet development for its 
state-defined goals, there are ‘many ways in which Internet use may pose challenges
9 1to authoritarian regimes’ (Kalathil and Boas: 2003: 136). The Zapatistas uprising 
particularly proved that use of the Internet allowed the Zapatistas to disseminate
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information throughout the world and called for international support. International 
public opinion advocating the movement made it ‘literally impossible for the Mexican 
government to use repression on a large scale’ (Castells 1997:80).
3.2.2 Recognition: the Internet helps online public opinion formation
On the Internet, ordinary citizens can communicate with their peers in a spontaneous 
way of one-to-one or one-to-many encounters. Virtual communities are thus formed 
on the basis of such interaction in which participants construct their identities in 
relation to each other (Rheingold 1993). Through ‘acts of discourse’ that are ‘not 
constrained by the gender and ethnic traces inscribed in face-to-face communication’ 
(Poster 1996:211), diversified viewpoints can be identified and evaluated in the 
process of public opinion formation.
Howard Rheingold defines online communities as ‘the social aggregations that 
emerge from the Net when enough people carry on those public discussions long 
enough with sufficient human feelings, to form webs of personal relationships in 
cyberspace’ (1993:5). Scholars (Jones, S. 1998, Baym, N. 1998, 2000) argue that 
‘sharing’ is the primary value within online communities. What welds online 
communities together, apart from ‘shared interest’, is also information, knowledge, 
expertise, wisdom, and in fact, ‘a holding-in-common of qualities, properties, 
identities or ideas’ (Wilbur 1997: 8). Nonetheless, such commonality does not rule out 
public plurality. The online experience of dislocation in time and space helps 
individuals to discover their own identities in different perspectives (Wilbur 1997:11). 
Such self-expression with diversity in opinion demonstrates the potential of 
reunifying people and renewing democracy (Poster 1995: 42-3).
Howard Rheingold (1993), Elizabeth Reid (1999) and other scholars all noticed that 
people in computer-mediated groups are ‘relatively uninhibited and nonconforming’ 
than they were in face-to-face groups (Reid 1999: 111-113). Though the ‘disinhibition 
effect’ (Smith, A. D. 1999) might encourage aggression and deception, it can also 
support intimacy, confidence, and ‘reconciliation of differences and discovery of the 
facts of a particular case’ (Smith, A. D. 1999:156). Uninhibited interaction within 
virtual communities encourages participants in political discussion to recognize 
different perspectives and comparably value other opinions. Such mediated
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experience provides a new approach to ‘public reason’ which, according to Kant, 
involves the efforts of putting oneself in the position of anyone else and the exercise 
of reflective judgment (Gamham 2000).
The Internet’s role in facilitating community construction is increasingly receiving 
attention from both scholars and government. Scholars believe that the potential of 
online communities in generating rational critical public opinion might be a cure for 
offline political apathy and official neglect (Ferdinand 2000: 5). E-govemment has 
been adopted by many municipal governments in the USA (Moon 2002) and has been 
consistently progressing (Norris and Moon 2005). ‘Electronic town meetings’ has
99been practiced by scholars since 1995 to promote citizens’ direct participation in 
debating and deciding on local issues.
Admittedly, the Internet cannot create a virtual community as a substitute for a real 
life electorate. However, the real-time interactive communication provides the 
possibility to enhance public integration into political life, especially for those who 
‘have been marginalised in the increasingly money-dominated world of democratic 
election’ (Ferdinand 2000: 10). Public opinion formed online constitutes an 
alternative public discourse parallel to the offline political discourse in the public 
sphere. Under most circumstances, such practice of online public opinion formation is 
still more or less informal. Habermas says that the ‘communicative power’ generated 
from ‘informal public opinion formation’ in the public sphere ‘influences the premises 
of judgment and decision making in the political system without intending to conquer 
the system itself’ (Habermas 1996: 487). In this sense, the practice of informal online 
public opinion formation can help to represent the interest from the ‘subaltern 
counterpublics’ and contribute to the health of the multi-tiered public sphere in 
contemporary society.
3.2.3 Responsiveness: the Internet assists rational critical public debate
The Internet has the potential to provide diverse, open and reflexive public debate in 
which rationality in publicity and the critical public opinion can be formed. This 
argument is supported by these facts -  preconditions for deliberation can be met in 
cyberspace; certain technological effects make the Internet compatible to reflexivity
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(Smith, A. D. 1999); and Internet culture credits rationality and reasoning (Castells 
2001). Since ‘every sovereign, centralized state is potentially aggressive and 
dictatorial’ (Keane 1991:94 citing Weil, S. 1933), critical public opinion is a very 
important harness to the hegemonic power of the state. For that reason, rational 
critical public debate online can specially contribute to a better democratic social 
structure in countries like China.
On deliberation, social choice theorist Kenneth Arrow proposes three conditions that 
aim to ensure the procedural equality: unrestricted domain, anonymity and neutrality 
(cited in Knight and Johnson 1997: 290). The practice of the online public discussion 
shows that these conditions can be mainly achieved in cyberspace. Within online 
discussion groups, there are no prior constraints on the content of public discussion, 
and every individual (online ID) in cyberspace is free from hierarchy in the offline 
social structure. Moreover, there is no bias for or against any particular discourse 
online. Through interaction with others on the Internet, users are continually ‘testing 
their own views by learning about alternatives’ (Sunstein 2001:194). These qualities 
of online discussion pave the way for rational deliberation.
Certain technological traits of the Internet facilitate reflexive rationality in online 
discussion. Richard Shell (1995) finds out that people may pay more attention to the 
substantive content of online messages than to the same content delivered verbally. 
Such lengthened concentration can potentially prevent faux pas, and improve 
reflection, communication, relationships, and problems-solving (Smith A. D.1999: 
156). The time lag during any interactive communication online can ‘gives one time 
to think, decide on courses of action and compose one’s words’ {ibid.). Another 
advantage of online communication is the verbatim record of any interaction among 
users. It can provide instant and accurate evidence for later reflection or study (ibid). 
Finally, ICTs support multiple tasks for one user at one time. This ‘ability to 
multiplex’ allows users to consult key people and information sources during the 
process of online debate (Smith, A. D. 1999: 157).
The culture of the Internet is a ‘techno-meritocratic culture’, as Manuel Castells 
argues (2001). This culture is rooted in the scholarly tradition of crediting the authors 
of each discovery, building a reputation based on academic excellence, and
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acknowledging contributions based on peer review (Castells 2001:40). This techno- 
meritocratic culture accords with the characteristic of the ideal public sphere, in that 
merits of argument instead of social status determine the outcomes of public 
discussion.
Based on the above qualities of online public communication, we can conclude that 
the responsiveness which accompanies the Internet enables those holding opposing 
views or claims to respond directly to each other. As a consequence, in mediated 
online communication lay publics are no longer in an inferior position to expert 
communicators, whose social status or professional knowledge holds them in an 
advantageous position of delivering messages to the public offline. Through online 
critical debate, the general public can evaluate, test and comment on the messages 
they receive from expert communicators when the offline ‘asymmetries of 
information, agency, and control’ (Bohman 2000: 57) is lacking.
Public engagement in rational critical discussion online creates the conditions for 
active interchange of opinion between people rather than between highly 
professionalized expert communicators. Through such a communication process, the 
political participation will be more comprehensive, effects will be more direct, and the 
scope of the influence will be more inclusive. As Laclau observes, authoritarian 
hegemonic forces take great pain to prevent the emergence of grass-roots movements 
(1977:81-142) so that the true critical public opinion would not be heard and would 
not challenge the status quo. Contrary to traditional communication means, the 
Internet has the potential to reverse the unbalanced power relationship between the 
communicators and public, and contributes to a robust public sphere through publicity. 
Such qualities make the Internet particularly revolutionary in authoritarian regimes.
3.2.4 Trans-nationalness: the global public sphere online
Globalisation arrived before the emergence of the Internet. However the Internet, as 
Downing enthusiastically proclaims, ‘is potentially our first global public sphere’ 
(2001:202):
The Internet is the first medium through which individuals and independent collectives 
throughout the globe may hope to communicate, in their own voices, with an 
international audience of millions. Thus the purely technical possibilities for the Internet
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as a public sphere are unlimited (Downing, J. et al. 2001: 202).
Globalisation’s impact on the mediated public sphere is a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, globalisation eliminates the barriers between national states and brings the 
publics together in scrutinising both domestic and international issues, which can 
ideally employ the Internet as an agora for a global debate (Sparks 2001). On the 
other hand, the worldwide flow of capital changes the political economy of digital 
media and heightens the role of transnational media corporations in the public sphere, 
which might subject public interest to international capitalism (Gamham 1995 [1986]).
Globalisation first took off in the economic area after the Second World War and 
gradually spread to the technological, cultural, social, and political aspects of modem 
life. In the socio-cultural sphere, the concept of globalisation is usually associated 
with cultural assimilation and cultural imperialism. For example, Richard A. Gershon 
argues that global corporations control the international marketplace of ideas (1997:4- 
5) and create a ‘homogenized world culture’ (1997:128). Nevertheless, Gershon 
overlooks the positive effect mass media have brought about in the process of 
globalisation. Globalisation enables media to bring sidelined public issues and 
marginalised public voices to international attention, which can reschedule the public 
agenda and might contribute to solve regional problems and conflicts in a ‘global 
village’.
The idea of a ‘global village’ was theorised by Marshall McLuhan in the 1960s. By 
‘global village’, he implies that electronic media such as television overcame time and 
space barriers in human communication and enable people to interact on a global 
scale as if it were in their own village (McLuhan 1962; McLuhan 2001 [1964]). Since 
the early 1980s, transnational broadcasting networks such as CNN and the BBC, 
along with international newspapers and magazines, established themselves as global 
media and created an international media environment (Sparks 2001). Access to 
international news is available around the world. Such an international media 
environment affects new political alliances and increasingly impacts on public 
participation, notions of political identity and ‘citizenship’, and the agendas and 
formats of political journalism within the global public sphere (Volkmer 2003).
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The Internet is no novelty device that replaces the existing global media structure. On 
the contrary, the Internet is an integrated part of the media ‘convergence’ in a global 
sense. ‘Convergence’, according to Thomas Baldwin et al. (1996), indicates the 
blurring of media industry boundaries. Media convergence has created organizations 
providing information through a heavily interconnected information network within 
which, however, the Internet plays a central role.
The Internet, as Castells (1996) argues, has increased the dynamics and complexity of 
the political globalization process and has created a new global ‘network society’ not 
in McLuhan’s sense of ‘sameness’ but rather in the sense of ‘Networked 
Individualism’ (Castells 2001). ‘Networked Individualism’, as Wellman et al. (2003) 
argue, refers to the changed concept of citizenship through positive Internet use. The 
understanding of citizenship moves away from ‘solidary, local, hierarchical groups’ to 
‘fragmented, partial, heavily-communicating social networks’ (Wellman et a. 2003). 
The Internet, viewed by Castells as a metaphor for a new global communication 
infrastructure, ‘de-centralizes’ the globalization process and affects the political 
identity of individuals within a new set of ‘supra- and subnational coordinates’. Such 
change as brought by the Internet has a profound implication on how people relate to 
each other and how they, as citizens, relate to governance at various levels.
The Internet can spread ideas across national boundaries in a strikingly quick way. 
Hence it can put public issues under the critical scrutiny of a diverse international 
audience at almost the same time. Scholars thus believe the ‘new media’ can enhance 
the transnational, cosmopolitan democracy through publicity in a global sense 
(Calabrese and Borchert 1996; Calabrese 1999; Chambers 2000). Publicity at a global 
level enables Internet use to function as a democratic watchdog ‘overseeing the 
actions and policies of the state’ (Chambers 2000: 193-4), which guaranteed the 
public sphere not be completely colonized by commercialism and political power 
(Chambers 2000:194).
The attribute of ‘transnational forums, global networking, and opinion mobilization’ 
(Dahlgren 2005: 153) of the Internet enables it to be an important tool for grassroots 
democratic movement at a global scale. There has been research indicating the 
revolutionary role of the CMC in constructing ‘the new global solidarity’ for
56
progressive politics and humanistic forces at a global level (Waterman 1996; 
2001 [1998]). Calabrese believes a ‘nascent global civil society’ comes into existence 
when resourceful activists from all around the world apply the Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) in exposing ‘what otherwise might be 
unaccountable government power, buried in arcane process of transnational deal 
making’ (Calabrese 2000: 79).
A global online civil society can be envisioned also because in the wired world, 
censorship becomes almost impossible. Peter Ferdinand (2000) believes that messages 
on the Internet are broken up into separate ‘packets’ of information at the sending end, 
and only ‘reassembled’ at the receiving end after directing across various routes. 
Therefore, it is impossible for governments to intercept online messages en route 
‘without destroying most of the efficiency gains that such a technology can bring’ 
(Ferdinand 2000: 12). The nature of circumventing censorship makes the Internet a 
‘long-term strategic threat’ to authoritarian regimes. As Charles Swett (1995) 
evaluates the information on the Internet:
News from the outside world brought by the Internet into nations subjugated by such 
regimes will clash with the distorted versions provided by their governments, eroding the 
credibility of their positions and encouraging unrest. ‘Personal’ contact between people 
living under such governments and people living in the free world, conducted by e-mail, 
will also help to achieve a more accurate understanding on both ends and further 
undermine authoritarian controls. Information about violations of human rights and other 
forms of oppression will be increasingly conveyed to the outside world by the Internet, 
helping mobilize external political forces on behalf of the oppressed (Swett, C. 1995).
The ‘multimedia experiences’ facilitated by new technology, according to Ohmae 
(1995), has fundamental consequences in terms of its ‘thought process and mind-set’. 
Based on these arguments, the continuity of information flow ‘exported’ from 
democratic societies to authoritarian societies can have the long-term effect of 
subverting totalitarianism. Cosmopolitan democracy will be envisioned through ‘a 
gradual introduction of the content of various political and social rights into the life of 
individual countries’ (Beck 2000: 93).
In his more recent reflection on the public sphere, Habermas explains the possibilities 
of a global public sphere. Since individuals have the communicative capacity to act
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politically: ‘it is the deliberative opinion and will-formation of citizens, grounded in 
the principles of popular sovereignty, that forms the ultimate medium for a form of 
abstract, legally constructed solidarity that reproduces itself through political 
participation’ (Habermas 2001: 76).
The global public sphere is not free from offline economic and social structures. 
Globalisation can intensify the discrepancies between the information-rich and 
information poor. The most significant challenge to global democracy is still ‘issues 
of redistribution’ (Habermas 2001:72) of social, economic and cultural capital. 
Meanwhile, the mechanisms for transforming international public opinion into offline 
decisions and policies are still highly limited (Dahlgren 2005: 153). Nevertheless, 
these limitations are not meant to restrict the potential of the Internet as the global 
public sphere. What is urgent, however, is to tackle a difficulty facing the idea of the 
public sphere in a post-national era which, as Habermas notes, is that ‘the regulatory 
power of collectively binding decisions operates according to a different logic than 
the regulatory mechanisms of the market. Power can be democratised; money cannot’ 
(2001: 78).
4. Summary
This chapter reviewed the conceptual development of the theory of the public sphere, 
media’s role in consolidating the public sphere, and the Internet in constructing the 
alternative public sphere. Three main arguments are presented. Firstly, the public 
sphere does not exist today in a singular comprehensive form. It is defined by 
plurality, complexity, exclusion, and competing publics. Secondly, modem media can 
consolidate the public sphere by extending political participation to the general public, 
representing various interest groups in the society, enriching the content of public 
dialogue, and facilitating public debate. Thirdly, in spite of all limitations, computer- 
mediated communication provides ordinary citizens, especially traditionally 
marginalised social groups, a more comprehensive access to political debate through a 
more dynamic interaction among people. The Internet also enlarges the horizon of 
political participation and facilitates rational public opinion formation at a global level. 
Dahlgren points out that politics through mediated online participation becomes ‘an 
expressive activity, a way of asserting, within the public sphere, group values, ideals,
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and belonging’ (2005:155).
The public sphere in the contemporary mediated communication environments can be 
defined as ‘the collection of places and spaces -  from neighbourhood cafes to Internet 
chat rooms’ (Bennett et al. 2004: 437). Academic arguments on the media’s active role 
in facilitating communicative rationality in public opinion formation have greatly 
broadened the original meaning of the public sphere. Online political participation 
thus becomes a part of the extra-parliamentary ‘new politics’ which is phrased as ‘life 
politics’ by Anthony Giddens (1991); ‘sub-politics’ by Ulrich Beck (1997); and 
‘lifestyle’ politics by Bennett (1998, 2003). Emphasis on the institutional role of 
media (the Internet particularly) in the public sphere helps media students to keep 
abreast with the evolving relationship between communication and politics.
Worth noticing, however, is that among the literature reviewed there has been little 
description of how the Internet helps to construct the public sphere in authoritarian 
societies. China, one of the few Communist countries in the world, has witnessed 
marketisation of its economy and globalisation in its socio-cultural sphere since the 
late 1970s. During this process, the Chinese media, previously totally controlled by 
the state, have been put in tension between democratisation and commercialisation. 
The Internet, which first connected China to the world in 1990, brings into Chinese 
society promises of a deliberating public sphere in cyberspace and the dangers of 
public interest being subjected to political hegemony and global capitalism.
Thus this thesis seeks to apply the theory of the public sphere to examine online 
deliberation on Internet bulletin boards in contemporary China. Components of the 
virtual public sphere -  the emerging antagonistic publics, the quality of the public 
debate, the administrative surveillance over the media itself, and the global context of 
‘Greater China’-  will be studied. Different histories, geopolitics, culture, development 
of time, security concerns, and the relationship between individuals decides the 
channels and means of political participation in different states. The public sphere 
thus takes different forms under different political circumstances. In the following 
chapter, I will explore the historic development of the public sphere in China and 
media’s role as a social institution in the tension-charged field of political deliberation.
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Chapter 3
Historic Account of the Role of Media in the Public Sphere in China
The concept of the public sphere has long been regarded as only existing in 
democratic societies rather than in ‘totalitarian’ regimes such as China. However, 
similar social institutions to those in the Western public sphere have been in existence 
in China since late nineteenth century and developed in the electronic age. In this 
chapter, I will explore the historic development of the public sphere in China and 
argue that the media have played a significant role in constructing the public sphere 
throughout history.
The first Republic (The Republic of China) was established in 1911 and was the 
outcome of the emergence and development of the Chinese bourgeois public sphere in 
the nineteenth century. By disseminating bourgeois enlightenment ideas and 
cultivating public understanding of civil rights, bourgeois newspapers played a critical 
role in bringing down the feudal Qing Empire. The bourgeois elites played a leading 
role in public deliberation, and people from lower social strata (such as peasantry, 
workers and soldiers) also actively participated in the revolution against feudalism 
and colonialism. The first bourgeois public sphere was also demonstrated by the 
emancipatory rhetoric from women (though small in number) concerning their equal 
rights as new citizens.
The second Republic (the People’s Republic of China) was characterised before the 
late 1970s by both the emergence and disappearance of the proletariat public sphere. 
Media in the PRC was owned and controlled by the state and used as ideological 
apparatus in propagating the Party’s policies to the people. Antagonistic voices from 
the public were muzzled and the media failed to perform their roles as watchdogs over 
the Party and the state. The Communist Party’s control over the media has constructed, 
to borrow Jakubowicz’s (1991) words, the ‘official public sphere’ as the dominant tier 
in social political life. The ‘alternative public sphere’ and the ‘oppositional public 
sphere’ existed marginally in the form of wall newspapers23, underground literature, 
or other radical media forms.
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The media have undergone significant changes in terms of political economy since 
reform took place in China in 1978. Though they are still mainly state-owned, mass 
media in China have been downplaying their role as ideological propagators for the 
Party and emphasising their roles as market-oriented information providers. This 
process of media commercialisation in China allows a certain degree of editorial 
independence for the media, which moderately attenuates absolute state control and in 
part helps to bring out the public voice. However, the commercialisation of the media 
privileged a small group of elites in setting the social political agenda for the majority 
of the public. Access to the media system is determined almost exclusively by those 
with political power or economic power, ‘a power the majority of workers and 
peasants do not possess’ (Zhao 1998: 152). Jian Meng believes that the emergence of 
a middle class and re-construction of social strata following the economic reform 
heralded emerging public power in China (Meng 2000). Though the ‘alternative 
public sphere’ and ‘the oppositional public sphere’ are expanding as a response to the 
public call for civil participation, the general Chinese public still struggles to find 
channels outside the official media for their political engagement.
1. The Emergence of the Public Sphere in China: Bourgeois Press and the First 
Republic
The first bourgeois public sphere in China emerged in the late nineteenth century, 
resulting from the bourgeois Reformist and Revolutionist movements24. During this 
process, bourgeois media and political associations provided public knowledge of the 
world, a channel to express political opinion, and a forum to debate China’s future. 
Bourgeois newspapers introduced the ideas of enlightenment and democracy into 
China and included intellectuals, people from lower social status, and women in the 
public discourse of anti-feudalism and anti-colonism (Wu 2004). For the first time in 
Chinese history, newspapers acted as a symbol for freedom of speech and an outlet for 
public opinion.
However, the first bourgeois public sphere had a tendency towards elitism and was 
dominated by scholars, officials, and gentry class members. This elite-dominated 
public sphere was not only a natural outcome of the poverty and massive illiteracy
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that was prevalent in the country, but also an inheritor of feudal legacies such as the 
meritocratic political structure rooted in Confucianism. Though Confucius has been 
admired for his emphasis on ‘virtue’ rather than ‘noble blood’ in evaluating rulers of 
society, the key Confucian political thought hangs on the idea that the intellectual 
class who labour with their minds are the rightful rulers of society; while those
25 ■country-men who labour with their physical strength are governed . This meritocratic 
political culture is based on the popular acceptance of inequality among a population 
as a function of merit, which is contradictory to an egalitarian society.
1.1 Public Life in Feudal China
China entered feudalism in 476 B.C. and the last feudal emperor was overthrown by 
the bourgeois Revolutionists in 1911. During this lengthy period of feudalism, there 
had hardly been any trace of public engagement in political life. However, social 
institutions such as kinship families and teahouses helped to weld people together in a 
patricentric community and they developed a primitive form of public discussion. 
Such interaction ultimately maintained the social stability in ancient China.
Habermas acknowledges that the public sphere evolved from the sphere of the 
conjugal family where individualisation was promoted through humane interpersonal 
relations as well as solitary reading (Habermas 1989: 43-45). Patricentric kinship 
families in feudal China played pivotal roles in bonding the community members 
together and regulating social and political life. The ancestor temples (ci tang) in 
natural kinship villages were the earliest venue for public gatherings, meetings, and 
decision making in a male-dominated community. A proportion of villages in feudal 
China were self-governing ‘because the central government lacked the resources to 
extend government to the grass-roots’ (Gray J. 1990:16), which allowed the kinship 
families more autonomy to act like local social and political bodies. It was usually the 
senior males in kinship families who took responsibility for the maintenance of social 
order, developing self-contained village economies, and creating and safeguarding 
behavioural norms for its member families (Feng 1996).
Around the core of kinship families there were teahouses, neighbourhoods, 
associations, and the world of letters that connected people together. Teahouses were
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especially popular in cities and towns for people to meet regularly, discuss current 
issues, promote business, arbitrate conflicts, or even talk about politics. During 
special periods such as peasant uprisings, teahouses were even used for gathering 
political information or exchanging military intelligence (Liu, Xiuming 1997: 98-112).
9 £sIn the world of letters, private diaries, annotations, and some primitive form of non-
97official ‘newspapers’ were used as means of political engagement by literati and 
intellectuals.
Nonetheless, these primitive forms of social institutions hardly constructed an 
antagonistic public. The political system in feudal China was moulded by the 
Confucian ideal which implies ‘ruling by an enlightened elite’ (Gray, J. 1990: 15). 
The Emperor possessed paramount power in political life, and the Confucian elite 
intellectuals served as his advisers (Gray, J. 1990). To a certain degree, the Confucian 
ideal moralised public opinion, as the saying goes as: ‘[words from] people weighs 
much more than [that of] the Emperor’. However, discussions among the literate elite 
were ‘normally part of the state apparatus’ (Fairbank 1987: 6) and seldom related to 
the common concerns of the lower social strata. Meanwhile, as harmony, social order 
and continuity were stressed as an ethos in feudal China (Rowe, W. 1990:243), an 
antagonistic public was viewed as a danger to the society. The ‘public’ were viewed 
by the governing elite as ignorant and riotous ‘masses’. Public opinion had neither 
been expressed through official outlets nor protected institutionally:
All communications [from ordinary people] with officialdom were, by definition, 
petitions. Appeal against the actions of an official could only be to his superior in office, 
who had often as much reason as his underling to cover up evidence of 
maladministration or injustice (Gray, J. 1990:16).
Those who ventured criticism of government would receive severe punishment, and 
the punishment usually extended to all members of the offender’s kinship family. The 
last feudal empire, the Qing Dynasty, was notoriously known for its ‘word prisons’ 
(Wen Zi Yu), or the imprisonment of intellectuals who aired their dissatisfaction 
towards the state in any written form.
In brief, the ancient Chinese empires were characterised by state monopolisation in 
almost every aspect of social life. Meritocracy and ‘a religious cult of the emperor’
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was the political culture in feudal China (Fairbank 1987:8). Before the introduction of 
modem bourgeois enlightenment ideas, there had been no means of channelling 
public opinion into policy making in feudal China.
1.2 Bourgeois Press and the Reformist Movements
The early bourgeois press in China was closely associated with social movements that 
aimed to achieve modernisation and independence of the nation. These goals 
immediately put the bourgeois press on the opposite side of the Qing feudal governor 
and Western colonists. The bourgeois Reformists newspapers were highly politically- 
oriented and systematically incorporated into the social activists’ appeals for reform to 
the feudal Emperor. By disseminating European bourgeois enlightenment ideas, 
newspapers promoted a certain degree of public discussion over national salvation 
among young scholars, intellectuals, and members from the gentry class. However 
due to its very exclusive nature, the bourgeois Reformist movement proved to be an 
abortive attempt to save feudal China.
The emergence of the bourgeois press in China was highly influenced by the early 
practice of foreign commercial and religious newspapers. The first English paper in 
China, the Canton Register, was set up on 8 November 1827 in Guangdong Province 
(Ding, et al. 1998: 36). Though this commercial paper focused mainly on business 
news, it devoted a substantial amount of content to political news, current affairs 
report and editorials. After defeat in the first Opium War in 1842, China was forced to 
cede Hong Kong to Britain and open coastal cities for foreign trade. More foreign 
press thus launched in China (Ge 1985 [1956]: 55-62).
The practices of the foreign press made Chinese bourgeois intellectuals more aware of 
the importance of newspapers in enlightening the public. Hong Rengan regarded 
newspapers as a means to ‘fulfil democratic politics’ in that the press can instruct the 
masses, superintend the government, and bridge the governors and the people by 
bringing forth public opinion (Ding, et al. 1998:37). Wang Tao, the owner of the first 
Chinese paper Xunhuan Daily, believes that ‘newspaper is for opinions’ and 
newspapers should ‘comment and discuss the current issues without any restraints’
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(Ding, et. al. 1998:61). Zheng Guanying, an independent publisher, pointed out that 
the press should ‘reflect the complaints of the people and reflect public opinion’ (Ding, 
et al. 1998:62).
In the late nineteenth century, the majority of newspapers in China were set up and 
controlled by bourgeois Reformists and Revolutionists. The bourgeois press became 
seedbeds of political unrest and was closely associated with national salvation from 
Western colonisation.
Kang Youwei, the Reformist leader, wrote in 1895 that newspapers should help in
98‘safeguarding territory, promoting reform’, and ‘getting rid of corruption.’ 1895 is 
also the year in which China failed to resist Japan’s invasion and was forced to cede 
land to Japan. Facing China’s failure in international relations and military conflicts, 
Chinese intellectuals were eager to debate China’s future on a new platform. Against 
such a background, the first Reformist paper Qiang Xue Bao (Newspaper on 
Strengthening [the country] through Studying) was set up on 12 January 1896. 
Though this paper only lasted for six days (until 17 January), it was ‘devoted to 
promotion of public discussion and publications on reform issues’ (Bays, D. H. 1978: 
20). Following this, Reformist newspapers, periodicals, associations and study groups 
were set up all over the country and constituted a bourgeois public sphere in which 
the intellectual elites and the gentry class participated. Shi Wu Bao (the Current 
Affairs Paper), the organ of the Reformist’s association Qiang Xue Hui, was set up in 
1895 in Shanghai and became a public forum for young intellectual elites to debate 
the country’s salvation. As Daniel H. Bays says, by ‘combining editorial essays with 
factual news and translations from the foreign press’, this paper ‘provided the first 
public forum for many young men who would later be important figures in the first 
decades of the twentieth century’ ( Bays, D.H. 1978:33).
The Chinese bourgeois press also introduced to the public the idea of newspapers as 
watchdogs of the government. According to Kang, newspapers should ‘let know 
complaints from the people and corruption of the officials’ (Ding, et. al, 1998: 89). 
Liang Qichao, who was influenced by the philosophical thoughts of Rousseau and 
Montesquieu, argued in 1902 that newspaper should ‘aim at serving the public interest
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of the majority of citizens’ and ‘act as a superintendent of the government’ (Ding, et. 
al, 1998: 89).
The bourgeois reform movement won a temporary victory during the One Hundred 
Day Reform in 1898. With support from Emperor Guangxu, some forty reform 
decrees were issued on 11 June 1898 ‘aiming at modernizing the Chinese state, its 
administration, education, laws, economy, technology, and military and police 
systems’ (Fairbank 1987:135). Among these reform strategies, the press received a 
fair amount of emphasis. Newspapers were allowed to be published by officials, the 
gentry class and ordinary citizens. Journalists were allowed to ‘report the truth and 
elaborate upon the truth without inhibition’ (Ding, et al, 1998: 94). Thus in a short 
period of prosperity, the critical press experienced a rapid growth and facilitated the 
spread of bourgeois Reformism ideas in major urban centres (Fairbank 1987:142). 
With support from the upper social classes, the Reformists later set up ‘newspapers, 
journals, schools, and study societies all over the country numbered in the dozen’ in 
the year (Bays, D. H. 1978:20). Nonetheless, this short-lived reform was interdicted 
when a royal dowager Cixi staged a coup d ’etat and detained Emperor Guangxu. 
Most of the reform decrees were denounced on 21 September 1898 and six Reformist 
leaders were decapitated, which marked the failure of the bourgeois Reformist 
movement.
The central concern of bourgeois Reformist papers was to introduce world news, 
technology, and Western Enlightenment ideas such as press freedom to the Chinese 
public. Seeing their country being colonized by western imperials, bourgeois 
intellectuals believed they should learn advanced technologies and advanced social 
political ideas from Western countries so that they could shake off the shackles 
imposed by feudalism and colonisation.
Bourgeois papers also promoted freedom and reasoning in public speech and debate. 
As Reformist leader Liang Qichao pointed out, public opinion is the utmost sanction 
power in the society, while the press is the most effective institution to reflect public 
opinion. In order to foster dynamic and vigorous public opinion, Liang believed 
‘public reasoning should be guided by the goal of searching for truth rather than 
enforcing personal preference through emotion’ (cited from Ding, et al, 1998: 135).
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These ideas put forward by the Reformists were very similar to eighteenth century 
Enlightenment ideas in Europe when the ‘reliance on the use of reason’ and ‘faith in 
the power of reason’ in investigating nature, man and society became the dominant 
feature of the intellectual process (Reiss 1991:6).
1.3 Bourgeois Press and the Revolutionary Course
Newspapers owned by the bourgeois Revolutionists in China were used as radical 
media in the fight against the dying feudal Qing Empire. Newspapers propagated 
revolutionary ideas and promoted revolts and uprisings. Compared to the Reformist 
papers, Revolutionary newspapers enlarged readership and systematically 
incorporated the revolutionary course. Through debating and reasoning, the bourgeois 
Revolutionary papers enhanced the public understanding of its political ideals, which 
finally helped bringing down the Qing dynasty.
When the bourgeois Reform movement started within China, Chinese bourgeois
Revolutionists set up their associations and the revolutionary press overseas.
Revolutionist leader Sun Yat-sen set up the first bourgeois revolutionary association
Xin Zhong Hui in 1894 in Honolulu and the first revolutionary paper Zhongguo Ribao
(China Daily) in Hong Kong in 1900. Zhongguo Ribao introduced bourgeois
revolution in Britain and France to the Chinese public. It ‘instigated the people rise up
against the feudalism, and to pursue democracy, freedom and civil rights’ (Ding, et. al.
1998, 2002: 98). Sun enlisted support from overseas Chinese for his anti-feudalism
course and set up the first Chinese bourgeois revolutionary party, the Tong Meng Hui
in Tokyo, Japan 1905. The first bourgeois Party’s organ Min Bao (People’s Paper) was
launched in the same year (till 1910). Under the influence of political theory of Karl
0 0Marx and Henry George , Sun Yat-sen perfected his political perception as San Min 
Principle which was published in the first issue of Min Bao. San Min Principle (the 
three People’s Principles) which included Minzu (nationalism), Minzhu (democracy), 
and Minsheng (the people’s livelihood) thus became the guiding principles for the 
bourgeois revolutionary course. Min Bao and other newspapers were used actively by 
the Revolutionists to propagate their political ideas and instigate public discussion on 
anti-feudalism and pro-democracy. Overseas Chinese students associations in Japan, 
England, France, Belgium and Germany supported the revolutionary enthusiastically
and also propagated the revolutionary ideals in their ow n publications (Li 1956:193).
One central concern of the Revolutionary press was to promote the idea of national 
salvation through the overthrow of the corrupt Qing feudal government. The media 
dared to expose corruption of the royal family and aristocrats, let known government 
incompetence in dealing with international conflicts, and voiced the misery of the 
general public. Min Li Bao, a Revolutionary paper set up in 1910 in Shanghai, 
publicly denounced the Qing empire as ‘retroaction government’ and supported the 
grassroots anti-colonization movements and anti-feudalism uprisings. During its one 
year of practice, Jinghua Ribao (1904-1905) in Beijing reported such scandals as 
Qing aristocrats burying their concubines alive; the Royal army harassing local 
residents; and Chinese labourers being maltreated by their British employers in South 
Africa. Jinghua Ribao was closed in 1905 by the Qing government for arousing 
dissident public opinion, and its editor-in-chief Peng Yizhong was exiled. However, 
public opinion showed its silent power when more than one thousand people turned 
up to see Peng off on the day he was exiled from Beijing (Ge 1985 [1956]: 142; Ding, 
etal, 1998: 113).
As one feature of the bourgeois enlightenment, Revolutionary papers also promoted 
public reasoning in debate. This quality of weighing up arguments in terms of the 
logos was exemplified in the public debate between the Constitutionalists (the former 
Reformists) and the Revolutionists during the Qing empire constitutional monarchy 
period30 (1906-1911). The Constitutionalists promulgated their political standpoint in 
their organ Xinmin Congbao (February 1902 - August 1907) and the Revolutionists in 
Min Bao. The polemic centred on some important issues in China’s social political life 
such as:
Did China need a national revolution?
Did China need a revolution for civil rights?
Was it essential to confiscate private land and distribute it equally among citizens?
Would the revolution invite foreign interventions which might lead to China’s
disintegration? (Ding, et. al. 1998: 118).
It was the first time in China’s history that two oppositional political camps debated 
their ideas openly through the media. As journalism historian Gongzhen Ge recorded,
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the Revolutionists presented their argument as: China needed a national revolution for 
civil rights; land should be equally distributed among citizens; the revolution would 
not invite foreign interventions and would not lead to China’s disintegration. This 
revolutionary view was ‘based upon concise and critical analysis’ of China’s social 
political reality and most importantly, it was in the public interest (Ge, G. 1985 [1956]: 
124-5). The Revolutionist idea was well received by the public through this debate, 
which helped to pave their way to the success of the bourgeois revolution in 1911.
The apogee of the bourgeois revolution came along with the Wuchang Revolt on 10 
October 1911, which marked the end of feudalism in China. The beginning of 1912 
saw the first Republic established in China. On 12 March 1912, the Nanjing 
temporary government decreed the Temporary Constitution of the Republic of China, 
in which it stated: ‘people have their rights of freedom in speech, publication, meeting, 
gathering and association’. Up to April 1912, the number of nationwide newspapers 
grew from around 100 before the Wuchang Revolt to more than 500, and the total 
circulation reached 42 million (Ge 1985[1956]: 149).
1.4 The Plebeian Public Sphere
Though intellectuals constituted their main readership, the bourgeois papers also 
emphasised the promotion of world knowledge and Enlightenment ideas to the 
general public. The plebeian public sphere emerged during this time and included 
nonbourgeois subaltern groups such as radical intelligentsia, the working class, 
peasantry, and soldiers at low ranks. The plebeian public sphere was not just an 
imitation of the bourgeois public sphere. Rather, it developed the bourgeois public 
sphere’s revolutionary potential and expanded civic participation into broader social 
life, which finally helped bringing down the feudal empire.
The formation of the plebeian public sphere in China owed firstly to the bourgeois 
Reformists’ efforts in introducing Enlightenment ideas and Western education systems 
into the country in the late nineteenth century. Kang Youwei, the Reformist leader, 
proposed in 1896 that bourgeois newspapers should aim ‘to enlighten the public’ and 
‘to enhance the public learning’31. Kang Youwei also advised the emperor Guangxu 
about the importance of opening educational institutions to public: if ‘everyone knows
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to learn and schools are set up all over the country’, he said, China would benefit from 
its talents and become strong.32 The first Western styled university Jin Shi Da Xue 
Tang (today’s Beijing University) was established during the One Hundred Day 
Reform and provided public with western higher education. Jin Shi Da Xue Tang 
survived the failure of the reformist movement and continued to be the cradle of 
liberal ideas in China.
During his editorship at Qing Yi Bao (December 1898-November 1901) and Xinmin 
Congbao (February 1902-August 1907), Reformist Leader Liang Qichao used his 
papers to introduce Western political thoughts, cultural and science knowledge to the 
Chinese public. Liang wrote in 1902 that citizenship can be nurtured through civic 
education and the newspaper was the ‘representative of the citizens’ common 
interests’ (Ding, et al. 1998: 107). The Reformist papers thus became a source of 
knowledge to the general public to learn about economy, military, legislation, religion, 
civil rights, revolution and even the idea of destruction (Ding, et al. 1998: 107-8). 
One of the Reformists’ political ideals was to encourage ordinary people to participate 
in the press. The One Hundred Day Reform triggered the setting up of more than 70 
new private papers between 1896 and 1898. Journalism historian Ge Gongzhen (1985 
[1956]) believes that the bourgeois enlightenment movement helped the Chinese 
people to grasp the ideas of freedom, humanity and equality:
With the arrival of the newspaper and periodicals, public issues started to be reported to 
the public. Thanks to the technology of modem print, the report of the public issues 
disseminated easily. As a consequence, there came the fashion of critical debate through 
which the truth could be attained. The so-called Freedom, Humanity and Equality were 
introduced into our nation (1985 [1956]: 146 author’s translation).
China witnessed a development in communication and media, and ‘participated in the 
worldwide rise of the popular press, international news reporting, and mass 
publication of books and journals’ in the early twentieth century (Fairbank 1987: 142). 
The progress in technology had an impact on both the literate elite in cities and ‘the 
literate upper level of the peasantry’ (Fairbank 1987:142) in rural areas. The 
geographical distribution of newspapers and periodicals extended from the coastal 
cities (such as Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Shanghai) to provincial capitals (such as 
Hankou, Chongqing, Chengdu, and Xi’an) and small cities (such as Hengyang, 
Pingxiang, and Wuhu). Apart from the political and partisan papers, periodicals
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started adapting themselves to a broader readership - professionals, youth, women, 
and children (Ding, et al. 1998: 93).
In this wave of an emerging popular press, a generation of independent publicists who 
came from humble family backgrounds came into the field and revolutionised the 
popular press. The written language in the Qing dynasty was still classical Chinese, 
and differed sharply from Baihua which was the spoken language used by the 
ordinary populace who had little classical education. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, bourgeois intellectuals started to use Baihua in their press as to enlarge their 
readership to ‘farmers, craftsmen, vendors, soldiers, and the teenager boys and girls’ 
(Lin Baishui cited from Ding, et al, 1998:103). In June 1901, the first Baihua paper 
appeared in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province. Its editor-in-chief Lin Baishui claimed that 
the paper should be ‘an institution of public speech’ and journalists should use the 
language acceptable to ordinary people (Wang, K. 06/09/2005). From then on, the 
Baihua paper developed, and was well received in Jiangsu, Zhili and other provinces, 
which cultivated a large popular readership for it. Early Communist party leader Chen 
Duxiu also set up a Baihua paper in Anhui province in 1908 and aspired to inform the 
public of ‘knowledge and current affairs in the most simple and easy language’ (Ding, 
et al. 1998:103).
The plebeian public sphere significantly facilitated the bourgeois anti-feudalism 
revolution. Geoff Eley argues that the liberal public sphere was faced at the very 
moment of its emergence by not only a ‘plebeian public that was disabled and easily 
suppressed’ but also ‘a radical one that was combative and highly literate’( l992:305). 
In China’s case, this combative and literate plebeian public was directly involved in 
and guaranteed the success of the bourgeois revolution. Da Jiang Bao (The Great 
River Newspaper and formed on 14 December, 1910) in Wuhan aimed to reach 
soldiers and officials of low rank and endeavoured to ‘reflect the bitter situation of 
soldiers’ life, and safeguard their rights’ (Ding, et al, 1998:206). This readership 
constituted a radical public. Though they mainly came from humble family 
backgrounds, soldiers and officials of low ranks received a certain amount of 
education enlightened with bourgeois ideas, and were collectively combative when 
compared to the majority of the public. One example is that up until the bourgeois 
revolution at the end of 1911, about one third of the 15,000 soldiers in the Hubei New
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Army joined various revolutionary associations (Huang K. 31/08/2005). Democratic 
ideas were well received by the soldiers and this plebeian public played a critical role 
in the success of the Wuchang Revolt led by the Bourgeois Revolutionists on 10 
October in 1911. The Qing feudal empire was brought down and the first bourgeois 
republic was set up in China.
1.5 Bourgeois Press and the Gender-Specified Public Sphere
Scholars (Fraser 1992; Landes 1988; 1998; Thompson 1993) point out that though 
theoretically the public sphere is open to all, in practice it is predominantly restricted 
to men. Chinese women were excluded from almost every aspect of social political 
life in the feudal society and it was the bourgeois reform and revolutionary 
movements that first included women in the public sphere. During this process, the 
bourgeois press promulgated the idea of equal rights and women’s emancipation, 
which helped Chinese women to shake off the feudal shackles and participate in 
social movements.
In feudal China, the Confucian ideal of woman’s virtue was regarded as being subject 
to one’s father, husband and son because ‘women are morally and intellectually less 
capable than men and therefore are to be under male control’ (Ebrey 1990: 204). 
Father versus daughter, husband versus wife, and son versus mother, constituted three 
levels of paternal and masculine dimensions in public life. To further guarantee male 
dominance in all aspects of social life and women’s inability to pursue knowledge, 
sociability, or career in the public life, foot-binding had been practiced since 
approximately the 10th century. Foot-binding usually started at a very early age and 
was practiced during the woman’s whole life. ‘Golden lily feet’, as the men 
euphonised the bound feet once formed, could not be unlocked like a chastity belt 
(Fairbank 1987:70). Those who dared not to bind their feet, if there were any, would 
be regarded as having no guarantee of their chastity, which would bring huge shame 
to their families. ‘By leaving only men able-bodied’, Fairbank says, ‘they ensured 
male domination in a very concrete way’ (1987: 70).
Women’s liberation was first brought onto the public agenda during the bourgeois
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Reformist movement in the 1890s. The first significant step was a campaign to 
abandon foot-binding. In August 1898, the bourgeois Reformist leader Kang Youwei 
sent a petition letter to the Emperor Guangxu about ‘allowing women to abandon 
foot-binding’. Kang raised his protest against this culturally constructed masculinity 
by acclaiming that ‘human rights were granted by Heaven; men and women are all 
equal’ (Su-Ren 2003:45). Since then, associations like Tian Zu Hui (Natural Feet 
Association) were set up in major cities calling on Chinese women to discard their 
feet-binding cloths. Tian Zu Hui even had its association journal to promulgate the 
idea of women’s emancipation (Ge, G 1985 [1956]: 103). The prevalence of foot 
binding finally died down in the 1920s after the establishment of the first Republic 
(Fairbank 1987: 70).
Chinese women started going out of their houses for their careers by participating in 
journalistic works with the bourgeois press from the late 1890s. The first Chinese 
woman working with a newspaper was Yufang Qiu who started work for her uncle’s 
Wuxi Baihua Paper in March 1898. From then on, more and more female editors and 
journalists were involved in the bourgeois press such as the Dahan Paper, and papers 
or journals aimed at the female reader such as Chinese Womens Paper, Womens 
Magazine, Women and the Family, Women s Daily, Women s Learning, and so on. The 
prestigious paper Shi Bao {Times) also created pages for both women and children, 
and started to employ female journalists (Ge, G. 1985 [1956]).
With the dissemination of bourgeois enlightenment ideas, Chinese women started 
emerging in public life by voicing the same emancipatory language for national 
liberation. The first bourgeois paper set up solely by women was formed in 1907. The 
female social activist and revolutionist Qiu Jin established this independent paper 
Zhongguo Niibao {Chinese Women) and advanced the slogan of ‘fighting for women’s 
rights, fighting for independence, fighting for liberation’ (Ding, et al. 1998:136). By 
bringing forward these ideas, the concept of women’s rights was closely associated 
with the salvation of the nation and the emancipation of the oppressed and the 
exploited populace. Qiu Jin even named her paper as a ‘division’ of the bourgeois 
revolutionary army (Ding, et al. 1998:136) to portray the important role women 
played in social changes.
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1.6 Characteristics and Limitations of the First Bourgeois Public Sphere
The first bourgeois public sphere in China was characterised by contradictions. The 
bourgeois public sphere was dominated by bourgeois elites with the exclusion of the 
majority of the population. At the same time, ‘subaltern counterpublics’ (Fraser 
1992:123) also emerged and constituted the radical forces during the bourgeois 
revolution. The bourgeois intellectuals introduced Western enlightenment ideas and 
public reasoning to Chinese people while at the same time, partisan interest and 
personal loyalty undermined rationality in public debate.
In terms of the inclusiveness of the public sphere, bourgeois intellectuals from the 
officials and the gentry class dominated public debate. During the heyday of 
bourgeois reform between 1895 and 1898, discussion of reform was largely confined 
to the ‘scholar-official class’ (Bays, D. H., 1978:20). People who were actually 
involved in debating China’s future were mainly young gentry members in Beijing or 
were near cosmopolitan places such as Canton and Shanghai (Bays, D. H. 1978:20). 
Mass illiteracy among the lower social strata made it impossible for the rise of a 
reading mass public in China. The self-sustaining agricultural economic mode in rural 
areas limited the peasantry class from participating in broader public life. However, it 
is not feasible to insulate the bourgeois discursive arenas from the effects of inequality 
against other societal groups. As Fraser puts it,
Where societal inequality persists, deliberative processes in public spheres will tend to 
operate to the advantage of dominant groups and to the disadvantage of subordinates [...] 
these effects [of societal inequality] will be exacerbated where there is only a single, 
comprehensive public sphere (1992:122-3).
Members from subordinated social groups (young intellectuals, overseas students, 
soldiers, officials, and women) constituted the alternative publics. Armed with such 
shared emancipatory language as ‘freedom’, ‘equality’, ‘emancipation’ and ‘national 
salvation’, these oppressed social groups recast their needs and therefore consolidated 
their positions in the political arena.
Bourgeois newspapers introduced the idea of rational critical debate to the Chinese
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public. For the first time in China, history saw that two political camps, the 
Constitutionalists and bourgeois Revolutionists, debated in public over the nation’s 
political future. The Revolutionists won the debate for their merits in rationality. 
However, bickering among partisan cliques and also personal loyalty to the power 
holders undermined the bourgeois ideal of deliberation and reinforced the Confucian 
ideal of meritocracy. Daniel Bays points out during the bourgeois Reformist 
movement: ‘the society and the newssheet went under in the crossfire of partisan 
political infighting between individuals and cliques in the never ending political wars 
of the court’ (1978: 21). Fairbank states that in the bourgeois revolution in China, 
‘governing’ was still regarded as ‘a moral responsibility borne by virtuous men to 
benefit the populace as Confucius taught’ (1987: 171).
A few months after the establishment of the Republic of China, the elected President 
Sun Yatsen was tactically replaced by warlord Yuan Shikai, who controlled military 
power. Yuan Shikai promised to arrange the abdication of the last Qing feudal 
Emperor in return for being named as the new President of this militarily weak new 
bourgeois Republic. In this way, feudalism was brought to an end in China and Yuan 
Shikai became the Provisional President. In the following years, China witnessed a 
conflicting warlord era. ‘From 1916 to 1931 the political history of China as a united 
country virtually ceases. There was a shifting system of quasi-independent states 
concerned to maintain or improve their positions in a struggle to control the national 
government’ (Gray, J. 1990: 170). The result of the warlord era was ‘the feudalisation 
of government’ (Gray, J. 1990:170-171). In 1928, the country was brought under the 
one party dictatorship of the National Party (Guomindang). In 1931, China was 
invaded and colonised by Japan until the end of the Second World War.
2. The Second Republic, Proletariat Authoritarian Governance, and the 
Dissolution of a Proletarian Public Sphere (1949-1978)
Marxism was regarded as a new solution to national salvation by Chinese intellectuals 
who were dispirited by the failure of bourgeois revolution. After the Republic of 
China fell into the hands of warlords, a generation of young Chinese intellectuals 
went to Europe searching for a philosophical justification for their struggle against 
feudalism and colonialism. They found Marxism and in 1921, with the help from the
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Communist International, the Chinese Communist Party was formed in southern 
China. The Chinese Communist Party injected Marxism into the Chinese indigenous 
revolution experience, and projected a comparatively progressive view of political 
participation which involved governance by the majority proletariat. However, after 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Party suppressed free public 
speech by putting the media under tight control. The media were viewed as part of the 
ideological apparatus, and used as propaganda tools for political indoctrination and 
mass mobilisation (Zhao 1998: 4).
Under the Communist Party’s dominant control in the official public sphere, 
alternative and oppositional public spheres existed marginally in the forms of wall 
newspapers, underground literatures, private gatherings, and non-official associations. 
Alternative political preferences and oppositional voices were largely unheard of by 
the majority of the population. Nevertheless, in times of crisis, alternative media 
forms such as the wall newspapers could proliferate, attract a large audience, and 
assist the expression of critical public opinion, and finally facilitate socio-political 
changes. The alternative and oppositional media showed their effect in bringing down 
the Partisan cliques and buttressing the economic reform in the turbulent 1970s. 
However, the alternative and oppositional public spheres have not become 
institutionalised in Chinese society, hence they can be easily manipulated by the 
dominant political power.
2.1 The Rise of the Communist Party
The emergence of the Communist party in China was an outcome of the domestic
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working class struggle, the New Culture Movement started in 1915, and gained 
momentum due to the international influence of the Russian Bolshevik revolution of 
1917. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Chinese working class 
expanded and working class movements were put on the political agenda. Meanwhile, 
the New Culture Movement further enhanced Enlightenment ideas and the Chinese 
youth eagerly searched for ‘a philosophical justification of the individual conscience’ 
(Gray, J. 1990: 204). The success of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution was regarded 
as a new solution for national salvation when ‘a united front of intellectuals, 
merchants, and workers had defeated the Government in defence of national interests’
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(Gray, J. 1990:199).
The development of the Communist Party in China was a result of the ‘imperfect 
autocracy’ of the National Party (Guomindang) from 1928 to 1949 (Fairbank 1987: 
185). As Fairbank points out, ‘the ruling-class elite had expanded and differentiated 
but the peasant masses, though restive in many small uprisings quickly suppressed, 
were still politically inert’ (1987:171). Under the name of a Republic, a meritocracy 
of those qualified by social status and wealth continued in China, and a large 
proportion of the population was left out of political participation.
The dynamic bourgeois public sphere that was formed before the first Republic was 
disappearing, and public concern was banned from discussion:
The press, though it persisted, was heavily censored. Publishers were harassed and some 
assassinated. Anyone concerned for the masses was regarded as pro-Communist. This 
anti-Communist stance had the effect of discouraging if not preventing all sorts of 
projects for betterment of the people (Fairbank 1987: 221).
Contrary to the National Party’s autocracy the Chinese Communist Party, under the 
leadership of Mao Zedong, practiced a ‘mass line’ philosophy as their political 
strategy for social change (Gray, J. 1990). This philosophy attracted the majority 
proletariat -  the urban working class, the rural peasantry, intellectuals and students, 
and the low-status soldiers in the army. ‘Mao Zedong had appealed to the Chinese 
people against the oppressiveness of Guomindang censorship, suppression of 
intellectuals, brutality towards students, murders of political opponents, and 
increasingly Fascist methods’ (Gray 1990:293). In Marx and Engels’ The German 
Ideology, they state that ‘the production of consciousness is interwoven with the 
material activity and the material intercourse of men -  the language of real life’ 
(1976:36). Due to social division of labour, the working-class people (the ‘masses’ in 
Mao’s words) who actually produce the goods in society do not have enough leisure­
time to create social consciousness but only ‘the means of subsistence’. Thus, it is 
important for a ‘revolutionary class’ to be created to counter the ruling class, arouse 
the working-class people to revolution, and participate in the changing of societal 
consciousness. In China’s case, the Communist Party identified itself as the 
revolutionary class for the working-class people. The Communist Party claimed they
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would rely on the people, act out of the interest of the people, and serve the people. 
The majority proletariat was also promised comprehensive civic participation, 
including universal suffrage and freedom of speech in political life.
Though the Communist Party promised freedom of speech, Mao also proposed the 
method of ‘unity-criticism-unity’ as a guideline for public discussion. ‘Unity- 
criticism-unity’ means that ‘if all discussion begins from acknowledged unity of 
purpose, then it can be carried on without rancour, after which unity can be reaffirmed 
at a higher level of rationality and mutual understanding’ (Gray 1990: 283). This 
common view of ‘democracy’ held by the Chinese Communist Party is a mixture of 
bourgeois enlightenment, Marxism, and Confucianism. According to Fairbank (1978), 
the optimistic (man-is-educable) Confucianism believes that ‘good government rests 
on a natural harmony of interest between the ruler and all individuals [...] every 
individual should develop his abilities and so contribute more to the common good’ 
(1978:152). In Mao’s philosophy, this state-centred Confucianism is rendered as 
‘unity’. Individuals should therefore fit into the unity of common purpose, while anti­
unity will not be in the interest of the masses, and thus will not serve the mutual 
purpose of the governor and the governed.
This comparatively progressive view of comprehensive political participation, 
especially when it involved for the first time political participation for the majority 
proletariat, won people’s support for the Communist Party during the Chinese civil 
war (1945-1949). ‘The people’s warfare’, as Mao named it, finally overthrew the 
National Party under Chiang Kai-shek’s governance. In late 1949, the People’s 
Republic of China was established.
2.2 Disillusion of the Proletariat Public Sphere
Establishment of the People’s Republic of China did not bring about the expected 
unified proletariat public sphere. The public sphere in China became a situation of 
“absorbing the less powerful into a false ‘we’ that reflects the more powerful” (Fraser 
1992: 123 citing Mansbridge). Though the polity of the PRC is ‘people’s democracy 
authoritarian’, it is actually one-Party dictatorship in a deceitful way. Antagonistic
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public voices, if there were any, were muzzled under the Party’s iron grip. The Party 
Principle (dangxing yuanze) became the guideline in both public societal life and the 
media daily practice. As Zhao explains, the Party Principle is comprised of three basic 
components: ‘that the news media must accept the Party’s guiding ideology as its own; 
that they must propagate the Party’s programs, policies, and directives, and that they 
must accept the Party’s leadership and stick to the Party’s organisational principles 
and press policies’ (Zhao 1998:19).
Chinese media in the early 1950s consisted of the state-subsidised organs of the 
Communist Party and a small number of commercial newspapers and radio stations 
from the old regime. As Zhao noticed, commercial media ‘were forced to design their 
coverage to support the Party’s guidance in political and social life’ and drop their 
practice of ‘intrusive’ interviewing style (1998:16). Being unable to attract any 
advertisement, commercial newspapers dropped in number from 58 in 1950, to 25 in 
1951, before disappearing entirely in 1952 (Zhao 1998:16).
Freedom in political discussion was gradually taken back by the Party when the 
Party’s organisations started their own newspapers. By 1954, there were 151 Party 
organs, 17 newspapers were aimed at workers, 23 at farmers, 17 at youths and 
juveniles, 14 at specialised trades and 15 papers were from social organisations and 
other parties in China (Zhao 1998:17). Though on the surface it looked as if 
independent media proliferated under the Communist regime, the Party controlled the 
media both financially and ideologically. All media were subsidized by the state and 
required to observe the ‘Party Principle’ in their journalistic practice. Even the official 
organ of the Chinese Democratic League34, Guangming Daily (est. 16 June 1949) 
which is supposed to be the media for oppositional parties, was supported by the 
Communist Party and ‘considered integral parts of the socialist press system’ (Zhao 
1998:16).
All newspapers in China apart from the Party’s organ focused on a certain subject area 
(e.g. economy, health, education, etc.), targeted specialised readership groups (e.g. 
workers, women, peasants, etc.), and were under the control of a certain official 
institution (e.g. Ministry of Health, National Trade Union, etc.). This measure, as 
Zhao says, ‘effectively prevents newspapers from being independent civil institutions
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outside the Party/state apparatus or the pseudo-civil organisations dominated by the 
Party’ (1998:127).
China witnessed wave after wave of nationwide political turmoil, such as the Anti- 
Rightist Movement in the 1950s and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the 
1960s and 1970s. These political campaigns involved extreme use of brainwashing, 
psychological pressure and physical deprivation against those assumed as being 
antagonistic towards the proletariat authoritarian governance. As Zhao contends, mass 
media were tightly controlled by the most powerful political clique within the 
Communist Party as a weapon for propagating political indoctrination to the people. 
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), most papers (including many of the 
Party organs) ceased publication. There were only 43 regular newspapers in China in 
1967 (Zhao 1998:17).
As to the ordinary Chinese citizens, the only officially acknowledged means for the 
expression of political opinion were the wall newspapers (dazibao) which were hand­
written tabloid news-sheets expressing political preferences or grievances posted on 
walls for public reading. Wall Newspapers have been praised by Marxists for their 
social role as political weapons (Gray, J. 1990). Mao Zedong believed the wall 
newspapers cost almost nothing in production, but were simple and accessible to 
anyone, and therefore should be encouraged for their ‘classless’ nature. Mao’s backing 
for the free airing of views through wall newspapers brought about the heyday for 
wall newspapers during the Cultural Revolution. However Gray notices:
In his [Mao’s] stress on the importance of democratic consciousness he underrated the 
importance of democratic institutions; democracy as a set of rules for the protection of 
particular rights was of no interest to him. The aroused masses would spontaneously 
create their own democratic institutions, he believed. Yet what was actually created in the 
Cultural Revolution? Nothing except Jacobin tribunals pre-empted by fanatics, leading 
inevitably to the Thermidor of the army-dominated ‘revolutionary committees’ 
(1990:378).
Mao’s poetic vision of the political mobilisation of proletariat during the Cultural 
Revolution proved to be a catastrophe for the whole nation. Schools and universities 
were closed; government institutions and state-owned media were taken over by 
different Partisan cliques; political disagreement displayed among wall newspapers
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escalated from verbal fights to armed skirmishes in real life; retaliation among 
different cliques led to arbitrary arrest, killing and missing. The proletariat public 
sphere failed to achieve people’s comprehensive political participation in China.
2.3 The Alternative and the Oppositional Public Spheres
The Communist Party’s control over the media and other aspects of civic life in China 
has constructed, to borrow Karol Jakubowicz’s (1991) words, the ‘official public 
sphere’ as the dominant tier. However beneath this ‘concrete’ surface, the ‘alternative 
public sphere’ and the ‘oppositional public sphere’ have existed and might change 
their role from marginal and underground to central during times of crisis.
‘Public’ in the Communist Party’s political discourse is phrased as ‘people’ or 
‘masses’. People’s role in public life as Mao Zedong states, is to embrace the Party’s 
ideas:
In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily ‘from the 
masses, to the masses.’ This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and 
unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and 
systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the 
masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and 
test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from 
the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and 
carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas 
becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time. Such is the Marxist theory of 
knowledge (Mao 1967:120).
The Party’s media, as Mao emphasised in 1948, is ‘to educate the masses, to enable 
the masses to know their own interests, their own tasks and the Party’s general and 
specific policies’ (Mao 1969:242). Thus the public in the Communist regime has been 
regarded as passive receivers of the Party’s indoctrination and the active executors of 
the Party’s decision. However, by making the above comment, Mao neglects the 
autonomy of the people in forming public opinion, especially the progressive nature 
of the liberal intellectuals which made them opinion leaders during time of crisis.
During the Cultural Revolution, underground literature and underground journals 
(mostly circulated through hand-written copies), private correspondence and 
gatherings functioned as an informal institutionalisation of the alternative and
oppositional public sphere. Underground literature, with poetry as its major form, 
aired out public grievances towards political chaos in the country and directed the 
accusation towards the partisan clique headed by Mao’s wife. When the Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai died in 1976, national mourning was demonstrated by voluntary 
poetry reading at Tiananmen Square in April. This later turned into a nationwide civil 
protest nationwide and helped bring down the ‘Gang of Four’35, which finally ended 
the Cultural Revolution.
Nevertheless, the most widespread and effective alternative media in China is the wall 
newspapers (Dazibao), or ‘Big Character Posters’ (Sheng 1990). According to legal 
scholar Hua Sheng (1990), the first Big Character Poster in China appeared on 23 
March, 1942. Wang Shiwei, a 36-year-old pro-Communist scholar at the time, posted 
an essay written in large characters on the wall of a building in Yan’an, the base of the 
Communist Party during most of the anti-Japanese War (1937-1945) and Chinese 
Civil War (1945-1949). In his essay, Wang criticised the Party leaders for their 
‘arbitrary and repressive treatment of political dissident’ (Sheng 1990: 235). Though 
Wang was beheaded and his supporters were imprisoned for raising criticism of the 
Party, his essay in the form of wall newspapers marked the birth of a form of political 
dissent in China. After the establishment of the PRC, wall newspapers were regarded 
by Mao Zedong as a form of ‘classless’ media that enable the proletariat class to raise 
their voices. In the late 1950s, with backing from Mao, wall newspapers proliferated 
in major cities: ‘they included lengthy formal theses, sarcastic essays, poems, cartoons, 
and traditional Chinese novels. After some posters were put up, many more followed 
to support or oppose views expressed in previous ones, resulting in lively debates’ 
(Sheng 1990: 237). It is widely believed that wall newspapers were manipulated by 
Mao Zedong to attack his political opponents and consolidate his leadership 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, wall newspapers ‘provided a means of 
expressing dissent publicly that facilitated open criticism of the government as well as 
criticism disguised as endorsement of Party policy’ (Sheng 1990: 243).
Deng Xiaoping launched his economic reform in spite of opposition inside the 
Communist Party in 1978, young intellectuals posted wall newspapers in Beijing to 
champion this move of the modernisation. As Chen says, public opinion aired in these 
wall newspapers supported Deng to carry out his reform plan, which secured Deng’s
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position in the Party (cited in Downing, J. et al. 2001: 172). This wall later became the 
famous Xidan Democracy Wall for accommodating oppositional political opinion.
Nonetheless, when wall newspapers later expanded their discussion from backing 
Deng’s reform to criticism of the Communist Party, Deng’s consent to the wall 
newspapers on the Xidan Democracy Wall changed to disapproval. Chen says that the 
oppositional public opinion carried on the wall newspapers harboured radical rhetoric 
such as condemning the Communist Party rule as a ‘feudal monarchy’, dismissing 
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong-Thought as a ‘deceitful hoax’, calling for people to 
hold demonstrations and organize citizens petition groups for human rights, and 
calling for establishing democracy (Downing, J. et al. 2001: 170-2). The Wall 
Newspapers in Beijing further triggered a nationwide flourish of underground journals 
and constructed oppositional public opinion against the Communist Party. These 
journals were ‘heartily embraced’ by the Chinese public and the excess of demand 
over supply made it impossible for the authorities to ignore their existence:
Though they [the underground journals] were inferior to the official journals by being 
mimeographed, often illegible and roughly bound with poor editing and often poor 
writing, nevertheless their ample variety of content, bold approaches to sensitive subjects 
and, most of all, prompt response to current events to readers’ demands outweighed this. 
(Chen, R. cited in Downing, J. et. al. 2001:172-3)
The alternative public sphere and the oppositional public sphere were temporarily 
buttressed by the national leader when public opinion served his interest. When 
antagonistic public opinion started to challenge the Party’s leadership, the government 
closed down the Democracy Wall and the underground journals (Gray, J. 1990: 392).
To sum up, under the totalitarian governance of the Communist Party, media were 
viewed as the ideological apparatus of political indoctrination and mass mobilisation 
in China. Media, largely separated from the public, were used as tools for mass 
propaganda and persuasion by the government or individuals from the Party. Though 
the alternative and oppositional media forms existed marginally, they failed to build a 
rational critical public and reflect antagonistic public opinion in a systematic way. In 
this perspective, the vision of a proletariat public sphere ended in failure in China.
3. Media Reform in a ‘Socialist Market Economy’ (since 1978)
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Economic reform commenced in China in 1978 and a ‘socialist market economy’ was 
officially adopted in 1992. Though the Chinese media still remain as government 
institutions, they have obtained a certain amount of financial independence to meet 
the audience’s demand. During the process of commercialisation, democratic forces 
also called for independent media and press freedom, which brought the Party’s 
control over the media into question. Public interest (in Chinese political discourse, 
the ‘people’s principle’) has been promoted from time to time as a challenge to the 
arbitrary power of the Party.
However, the change in the economic sphere in China marked the ‘semi-takeover’ of 
capitalism and had the effect of ‘re-energising China’s capitalist revolution after 
Tiananmen’ (Pei 1994:84). The commercialisation of the Chinese media took place 
under this universal push towards globalisation and diversification of media 
ownership, privatisation and deregulation in the communication field (Lent, J. A. 
1998). Though commercialisation freed the Chinese media from being an absolute 
ideological apparatus for the Party, the democratic ideas for a more independent 
public sphere were still ‘elementary, fragmentary and unsystematic’, as Zhao observes 
(1998:41).
3.1 Commercialisation of Mass Media
The commercialisation of media in China has a double-sided effect. On the one hand, 
it brought about the phenomenon of de-ideologisation (Chu, L. 1994). Leonard L. Chu 
argues that with the liberalisation and marketisation of China’s media system, the 
Party’s power and ideological control are eroded and Chinese media are used less as 
ideological apparatus. However on the other hand, commercialisation brought 
business interests into the media industry, which posed a threat to the emerging public 
sphere.
The media’s reform in China started when the Party’s organ Peoples Daily first 
embraced the market economy. The Ministry of Finance approved the introduction of 
business management to the People’s Daily in 1978 and later to other media. Zhao
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observes that:
Although these newspapers were still regarded as political and cultural institutions and 
still received subsidies, they began to be managed as business enterprises [...] They were 
forced to save money by streamlining operation and were subjected to cost analysis, 
profit targets and government taxation (1998:53).
Since the early 1980s, the government gradually cut its subsidies to media and 
encouraged commercialisation in the media industry. As a consequence, the media got 
the permission of the Party to abandon the practice of propagating ‘class struggle’ and 
started providing information to the public. As Zhao recorded, Li Ruihuan, the 
Communist official in charge of media and propaganda, stated in 1992 that 
propaganda work should emphasise economic construction. He further pointed out 
that ‘media should be more informative and should meet the needs of various 
audience’ (Zhao 1998:48). This guideline of meeting the needs of readers/audience 
was enthusiastically practiced by the Chinese media. During my internship with 
Guangming Daily from July 1994 to February 1995, the majority of domestic news I 
was assigned to cover were consumer-oriented stories about the likes of food quality 
and intellectual property rights conflicts.
Commercialisation of the media in China enhanced media expansion and encouraged 
the proliferation of media outside of Party organs. From 1991 to 1995, the number of 
newspapers in China rose from 1,543 to 2,20236, the number of radio stations from
"xn724 to 1,202 and television stations 543 to 837 . Evening papers, morning papers, 
tabloid papers, paper devoted to legal issues and crime stories flourished in the market 
and succeeded in building up their readership. Zhao (1998) perceives a power shift 
within the media system reflected in the decline of Party organs and the rise of 
metropolitan papers. Most municipal media outlets in China dropped the practice of 
propagating Party and government policies. Content close to daily life of the urban 
population was welcomed by both media practitioners and audiences (1998:68-9). In 
the southern cosmopolitan city Guangzhou, the Guangdong Provincial Party’s Organ 
Nanfang Ribao set up the first media conglomerate within the Party press system -  the 
Southern Media Group in 1998. The Southern Media Group covers publishing, 
printing, advertising, information service, real estate, and other business areas. Even 
the Party’s organs and the government organisations’ papers in Beijing expanded their
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pages or produced weekend editions to meet their readers’ demand. People’s Daily, 
the Party’s media conglomerate, now has eight papers, six weeklies, and 11 journals 
affiliated to it. Apart from the overseas edition of the People s Daily, most affiliated 
papers and journals are market-orientated, which can be detected from their names 
such as Market News (since 1979), International Finance News (since 1994), or 
Chinese Automobile (since 1984). Readership of the newly established commercial or 
semi-commercial publications in urban areas started to divert readers’ attention from 
the Party hegemonic role in societal life.
With more and more media becoming financially independent from the government, 
some liberal Chinese journalists started to question the Party’s interference in editorial 
matters. In 1986, the chief editors of national newspapers openly expressed their 
desire for press freedom and autonomy of journalistic practice. Some journalism 
theorists in that period even claimed that press freedom should be written into legal 
frameworks, which advocated their support for the media’s desire to break away from 
the ‘arbitrary power of the Party’ (Zhao 1998:35-6). The call for press freedom 
reached its peak in May 1989 when Hu Jiwei, one of the Party’s top leaders, released 
a statement contending that ‘there will be no genuine stability without press freedom’ 
(Zhao 1998:37). Journalists from both Party organs and newly established media 
walked into the streets and were directly involved in the pro-democracy movement. 
Yet after the brutal crackdown on June 4, the media reverted to the old track as part of 
the Party’s undertaking, and had to hold the same view as the Party (Meng 2000). 
Restrictions on editorial autonomy even increased for a few years after 1989. People’s 
Daily ‘was required to report its main news content to the Party’s Propaganda 
Department before its daily four o’clock editorial committee meeting’ (Zhao 1998:46).
With the progress of commercialisation after 1989, Chinese media has gradually 
stripped away ‘the ideological straitjacket imposed by the CCP [Chinese Communist 
Party]’ (Lee, C-C. 1994:12). Media content was shifted from political instruction and 
propaganda to more business information, social news, entertainment, and even 
criticism of authority. As Zhao noticed, media in China went from ‘leader-oriented’ to 
‘reader-oriented’. Journalists started to emphasise ‘truthfulness’, ‘brevity’, 
‘timeliness,’ ‘liveliness’ and ‘readability’ in their stories. Human interest stories,
disaster news, crime news, and news that criticised the wrongdoing of officials 
became acceptable (Zhao 1998:34). Journalists and writers from provincial media 
especially dare to expose scandals and express antagonistic opinions that would not be 
allowed on the Party’s organs. Nanfang Zhoumo, a flagship paper from the Southern 
Media Group, is a case in point. Being China’s largest circulation weekly, Nanfang 
Zhoumo won fame for its coverage of sensitive or even scandalous social issues such 
as two imprisoned corrupt officials in Shenyang who still enjoyed extravagant 
banquets in prison (26/01/2006), or a peasant who bombed the judical high court in 
Gansu Province and killed the judge (08/01/2006). These topics, though well received 
by the public, were usually regarded as ‘negative reporting’ by the Party. However, in 
spite of being forced to dismiss its journalists or editors by the Party’s Propaganda 
Department, Nanfang Zhoumo has not given up its bold coverage of taboo issues in 
contemporary China and always stirs up a big reaction among its readers. As Zhao 
comments, media commercialisation in China makes it possible that the ‘principle of 
Party journalism such as positive propaganda, “correct” guidance of public opinion, 
as well as conventional Party definitions of news, have been disregarded or subverted’ 
(1998:139).
Nevertheless, commercialisation of media had the negative side effect of undermining 
the emerging public sphere. Since advertising has become the major financial source 
for Chinese media, business interests started to influence the coverage of public 
affairs. Meanwhile, financial independence has not brought media freedom from the 
Party’s administrative control. Chinese media have become a servant with two 
masters and have to observe the Party’s instructions and serve their business clients at 
the same time. Sponsorship brought in business interference in editorial policy which 
Zhao calls ‘Chinese informercials’ that is ‘paid information services that are 
integrated into regular media content’ (1998:59). According to Zhao, commercial 
sponsorship of media content started in the mid-1980s from entertainment and 
educational programmes, and spread to news programming and across different media 
(1998:62). When it came to the 1990s, a business could take over content production 
from a media establishment. A purchasing company ‘can buy a segment of the Party’s 
mouthpiece and turn it into its own mouthpiece while still making a profit’ (Zhao 
1998: 65).
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3.2 Media’s Representation of the ‘Public’
As discussed before, the ‘public’ in the Communist regime were regarded as ‘masses’ 
to be educated and represented by the Party through state-controlled media so that 
they would know their own interest. After the reform taken up in the late 1970s, 
scholars started arguing for the ‘People’s Principle’ in media coverage in the early 
1980s. As Xinfen Gan argues, the Chinese media should speak for the people and 
represent the people’s interest:
The lesson of the holocaust of the ten-year Cultural Revolution has taught us that the 
Party’s leadership, even the Party Central Committee, may commit mistakes. When 
mistakes are made and when the party’s press blindly executes the leadership’s intentions, 
newspapers themselves are committing serious mistakes. Therefore, upon discovering 
mistakes, editorial departments should not blindly implement their instructions. 
Newspapers should put the interests of the people above everything else and be run 
accordingly... .When a communist society is attained, even the Party will be eliminated. 
Yet the people are permanent, they live forever! (cited from Zhao 1998:38)
The economic reform, as Jian Meng believes, brought about the re-construction of 
social strata and an urban middle class emerged, which heralded a rising public power 
in China (2000). The call for civil participation from the newly emerged middle class 
expanded the ‘alternative public sphere’ and ‘the oppositional public sphere’. Some 
liberal-minded leaders within the Party sensed this change, and tried to situate the 
media within both the ‘Party’s Principle’ and the ‘People’s Principle’.
In October 1987, the Party’s former General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, first used the 
phrase ‘political transparency’ to advocate openness in governmental policy-making 
procedure. It is Zhao who first suggested a democratic communication model between 
the Party and the people: the Party and the government should inform the people 
about important events (zhongda shiqing rang renmin zhidao), decision-making over 
important issues should involve public discussion among the people {zhongda wenti 
jing renmin taolun) (Liu, X. 17/10/2004), and the Party should be supervised by 
public opinion (Yulun Jiandu) (Zhao 1998:36). Though Zhao Ziyang’s efforts in 
launching democratic political reform were aborted with the crackdown in Tiananmen 
Square in 1989, public-orientated content started to receive more emphasis in media’s 
coverage in the following years.
The reflection of public interest could be found in some broadsheet newspapers such as 
Beijing Youth News in the capital. Beijing Youth News, which is an official organ of the 
Beijing Communist Youth League, was one of the dailies successfully adapted to the 
market and its reader-oriented content was largely welcomed. Zhao describe the paper in 
the mid-1990s as ‘had elements of the nineteenth-century American penny press’ in 
‘breaking away from an elite readership’. The paper, as Zhao believes, was ‘downplaying 
narrow political news’ and ‘emphasising entertainment and news outside the Party/state 
apparatus’. It won its popularity for ‘its concerns for common people and defence of 
their interests against corrupt officials and business,’, ‘its social critiques,’ and ‘crusading 
journalism’ (Zhao: 1998: 144-5).
In the radio and television section, audiences started to participate in programmes and 
have their voice heard. Call-in radio programmes started first in entertainment shows 
then with experiments in news and current affairs, so that ‘the elitism of some media 
professionals and reformers has been at least partially modified’ (Zhao 1998:156). 
The call-in radio programmes started in the late 1980s in Guangdong Province and 
quickly spread across the country. As one presenter recalled:
It seemed suddenly every radio station opened their call-in hotlines. Listeners then called 
in to participate in the topical panel discussion, interview the guest speakers, confide 
their troubles to the presenter in late-night talk programmes, or request songs for their 
families or friends... (Li, Q. 2005:119 author’s translation).
This interaction between the media and ordinary audiences undermined the media’s 
role as solely the Party’s mouthpiece. Ordinary people, who do not necessarily have 
qualifications or institutional recognition, can simply act on their own behalf, air their 
complaints, express their opinions, and speak out in their own language.
TV programmes followed this example. In 1993, the China Central Television (CCTV) 
launched a morning magazine programme Oriental Horizon (dongfang shikong). This 
magazine programme has provided close contact with ordinary people, addressed 
their concerns, and treated them as protagonists38. In 1996, the first talk-show 
programme Tell It Like It Is (Shihua shishuo) in China was launched on CCTV. This 
programme has provided Chinese public with access to participate in public 
discussion and speak their opinions in their own language. These two programmes 
were hugely popular and triggered copycat programmes all over the country. Though 
the audience participation goes through selection process and is still limited in terms 
of numbers, the democratising potential is worth noticing. Public participation in
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media production reduces the Party’s advantage in using media as ideological 
apparatus, and thus poses a challenge to the Party’s hegemony in public perception.
Today’s audience-oriented commercial media in China is different from pro­
democracy political journals such as the World Economic Herald (the Herald) in the 
1980s. Li Cheng and Lynn T. White argue that the Herald, had an ‘obvious bias for 
the interests of technocratic elites’ (1991:365). ‘Social welfare, environment, labour, 
and domestic trade were rare among its domestic coverage. Women, the elderly, urban 
housing, and other important issues received little attention’ (Cheng and White 
1991:364). Commercial papers in China today cater to a wider range of readers and 
audience, including the self-employed, urban unemployed, immigrants peasants, and 
workers whose needs are usually neglected by the Party’s organs. The latest 
commercial TV success, the Super Girls, as Sociologist Li Yinhe comments 
‘represents a victory of the grass-roots over the elite culture’ (China Daily 
30/08/2005). The Super Girls, an American-Idol type show in 2005, involved national 
voting for the final winners, and was heralded by many Chinese as a mediated 
experience of democracy. One has to admit that the commercialised voting for a pop 
idol is totally different from casting votes while practicing suffrage. However, as 
famous Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo points out, the popularity of Super Girl created 
a carnival of public participation and national voting, which created a ‘non-political 
politics’ in China. The Super Girl phenomenon revealed that a sense of citizenship has 
been cultivated in a civil society (Liu, X. 25/08/2005). Compared to the elite- 
dominated democracy discourse prevalent before 1989, the post-1989 democratisation 
reflects the decreased intellectual divisions in China by bringing the majority of the 
public into an enlightenment dialogue.
3.3 Characteristics and Limitations of the Public Sphere in Contemporary China
The public sphere in today’s China is exemplified by various informal institutions in 
societal life. Media (various in their forms and political economy) play a significant 
role in reflecting rising public power and constructing the alternative and oppositional 
public sphere. On the surface, the dominant tier in the public sphere is still 
consolidated by state-controlled media. Under this dominance, semi-independent 
commercial media and radical media venture to expose social inequality,
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governmental scandal, and even challenge the hegemonic Party ideology. However, 
under the joint forces of commercialisation and globalisation, Chinese media are at 
the same time undergoing a process of de-politicalisation. Entertainment content 
rather than coverage on political and public current affairs becomes the main content 
provided by various media. Even in news programmes/stories and current affair 
coverage, the demarcation between information and entertainment or advertisement is 
blurred. Some current affairs coverage aim more at tantalising the public with 
sensational details than helping the public to cultivate rational critical discussion. In 
this sense, the public sphere in China is facing the danger of deterioration from both 
political intervention and commodification.
Before the media reform, the political economy of mass media in China was 100 
percent owned and controlled by the Party and the state. As Leonard Chu (1994) says 
the Community Party was ‘the owner, manager, and the practitioner’ of Chinese 
media and no private media organisation was allowed. With the commercialisation of 
the media, state intervention decreased and ideological application of media was 
weakened in public life. Similar changes were observed by Slavko Splichal in 
analysing media system in eastern European countries: ‘privatization is seen as the 
only instrument that can reduce and possibly abolish state intervention in the media’ 
(1994: 136).
The media gains proportionally more autonomy when they gain a certain amount of 
economic independence from the state. As Habermas argued, with the establishment 
of the bourgeois constitutional state and the legalisation of a political public sphere, 
the press as a forum of rational-critical debate was no longer requested to take sides 
ideologically (1989: 184). In China’s case, commercialisation helped change the 
media’s role from the Party’s mouthpiece to a public forum. Chu thus grouped 
together commercialised local television, radio, cable and satellite TV, commercial 
papers (such as evening papers), and foreign media (such as BBC and VO A) as 
‘China’s alternative media, which the Party has found to be disturbing but impossible 
to curb’ (1994:9). However, commercialisation in the media industry will not 
necessarily fulfil the media’s role as carrier of critical public opinion against the 
political authority. With the commercialisation of media, government’s control over
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the media does not loosen but changes more subtly ‘by sending unclear signals 
regarding the degree of freedom allowed, thus keeping editors and broadcasters off 
balance and producing dangerously high levels of self-censorship’ (Lent 1998: 185). 
This is what happened with the Chinese media. As Zhao noticed:
Commercialisation outlets survive and flourish not by directly challenging the party 
principle and discarding political propaganda but by softening the tones of political 
propaganda, moving beyond narrow political propaganda, and broadening content to 
include social and personal issues. Their contents are supplementary rather than 
oppositional to the more conventional Party organs (1998:159).
Meanwhile, commercialisation sets new rules for media to fit their content into 
business management. John Keane criticises the structural limitation of the market in 
building democracy:
Market competition produces market censorship. Private ownership of the media 
produces private caprice. Those who control the market sphere of producing and 
distributing information determine...which opinions officially gain entry into the 
“marketplace of opinions” (1991:90).
Within the commercialised media system public interest, public concerns, and 
diversity in public opinion may hot be fully reflected in media content. As Lent argues, 
under the circumstances of media commercialisation, many representative groups in 
society are trivialised into a ‘haphazard, dull, sketchy and negative picture’ (Lent 
1998:159). Before the economic reform, there were government-funded wire-radio 
networks and newspapers carrying agriculture news and information in the rural areas. 
In the fierce competition for advertisement, papers for peasants who lack both 
political and cultural capital declined dramatically. Wired-radio network deteriorated 
due to lack of public investment (Zhao 1998: 69-70).
4. Summary
The public sphere in China has been characterised by its pluralism, complexity and 
also deficiency in public deliberation. Throughout history, the media’s role in 
constructing the public sphere is worth noticing. The bourgeois press was used as a
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radical media form in fighting against the feudal empire. Under the Communist 
regime, the media was used as ideological apparatus for maintaining the status quo by 
suppressing an antagonistic public. In today’s China, media’s role in constructing 
rational critical publics is both facilitated and hampered by commercialisation. The 
public sphere in China is charged with tension and ambiguity.
The bourgeois press had actively participated in Reform and Revolution since the late 
nineteenth century. The media fulfilled the roles of enlightening the public, exploring 
public wisdom, voicing public complaints, and guiding public opinion. Class barriers 
were broken down in debates over China’s future and arguments were weighed 
according to the logo and factual evidence. The rising Bourgeois class regarded 
themselves as the representatives of the general public and used the press as a weapon 
in anti-feudalism and anti-colonialism political campaigns. Alongside the bourgeois 
public sphere, ‘subaltern counterpublics’ such as working class people, soldiers of low 
rank, and women also developed their own emancipatory language, which contributed 
greatly to the Bourgeois revolutionary course that brought down the feudal Qing 
Empire.
During the Communist Regime from the 1950s to the late 1970s, the Party maintained 
its overt control of the political economy of mass media and other social institutions 
in the public sphere. The public are regarded as ‘masses’ to be educated and motivated 
by the Party through the media which was used as a propagating tool. The media were 
not able to be watchdogs over the Party and the government, nor could they reflect 
antagonistic public opinion. As Zhao contends, the media had not emerged as an 
independent public sphere (1998:151).
Since the Economic Reform in the late 1970s, the Party’s absolute control over media 
has been largely attenuated. Financially independent media emerged in the 
metropolitan cities and won readers and audiences from the Party’s mouthpieces for 
their bold coverage on social problems. Even the state-controlled media have regained 
a certain degree of editorial independence in producing public-oriented content. Also, 
for the first time media, especially broadcasting, started to involve public participation 
in their productions by launching phone-in programmes, talk shows and public-voting 
programmes. However, the downside of this commercialisation is that ‘the
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undistinguished “masses” and “the people” of the Party’s mass-line journalism may 
eventually become the advertisers’ targeted middle-class consumers’ (Zhao 1998:155), 
which will lead to the deterioration of the public sphere rather than building up a 
critical public.
China’s joining the World Trade Organisation has quickened the country’s pace in 
globalisation. Today’s China sees that ‘a globally integrated [...] communication 
system is rapidly redefining communicative relationships within and across Chinese 
borders’ (Zhao 2003: 68). Under such circumstances, web-based new media forms 
such as bulletin boards shed hope on the structural transformation of the public sphere 
in China. CMC can broaden the scope of public discussion, facilitate rational critical 
debate, mobilise politically marginalised or suppressed social groups, and cultivate a 
sense of citizenship among Chinese publics. The use of bulletin boards can be 
oppositional, but not always subversive. By constructing an alternative public 
discourse, the bulletin boards can build a discursive space for conversation among 
citizens first and might gradually engage the state in this dialogue. In this sense, the 
Internet is intrinsically a media form that might change political culture in China.
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Chapter 4 
Methodology
Studying online communities based on bulletin boards involves rethinking (and 
probably revising) traditional research methods in media studies. The tradition of the 
production-content-reception study is challenged, as the demarcation between 
production and reception is blurred in cyberspace where producers and audiences can 
be integrated into one. This research, as argued before, attempts to reflect the changed 
relationship between gatekeepers and users (the traditional audience) in cyberspace, 
and explores how this change affects the outcome of media content. Therefore, I adopt 
multiple qualitative research methods which involve analysing gate-keeping, 
production, representation and reception. To be specific, this research includes:
•  Field notes of a two-month participant observation with QGLT as an intern 
moderator;
•  Interviews with seven QGLT moderators, 22 users, one NGO member, two 
journalists and one government official;
•  Textual analysis of QGLT users’ pennames, signature files, and postings during 
the SARS crisis in 2003.
1. Research Ethics
China is a country that practices severe online censorship and imprisons online 
dissidents. For that reason, one central concern of this study is research ethics. As 
Neuman (1994) believes, research ethics are about how to acquire and disseminate 
trustworthy information in ways that cause no harm to those being studied. The 
ethical obligations require avoiding deception, asking permission to record, being 
honest about the intended use of the research and ensuring interviewees are not hurt 
because they agreed to talk with the researcher (Rubin, H. and Rubin I. 1995:94).
I have been reading QGLT postings since 2001. Since the SARS crisis in early 2003,1
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registered a few pennames with this community and started posting occasionally. 
This participation in the online community gave me an opportunity to gradually 
familiarise myself with the terms and social norms within QGLT and also gain
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knowledge of other community members. This experience helped greatly with my in- 
depth interview with QGLT users from April 2004 to April 2005 and my participant 
observation of QGLT from July to September in 2004. One delicate issue regarding 
this is how I can truthfully integrate the data from field research in my dissertation 
without endangering the interviewees who trusted me with their insiders’ perspective 
of media policies in China or their antagonistic political opinion.
Before I conducted interviews, I indicated the purpose of the study clearly in the first 
email sent to my interviewees. When I started recruiting interviewees, I made the aim 
of this project and the use of data known to QGLT users who agreed to be interviewed. 
Interviewees’ consent was given by emails, web Messenger, and through phone calls. 
Also before each interview, the interviewees were again informed and made aware of 
the nature of my questions and purpose of my research. QGLT staff, two journalists 
and one informant from the State Council remain anonymous in the research and are 
identified only by their affiliation. All QGLT users believe that their pennames 
function as a protection of true identity, so all of them agreed to allow me to use their 
pennames as that guarantees a kind of anonymity.
However, before submitting this dissertation, I need to consider some of my 
interviewees who trusted me by telling me of their offline activities that might offend 
the authorities (e.g. one interviewee had his articles about the labour pension system 
in China posted on the site of a labour rights organisation based in the USA). Though 
there is a slim opportunity that this dissertation will be read by the Chinese police, I 
will still replace their pennames by common English names.
2. Participant Observation of Gate-Keeping Process within QGLT
Participant observation, as some scholars believe, is ‘particularly suitable for a study 
of the gatekeeping process’ (Wimmer and Dominick 2000: 113). As a qualitative 
research method, participant observation combines document analysis, direct 
participation and observation, interviewing, and introspection from an insider’s 
perspective (Denzin 1989, Flick 1998).
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In June 2004, I applied to www.people.com.cn for an internship with QGLT and had 
my application granted in July. From July 18 to September 20, 2004, I worked with 
QGLT editors in the same work settings and practiced moderating under supervision 
for two months. A field notes journal was kept during this period. This experience 
provided me with in-depth descriptions of the media environment and an explanation 
of QGLT editors’ gate-keeping and self-censorship practice that would otherwise be 
difficult to obtain.
2.1 Gaining Access to the Work Setting
The research setting was part of the www.people.com.cn 1,500 square metres open 
working area in a two-story building located inside the big complex of the People s 
Daily. Holliday suggests the research setting ‘should be sufficiently small: logistically 
and conceptually manageable’ (2002:38). The QGLT working area had 12 cubicle 
working units in total when the research was conducted, which is sufficiently small 
and manageable. Each member of staff works with a PC in their open unit adjacent to 
each other, which provides a natural bounded environment for field observation.
Since I was told by Mr. Jiang Yaping, the Deputy President of www.people.com.cn, 
that QGLT had never received researchers for participant observation before, I applied 
to work as an intern moderator. Stated in my application letter were also the research 
purpose and how I would use the field observation data. Steven Taylor and Robert 
Bogdan contend that the rapport between the researcher and observed is best 
established when the researcher participates in common activities which will not 
disrupt the institution’s normal routine (1984). Working as one of the newsroom staff 
was the best approach for me to observe the gate-keeping process of my study without 
disturbing its staff’s daily media practices. I believe my participation improved my 
access to sources and had a minimal effect on the QGLT staff who were being 
observed.
2.2 Field Work Journal as Data Collecting
The field work journal, as Spradley defines, is the personal perspective of
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‘experiences, ideas, fears, mistakes, confusions, breakthroughs, and problems that 
arise during field work’ (1979:76). The central part of my field work journal is my 
experience of moderating one of the QGLT boards, Lianyi Huiguan (Friendship and 
Liaison Board). Apart from that, I also took notes of the newsroom weekly meetings, 
what happened in the news room, what was said by the QGLT director, my interaction 
with QGLT staff, interviews with QGLT staff, as well as my impressions and 
interpretations of what was observed. I usually scribbled down observations and 
impressions in a note book and expanded this condensed note into detailed field notes 
during natural breaks or at the end of the day.
My routine work of moderating Liangyi Huiguan (.Huiguan thereafter) mainly 
included designing ‘soft’ topics (which means less political, more cultural or 
entertaining) for discussion, and deleting inappropriate postings (such as postings 
containing political innuendo, obscene language, or officially banned topics). 
Huiguan, as I later found out, was one of the few boards40 allowed to be moderated by 
non full-time QGLT staff such as volunteers41. Meanwhile, Huiguan is the only board 
within QGLT that is open till 11pm or even later when other boards close at 10pm. 
Discussion goes on as long as there are volunteers moderating the board (in Chapter 5, 
the role of volunteers in QGLT will be discussed in detail). These two characters give 
Huiguan a certain amount of autonomy and accommodate active interaction among 
users late at night. Moderating Huiguan generated rich and detailed data for this 
research.
My field observation usually started at 9 in the morning. One of the editors-in-chief 
would assign the day’s working shifts among editors -  due to the intensity of online 
moderating, each editor works two hours for one shift. Meanwhile, editors would 
submit a summary of postings they had deleted from the previous day and post their 
summary on the internal forum. This practice aims to provide for every editor a 
guideline to what recent sensitive issues (s)he should keep an eye on.
Every afternoon, there would usually be an online panel meeting with guest speakers 
within QGLT. I was assigned to design questions for panel meetings several times and 
to post those questions during the session under pseudo-usernames. The questions 
were supposed to be sharp, meaningful, and challenging, but not provocative or
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confrontational. This practice served a few purposes, according to the QGLT 
administration. Firstly, if there were a small amount of users logged on for the panel 
meetings, the pre-designed questions would save guest speakers from the 
embarrassment of meeting no ‘audience’; secondly, even if there were enough users 
turning up for the panel meetings, the pre-designed questions would be prioritised so 
that the online discussion would be moderated under some ‘correct’ guidelines.
Apart from observing the real life working environment, I also browsed information 
on the internal discussion board which was only open to QGLT editors. The internal 
board is updated with newsroom policies, detailed regulations concerning moderating, 
and opinion-exchanging among editors. Unfortunately, my user name and password 
for the internal board lasted for only one week before the QGLT director decided I 
should be banned from accessing this board.
In the field notes I recorded what happened in the newsroom, the newsroom policies, 
my interaction with QGLT staff, as well as my impressions and interpretations of what 
was observed. To draw the distinction among events observed or heard, and my own 
impression or interpretation, I followed Strauss et al.’s strategies in keeping field 
notes: words within quotation marks signified exact recall; words with apostrophes 
indicated a lesser degree of certainty or paraphrasing; and verbal material without 
markings meant recall. Explanation and impression was kept separated from actual 
observations by the use of single parentheses and brackets (Strauss et. al. 1964:29).
Box 4.1 An example o f field note:
Time: July 22 2004 17:10
Event: Warning the user who posted ‘inappropriate’ messages 
Observation:
At 17:13:53, a posting from editor Jon appeared in QGLT, it read:
‘Dear user wo ai yesu, thank you for your continuous support to QGLT. You are a 
veteran user within this community, so there is no need for me to repeat some 
regulations to you. Please help others by helping yourself when you post. Thank you. 
Jon.’
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I came to Jon and asked:
YW: What happened just now? I saw you posting a message to wo ai yesu.
Jon: *Oh, I just gave wo ai yesu a warning.*
YW: Warning? Why?
J: * wo ai yesu has been holding a negative opinion against the previous Prime 
Minister Zhu Rongji. He has been particularly against Zhu’s financial policy of 
levying 20 percent tax on increased interest from banks. He always claims that Li 
Peng was a better Prime Minister than Zhu. Look at his postings, there’s no content at 
all apart from 'Jiaxi jiaxi jiaxi jiaxi....’ (‘increasing the interest’ 20 times). But wo ai 
yesu has been a veteran user and he knows these kind of postings are inappropriate, so 
I only need to give him a warning*.
YW: Why inappropriate? Negative comments on Zhu Rongji or posting 'Jiaxi jiaxi 
jiaxi jiaxi....’ without content?
J: Both. He also used to upload Old Testament and New Testament to QGLT. You 
know, it is illegal to preach religion in non-religious venues. That was also 
inappropriate behaviour.
YW: Will the warning prevent wo ai yesu from posting similar messages?
J: Warning works for the short period of time. Then he’ll be back. I know.
YW: Would it be easier for you to block his penname so he couldn’t post?
J: *No, no, no. If I blocked this penname, he would change to another ‘waistcoat’ 
(penname) and come back again. Some users have more than ten ‘waistcoats’. It will 
be more difficult to spot him if he’s in a different waistcoat. It’s better to just give a 
warning*.
[Impression: To punish those who post ‘inappropriate’ messages, QGLT moderators 
can delete the postings, give warnings, block the users’ pennames or even block the 
users’ IPs. Most QGLT moderators tend to choose a mild way of punishing -  not just 
for building better relationship with users, but also for more efficient management of 
the boards].
The major difficulty in conducting participant observation with QGLT was the 
growing suspicion towards me from the administrators. My overseas student status 
always cast doubt over me as I might be suspected of getting information from the
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Party’s organ for some antagonistic western media or political groups. I was requested 
to stop taking notes during meetings and during work. Later in my field work, making 
mental notes and transcribing them at the natural intervals of work replaced jotting 
down a condensed account of observation.
3. Interviews
Thirty-three interviews, including seven interviews with QGLT staff, twenty-two with 
users, and four with other sources were conducted for this research. Semi-structured 
open-ended questions were used as an interview guide. In-depth interviews was the 
main method for this specific research for the following reasons:
•  QGLT participants’ understanding, knowledge, and insights of the virtual 
community might not be measured by quantitative methods like surveys;
•  The choice of interview questions can be tailored to match what the 
individual interviewees know and feel (Rubin, H. and Rubin I. 1995:6) so 
that it can generate answers based on each respondent’s perspective. In-depth 
interviews work best for sensitive issues (Wimmer and Dominick 2000: 122), 
so that it fits well with the study of QGLT as ‘an avenue for dissidents’ 
(Turner 10/04/2000) in authoritarian China;
•  The practice of online communities based on the Internet bulletin boards 
forms a new culture, lexis and norms. As a researcher, I need to ‘figure out 
the special new vocabulary and the taken-for-granted understandings’ 
(Schiitz 1967:74) through in-depth conversation with QGLT staff, users and 
informants.
The qualitative in-depth interviews conducted are in a semi-structured (also called 
focused) format (Merton, et al. 1990) of topical interviews. Before every interview, I 
had already read the online profile and postings from the interviewee and had some 
knowledge of his/her interest and main argument on certain current issues. I started 
interviews with general questions such as the interviewees’ media consumption habit 
(or journalistic work experience for the QGLT staff), then guided the discussion by 
asking individually tailored questions dealing with more defined subjects. For 
example, one Taiwanese user who posted frequently in 2001 advocating Mainland 
China’s re-unification with Taiwan, moved his family to the Mainland in 2002. My
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interview questions included, ‘what was your motivation for logging on to QGLT to 
discuss current issues when you were in Taiwan’; ‘how did other QGLT users react to 
your argument for China’s re-unification’, etc.
3.1 Interviews With Gate-keepers
Fifteen www.neople.com.cn staff, including twelve QGLT staff, two Vice-Presidents 
and the President of www.people.com.cn were invited to be interviewed in person. 
Letters of invitation for interviews were submitted to the President and the vice- 
Presidents with the major questions listed. Finally, seven interviews were conducted.
In getting knowledge of QGLT staff, I conducted a small-scale survey among them. 
The questionnaire consisted of mainly demographic features such as age, education, 
political affiliation, journalistic working experience, years of using the Internet, years 
of working with QGLT, etc.
My impression of QGLT editors (moderators) was that they were amenable in terms 
of helping me when it came to familiarising myself with the working environment and 
moderating the boards. However, when I asked in person (in a more or less private 
way) for an interview, some of them reacted defensively. Instead of openly turning me 
down, those editors (moderators) showed extreme reluctance in fixing a date and time 
for interview. Meanwhile, two of the three top administrators declined my invitation 
for interviews as they said what they could tell me would have been covered in 
www.people.com.cn online public relations materials. Eventually, seven interviewees 
accepted in-depth interviews with each interview lasting about one hour. Box 4.2 
shows the composition of my interviewees.
The major difficulty of interviewing QGLT moderators was how to handle the issue of 
confidentiality in our conversations. Since I had been working with them, most of 
them tended to treat me as a colleague and talked honestly about this online 
community to the best of their knowledge. However at certain points, they were also 
aware of my overseas student status and requested that I should not include what they 
said in the interview transcription. One of the editors had a lot of insightful ideas 
about political discussion on Chinese bulletin boards when the two of us chatted over
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lunch, but when I took out a tape recorder and a notebook, he started to speak like a 
spokesperson from QGLT. In a country like China where journalists still go to jail for 
passing information to Western journalists, I can totally understand their suspicion 
and worry
Box 4.2 The composition o f interviewees from QGLT
Interviewees from QGLT, www. people, com. cn
•  Top-level administrator: Mr. Jiang Yaping (founder of QGLT and Vice-President 
of www.peonle.com.cnk
•  Mid-level administrator: Mr. Shan Chenbiao (one of the major founders of QGLT 
and Director from August 1999 to July 2004);
•  Two QGLT Editors-in-chief;
•  Three QGLT editors (moderators).
3.2 QGLT Users Interviews
The majority of my in-depth interviews were conducted with QGLT users. Interviews 
with QGLT users were semi-structured topical interviews which, as Rubin and Rubin 
describe, is ‘a tree-and-branch mode’ (1995:201). I started out with a set of structured 
main questions covering the overall subjects such as users’ media consumption 
behaviour, the frequency they visit and post on QGLT, their understanding of good 
postings and good online discussion, etc. There were a few probes and follow up 
questions under certain main questions such as asking users to give examples of ‘good 
discussion’ or ‘bad discussion’ they experienced within QGLT (see Appendix 1 for an 
example of my semi-structured interview with a QGLT user).
‘Many qualitative interviews have both more structured and less structured parts but 
vary in the balance between them’ (Rubin, H. and Rubin I. 1995:5). In the less 
structured parts of the interview, I tailored my questions to each individual based on 
my knowledge of them from their postings. The less-structured part of the interview 
provided detailed information about what factors encourage or inhibit QGLT user’s 
online opinion expression, their specific understanding of political discussion, and
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their unique experience of identity construction both online and offline.
3.2.1. Sampling
The sampling strategy was a combination of maximum variation sampling (Wimmer 
and Dominick 2000: 115) and snowball sampling (Lindlof 1995: 127-128) due to the 
sensitive political nature of the research objectives.
I started sending emails with questionnaires attached to QGLT users’ personal email 
addresses as a pre-selection process from May 2004. The questionnaire consists of 
three sections of multiple choices. Section I is the demographic features of QGLT 
users (e.g. gender, age, education, profession, place of origin, place of living, and 
political affiliation). Section II is about QGLT users’ media consumption including 
their Internet using behaviour. Section III aims to gain a general understanding of how 
users perceive QGLT online discussion (see Appendix 2).
My own contact with 11 users and another 24 users from snowball sampling answered 
questionnaires. Based on the questionnaires received and also users’ voluntary 
participation, I selected 22 of them for intensive interviews (see Appendix 3 for the 
composition of my interviewees). My interviewees were chosen according to the 
following criteria:
•  They were ‘encultured informants’ within QGLT. American anthropologist 
Spradley uses this term (1979:47) to describe those individuals who know 
the local culture well and take it as their responsibility to explain it to others. 
All my interviewees had been encultured in QGLT for at least 1 year up to 
the interview date and were quite familiar with this virtual community. 
Apart from one lurker recruited from my off-line friend circle, all the rest of 
the QGLT interviewees were heavy posters and played active roles within 
the community;
•  They were chosen purposefully to yield as many different and varied 
situations as possible. My selection of interviewees varied in its 
composition in terms of gender, education, age, profession and other 
demographic elements. By doing so, I attempted to present a range of views 
from QGLT users;
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•  They were willing to talk about their experience. There were some QGLT 
users who answered my questionnaire, but later turned down my invitation 
for an interview. One reason might be their preference towards maintaining 
the anonymity associated with online identity. The other reason might be the 
political risk in being involved in this kind of research based overseas. I had 
been questioned a few times for my real identity and once was even asked 
to show my ID card by my interviewee. Some QGLT users suspected I 
worked either for the Chinese government or for a foreign media 
organisation under the disguise of a Cardiff University student.
The major difficulty for this research is the potential political danger to QGLT users 
associated with their passing on information to an overseas researcher. This concern 
restrained some QGLT users from talking to me about their involvement in online 
political discussion. Social institutions like parliament in China (namely, the People’s 
Congress) do not accommodate open debate. Political discussion among ordinary 
citizens only exists in the virtual world when anonymity provides some kind of 
protection. Even in online discussion, the Communist Party imposes many taboos in 
terms of what should be debated. Talking about issues like Taiwan’s independence, 
Tibet’s independence, the Falungong Spiritual movement, the 1989 pro-democracy 
movement, criticism of the Communist Party and its top leaders, etc. might lead one 
into political persecution. It is widely believed that spies from government 
organisations (e.g. Public Security Bureau) have been lurking on most bulletin boards 
ready to track down ‘offenders’ for prosecution (Cohn, M. R. 21/07/2001). This harsh 
reality made a planned online focus group impossible and also recruiting users for 
interviews very difficult.
3.2.2. Record the interview
The Internet allows data collection from individuals all over the world at fast speed 
and reasonable cost. In addition, since the respondents remain anonymous, they may 
be more likely to honestly express their opinion on sensitive topics (Wimmer and 
Dominick 2000: 422). These qualities make the Internet a possible tool for conducting 
in-depth interviews. However, it also brings challenges to the recording of 
conversation in traditional face-to-face interviews. Interviews conducted for this 
research were recorded in emails, instant messenger online chatting record, and
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traditional audio cassette.
Based on the information from questionnaires, I realised that only two of my 
interviewees live in Beijing, 18 of them live in other parts of China, and two of them 
in the USA. It was physically and financially impossible for me to conduct face-to- 
face interview with them all. Meanwhile, most of my interviewees only agreed to 
accept interviews through electronic media form (e.g. emails, QQ, MSN, Skype, etc.) 
even after talking over the phone with me when I fixed the interview time. The 
following table shows the communication means I used for intensive interviews with 
QGLT users.
Table 4.1 Tools used for conducting interview with QGLT users
Face-to-face interviews 2
Face-to-face interview + Instant Messenger* + Online phone 
talk
1
Telephone interviews 8
Telephone + email 1
Telephone + Instant Messenger 3
Instant messenger 1
Instant messenger + email 3
Emails 3
Total 22
* Instant messenger used including MSN, Skype, and QQ.
The following reasons might also contribute to QGLT users’ preference for being 
interviewed through electronic media rather than face-to-face communication:
•  The anonymity associated with online identity encourages users to talk about 
politics openly and honestly. Communication through electronic media 
enables users to preserve a certain amount of anonymity;
•  Most users are fairly adapted to express their opinion through computer- 
mediated communication. They prefer to talk ‘serious issue in-depth’ through 
the electronic communication means;
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•  Computer-mediated communication can be used as an alternative means for 
efficient data collecting. For example, instant messengers allow individuals 
to have instant verbal exchange of conversation. Facial icons (a smiley / 
surprised / angry / depressed / confused face) express partially how the 
‘conversationalists’ feel. Besides, most instant messengers support online 
audio/video communication between individuals using the same messenger 
service, which might be viewed as an alternative to telephone interviews and 
face-to-face interviews.
Intensive interviews conducted online also have self-evident disadvantages. As the 
New Yorker Cartoonist Peter Steiner said in July 1993, nobody knows you are a dog 
in cyberspace. There is no way to check whether the interviewees are who they say 
they are (Wimmer and Dominick 2000: 422). Follow-up questions are more difficult 
to ask and probing into the interviewees’ changes in attitude or tone becomes 
impossible. To avoid unintended deception from users, I read and took notes of all 
available postings from them before interviews. Self-disclosure postings from users 
were used as guidelines for raising probes and follow up questions. One interview was 
conducted in July 2004, according to the interviewee’s request, through the instant 
messenger service Skype. We started the interview by exchanging verbal messages 
and followed by talking online through microphones and earphones. A few weeks 
later, we met in person in Beijing so that I had the chance to check my online 
interview data. The follow-up face-to-face interview confirmed what I had already 
leamt from online interviews. Interviews with another two QGLT users in person also 
corresponded with my impression of their online identity and personality.
It is true that multiplicity in identity can create deception in online communities. 
However, as Judith Donath notices, some varieties of identity can be subtle identity 
manipulations, which are ‘similar to the adjustments in self-presentation we make in 
many real-world situations’ (1999: 44). This identity manipulation or concealment 
from interviewees would not be able to be avoided even in offline contexts when 
interviews are conducted face-to-face.
3.3 Other informant interviews
My other informant interviews included interviews with the founder of an
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environmental protection non-government organisation, two journalists from the 
official media, and one official from a government organisation. Originated as an 
anthropology / ethnography term, informants are defined as native speakers who are a 
source of information for the ethnographer (Spradley 1979: 25). In this study, the 
informants are ‘natives’ in their work settings. They played vital roles in providing me 
with valuable insiders’ perspective of the social ecology for online discussion on the 
Internet bulletin boards.
The founder of the environmental protection NGO was interviewed over the phone for 
her understanding of the role of Internet bulletin boards in coordinating actions among 
grassroots NGOs. Two journalists from the national media kindly worked as my 
informants during the SARS crisis in 2003 and shared with me their knowledge of 
governmental measures for regulating media during this crisis and the corresponding 
news room policies. Another informant from the Information Office of the State 
Council provided me with comprehensive information of government policies of 
controlling online political discussion over the Internet bulletin boards.
One sensitive issue arising from this is the protection of my informants. In China, 
informants for western media are still persecuted in the name of ‘leaking national 
secrets’ and have their career, freedom, and even life jeopardised. I had communicated 
my research objectives as clearly as possibly to my informants, kept them informed 
about how I was going to use the material, and kept them anonymous in this 
dissertation.
4. Textual Analysis
The study of QGLT postings during the SARS crisis is a case study. A case study, 
though focusing on a single event as a research subject, can provide detailed and 
explanatory information about the research topic. It aims to capture ‘the particularity 
and complexity’ in this event and ‘understand its activity within important 
circumstances’ (Stake 1995: xi). A variety of research methods can be employed in a 
case study (Wimmer and Dominick 2000: 125). To capture the complexity of the 
SARS incident, I used textual analysis as the research method in analysing online 
postings.
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I started monitoring SARS postings within QGLT from Feb. 8, 2003 when first I 
heard of the outbreak of ‘serious pneumonia’ in China from personal contacts. In the 
following three months, I collected postings on SARS discussions mainly from three 
sub-bulletin boards within QGLT - Current Affairs, In-Depth, and Health. I filtered 
355 postings in total from the QGLT In-Depth with ‘SARS’ or ‘Atypical Pneumonia’ 
in their titles for textual analysis. This analysis is also compared with the 
322 SARS news stories from the People s Daily from April 4 to April 30. The sample 
thus covers periods when the SARS crisis started to emerge to the time when it was 
gradually put under control. This selection of text aims to be both representative and 
significant.
Alan McKee writes that textual analysis is a process that means ‘we make an educated 
guess at some of the most likely interpretations that might be made of that text’ 
(2003:1). The definition of a “text” can be any object that is symbolic and carries 
meaning (Matheson 2005: 182) -  the words, numbers, pictures, news articles, 
television footage, online postings, etc. On Internet bulletin boards, the textual 
elements in each posting can be broken down as the title (of the posting), the penname 
(of the contributor), body of the posting, signature file (of the contributor), replies and 
follow-up postings to the main posting, and hyperlink(s) in the posting, as shown in 
the following figure:
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Figure 4.1 The Composition o f  a posting
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The above screenshot shows an ordinary QGLT posting. As displayed above, an 
online posting as a new media discourse can be broken down into mainly the 
following textual elements.
• Title. The title is usually made up of words, phrases, or a short sentence. It can 
be a summary of the main ideas in the posting or used to arouse other users’ 
interest by raising a question.
• Penname (Username). A penname could be made up of words, phrases, or 
even a short sentence in QGLT. This is an important means for users to present 
their identity. A semiotic study of users’ pennames can reveal the connotation 
of the symbolic signs chosen for the pennames and the ideology constructed 
through choosing signs and arranging words in sequence.
• Body of the Posting. Online postings, as a novelty discourse contributed by 
individual users, have the potential of both observing and breaking down the 
generic conventions found in traditional media. Postings can be any form of 
headline news, investigative stories, feature stories, news commentaries,
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reviews, diaries, letters, audio or video clips, photos and pictures, etc or the 
combination of any of these different forms.
• Signature file. A signature file can be a name, an e-mail address, a line of 
quotations, a statement, a poem, photos and illustrations, ASCII illustration, 
etc. Similar to pennames, a signature file is an important means in constructing 
online identity in an extended way. Semiotic studies of the symbolic and 
iconic signs chosen for the signature files in QGLT reveal rich and distinct 
cultural and political connotations associated with online identity construction.
• Replies and follow-up postings to the main posting. Some postings (in most 
cases because they raise controversial issues) trigger applause, criticism, 
discussion or debate from other users. The follow-up postings develop the 
argument in the main posting and construct distinct interactivity among users. 
A narrative study can reveal, to a certain extent, how knowledge of social 
events is constructed through interaction among users according to cause and 
effect and how this development of argument moves towards a conclusion.
• Hyperlinks. Hyperlinks can be found in QGLT users’ pennames, signature files, 
or body of the postings. These links are usually directed to users’ online 
profiles, personal webpages or blogs, relevant articles or background 
information. The study of intertextuality between main postings and their 
secondary texts can further reveal the pattern of online narrative construction.
Since the 1980s, a trend in the study of texts is that it has moved from a simply 
linguistic perspective to an approach emphasizing the social contexts within which 
texts are constructed and used (van Dijk, T. A. 1985; Fairclough 2003). The concept 
that media texts are ‘transparent’ bearers of meaning is challenged and much attention 
is given to both the linguistic and ideological structuration in media messages (Hall 
1980: 117-8). Stuart Hall defines ‘the media as a major cultural and ideological force, 
standing in a dominant position with respect to the way in which social relations and 
political problems were defined and the production and transformation of popular 
ideologies in the audience addressed’ (1980:117). It is based on this belief that textual
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analysis is used in this project to reveal how Chinese users construct, interpret, contest, 
and change their sense of social reality. Thus in this research the analysis of text-based 
online interaction is not limited to describing the syntactic meaning of each sentence. 
Instead, this research focuses on the context of the production of online text, and aims 
to reveal the ideological position of users and the power relationship between the 
public and the political authority in both online and offline circumstances.
5. Summary
Multiple qualitative research methods including participant observation, in-depth 
interview, and textual analysis are used in this research to analyse the gate-keeping 
process, and the production, representation and reception within online 
communication.
As argued before, the tradition of the production-content-reception study is 
challenged in the online media environment as the demarcation between production 
and reception is blurred in cyberspace and producers and audience can be integrated 
into one. Thus, I choose qualitative research methods with an ethnographic approach 
in an attempt to reflect an ‘insider’s’ perspective of the changed power relationships in 
the online media environment, and explore how this change affects the outcome of 
media content. The qualitative research methods can be effectively applied when the 
anonymity, mobility and multiplicity associated with online identity make quantitative 
research methods such as surveys less practical and less reliable. It is also worth 
noticing the role of the Internet facilitated communication methods such as emails, 
instant messenger, etc. These new online communication devices are efficient and 
effective tools for recruiting and interviewing users across the world. Finally, I would 
add that only when the researcher him/herself becomes an ‘encultured informant’, can 
(s)he be able to reveal part of the mystery associated with online communication.
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Chapter 5 
Surveillance, Censorship and Self-Censorship in QGLT
In theory, computer-mediated communication opens a dialogue among citizens and 
the decentralising nature of the Internet makes censorship very difficult. However, 
digital technologies that facilitate electronic deliberation can also ‘provide the 
ultimate means of surveillance’ (Noveck 2000:25). Information communication 
technologies can consolidate the offline gate-keeping process, enhance digital 
monitoring, and put online public content directly under the censorship of authority. 
In this chapter, I will look into how online political discussion in China is moderated, 
filtered, and censored based on my participant observation as an intern moderator 
with QGLT from July to September 2004.
My study reveals that in spite of the commercial business model introduced into the 
Party’s organ Peoples Daily since 1978, political discussion within its online 
community QGLT still has to go through the micro and the macro level of the gate- 
keeping process. On the micro level, QGLT staff practise the moderating roles. All 
users’ postings have to go through editors, editors-in-chief, and directors before they 
can appear on QGLT bulletin boards. On the macro level, certain government 
institutions such as the Beijing Municipal Government Public Information 
Administration (Department of Internet Censorship), and 1106 Office from the 
Central Propaganda Department can intervene at any time by giving administrative 
orders.
Existing studies on Internet bulletin boards in China often focus on discourse analysis 
of online postings, rather than the study of production which involves gate-keeping on 
bulletin boards. The following sections examine the online gate-keeping process in 
which ICTs are used as ‘ideological state apparatuses’ to consolidate the dominant 
political discourse. Based on my ethnographic research within QGLT, I found this 
bulletin board subject to strict administrative regulations and news room censorship 
by journalists (moderators). Self-censorship is also practised among users (mainly 
through the mediation of volunteers), which further limits new media’s deliberation
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potential. By setting the agenda for public debate, diverting the discussion topics 
away from sensitive issues, and punishing opinionated dissidents, QGLT is facilitating 
the stringent watch from ‘big brother’.
1. The Political Economy of the QGLT
The commercialisation of the media in China brought about the phenomenon of de- 
ideologisation (Chu, L. 1994) meaning that Chinese media are now used less as an 
ideological apparatus by the Communist Party. Being part of www.people.com.cn. the 
online edition of the Party’s organ Peoples Daily, QGLT possesses the dual 
characteristics of being financially semi-dependent and administratively dependent on 
the government. This feature makes it more tolerant towards liberal ideas contributed 
from users; while still subject to administrative surveillance, newsroom policies, and 
self-censorship practised by QGLT editors/moderators.
Peoples Daily, which has been the Chinese Communist Party’s ‘mouthpiece’ ever 
since its creation in June 1948, has a circulation of more than 3 million. Like its 
counterparts in other former Communist countries42, People’s Daily has the status of a 
separate government ministry (Haggart, K. 1992:50) and provides ‘official political 
roadmaps for party officials and other readers who needed to be informed’ (Johnson,
O. 1998:108). Unlike its counterparts in other Communist regimes, People's Daily 
went through a transformation from being solely a Party organ to a media 
conglomerate after reforms in 1978.
As the Party’s organ, Peoples Daily is under direct surveillance from the Party’s 
Propaganda Department and the Information Office of the State Council. A hotline 
connects the Propaganda Department and the chief editors’ offices. In times of crisis, 
chief editors consult the propaganda officials or ‘the Propaganda Department might 
well call in the chief editors on a daily basis’ (Haggart, K. 1992:52). Top Party 
officials (including the late Chairman Mao) penned a number of editorials for the 
People s Daily from time to time (Zhao: 1998).
Nevertheless, since the media reform in 1978, Peoples Daily has been actively 
involved in a series of business activities, and has become a conglomerate of a
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business enterprise despite continuing to be an ideological state apparatus. Apart from 
being a media group, People s Daily now extends its business antenna into real estate, 
finance, infrastructure construction, the film industry, and both domestic and foreign 
trade. 43 These changes in the economy of People s Daily reflect the rate of 
commercialisation in the Chinese media industry. The media were gradually stripped 
off its ‘ideological straitjacket’ (Lee, C-C 1994:12) and shifted its content from 
political propaganda to more business information, social news, entertainment, and 
even criticism of the authorities.
In terms of media, the Peoples Daily group owns 10 dailies,44 3 weeklies,45 and 12 
journals.46 Most of these publications, apart from People’s Daily and its overseas 
edition, are market-oriented commercial papers with a focus on social news, 
economics, finance and lifestyle. Even People s Daily is still used to pass the Party’s 
instructions to the people. It has changed significantly and ‘began carrying more 
human-interest stories, more objective reporting on social problems [and ...] more 
citizens’ grievances on the popular letters-to-the-editor page’ (Haggart, K. 1992:51).
Launched on January 1, 1997, www.people.com, cn was first created as ‘the online 
news publishing platform’47 of People’s Daily. This on-line Party’s organ has enjoyed 
a prosperous development ever since. During the 9/11 attacks on the USA, online 
traffic reached an impressive 10 million hits daily. Aiming to become a world-level 
Internet portal o f ‘multi-media’, ‘interactivity’, ‘database’ and ‘multi-terminals’ (Jiang, 
Y. 2002), people.com.cn now has more than 70 offices throughout the world, 2 mirror
ao
sites in Japan and the USA, and provides online services in 7 languages. Following 
People s Daily's example, in the year 2000 more than 200 Chinese newspapers went 
online (Liu, Y. 2000).
As Shanthi Kalathil notes, People’s Daily views its web site as ‘separate entities with 
their own corporate culture and often a more progressive mode of operation’ (2002). 
People.com.cn's front page brands itself more as a commercial portal than the Party 
organ, as illustrated below:
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Figure 5.1 People.com.cn s front page
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Also adopted is the commercial media’s journalistic practice. People.com.cn updates 
its news 24-hours of the day and the average number of updated news items per day is 
more than 6,000.49 There are more than 40 website channels including ‘political 
news’, ‘local news’, ‘international news’, ‘viewpoints’, ‘economic news’, ‘sports 
news’, ‘entertainment’ and so forth. Its flagship QGLT has become ‘the most popular 
Chinese-1 anguage bulletin board.’50
QGLT was set up on 9 May 1999, one day after NATO’s bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo conflict. The bulletin board was first named 
Kangyi Luntan (Protest Forum) and attracted 50,000 visitors within 24 hours (Turner 
10/04/2000). More than 90,000 messages of civil protest were posted until the forum 
changed its name to Qiangguo Luntan (QGLT) on 19 June when the protest died 
down.
Any user can view QGLT sites, but only registered users can post. By 18 May 2006, 
the number of registered users reached 443,726. The average number of daily visitors
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is ‘near 1,000,000’ and the average number of daily postings is more than 10,000. 
Broadband, with a connection speed of 200 Megabytes per second, provides 
comparatively fast and steady input and output of data including audio-visual services. 
The asynchronistic temporal structure of the bulletin boards allows users to post at 
different times along the same topical discussion. Though the majority of the users are 
based in Mainland China, there are a significant number of users from Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, the USA, and other countries.
After seven years, QGLT has grown into a mature online community with 35 bulletin 
boards in total. 33 bulletin boards are in Chinese and cover the topical discussions 
ranging from ‘hard’ subjects such as anti-corruption and China-Taiwan relations to 
‘soft’ issues such as education and environmental protection. In addition, QGLT also 
has a China Forum board for current affairs discussions in English. Panel Meeting 
with Guest Speakers is an online version of a television panel programme. This 
special online panel allows ordinary users to put forward questions directly to political 
officials, professional experts, celebrities or news figures from around the world (see 
Appendix 4 for a list of all QGLT bulletin boards).
These 35 boards are linked through navigation bars at the top of the QGLT front-page 
so users can easily move from one board to the other. The three most popular boards 
are Current Affairs, In-depth Discussion, and Friendship and Liaison. The Current 
Affairs board is known for its highest online traffic; the In-depth Discussion for its 
accommodating rational debate through in-depth analysis (the minimum length of 
postings on this board is 500-words); and Friendship and Liaison is the only board 
that has users as volunteer moderators and in theory is open 24-hours53 while all the 
other QGLT boards are open from 10am to 10pm.
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Figure 5.2: the front page o f QGLT community (18/05/2006)
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Yaping Jiang, Vice President of people.com, said people.com is still a ‘Socialist 
medium’ and it has to meet both the Party’s requirements and its users’ demands 
(Xiao, C. 04/06/2001). This statement again reflects this nascent medium’s 
ambivalent status of being a political instrument, a semi-commercial medium, and a 
public service forum at the same time. The consequence is clear: ‘it received more 
restrictions than commercial websites both financially and administratively’ (Wang, 
Zhujun 2001: 418).
According to Jiang, around 50% of people.com’s annual budget comes from the 
government; 25% from its parent company People s Daily, and another quarter comes 
from its own commercial activities such as online advertisements, text messages, and 
information and technical services. From 1997 to 2001, people.com received 20 
million Yuan RMB (around £1.6 million) from the government as financial support. 
Some observers believepeople.com will remain a ‘state-owned enterprise’ and cannot 
be financially independent. Even if people.com attained financial independence, it
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would still be administratively subject to its real ‘boss’, the Chinese Communist Party. 
The Party would never let its own ‘organ’ go against its will and become a ‘fourth 
estate’.
Jiang, who impressed me more as a daringly critical scholar than a bureaucrat, stated 
on several public occasions that ‘the first priority’ for people.com is ‘serving the 
‘boss” . Only by ‘making the ‘boss’ satisfied’ first, can they ‘provide the public with a 
place to speak’ (interview 20/04/2003).
Nevertheless, the liberalisation of the market still has its effect on the liberalisation of 
media content on the Internet. Junhua Zhang (2002) believes that interaction and 
communication between citizens and government in China has been improved via 
digital networking. This celebratory view can also be supported by statistics. A survey 
conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 2001 on the impact of the 
Internet on Chinese politics shows that 60.8% of respondents believe that the Internet 
gives them more opportunity to express their political opinions; 51% think it gives 
them more opportunities to criticize government policies; 55.9% think they have a 
better knowledge of politics, and 43.8% think it will allow top officials to listen to 
public opinion from the common people (Guo, Liang 2001).
On QGLT, online ‘panel meetings’ between citizens and government officials have 
been actively used for political networking since 2003 and some online public opinion 
has been be translated into decision making. Professor Hongyu Zhou, a People’s 
Congress delegate and a university president, posted his propositions for the annual 
People’s Congress Assembly on QGLT on March 1, 2004. Within five days, his 
postings had been viewed 3,210 times and had received 33 responses. Among the 
replying messages, there was criticism of the arising university tuition fees and calls 
for attention to the miserable livelihood of employees of state-owned enterprises. 
Further postings urged the government to take steps to improve human rights:
The People’s Congress should work out a timetable for putting into effect the UN 
Covenant on Civil Political Rights {Yang Liankang 06/03/2004)
Scholars from Mainland China have been eager to celebrate the democratisation
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accompanying the digital revolution. Min (10/07/2001) and Li and Qin (2001) argue 
that QGLT enables the user to enjoy their right to express an opinion over domestic 
and international current issues, breaks down the uniformity in public opinion 
presented by the traditional media, and forms online public opinion. Chen and Deng 
(2002) point out that online public opinion (especially critical public opinion) formed 
on QGLT serves as an institution of ‘safety valve’54 in Chinese society for channelling 
conflicts while maintaining the stability of society. By observing the online interaction 
within QGLT during an incident when Chinese and US military planes collided in 
200155, Tang and Shi (2001) concluded that the Internet bulletin boards contribute to 
the formation of the public sphere in contemporary China. Such literature correctly 
points out that ‘gate keeping’ on the Internet is technically weak and online public 
opinion developed on bulletin boards has impacted upon the offline democratisation 
process. However, all the above scholars fail to point out that technology can also be 
explored to reinforce the status quo. Censorship of media content will not necessarily 
be alleviated on the Internet. On the contrary, new technology can even be employed 
to fortify the censorship in post-Communist China.
2. Surveillance and Censorship over QGLT
Technically speaking, computer-mediated communication enables ‘free and open 
dialogue’ on common concerns among ordinary citizens who ‘attempt to come to an 
understanding of their interlocutors and to reflexively modify their pre-discursive 
positions in response to better arguments’ (Dahlberg, L. 2001c: 167). Compared with 
traditional media, there is no unifying media playing a central role in cyberspace and 
autonomy is one of the most essential values (Levy, P. 1996:108-112). Rational 
individuals can make informed and un-coerced decision through such a decentralised 
communication process, and can offer an alternative ‘persuasive discourse’ which 
might challenge the authoritative discourse (Mitra, 2001:32).
However as a Computer Mediated Communication service provider, people.com.cn is 
subject to regulations from the Ministry of Information Industry; as a section of the 
official newspaper, it receives instructions from the Communist Party’s Propaganda 
Ministry, the State Council Information Office, and other security organisations such
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as the Public Information Administration Division of the Beijing Municipal 
Government (well known as Internet Surveillance Division). As the online 
‘information platform’ of the Party’s organ, QGLT is also obliged to practice self 
censorship.
The relaxed control over the media’s economy does not result in the same level of 
laxity in the Communist Party’s control over media content. The omnipresent 
censorship muzzles criticism and dissident opinions on both official and commercial 
bulletin boards, which largely limits the deliberating role of the Internet. Although 
China has witnessed a quick growth in Internet development and boasted that 8% of 
the population were online in January 2006 (CINIC Report XVII), the strict control 
over Internet media has hindered the construction of the public sphere in cyberspace.
2.1 General Administrative Regulations
Up to April 2006, 205 administrative regulations concerning the Internet were 
promulgated in China56. Some of them are measures regulating the general online 
practice such as protecting intellectual property rights57; while others are rules that 
QGLT and other Internet bulletin boards have to follow when publishing news or 
information. Since early 1996, the Communist Party has introduced administrative 
regulations to contain what it considered to be ‘inappropriate’ content on the Internet. 
Among them are these key regulations:
Provisions on the Administration o f Internet News and Information Services 
(effective from Sep. 24, 2005);
Measures for the Administration o f Filing an IP Address (effective from 
March 19, 2005);
Measures for the Administration o f Broadcasts o f Audio-Visual Programs 
through the Internet and Other Information Networks (effective from Oct. 11, 
2004);
Notice on Issues Concerning the Regulation o f Short Messaging Services 
(effective from April 14, 2004);
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Interim Provisions on the Administration o f Internet Culture (effective from 
June 30, 2003);
Interim Administrative Provisions on Internet Publishing (July 31, 2002); 
Interim Administrative Provisions on Websites Engaging in the Business o f 
Posting News (Oct. 23, 2000);
Administrative Provisions for Electronic Bulletin Services on the Internet (Oct. 
7, 2000);
- Notice Concerning the Filing o f Records on Computer Information Systems 
(January 29, 1996);
Measures for the Administration o f Inbound and Outbound Channels for 
International Networking o f Computer Information Networks (effective from 
April 9, 1996);
Among these, Administrative Provisions for Electronic Bulletin Services on the 
Internet passed in October 2000 is a comprehensive administrative regulation from 
the Ministry of Information Industry that aims to regulate bulletin board service. It 
says that Internet bulletin boards, electronic forums, chat rooms, message boards and 
other interactive services must be put under tight control of government institutions to 
prevent the spread of pornography, violence, rumour, slander, and anything that 
undermines national security.
Internet users in China are required to register with an ID card when they apply for an 
Internet connection at home. They are also forbidden from posting any information 
that might ‘endanger the nation’s security, let out the nation’s secrets, subvert the 
sovereign, and impair national unification’, or ‘stain the nation’s reputation or damage
r  o
the nation’s interest’ . These evasive and ambiguous political phrasings can be used 
in any circumstances when the Communist Party needs a reason to punish those who 
voice antagonistic views online.
Internet service providers are required to delete so-called ‘objectionable’ information 
immediately if it occurs, record the violations, and report to ‘certain governmental 
institutions’.59 In terms of daily security management, the Internet service providers 
must keep all postings for at least 60 days including the senders’ time spent online, 
their usernames, IP addresses or domain names, and dialled number if using the
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telephone line for at least 60 days in case this information is needed for investigation 
by ‘certain governmental institutions’ which is often an euphemism for the public 
security bureau and online police.
Most Internet bulletin boards operators (especially those affiliated to the traditional 
media) have their own news exchange programme with international media outlets 
such as Reuters or the AFR At the same time, they also rely on their users’ 
contribution for news tips. On May 8, 1999, a commercial web portal www.sina.com 
posted the news of NATO’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade60 within 
minutes after the incident took place thanks to one user’s contribution. Chinese users 
celebrated this moment as a turning point for the Internet becoming an autonomous 
grassroots media. However, the Chinese government immediately followed the users’ 
celebration by passing an administrative notice that political news could only be 
posted on websites with the permission of the government (Fries 2000:56). Later, in 
February 2000, the State Council Information Office (SCIO) ruled that Chinese 
websites that wanted to distribute news had to apply for a license from the SCIO61. 
Also according to the rules, Internet content providers cannot hire reporters to 
produce news content exclusively for their websites. They have to source from
£\7China’s traditional media if they want to carry news (Fries 2000:57). Thus, instead 
of cultivating a new media form, all these regulations tend to restrain the online 
freedom of speech.
This strict control from the government over QGLT, www.peonle.com.cn and People s 
Daily is also expressed in physical forms. On each gate of the People s Daily offices, 
there are armed soldiers guarding the entrance. This is a legacy from the crackdown of 
the 1989 pro-democracy movement. Armed forces have taken the major official media 
back from the liberals and have ‘safeguarded’ the media ever since.
2.2 The Weekly Meeting
The weekly meeting held in QGLT usually includes updating stuff on newsroom 
policies and regulations concerning online surveillance from the government, editors 
discussing ‘problems’ from the previous week, and planning for the coming week. 
The meeting is compulsory for all staff and to a certain degree, confidential. When I
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first started my ‘internship’, I was allowed to participate in the weekly meetings. A 
few weeks later, I was picked out at the meeting by one of the vice Presidents Guan 
Jianwen from www.peonle.com.cn for ‘taking notes’. After that my access to the 
weekly meeting became unwelcome and later denied. In the following paragraphs, I 
am going to give examples of how weekly meetings within QGLT shape news room 
policies.
The gate-keeping process within QGLT (see Figure 5.3) flows in two ways. When 
postings come in, they are directed to editors (moderators) first. Editors decide which 
postings can go to the bulletin boards and which cannot. However, editors do not have 
entire autonomy in making such decisions. Editors are responsible to editors-in-chief, 
and editors-in-chief to their upper level administrators. On the top level, the President 
and the vice Presidents of www.people.com.cn decide the general framework 
concerning the management of QGLT, which involves setting an agenda for online 
public discussion and conceptualising the press freedom tolerated on QGLT bulletin 
boards. The President and two vice Presidents of www.people.com.cn are all veteran 
journalists who know well enough about media policies from the government. On 
weekly meetings, they review the public discussion on QGLT in the previous week, 
comment on the merits and shortcomings of the editors’ work, and give detailed 
instructions on how to deal with ‘problematic’ postings which usually contain 
political dissident opinion. Such organised control over online discussion is not much 
different from the traditional media’s gate-keeping process such as the selection of 
letters to the editors. Editors from print media can decide whose concerns can be 
voiced through their selection of readers’ letters for publication (Wahl-Jorgensen 
2002b). On the QGLT bulletin boards, the moderators play a similar role in 
constructing the publics by giving some users’ opportunities to express their opinion 
while denying others.
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Figure 5.3: the gate-keeping process o/QGLT in 'www.veovle. com, cn
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The weekly meeting of 27 July, 2004 mainly focused on the requirements for 
moderators to keep their work logs. Moderators are required to keep a record of the 
number of users and the key discussion topics. They are required to make a copy of 
‘problematic’ postings in their work logs before deleting them from the boards. In this 
meeting, the importance of the work logs was emphasised and moderators were 
required to keep ‘detailed’ record of any offensive postings.
‘Problematic’ postings could be any article that touches ‘sensitive political issues’, 
shows dissident opinions, or just does not conform to the Party’s dominant discourse 
under certain circumstances. The ‘problematic postings’ raised at the weekly meeting
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on 10 August, 2004 were online discussions about the late national leader Deng 
Xiaoping (http://202.99.23.223 :8080/dxp/list.php). August 2004 marked the 100th 
anniversary of Deng’s birth, www.people.com.cn. like other official media, launched a 
memorial page. Within QGLT, one fervently discussed topic was comparing Deng 
with Mao in their respective achievements and mistakes. Guan Jianwen, Vice
 /T'l
President from www.people.com.cn who directly supervised QGLT , made the 
following comments:
It is unavoidable that we have postings on the comparison between the two late national 
leaders. However, we are not supposed to encourage this.... We are not supposed to 
comment on Deng’s contributions and his faults on QGLT. Firstly, Deng is a great man; 
secondly, the official nature of our forum [does not allow us to make comments on 
national leaders]; thirdly, we must only say good things because this year marks the 100 
year anniversary of Deng’s Birth (field note 10/08/2004).
Because it is affiliated to the Party’s organ, QGLT shows less tolerance towards 
political discussion on controversial issues than other commercial bulletin boards do. 
However, the QGLT administration has its own justification. Because of the official 
nature of QGLT, public opinion formed on this bulletin board has been frequently 
interpreted by western media as fluctuations in the political climate, i.e. ‘warming up’ 
propaganda from the Communist Party that prepares the ground for future political 
movement. For that reason, QGLT has to be very cautious in releasing radical political 
voices from its users.
Ironically, my interviews with QGLT users partly confirmed this justification. Gary*, 
who is an employee in a state-owned enterprise, said one of his articles on an online 
anti-corruption campaign was interpreted by Hong Kong-based Asian Times Online 
(www. at Chinese, com) as ‘Hu Jitao is about to build an online democracy wall’ in 
fighting corruption (interview 03/09/2004). User Tony* also said some of his 
argument had been quoted by the Voice of America and Deutsche Welle Chinese 
broadcasting as sourced from the Chinese official bulletin board rather than from a 
QGLT user (interview 17/08/2004).
Therefore, some foreign media’s misinterpretation of the relations between grassroots 
postings on QGLT and government policy alarmed the Communist Party and 
provoked them to tighten up its control over online postings on controversial domestic
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and international issues. A case in point is the control of online discussion on the 
anniversary of the end of WWII in Asia, which inevitably involved anti-Japan 
extremist voices. Liu, Director of QGLT called to the attention of all staff the need to 
‘safeguard the security of QGLT bulletin boards’:
We are the governmental bulletin boards, we are the official media. It won’t be a big deal 
if some [extreme anti-Japan] postings appeared on the non-governmental forums; but it 
will be regarded as a signal from the central government if these kinds of (extremist) 
postings appear on QGLT. This is decided by the special nature of the 
www.neople.com.cn. So we have to be very cautious (field note of weekly meeting 
12/08/2005).
Nonetheless, this official control of anti-Japan discourse does not contradict Hughes’ 
(2002) argument that the Internet is used to legitimate the Communist Party’s 
governance. Chinese media have been used by the Communist Party to cultivate 
nationalism and hatred against Japan as Thomas J. Christensen (1999) argues:
Nationalism has always been a strong element of the legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), and opposing Japanese imperialism is at the core of this 
national story. As a result, Chinese citizens have been fed a steady diet of patriotic, anti- 
Japanese media programming designed to glorify the CCP’s role in World War II. 
Although far removed from that era, most Chinese young people hold an intense and 
unapologetically negative view of both Japan and, in many cases, its people (Christensen 
1999:54).
However, Christensen also pointed out that the anti-Japan public emotion has not 
affected the practical management of Sino-Japanese relations. ‘On the contrary, since 
the 1980s the Chinese government has acted to contain anti-Japanese sentiment in 
society at large to avoid damaging bilateral relations and to prevent protestors from 
using anti-Japan sentiment as a pretext for criticising the Chinese government, as 
occurred several times in Chinese history’ (Christensen 1999: 54-5). The day-to-day 
management of the China-Japan relationship is mainly dictated by the close trade and 
investment links between the two countries, which makes it too risky for the 
Communist Party to lose Japan as a business partner and investor. According to 
Japan’s Ministry of Finance, total trade (exports plus imports) between the two 
countries reached $64.1 billion in 1997 and the bilateral trade balance is in China’s 
favour. Japanese firms invested in China $4.5 billion in 1995 and $2.0 billion in 1997 
(Johnstone, C. B. 1998: 1072).
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2.3 A Routine Weekday for a QGLT Moderator
A moderator’s daily work mainly involves monitoring the bulletin boards and 
maintaining webpage layout. Among all the bulletin boards within QGLT, four sub­
boards such as the Nibcing Luntan (Female Forum) and Lianyi Huiguan (Liaison and 
Friendship House), Zhongri Luntan (China-Japan Relations Forum), and China 
Forum have their own respective moderators. The rest of the boards are moderated by 
all moderators by shift. QGLT Current Affairs and QGLT In-depth are the highlights 
of the community and the main focus for moderators’ work. Current Affairs gathers 
most users and attracts 330-400 main postings (with exclusion of follow-up postings) 
per hour on average. On the In-depth board, postings are required to be more than 
1,000 bytes (that is, at least 500 Chinese characters) which encourages a quality of 
argument. All postings have to go through the selection process of the moderators 
before they can appear online. Due to this intensity of monitoring, each work shift 
lasts about two hours.
The following table shows the duties of one editor-in-chief and one moderator on an 
ordinary work day:
Table 5.1 QGLT moderators work shift 19/07/2004
A
Editor-in-chief
Updating the ‘news & interaction’ on the community front page;
Deciding t Today s Focus’ and ‘ Today s Headline News'
Recommending postings for the front page of www.people.com.cn
Moderating QGLT Current Affairs 10:00 -11:30
Moderating QGLT In-depth and the Three Educations 13:30 -15:30
B
Moderator
Updating the ‘Focus’ on QGLT community front page
Moderating QGLT In-depth and the Three Educations board 10:00- 
11:30
Moderating QGLT Current Affairs 13:30 -14:30
Preparing questions for the Guest interview in the afternoon
128
The first duty in the morning for QGLT moderators is to search the traditional official 
media news feed and recommend news stories to the editor-in-chief for Today s Focus 
and Today s Headline News. The editor-in-chief of the day will decide on a couple of 
news stories and post on QGLT Current Affairs. So as an ordinary user, when s/he 
opens the link to QGLT at 10:00am in the morning, s/he will find a selection of 
current affairs waiting to be read.
At 09:06:38 am on 19 July 2004, almost one hour before the opening of QGLT 
bulletin boards. Li, the editor-in-chief, decided the following news stories should be 
put on Today s Focus and posted this message on the internal forum:
Today’s Focus:
Analysis of the economic situation in the latter part of the year;
Campaign against Internet pornography;
China National Audit Office shifts its focus to auditing the leaders of state-owned
enterprises and the officials above the county level;
Storms strike most parts of the country;
Urgent countermeasures put into effect for the stormy weather in Beijing.
These stories were taken from the news feed provided by People’s Daily; Beijing 
Youth, Chinese Youth and other official newspapers. Li chose these news stories 
because they were ‘concise, substantial, and could trigger discussion among the users’ 
(Interview 19/07/2004). Today’s Focus and Today’s Headline News set the agenda for 
an otherwise anarchic public discussion online. This macro control of the agenda of 
public opinion confirms the hegemonic role of politically powerful institutions in 
dominating people’s everyday knowledge. By highlighting certain meaning making in 
people’s everyday experience, the politically powerful institutions discourage people 
from thinking thoughts that might challenge the status quo (Eliasoph, N. 1998:232).
To a certain degree, the moderating work shares a similarity with the selection of 
letters to the editors in newspapers64. Moderators have the right to not upload postings. 
However, the four rules of selection of letters to editor: relevance, brevity, 
entertainment, and authority (Wahl-Jorgensen 2002a) do not necessarily exist on 
Internet bulletin board moderating in this instance. Due to the almost limitless 
capacity of cyberspace, bulletin boards have the potential to accommodate in-depth
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arguments and users’ own topics on the agenda. The anonymity associated with online 
identity also permits individuals without authority to have their voice heard. However, 
by recommending some postings (adding flashing icons such as a star or a diamond to 
postings or linking postings on the www.neople.com.cn front page) and deleting 
others, QGLT moderators actually manipulate the representation of online public 
opinion. Postings that fit into the official agenda are publicised and highlighted, and 
postings containing antagonistic voices disappear.
During their seven-year experience of managing these bulletin boards, the QGLT 
administration has worked out a news room policy for forbidden topics. It is stated in 
QGLT Regulations that users cannot post anything against the Reform and Opening 
up policy or the Four Basic Principles65. Claiming the independence of Tibet or 
Taiwan in postings is regarded as a ‘malign behaviour’ that will result in closing down 
of users’ online identities. The following regulation has been used by moderators as 
guidelines for moderating QGLT In-Depth:
Table 5.2 ‘Postings that are prohibited from going public’ from the ‘Regulations on 
the QGLT In-depth discussion (2004-02-13)
1. Postings that try to attack the present policy and the present national leaders in 
the name of discussing historic issues such as the Cultural Revolution, the history 
of the Chinese Communist Party, or the historical judgement of Mao Zedong;
2. Postings of pure news crossposted from other media without any comments or 
analysis from the user;
3. Petition postings that should appeal to court or the public prosecution 
institutions;
4. Flaming, and personal attacks among the users;
5. Repeating postings.
The above regulations might sound vague, but from time to time, these abstract terms 
will be translated into the concrete action of banning public discussion on the bulletin 
boards. Postings such as ‘Demonstrators protest against the officials’ corruption in
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Beijing’ (18/07/2004) never had the chance to be published on QGLT. Users who post 
such messages will have their detailed information recorded in moderators’ work logs 
which will later be submitted to the government. In some cases, moderators are even 
asked to delete all discussion on a certain topic even if the topic banned has not 
violated any of the above regulations. On 22 July, 2004, a sudden phone call from the 
www.people.com.cn administration sent all the QGLT staff carefully searching for any 
‘problematic’ discussion on a newly published poetry collection Xin Cang Da E 
(Bearing Great Evil in My Heart). This poetry collection exposed young people’s 
frustration, resentment and rebellion, and was regarded as ‘inappropriate’ for public 
discussion by the Propaganda Ministry. Thus, even mentioning the poet’s name, 
Haobo Shen, on QGLT was not allowed. It is written in their news room policy that: 
‘Problematic’ postings should be deleted first to avoid them being misplaced and 
disseminated’.
Table5.3 Skills in moderating in QGLT (13/02/2004)
•  Try to release postings according to the time order we receive them. Release 
eligible postings as soon as possible. Try not to give the users an impression that 
we prefer postings from some users and deliberately restrain postings from 
others;
•  Very long articles could be divided into series of short articles and posted 
under the same title;
•  Don’t let three (or more) postings go to the bulletin boards at the same time so 
that we can avoid releasing the problematic ones by mistake;
•  If you are not sure whether a posting can be published, consult other 
moderators or leaders to avoid letting loose the problematic postings.
•  If you decide not to release a posting, you’d better send a message to the user. 
Show him/her respect and create a friendly atmosphere;
•  Try to be neutral and impartial when you comment on postings. Try to know 
more about other moderators’ previous comments on the same posting to avoid 
different comments from QGLT. Otherwise, misunderstandings will arise.
Some QGLT moderators were self-deprecatory about their role as ‘cleaners’ within 
QGLT where their only job is to delete ‘objectionable’ postings. Nevertheless, even
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cleaners have their professional skills and ethics in doing their job, so do QGLT 
moderators. The above Skills in moderating QGLT are drafted by Mr. Shan (Director 
of QGLT from 1999-2004), and posted on the internal forum as a guideline for other 
moderators (see Table 5.3). By employing these skills, the online surveillance in 
QGLT becomes more covert, so that an illusion of a free market of opinion is created.
3. QGLT Words Filtering System
The ‘words filtering system’ is computer software used in QGLT to prevent 
‘inappropriate’ postings from appearing online. This system automatically selects 
‘sensitive’ words from postings, and highlights them in yellow, red or purple colours. 
Moderators are expected to scrutinise these postings more carefully. It is true that 
postings containing obscene words like ‘fuck’, ‘fart’, ‘intercourse’, or even ‘sex’ will 
not get through this system, but political surveillance is the major reason for the 
existence of this system. For example, a posting containing the Chinese character 
Jiang (LL), as in Jiang Zemin, will appear in red colour, which indicates a high level 
of alert to the moderators. However, Jiang (Lf) as a character also has the meaning of 
‘river’, apart from being used as a surname. QGLT moderators need to scrutinise and 
decide whether the posting is an innocent article about a river or an ‘evil’ posting 
‘attacking’ the national leader.
There is a list of words that cannot go through the words filtering system posted on 
the internal forum. As shown in the following table, I categorise these words into the 
following major eight groups according to their political relevance and give a few 
words out of many as examples to each category:
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Table 5.4 QGLT words filtering system database (July 2004)
Political Relevance Words as examples
Chinese Communist 
Party leaders
‘M’, ‘Mao’, ‘Mao Zedong’, ‘Jiang’ (as in Jiang Zemin), 
‘Song’ (as in Song Ping), ‘Peng’ (as in Li Peng), ‘the third 
generation’, ‘core’, ‘Zhu Rongji’, etc66.
1989 Democratic 
Movement
‘Wu Er Kai Xi (Urekesh)’, ‘Chai Ling’, ‘Dai Qing’, ‘Tian’an’ 
(as in Tian’anmen square), ‘Blood’, ‘butcher’, ‘memorise’, 
etc67.
International
relations
AX‘The Japanese Embassy’, ‘North Korea’, etc.
Taiwan ‘The Democratic Progressive Party’, ‘(Annette) Lu Shiu-lian’, 
etc.69
Domestic social 
problems
‘Atypical pneumonia’, ‘SARS’, ‘press censorship’, ‘to muzzle 
public opinion’, ‘inflation’, ‘class dictatorship’, ‘one party
nosystem’, ‘Li Hongzhi’, ‘Fa Lun Gong’ etc .
Religion and ethnic 
minorities
‘Islam’, ‘the riot in Tibet’, etc.71
Dissidents and 
dissidents’ opinion
‘The Beijing University Triangle’, ‘the stainless steel mouse’, 
etc72.
Hyperlink ‘img’, ‘http’, and other html language.
Also worth noticing is the ever growing amount of censored words and the wide 
application of the word filtering system in Chinese cyberspace. The database of 
forbidden words keeps growing and getting updated. Meanwhile, not just QGLT and 
other bulletin boards in China, but also wireless and instant messenger services 
(including text messaging services) in China filter user communication through key 
word blocking systems. According to China Digital Times.net, among all the 
forbidden words, about 15% are sex-related; 20% are Fa Lun Gong related; 15% are 
names of officials and their relatives; 10% are words used in liberal political discourse 
such as ‘democracy’; 5% are related to certain nationalistic issues; 15% are related to 
anti-corruption, and the rest of the censored words include names of dissidents writers
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and intellectuals, and names o f  foreign publications (Xiao, Q. 30/08/2004).
QGLT words filtering system has been an open secret to its users and has triggered 
resistance from time to time. QGLT users have invented their own lexis for politically 
sensitive words, which is vague enough to pass through the words filtering system but 
clear enough to get the idea across to others. Using other Chinese characters of similar 
pronunciation is the most common practice. During the SARS crisis in 2003, when 
Atypical Pneumonia in Chinese, pronounced as Feidian), was blocked, users
invented Huidian J t% ) to avoid censorship. Another strategy is to combine
Chinese characters with numbers. Human Rights (At5( in Chinese), could be written 
as ‘A 22 $C or ‘A 1 1 ’ so the postings would not be picked out by the system.
Some postings like the following example came out as a direct challenge to the online 
censorship:
Human rights and democracy; democracy and human rights. Human rights and 
democracy; democracy and Human rights. Human rights and democracy, democracy and 
human rights. Human rights and democracy, democracy and human rights. (Shibuguanji 
Gaogaoguaqi 19/07/2004)
Another user posted this ‘game invitation’ in Lianyi Huiguan board on 19 July 2004: 
‘Let’s play a great game: from now on, every posting must contain a word from the 
QGLT filtering system. I’ll go first: the wind from the Yangzi River (Jiang LC) set my 
guest off his course...’ (Xueshan Xiongying). This ‘game’ was received 
enthusiastically by other users and the Lianyi Huiguan webpage was bombarded with 
‘innocent’ postings containing sensitive words. By ridiculing the censorship, QGLT 
users show their defiance towards the authority.
‘Digital resistance’ now attracts analysts’ attention on the nature of online interaction 
and the relationship between online and offline political engagement. Digital 
resistance, according to Russell (2005), has come about through ‘a combination of 
necessity and opportunity’. People who practice ‘digital resistance’ are usually those 
who ‘have been denied access to information and media products and/or the power to 
convey and control their message’ (Russell 2005: 514). In China’s case, these ‘digital
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resistors’ can be categorised as those holding politically marginalised voices. By 
commanding technological and cultural skills, digital resistors can get around the 
barriers to and filters of media, hack technological and legal restraints on information, 
so that they deliver alternative messages to other netizens (Russell 2005: 514).
4. Punishing the ‘Offenders’
To prevent ‘problematic’ postings from appearing on QGLT and to punish those who 
post ‘inappropriate’ messages, moderators take four steps to punish the offenders: 
warning; blocking the penname temporarily; blocking the pennames permanently; and 
blocking out the Internet Protocol addresses permanently.
A warning is usually given to users who conduct ‘minor misbehaviour’. Moderators 
usually send a message of warning to users through the QGLT internal messenger 
service. Or sometimes, a warning message will be posted within the QGLT 
community. As the following one found on 22 July 2004:
Dear user Wo Ai Ye Su, thank you for your continuous support to QGLT. You are a 
veteran user within this community. So there is no need for me to repeat some 
regulations to you. Please help others by helping yourself when you post. Thank you. 
(Moderator Jon 22/07/2004)
This message did not give any reasons for warning Wo Ai Ye Su. So I asked moderator 
Jon and he gave the following reasons:
Wo Ai Ye Su has been holding negative opinions against the previous Prime Minister Zhu 
Rongji. He has been particularly against one of Zhu’s major policies of levying 20% tax 
on increased interest from banks. [...] Look at his postings, there’s no content at all apart 
from “Jiaxi jiaxi jiaxi jiaxi....” (“increasing the interest” 20 times). [...] This user also 
uploads Old Testimony and New Testimony to QGLT from time to time. You know, it is 
illegal to preach religion in non-religious venues. Those postings are also inappropriate 
(field notes 22/07/2004).
I asked Jon whether the warning would prevent Wo Ai Ye Su from posting ‘offensive’ 
messages and if not, whether he would consider taking other measures such as 
blocking the penname to punish him? Jon said that a warning works for a short period 
of time, but he would rather not block Wo Ai Ye Su’s penname because he would
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register another pseudonym (field notes 22/07/2004).
In general, users who ignore QGLT warnings will receive further punishment by 
having their pennames blocked temporarily or permanently so they cannot post on 
QGLT boards. This punishment message appears on the Public Notice Board 
(www.qglt.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=99T 168 records of blocked users’ pennames were 
shown from 17 June to 18 August 2004. The following table is an example:
Table 5.5 A sample o f QGLT users who had their pennames blocked temporarily or 
permanently (2004-08-18).
Penname Time for  
blocking
Reason for being blocked
Hui Sikao de Luni 
(A Slave who can think)
1 days from 
2004-08-15
Posting articles against 
QGLT regulation
Ji mo Kai Wu Zhu 
(Lonely in blossom)
7 days from 
2004-06-22
Attacking Jiang Zemin and 
voicing grievance for 
Jiang, Yanyong73
Taiwan Lang 
(Taiwan Guy)
10 days from 
2004-06-13
Disseminating the idea of 
Taiwan’s independence
Sui Bian-----!
(Anyhow---- !)
7 days from 
2004-07-23
Posting obscene language
Fengfeng Diandian Sheng 
(A mad guy)
Permanent Similar penname to 
Fengfeng Diandian Seng
Apart from the examples given above, other reasons that may lead to pennames being 
blocked include criticism of the Ministry of Propaganda, criticism of the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics, criticism of the nine members of the Standing Committee of the Political 
Bureau; postings mentioning the 1989 pro-Democracy Movement; personal attacks 
against the guest speakers and other users; extremist rhetoric about Japan (including 
both extreme admiration towards and extreme hatred towards Japan); discrimination 
against peasants or ethnic minorities, posting advertisements, etc.
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Blocking users’ IP is the most severe punishment and this is used most carefully by 
QGLT moderators. When a users’ penname is blocked, s/he can still switch online 
identity and post again; but if a user’s IP is blocked he cannot post on QGLT from that 
PC terminal. Five IP addresses were blocked by August 2004 for the following 
reasons: constantly posting ideas about Taiwan’s independence, postings containing 
attacks on Jiang Zemin, and constantly posting advertisements.
The ultimate punishment for the Internet users is imprisonment. According to 
Reporters Without Borders (17/11/2005) ‘China is the world’s biggest prison for 
cyber-dissidents, with 62 in prison for what they posted online’. The political 
economy of the Internet suggests its development quickly directs the intensified 
commercialisation (Patekis 2000), and media conglomerates are usually eager to 
embrace authoritarian governments for an exchange of market profit. The Yahoo arm 
in Hong Kong passed on information from its discussion groups to the Chinese 
security ministry in 2005, which led to Chinese journalist Shi Tao’s imprisonment in 
the name of ‘leaking national security information to the foreign sources’ (BBC news 
07/09/2005)74.
5. Hierarchy in Human Resources Management, Self-Censorship, and ‘Big 
Brother Watches You’
Before the media reform in 1978, all Chinese media gave their journalists permanent 
employment. Accompanying the ‘marketisation’ of media, a proportion of fixed-term 
employment has been introduced into media human resources management. A ‘caste’ 
system has been gradually established, where all levels of leaders in media 
organisations hold permanent positions while staff are usually on fixed-term contracts.
In August 2004, QGLT has in total 16 staff: 1 Director, 1 Deputy Director, 3 Editors- 
in-chief, 9 editors, and 2 part-time editors. Like most official media in China, the 
Director of QGLT holds a permanent position, while the rest of the staff are on 
temporary contracts. The director, who was just designated from the leaders ‘above’, 
is supposed to supervise the ‘gate-keeping’ of her staff and take full responsibility for 
the ‘security’ of QGLT.
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Most moderators on fixed-term contracts are university graduates in their 20s or early 
30s. They have a comparatively low salary (RMB 2,500 - 3,000) and have no 
professional training in communication or journalism. Their major duty is to delete 
postings, which, as one moderator put it, ‘could be done by any literate person’. 
QGLT is used as a stepping stone for young moderators to get a more profitable and 
more stable position in other media, which leads to a lack of enthusiasm towards work 
and great mobility in QGLT staff.
In his interview with Chinese journalists from 1998 to 2000, Hugo de Burgh (2003) 
found that most Chinese Journalists:
live in the world as it is constructed for them by their political masters and probably jog 
along as best they can, accepting the perks of the job, fitting in with the spin doctors and 
propagandists, ducking the risky opportunities to anger the bosses but still imagining 
themselves belong to the congregation of the faithful (2003:96).
This conclusion also applies to the moderators working for the official Internet 
bulletin boards. During my association with the moderators, I found they possessed 
journalistic integrity, but in their day to day work their integrity disappeared. They 
joined the team and ‘duck[ed] the risky opportunities to anger the bosses’ by 
practicing self-censorship. Self-censorship practice in the newsroom works in a long, 
indirect, covert way, compared with the short-term, direct and overt censorship from 
the Communist Party. Self-censorship among QGLT moderators works more 
effectively in muzzling the courageous grassroots voice, and undermines online press 
freedom from its very base.
On 21 July 2004, a posting on QGLT Current Affairs revealed a scandal when the 
Chinese government suppressed independent voices in the press:
Main Posting: Chen Guidi’s A Report on the Investigation into China s Countryside has 
been censored and banned!
Reply 1: The censorship is conducted through phone calls to the media. Censorship is 
a dagger kills without leaving traces of blood!
Reply 2: Chen Guidi: A Report on the Investigation into China’s Countryside. Here is 
the electronic version (Field note 21/07/2004)
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Since the above three postings contained no forbidden words, they came through the 
filtering system and appeared on QGLT. But within minutes, these three postings 
disappeared. I asked moderator James why he deleted these postings. His answer 
surprised me and showed the day-to-day instructions from the Ministry of Propaganda 
have such a brainwashing effect on the moderators:
Peasants’ livelihood in the countryside varies greatly from East to West. This book [A 
Report on the Investigation into China’s Countryside] is very biased in that it only 
displayed the negative side of the story. This book has stirred up the dissatisfactions 
among the public. The Ministry of Propaganda has notified media at all levels not to 
report the book or quote from this book since last year (Field note 21/07/2004).
Censorship within QGLT can also be detected from the manoeuvre of the so called 
‘live net-casting’ Panel Meeting with Guest Speakers. The panel meeting is designed 
to be an exchange of opinion between the policy makers and the public through their 
interaction online. Guest speakers (mainly government officials and scholars) are 
supposed to be challenged by questions from users. However, to guarantee their guest 
speakers do not encounter ‘hostile’ questions, QGLT staff prepare 10-15 ‘harmless’ 
questions for each panel meeting and post under different pseudo-pennames so that 
the questions look like they are coming from ordinary users. This self-censorship 
practice creates an illusion of ‘open and transparent’ political dialogue between the 
authority and the grassroots, while in reality erodes the basic professional ethics of 
integrity.
In August 2004, an anonymous official from the State Council Information Office told 
me that agents from the Public Security Ministry worked in almost every official 
Internet media. To further control online public opinion, a notorious plan called the 
‘one-thousand-people writing army’ was fermented. This conspiratorial campaign 
from the Communist Party aimed to recruit at least one thousand people nationwide 
who were ‘politically reliable’ to guide discussion on public bulletin boards away 
from politically sensitive issues. By receiving subsidies from the government as part- 
time ‘online commentators’, these officially patronised individuals would contribute 
‘public opinion’ regularly to major bulletin boards anonymously as ordinary users. 
This information was confirmed in 2005 when the Southern Weekend revealed that ‘a
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team of about 20 commentators has been operating in the city of Suqian, in Jiangsu 
province’ since April 2005 (Watts 14/06/2005).
The squad of government-subsidised online agents has been expanding. Since early
n c
2006, ‘web superintendents’ have been openly recruited in major cities in China to 
moderate both commercial web forums and campus-based bulletin boards. ‘Web 
superintendents’ are ordinary users recruited by the Chinese government. They play a 
role as ‘part traffic cop, part informer, part discussion moderator’ (French 09/05/2006) 
online without the knowledge of their peers. They introduce ‘politically correct or 
innocuous themes for discussion’, ‘steer what they consider negative conversations in 
a positive direction’, and report ‘anything they deem offensive’ to Web masters for 
deletion (French 09/05/2006). They are also responsible for reporting any ‘offences’
Hf\to the governmental organisation through emails, phone calls and irregular meetings .
6. Volunteer Systems and the Decline of Ce Lun Qu
It is inevitable for the moderators to recruit volunteers from the most active members 
to help on Internet bulletin boards where thousands of messages are posted every day. 
QGLT started recruiting volunteers in 2000 and the volunteers have now become part 
of its culture. Responsibilities associated with QGLT volunteers include raising 
discussion topics, giving induction to new users, maintaining the rational discussion 
(including breaking up fights sometimes), and deleting postings containing obscenity, 
flaming or politically inappropriate content. To a large extent, the role of volunteers 
lies between that of the moderators and users. Though volunteers contribute greatly to 
the autonomous online political discussion within QGLT, they also inevitably become 
a part of the online surveillance.
Sociologist Hairui Liangqian and lawyer Laoxin are two of the earliest volunteers 
invited to join the QGLT moderating team in May 2000. According to Huirui 
Liangqian, a researcher specialising in Employment and Labour Studies, he was 
chosen to be a volunteer for the following reasons:
One reason is the lack of hands within QGLT. Another reason is that moderators found it 
difficult to cope with topical discussions covering all aspect of social life, and they need
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professional people for consultancy. Laoxin and I started by designing discussion topics 
based on our professional knowledge. We even set up a virtual courtroom ‘Lianyi 
Courtroom'’ where users could ask questions concerning legal issues. We were also 
granted the right to delete postings on Lianyi Huiguan board (interview 26/08/2004).
Volunteers’ most successful experience was the launch of Ce Lun Qu (CLQ) which 
literally means ‘Policies Debating Area’. Released as an experimental form from 2000 
to 2001, CLQ consolidated its nature as a board devoted to autonomous debates over 
policies. As one volunteer recalled, the discussion ‘captured the focus in social
77thought and took a leading role in controversial debates’ (Chenmozhi 12/04/2004) . 
CLQ changed its name to the Special Discussion Channel on Strategic Development 
in 2001. In early 2003, with most key volunteers withdrawing, CLQ was taken back 
by QGLT.
CLQ successfully targeted detailed problems in China’s development and raised them 
for public scrutiny. 12 volunteers, Hairui Liangqian, Huangyan, Dahe Xiqu, 
Chenmozhi and others, were actively involved in the daily management of the board 
by designing topics, organising discussion, and moderating online debate. This 
practice was warmly received by other QGLT users. After one year’s discussion on 
strategic development (2001-2002), 69 users actively participated and 134 articles of 
original writing about development problems in China were posted. Up to April 2002, 
25 topical discussions were put on the agenda, ranging from domestic issues like 
‘Education and Social Welfare’, ‘Reform on Governmental Administrative System’, 
‘Anti-corruption and Balance of Power’, ‘Reform of State-owned Enterprises’, to the 
Taiwan issue and international relations.
Dryzek believes that ‘discursive democracy should be pluralistic in embracing the 
necessity to communicate across difference without erasing difference’ (2000:3). 
However, QGLT is not always tolerant towards difference through discursive 
interaction. QGLT users have not yet acknowledged that the difference among their 
awareness of civil communication and class interests should not necessarily be erased 
through online discussion. When their efforts towards reaching a bargained consensus 
fail, users holding difference viewpoints resort to flaming. Flaming as Littman (1995) 
says, is ‘a dangerous invitation to digital vigilantism and promiscuous computer 
violence’ (cited in Whine, M. 1997: 224). As one previous volunteer recalled, when
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discussion on the strategic development of the country turned into ‘dispute
78engendered by personal feelings and preferences’, he felt disheartened and decided 
to drop the volunteer team (Chenmozhi 12/04/2004).
When reflecting on reasons contributing to the failure of CLQ, Hairui Liangqian first 
blamed the fluidity of online identity, and mobility in online communication. These 
two factors made it difficult to engage a stable group of conversational members who 
are able to carry on a topical discussion for a long span of time. Also he said ‘some 
users lack the capacity of conducting civil debate’ in that they could not ‘carry the 
topics towards a rationally constructive conclusion’ (Interview 26/08/2004).
The decline of CLQ revealed some vital weakness in the online grassroots 
deliberation in China. According to Coleman and Gotze, public deliberation at its best 
should include the following elements: 
access to balanced information; 
an open agenda;
time to consider issues expansively; 
freedom from manipulation or coercion; 
a rule-based framework for discussion; 
participation by an inclusive sample of citizens; 
scope for free interaction between participants;
recognition of differences between participants, but rejection of status-based 
prejudice; (2001:6-7).
However, there are a few elements of an ideal deliberation missing in CLQ political 
discussion in China. As Rawls (1993), Cohen (1996), and Dryzek (2000) all argue, 
‘reasonable pluralism’ which implies of ‘public reasoning so conceived begin with 
freedom of expression’ is the foundation for deliberation:
Arguments that persuade like-minded individuals.. .will not be persuasive to all members 
of society, which gives force to the need to couch arguments in terms differently-minded 
individuals.. .can accept (Dryzek 2000:11).
What should be blamed for the decline of CLQ is the lack of a social mechanism for
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negotiating compromise and the lack of some kind of institution framework to 
guarantee public reasoning. Under a ‘free public reasoning among equals’ (Cohen 
1996:99), ‘participants regard one another as equals; they aim to defend and criticize 
institutions and programmes in terms of considerations that others have reason to 
accept’ (Cohen 1996:100). However, the Internet public sphere ‘faces a severe 
“economy of attention” -  the economy of competing draws on the attention resources 
of individuals’ (Muhlberger 2005). For this reason, the degree of interactivity for 
debate among users is often rather weak (Cammaerts and van Audenhove 2005). In 
addition, due to the lack of an offline democratic framework in which the Internet 
culture is embedded, the loose organisation of online communities would be easily 
subject to political pressure.
According to Hairui Liangqian, CLQ gradually became quiet after April 2002. When 
it came to the following March, propagating the National People’s Congress (NPC) 
Assembly and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
became a political obligation for www.peonle.com.cn. CLQ was then turned into an 
officially accredited Special Area for Policies Debating for  the NPC and CPPCC. 
This was perceived as a bridge between citizens and government via digital 
networking.
With the growth and expansion of QGLT, more volunteers were involved and the 
managing of volunteers became more systematic. Volunteers are no longer expected 
to chair online debates but are expected to initiate non-political topics, keep the 
intensity of interest high, and most important of all, help moderators to keep QGLT 
free from ‘inappropriate postings’. More and more frequently, voices from users ask 
for the abolition of the volunteers system. I asked former QGLT director Shan why 
Lou was kept as a volunteer while there was a lot of criticism of him from other users. 
The answer was: ‘Lou is diligent in writing and he’s politically reliableV If a 
volunteer who has the right to delete other users’ postings is politically reliable to the 
authority it is hard to imagine that any critical, not to mention dissident, voices can 
come through this self-imposed surveillance.
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7. Summary
Being part of the official media People s Daily (especially the Party’s organ) is both 
an advantage and disadvantage for QGLT. Emerging from the ashes of a political 
incident, QGLT was immediately injected with public enthusiasm and became the 
most credible brand name of the People s Daily Group. On the other hand, QGLT has 
been a troublesome ‘child’ for its mother company in that liberal ideas from this 
online community could offend the conservative Maoists in power. Because of its 
sensitivity as a political public forum affiliated to the Party’s organ, QGLT has been 
under the direct surveillance of the government organisations. ‘Big brother’ is always 
watching QGLT and he tightens his grip from time to time.
This official nature enabled QGLT to attract a group of quality users until 2002 under 
rather relaxed surveillance. Jiang Yaping, the founder of QGLT and a veteran 
journalist, used to instruct his staff in 1999 that ‘if you have hesitation in deleting a 
post, then don’t delete it’. However now Jiang is only one of the vice-Presidents of 
people.com.cn and his responsibility is to ‘make money’ rather than manage content 
online. Most QGLT moderators I interviewed admitted that tolerance towards critical 
political debate in QGLT is shrinking. As moderator Cindy said:
The Internet bulletin boards are the newest media form, thus they should be more daring 
in touching sensitive social political issues and help both government and people become 
familiar with critical voices. If we carry on expanding their political tolerance, they [the 
Party and the government] will gradually adapt to this new media culture. However, 
QGLT is binding its own feet now and hesitating to move forward (Interview 
31/08/2004).
Editorials from People’s Daily have long been regarded as a window to detect 
political changes in China. Now QGLT plays the same, if not a more, important role, 
which attracts both contributors and viewers. However as moderator Hank said, 
bearing in mind the fear that QGLT postings might be interpreted as tips for policy 
changes from the top, the Party’s propaganda institutions choose to squash lively 
online debates rather than encourage them.
During my ethnographic studies with QGLT, a lot of users and moderators were
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worried over the future of QGLT. There are a few problems worth consideration 
within QGLT The pre-arranged questions for a ‘live’ net-cast of online panel meeting 
with guest speakers produce ‘faked online interaction’; technical problems such as 
users being unable to get access to QGLT from time to time have existed for five 
years without any proper solution; the search engine with QGLT can only help users 
track down articles posted during the past month; the volunteer system caused more 
conflicts than it intended to solve; online secret agents pinned down dissident voices 
and encouraged eulogies for the dominant political authorities; critical rational voices 
were censored, punished and exiled.
Technologically, bulletin boards and other interactive Internet facilities are harder for 
authorities to control. Brants et al point out: ‘network technology has the potential to 
create a new public sphere which fits the social structure better [...] However, politics 
does not yet fit the new technology. Politicians feel uncomfortable with the different 
role they play in such a challenging direct democracy’ (1996: 246).
Some scholars predicted that the policies on online speech freedom would loosen 
slowly step by step in Mainland China, though the process might have ‘pauses and 
even reversals in special times’ (Tao 2001). However, taking into account that 50 
cyber-dissidents are currently imprisoned in China (Reporter Without Borders 
20/01/2006), and that Chinese people have been detained for online political activities 
such as browsing overseas-based ‘reactionary web sites’, downloading ‘reactionary’ 
articles or publishing ‘subversive articles’ on overseas bulletin boards, the relaxing of 
online surveillance seems anything but immediate.
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Chapter 6
The ‘Net-beings’: QGLT Users study
Online communities are ‘social aggregations that emerge from the net when enough 
people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, 
to form webs of personal relationships’ (Rheingold 1993:5). The QGLT community 
provides Chinese users with a virtual civil space for identity construction and network 
building. Internet bulletin board users integrate the role of information producer and 
receiver in an (almost instant in some cases) interactive environment. Bulletin boards 
open a new arena for users to act out roles as journalists, news analysts, current affair 
commentators, scholars and social activists. At the same time, interpersonal 
relationships are also established within this community and can extend into offline 
experience.
This chapter depicts the emerging Chinese ‘public’ as represented on QGLT bulletin 
boards. Users’ pennames, signature files, political clusters formed within the 
community, and how gendered-social structure affects women users will be examined 
respectively. By exploring the community nature of QGLT, this chapter aims to 
investigate the potential of CMC in uniting users into a critical public through opinion 
expression over current issues. The chapter concludes that enthusiasm in constructing 
political identities as active citizens within QGLT helps to bring about a mediated 
public sphere online. Nevertheless, online identity construction will not necessarily 
give the public the knowledge and wisdom needed for deliberation.
The QGLT community provides an example of how ‘task-focused’ and ‘relationship- 
based’ online group performance can co-exist simultaneously. Jan Walls attributes to 
the role of CMC within online groups ‘either as a means to achieve firm goals through 
flexible social relationships or as a means to maintain firm relationships by achieving 
flexible goals’ (Walls 1993: 157). A strong sense of political participation, which is 
suppressed in offline life in China, welds different opinionated individuals together in 
the QGLT community. In this sense the nature of QGLT is ‘task-focused’, while at the 
same time, the interaction among QGLT users also suggests social relationships
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rooted in ‘offline symbolic and economic contexts’ (Hills 1999:258) have been 
developed within this online community. The study of QGLT political clusters verifies 
Bart Cammaerts and Leo van Audenhove’s (2005) argument that online debate 
between ideologically different participants represents political conflicts in the offline 
world. To a certain extent, online behaviours such as lurking, posting, flaming, and 
gendered-structure of Internet use within QGLT is not only a reflection, but also a 
confirmation, of offline social political relationships.
1. Construction of Online-Personalities within QGLT
Within online communities, the ‘public’ has largely been a blurred picture of 
anonymous individuals as the Internet ‘make[s] possible the creation of an identity so 
fluid and multiple’ (Turkle 1995: 12). Scholars believe the anonymous online 
environment and fluid online identity can disguise CMC users’ true public selves. 
Anonymity enables CMC users to switch their genders, ages, sexual orientation, and 
other aspects of their public self or to take on multiple identities (McRae 1997; Myers 
1987; Stone 1995; Turkle 1995). However, studies on online communities also prove 
the consistency of online and offline selves among the majority of users (Baym 1998; 
2000). The Self is ‘a reflexive project’ through which the individual constructs ‘with 
the symbolic and material resources at their disposal, a coherent life-project’ 
(Thompson 1995: 215). Thompson also points out that individuals increasingly 
depend on a range of social institutions and systems for both the material and 
symbolic means in constructing a narration of self identity (1995:215).
By observing QGLT users’ pennames and signature files, one can spot from the 
construction of their online identities an aspiration for political participation. When 
this aspiration has not been fully implemented in offline experience in contemporary 
China, users turn to bulletin boards to have their voice heard in cyberspace. This 
strong sense of civil participation connects people together for a virtual public debate 
about issues of public interest, which forms a collective identity of the online group. A 
consistency of online and offline selves can also been found among QGLT users and 
the invention of online identities is situated closely in offline social context.
QGLT has an asynchronous temporal structure -  that is, the responses among users do
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not occur at the same time79, so that interpersonal communication within the 
community is mediated by a time difference. The asynchronous temporal structure 
enables participants in computer-mediated communication to have time to think about 
what to write before posting, thus enhancing their ability to strategically manage the 
impressions they create (Walter 1996). Within QGLT, users have control of their 
online personalities by naming and grouping themselves in an anonymous 
environment. The hierarchy among QGLT users is largely decided by their seniority 
with the community, frequency of posting, the click rate of their articles, the number 
of replies to their articles, and the frequency of their articles recommended by the 
moderators on the front page of www.people.com.cn. Expressional icons are not
o n
provided within QGLT and users rely on words, signs , repetition, HTML language, 
or set the words in larger font or in colour for emphasis or expression of emotion.
This online image management is particularly relevant in political bulletin boards 
such as QGLT where political inclination largely decides online relationship among 
users. Most users flag up their political preference when they first unlurk, i.e. they 
usually associate themselves with certain political belief or ideological preference 
when they first start posting or introduce themselves to others. Through this practice, 
‘friends’ or ‘enemies’ are demarcated during online debate and affect other online 
behaviour such as lurking (keeping silent) and flaming (having verbal conflicts with 
others). Political clusters formed within QGLT reflect a variety of ideological 
inclinations in contemporary China.
Information communication technologies offer women, as a ‘traditionally 
subordinated group’, a new means for their struggle for equality (Pattanaik 1999), and 
to subvert masculine dominated culture (Plant 1995, 1997). Women users’ 
participation in the online political discussion within QGLT shows that Chinese 
women users are as capable as their male peers of addressing the important issues in 
the public sphere. However, women’s use of the Internet is hindered by a gendered 
social and cultural structure. Without the change in the basic structure in the society, 
new media and technologies alone would not be able to help women change the rules 
of the game in the communication process.
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1.1 Pennames
The asynchronous temporal structure within QGLT gives users great control over their 
cyber-image by naming themselves in an anonymous environment. Names are 
‘transformed into trademarks, distinctive individual smells by which their users are 
recognized as either friends or enemies within an otherwise vague and anonymous 
BBS communication environment’ (Myers 1987: 240). The majority of QGLT users’ 
pennames contain a political theme of ‘strengthening the country’ which is 
demonstrated in pennames advocating patriotism; nationalism; democracy; humanism 
and humanity; and social justice.
A theme of patriotism runs through most QGLT users’ pennames such as LovelyChina
and Zhonghua shi wo qin ’ai de jia  (China is my beloved motherland). Patriotism in
China is usually associated with nationalism, which exhibits a certain degree of state
insecurity from a more than one hundred year history of being invaded and colonized.
One example is the penname Renzhong Daoyuan Baowei Zuguo which literally means
‘when it comes to safeguarding my motherland, the task is solemn and the road is
long’. Zhongguo de Nuhou (Angry roaring from China) from Taiwan registered this
penname with QGLT in April 2001 to show the user’s indignation towards the USA’s
military dominance in an incident involving the collision of Chinese and US military 
81planes . A similar example can also be found in Rihuo sheng rihuo, guohuo zhu 
guohuo (the Japan-made commodities bring calamity; the China-made commodities 
benefit our country) which extends the patriotism into the economic realm.
Public resentment towards corruption, injustice and inequality, the widening gap 
between rich and poor, and other social problems in contemporary China can also be 
detected from QGLT pennames. Zuigaofayuan dafaguan xuancheng de sifa 
gongzheng zai na’r?? (where is the legislative justice claimed by the Supreme Court 
Judge??) questions the operation of the Chinese legal system. The penname Teda 
Tanguan, which means ‘a super corrupt officer’ in English, is chosen to express the 
user’s ‘hatred towards official corruption’ and his ‘sarcasm and derision’ (20/04/2004). 
A celebration of working class pride and a sympathy with proletarian livelihood can 
be detected in QGTL from pennames like Shanyecunfu (a peasant from the wild 
countryside) or Banyun Gongren (a porter). Pennames are also used to reflect the
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miserable life of the lower social stratum such as Ti xiagang shiye zhigong shuoju 
gongdaohua (speaking out for the unemployed workers) and Woshi nongmin, 
nongmin ming zhenku (I’m a peasant; our peasants have a doomed destiny).
Ideological advocacy and political viewpoints are also embedded in QGLT pennames. 
Minzhu qingchu fubai (democracy eradicates corruption) and Jianjue hanwei gongmin 
jiben quanli (firmly safeguarding citizens’ basic rights) exhibits users’ political 
objectives. Behind the penname HKob in Russian is the user’s ‘democratic Socialism’ 
ideal (Interview 31/08/2004). Movement towards a market economy has brought 
about privatisation in China since 1992, and has triggered public debate and nostalgia 
towards an idyllic equality during the Socialist era within QGLT. The penname 
Shichang neng jiejue wenti ma (can the market solve all the problems) is one example.
A survey conducted by QGLT in 2004 (see Table 6.1) reveals that among the 1635 
QGLT respondents who have pennames, around 17.8% (291 people) have more than 
one penname. One QGLT user I interviewed claimed he has more than 500 pennames 
from the end of 2000 to April 2005. Pennames attributed to him are created to show 
his attitude in topical discussions. For example, he used Lixing Kangri (Resisting 
Japan rationally) in the March 2005 nationwide online protest against Japan’s 
whitewashing of wartime events in their history textbooks; and Huanying Lian Zhan 
Laifang (Welcome Lian Zhan to the Mainland) before Taiwanese Kuomintang Party 
top official Lian Zhan’s visit to Beijing in April 2005. Multiple-identity, according to 
a user who registered more than twenty pennames up to 2004, is also a way to avoid 
flaming when disagreement in political debates leads to personal attacks (Songyang 
19/04/2004).
Flaming, defined by Gattiker, is ‘a virulent and often largely personal attack against 
the author of a posting on the Internet’ (2001:195). My participant observation 
revealed that QGLT users tend to flame when disagreement in subjective discussion 
cannot reach a compromise and the rational debate is carried away by personal 
feelings. For example, during the 2003 war in Iraq, some anti-war users labelled those 
who supported the USA’s military action as the USA ‘running dog’ and called them to 
‘go and fetch a left bone from your master’ or ‘go and lick up your master’s boots’. 
For those users who do not want to confront such flaming postings, they can pretend
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to go offline by switching identities.
Table 6.1 Survey on QGLT users ’pennames (2004)
Number of pennames 
used per person in QGLT
1 2-5 6-9 10-15 16
Number of respondents 1344 227 15 31 18
Percentage 82.20% 13.88% 0.92% 1.90% 1.10%
Total respondents: 1635
Use of multiple identities has been a feature for almost all online communities. 
However, the majority of users stick to one identity. My in-depth interviews found 
veteran QGLT users who have built up credibility within this online community 
especially prefer to stick to their main penname. Laobenniu (the old dull bull) is a 
Chinese living in the USA who has registered this penname since 2000. He uses 
Laobenniu to post and this name has been well known among other users. Two other 
pennames Xin laobenniu (the new old dull bull) and AidangAiguo Airenmin (Love the 
Party, love the country, and love the people) are only used when Laobenniu is blocked 
temporarily (usually up to seven days) for his occasional dissident opinions such as
O')
advocating the 1989 pro-democracy movement . Though QGLT moderators know 
well these three different pennames come from the same IP, they would rather not lose 
this loyal community member, as long as he does not become too radical in his 
political opinion.
1.2 Signature Files
Signature files can be a name; an e-mail address; a line of quotations; a statement; a 
poem; photos; illustrations; or even ASCII illustration (built out of punctuation marks 
and letters) that are attached to the bottom of each posting. A signature file usually 
shows the user’s hobbies; political preference; humour; or friendliness. Because they 
appear on every posting from the senders, they become ‘one of the most immediate 
and visually forceful cues to identity’ (Baym 1998:56). Embodied in QGLT users’ 
signature files, the expression of their political preference constitutes an indispensable
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part o f  the online selves and a reflection o f  the comm unity identity.
Appearing most often in QGLT users’ signature files are URLs of their personal web 
pages; blogs; or contact details like email addresses or even telephone numbers, 
which resemble the exchanging of business cards in offline society. Apart from Email 
addresses and personal websites, some users also make a small statement in their 
signature file to further disclose their personality. As Ji ’art's signature file says, to him, 
Internet bulletin boards are his farmland on which he works for the benefit of the 1.3 
billion Chinese people. He also invites other users to publish, copy, or crosspost his 
articles or translate his articles into other languages and communicate the idea to the 
world.
Political enthusiasm constitutes an indispensable part of QGLT users’ signature files 
and reflects a collective identity. Patriotism, nationalism, longing for democracy and 
resentment towards social injustice remain key themes. Qiangtan Kanke quotes a line 
from the former national leader Deng Xiaoping in his signature file: ‘I’m a son of 
Chinese people, I devote my deepest compassion to my motherland and people’. 
LovelyChina states his wish for Chinese unification along the Taiwan Strait and 
declares himself as ‘an absolute Chinese nationalist!’ Renwoying expresses his 
yearning for democracy: ‘Democracy is the only road leading to a strong nation for 
China!’ ‘Only democracy can save China! Only democracy can save China! Only 
democracy can save China!...’ Laobenniu, who has been living in North America for 
16 years, still has concerns over corruption in the Mainland, and expresses this 
concern in his signature files:
The old dull bull,
Hates the corrupt officials;
He’s digging graves for them;
He’s working for the elimination of corruption...
(http://www.qglt.com/bbs/GetGuestInfo?GuestID=66069 accessed 16/04/2004)
During my interview with Laobenniu, he said that Laobenniu is a ‘netbeing’ 
possessing its own character and credibility. This signature file of resenting corruption
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contributes to the overall ‘personality’ of this netbeing.
1.3 Clusters Formed From Different Political Views
Political discussion over current affairs brings about the categorization of the ‘Left’ 
and the ‘Right’ among QGLT users. Some users even flag up their political preference 
through self-explaining pennames such as Zuo Ye (a leftist), Youce tongxing (passing 
through on the right side) or Gongchan zhuyizhe Jia (Communist A).
In their study of QGLT postings regarding the 2001 US-China planes collision 
incident, Tang and Shi (2001) concluded that QGLT users formed three political 
clusters online—the Left, the Right, and the Middle-of-the-road. Members of the 
same political cluster appeared online at the same time and showed group 
characteristics. Key members of each cluster (usually 3 to 5) actively posted and led 
the on-line debate. According to Tang and Shi, the Left viewed the incident as a 
provocation from ‘American imperialists’ and urged the Chinese government to take a 
hard-line on foreign policy. The Right urged the Chinese government to return the 
American planes and the crew for a peaceful solution to the crisis; while the Middle- 
of-the-road put this single incident in the context of international relations and 
international laws and started re-thinking China’s role in a changed international 
security environment.
The left-right demarcation in QGLT is characterised by contrasting ideological 
preferences adopted by different clusters. However, the boundaries among the 
political clusters are never stable, and users can easily move into overlapping 
subgroups holding pro, anti, and mixed attitudes towards any current issue. Tang and 
Shi’s categorisation simplified the complicated political outlooks presented within this 
community. Meanwhile, though ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ have been used as political terms in 
China since 1920s, the demarcation between left-right is very different to that in 
Western nations. In general, the Left in China refers to those who advocate the 
Communist Party’s governance, while the Right refers to those who long for 
democracy. These dual standards in categorizing political preference can sometimes
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create confusion within QGLT. For example, fikob claimed to be Centre-Left 
advocating Democratic Socialism, but other QGLT members on the ‘Left’ have 
labelled him as ‘Right’.
Based on my participant observation and textual analysis of QGLT users’ postings, I 
attempt to provide a basic description of the prevalent political beliefs within the 
QGLT community in the following Table 6.2 ‘An Analysis o f QGLT clusters'.
Worth noting is also the trend that more and more QGLT users believe they cannot be 
simply labelled as Left or Right. The users who advocated the USA’s military 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 (usually the ‘Right’ in QGLT) could be the same group of 
users arguing for the public ownership of educational institutions (usually the ‘Left’). 
Hence, a growing number of QGLT users choose to strike a balance between the 
‘Left’ and the ‘Right’ outlook and tend to describe themselves as: ‘a moderate leftist’, 
‘a so-called rightist’, ‘a slight leftist’, and so on.
The categorisation of political ‘Left’ or ‘Right’ triggers debates and even flaming 
within the QGLT community. But most users believe the categorisation of political 
clusters is necessary for debating ideas (Yundan shuinuan 06/01/2004). Some even 
believe the magnetism of QGLT lies largely in its debates among different political 
clusters, from which ‘dialogue between different political camps are held’ (Interview 
with Dahongyan 18/04/2005).
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Table 6.2 An analysis o f  QGLT political clusters
QGLT
Category
Description Economic advocacy Totalitarianism/
democracy
Equality and social 
justice
International
Issues
Transformation 
of society
Far Left Maoists Planned Economy; 
Organised social production, 
State ownership
People’s democratic 
dictatorship
(totalitarianism)
Anti-humanism Aggressive
Nationalism
Radical
Neo-Left Neo-Leftism in 
China
Accept market economy, but 
advocate a mixed economy with a 
significant public sector;
Advocate state intervention in the 
economy
Agree with freedom 
and democracy, but 
believe the social 
conditions in China 
are not ready for 
democracy
Concerns for public 
interest; against the 
widening gap 
between the rich and 
the poor
Range from 
Aggressive 
Nationalism to 
Nationalism
Range from 
radical to 
reformist view
Right Liberalism and 
centre-left
Accept market economy, but 
advocate a mixed economy with 
both public sector and private 
sector;
Limited state intervention in the 
economy
Advocate for 
democracy and social 
liberty
Concerns over the 
wellbeing of common 
people
Rational
Nationalism
Sympathize with 
or advocate 
democratic 
movements
Far Right Extreme
Liberalism
Laissez faire capitalism; 
Privatization of industries; 
Economic liberty
Longing for western 
(especially American) 
democracy
The state should 
prioritize economic 
liberty to social 
equality
Internationalism
pro-
Americanism
Mixed to radical
Centralism A mixture of via 
media and no­
attitude
Developing economy and 
strengthening the nation is the first 
priority for China
Mixed Mixed Mixed Against radical 
social changes
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1.4 Lurkers
Lurkers, those users who choose to rarely or never contribute to the online discussion, 
account for a significant majority within QGLT. As Nancy Baym argues ‘one cannot 
create a recognisable identity in any [online] group without posting’ (Baym 2000:144), 
and lurkers remain anonymous and invisible in general. Nevertheless, the boundary 
between lurkers and posters are not as stable as that between audience and media 
producers in traditional media. A lurker can suddenly unlurk by posting messages; 
while an active poster can stop posting and go lurking for various reasons. In this 
sense, lurkers are participants rather than ‘audiences’ in cyberspace.
A QGLT survey in 2004 shows that around 48% (1481 out of 3116) of respondents 
have never registered pennames. Since only registered users can post in this 
community, almost half of QGLT users choose not to talk about politics in public. My 
participant observation found an even higher percentage of users lurking within QGLT. 
Take for example, a typical ‘rush hour’ for QGLT from 1 to 2 pm GMT (9-10 pm 
Beijing Time) on an ordinary weekday on 5 January, 2005. The total number of 
registered users reached 348,160 on that day from QGLT’s inception. Of the 38,570 
visitors online at 13:52 GMT, only 168 users posted. The rough figure is that 4 out of 
1000 users post on average. The majority of the posters gathered in the QGLT Current 
Affairs board (105 out of 168), another 38 users posted in QGLT In-Depth, and there 
were still dozens of users in another two discussion boards. Therefore, a large number 
of QGLT users, 38,420 in my observation, were interested in the current issues being 
discussed but remained as a silent anonymous collective.
Hannah, an unregistered user in QGLT, is a 33-year-old female university 
administrator. When talking about her lurking, she gave the following reasons:
I don’t think I’m cherishing an enthusiasm for politics or holding an extreme political
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attitude which presses me to speak out in public in this online community... But I do like 
reading other users’ posting every day during the lunch break... I also visit other 
universities’ bulletin boards like Yita Hutu based in Beijing University. To me, the online 
discussion and debates remind me of the other part of my personality, that of an active 
citizen apart from being a good employee, a wife and a mother (Interview 05/08/2004).
Unregistered lurkers like Hannah are extremely difficult to trace. Their status will 
only be registered as a number of ‘visitors online’. The existence of lurkers, as some 
scholars argue, can be viewed as the ‘passive’ audience in the mass communication 
process. David Marshall believes that the lurkers indicate the ‘past relationships to 
media can be channelled through new media’ (2004: 26). However, Marshall is wrong 
in believing that ‘the lurker watches and listens much as the viewer/audience 
subjectivity is produced by television or radio’ (2004: 26). What lurkers gain from the 
Internet bulletin boards is a more individualised experience than viewers get from 
traditional mass media. Meanwhile, the status of lurkers can be also fluid, and flexible 
in that lurkers and posters change their roles from time to time.
Quite a few of the QGLT heavy posters started as lurkers when they first joined this 
online community. Wanyusu had been lurking for a few months before posting. He 
had been ‘listening too much and thinking too much,’ and found words failing him at 
the beginning (28/05/2004). Chenmozhi had been a heavy poster in QGLT from 2001 
to 2004, but chose to lurk in 2004 because ‘the more I know about this society, the 
less I can write about. The more I understand, the more willingly I choose to keep 
silent’ (12/04/2004). Sanyeqing started by posting short comments on QGLT Current 
Affairs and soon felt himself rather ‘shallow’ compared to others. Then he opted to be 
a lurker and had been lurking for 3 years before unlurking again as a frequent poster 
(30/05/2004). Thus, there is a fluid identity exchange between lurkers (especially the 
registered users) and posters, and reasons for this identity exchange vary greatly 
among individuals.
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2. Talking Politics: a Gendered Issue?
Information and communication technologies offer women, as a ‘traditionally 
subordinated group’, a new means in their struggle for equality (Pattanaik 1999) and 
in subverting the masculine dominated culture (Plant 1995, 1997). Women users’ 
participation in the online political discussion within QGLT shows that Chinese 
female users are as capable as their male peers of addressing the important issues in 
the public sphere. Internet bulletin boards help women, to a certain degree, to ‘reverse 
traditional power games in the communication process’ (Castells 1996:391). 
Nonetheless, women’s use of the Internet is hindered by a gendered social perception.
The gender ratio within QGLT is extremely unbalanced (especially on the Current
o r
Affairs and In-Depth boards), with almost nine out of ten users being male in 2001 . 
But, compared with most ICPs who address their female users with gendered topical 
discussion on child care, cooking, fashion, and relationships, QGLT provides female 
users (though in a small group) with an equal chance to take part in political 
discussion. Female users have developed their speciality in talking about politics— 
Jieyu on agriculture and migrant peasant workers issues, Xiaowan on Chinese 
unification along the Taiwan Strait, Aierbushang on the historic account of state- 
owned enterprises. Postings from QGLT female users show that women are more than 
capable of giving their opinions on important political issues in the public sphere.
Jieyu, a university teacher, revealed in her postings that she was brought up in a 
lower-status peasant family. This connection to the rural area means she is still 
concerned with agricultural policies, village development, and the miserable lives of 
migrant peasant workers. In her postings, Jieyu argues for equal rights for the migrant 
peasant workers in the city (15/05/2002) and discusses measures to protect their rights 
(16/05/2002). Along with some other users, she suggested setting up a special 
discussion board on agriculture policies, peasants, and peasant migrant workers within
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QGLT in 2002, which later became a platform for discussion on issues concerning
o / :
agriculture, rural development, grassroots democracy, and migrant peasant workers .
As an online current affairs discussion community, QGLT is comparatively friendly to 
female users. When asked whether she observed discrimination against women in a 
male-dominated QGLT, Jieyu said:
In some commercial web forums or bulletin boards like Xilu and Tianya, the colour of ID 
is differentiated according to gender status. But gender status is not displayed in QGLT. I 
really appreciate this© I have never felt discrimination against women in discussion 
myself in QGLT (Interview 24/08/2004).
This friendly atmosphere encourages female users to take a clear political stand in 
online debate. Compared to male users, female users are less likely to join abstract 
theoretical debates, but more likely to participate in the discussion over specific issues. 
Meanwhile, most female users showed little interest in categorising themselves and 
others into political clusters, nor were they inclined to flame over oppositional 
opinions. Describing herself as ‘slightly Left’, Aierbushang said she shows respect 
towards her ‘opponents’ within QGLT:
I respect the QGLT Right like Meiyuan and Xueqinren. They are loyal to their own 
political belief and adhere to it. They show civilized and serious attitude in discussion. I 
can detect the philosophical thoughts and a sense of justice in their arguments. I also 
respect the centrists like Qingwuyudanghe, Yangzijian, and Caoqiaoguanmin, they are 
more cool-headed and rational. I leam more about a true China through online political 
discussion (Interview 28/07/2004).
To encourage more female users to participate in online discussion, QGLT launched 
Ntbcing Luntan (Female Forum) in March 2003 ‘to increase the inclusiveness and 
openness of the QGLT community’ (Interview with Ntbcing Luntan moderator 
31/08/2004). Ntbcing Luntan attracted 300 main postings daily on average from a 
group of gender-balanced users. The backbone of this forum is the online panel 
meeting with female professional guests. These guests are usually government 
officials, scholars, news figures, and professionals like artists, Olympic champions,
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entrepreneurs, journalists, and so on. The panel meeting is intended to provide female 
users a space for serious, in-depth discussion concerning issues of ‘female interests’ 
such as:
Money management at home and in the company (10/04/2003)
Women and the Internet (14/03/2003)
What does the family mean to the modem women (08/08/2003)
Series: Eradicating domestic violence against women (Nov. 2003)
Female thoughts and its influence on social development (09/01/2004)
Female and youth education (09/032004)
Equal rights and female labour protection: legislation and development (22/052004)
How can we be good parents (23/07/2004)
The above topical discussions in Niixing Luntan prove Mary Ryan’s argument that 
access to the public sphere holds many promises for women (Ryan 1992: 260). For 
most Chinese women today, family loyalties still play a significant role in their 
identity construction. The awareness of their social roles is mediated between the 
consciousness of independence in public (the capacity to earn a salary and support 
their families) and womanliness in private (fidelity to their parents, husbands and 
motherliness to their children). When ‘going public’, Leonore Davidoff believes most 
women do so in order ‘to protect and further their position within the bounds of the 
category “women” as it has been constructed within the home and family’, and tend to 
campaign ‘around issues generally designated as domestic and private’ (Davidoff 
1998: 183). This character of women’s public commitment is shown on Niixing 
Luntan within QGLT as well. It seems that most Chinese women users feel more 
comfortable accessing the public sphere by talking about issues of ‘domesticity’ as the 
first step. As Mary Ryan says, by bringing issues of domesticity to public attention, 
women ‘place [...] a multitude of specific issues, often draw [...] from their “private” 
experience, on the public agenda’ (Ryan 1992:260). Such topical discussion shows the 
permeable boundary between public affairs and private issues. Fraser believes ‘the 
‘private’ idioms of domesticity and motherhood’ can be served as ‘springboards for 
public activity’ (1992: 115). The feminist perspective constitutes a vital part of the 
public sphere and adds new content to the discussion and debate in public. However,
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according to the Niixing Luntan moderator, female users are usually passive in 
volunteering opinions in public, which makes it difficult to mobilise their active 
involvement. Meanwhile many QGLT males think the ‘female topics’ are not of 
interest in ‘strengthening the country’, and feel embarrassed to participate in 
‘women’s talk’.
The demarcation between ‘female’ topics and ‘male’ topics also affects the perception 
of female presence in ‘male’ topical discussion. As one user says:
On the day when the military planes collision incident happened, most of the users were 
cursing George W. Bush. I still remember the moderator was Gangtie. We were very 
happy because he’s a guy. So we wouldn’t worry about the inconvenience of the presence 
of ladies and could curse and swear as we like (Songyang 19/04/2004).
QGLT females are usually talked about by male users based on perceived traits of 
femininity such as ‘naivety and elegance’ rather than rationality or eloquence in their 
writing. Though Aierbushang has posted many serious articles about state-owned 
enterprises, she was remembered by male user Laokexinlai as ‘a very interesting little 
girl’ who has a ‘genuine Beijing dialect in her postings’. But other male users were 
remembered by Laokexinlai for their professional speciality in online political 
discussion: ‘Gangbijiaqianbi is good at analysing transportation problems.
Yangliankang seems have speciality in water conservancy projects’ (25/04/2004).
3. Exclusions and Limitation of the Virtual Public Sphere
Though Internet bulletin boards provide a platform for public political discussion, its 
empowering capacity has inherent limitations. This virtual public sphere emerging in 
China tends to exclude those who are poorer, less educated and female. It is also 
vulnerable to political control and commercialisation. Political extremist voices also 
pose a threat to the rational critical debate online.
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3.1 Elite-Dominated Virtual Public Sphere
Though in theory the public sphere is open to all, Habermas points out that the 
‘public’ in the bourgeois public sphere are those private individuals ‘who -  insofar as 
they were propertied and educated -  as readers, listeners, and spectators could avail 
themselves via the market of the objects that were subject to discussion’ (Habermas 
1989:37). Thus the public sphere in practice excludes those who are less well-off, 
uneducated or less educated. This elitist tendency in public discussion is also found 
online. Nicolas Jankowski and Martine van Seim (2000) argue that the online 
discussion in practice seems to be dominated by elites and is unable to influence 
public policy formation. The exclusion from the online public discussion exists in the 
form of digital divide in China, which puts people from rural area or with less 
education at a disadvantage position.
In general, QGLT users fall into the propertied, educated and digitally well-off 
category. Among the 35 QGLT users who answered my questionnaire, 34 of them 
hold a university degree or above and live in a non-rural area. The latest nationwide 
census in 2000 displayed that only 3.53% of the whole Mainland China population 
hold a university degree or above, whilst 63.91% of the whole population live in a
0 7
rural area. Comparing with this demographic figure, the composition of QGLT users 
is quite selected.
This elitist trait within QGLT is a reflection of the domestic digital divide in China. As 
Karsten Giese says, the digital divide in China is characterised by ‘a national situation 
in which a few high-tech islands stand isolated in what amounts to a vast 
technological wilderness’ (2003: 40). Though the quick growth of Chinese public 
online looks promising at first glance, the distribution of Internet users in China is 
economically, geographically and educationally imbalanced. Three economically 
developed provinces -  Guangdong, Shandong and Jiangsu, made up 29.4% of the 
national users up to 31 December, 2005. While the less developed provinces,
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especially the Western provinces, share a rather marginal percentage: Tibet (0.1%); 
Qinghai (0.2%) and Ningxia (0.3%). Media illiteracy also excludes a large population 
from electronic deliberation. Statistics show that by the end of 2005, 50.7% of 
Chinese Internet users hold or are doing a university degree or above. 38.7% of non­
users state they ‘have not knowledge and skills in using computers or the Internet’ 
(China Internet Network Information Centre 2006). The majority of Chinese users, 
according to CINIC 2006 Annual Report XVIII, can be described as male (58.7%), 
single (57.9%), working towards a university degree or are already university degree 
holders (50.7%), and are aged between 18 to 30 (54.4%) (CINIC Report XVII 2006). 
Such demographic features reveal how gender, education, and other social political 
elements affect participation in online dialogues.
Nevertheless, there are also signs showing that QGLT users are not entirely middle 
class elite intellectuals. The QGLT survey in 2004 shows that 73% of QGLT users
claim they have no steady income or a monthly income less than RMB 2,000, which
88indicates their economic status as below the urban middle class. More importantly, 
all QGLT users I interviewed are very reluctant to label themselves as ‘elite 
intellectuals.’ ‘Elite intellectuals’ to them are intellectuals trading their knowledge and 
social conscience for personal gains from the government or foreign powers. They 
view themselves as plebeian representatives, talking about issues of general public 
interest with the goal of ‘strengthening the country’.
Computer-mediated communication, ‘favours uninhibited communication and 
stimulates participation from lower-status workers in company-based networks’ 
(Castells 1996:390-391). However, Pierre Bourdieu points out that there is an 
opposition between ordinary entrepreneurs and cultural entrepreneurs. Ordinary 
entrepreneurs seek ‘immediate economic profit’, while the culture entrepreneurs are 
‘struggling to accumulate specifically cultural capital, albeit at the cost of temporarily 
renouncing economic profit’ (1993:83). QGLT users, intentionally or unintentionally,
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fall into the category of cultural entrepreneurs. As self-employed QGLT user 
Zhongguo de Nuhou said, ‘if judged from our intelligence and our thought, we are 
elite; but if judged by wealth and social status, we are definitely not’ (interview 
01/09/2004). As cultural consumption is determined by class location (Bourdieu 1984) 
rather than immediate economic status, Internet users from QGLT are still elitist 
according to such a social determinant.
3.2 Male Dominated QGLT
There have been several reasons contributing to the lack of female users in QGLT. 
Different language patterns in argumentation, men’s dominance in communication, 
bad manners from male users, and the traditional social norms that frown upon 
women participating in public speech (especially politics) should all be blamed. All 
these reasons are rooted in the offline gendered role-playing in socialisation, as Dale 
Spender argues ‘the sexes are taught specific technological relationships as part of 
their gender identity’ (1995: 172).
Different language pattern between male and female users is one reason for the 
exclusion of women in online political debate. Savicki et al. (1996) argue that men 
tend to use more fact-oriented language and call for action, whereas women are more 
likely to self-disclose and try to prevent or reduce tension. The language pattern 
within the male-dominated QGLT is ‘masculine’ in its objectivity, impersonality and 
rationality. The general language pattern of femininity, associated with subjectivity, 
personal feelings, and emotions, does not fit into this community very well. Even 
though QGLT female users show their ability to join rational critical debate, their 
intrinsic disposition to prevent or reduce tension makes them vulnerable in the 
powerful ‘warfare of argument’.
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Nevertheless, the gendered difference in online language pattern is only the 
superficial phenomenon of men’s dominance in offline communication. ‘Men talk 
more often, they talk for longer periods [...]; men define the topic, assume the 
legitimacy of their own view, and override women who do not see the world in their 
terms’ (Spender 1995:193). If a woman tries to play a central role in public 
communication, one common strategy for men to regain their dominant status is to 
interrupt and correct the woman so that they ‘redefine her meaning in their own 
terms’ (Spender 1995:193). These offline social values and linguistic tactics are 
transferred to the online world and keep women in their disadvantaged conversational 
position.
Bad attitudes from male users such as using intimidating, insulting or harassing 
language is still another reason for female users’ exclusion from online discussion. 
There is evidence suggesting that ‘users can behave in a much more abusive and 
crudely coercive way when they are anonymous, than they would in a face-to-face 
situation’ (Spender 1995:195). Aierbushang has been in QGLT since 2002, but she 
still finds it ‘difficult and frustrating’ when she is confronted with ‘vulgar and coarse’ 
language from male users (interview 28/07/2004). A young female user 
Qingjumingyue revealed in her posting that some male users had posted sexual
OQ
innuendo or harassing messages to female users (14/09/2004) . As a female intern 
moderator, I had the experience of getting unpleasant postings from male users as 
well. When I was moderating the Lianyi Huiguan board on 21 July 2004, a male user 
Banong Guocui followed my postings with questions such as ‘Who’s this chick?’ and 
‘Which guy in QGLT possesses her?’ I replied to him and told him ‘to watch his 
language’, which only invited swearing. Within 20 minutes, a verbal fight containing 
coarse language ensued between users who sympathised with me, and those who took 
the side of Banong Guocui. This fight was only ended when I deleted all these hostile 
postings under the supervision of Mr. Shan, then the QGLT director. Though Mr. Shan 
backed me all through this minor incident, I still could not help feeling guilty for
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triggering such a ‘fight’ within QGLT. It is not difficult to imagine how shocked, 
distressed, and discouraging this kind of experience would be to other female users.
To avoid the online discrimination, provocation and harassment, many women choose 
a ‘neutral’ penname which has no clear indication of their gender (Wallace 1999:47). 
This is the strategy for some QGLT females as well. However, the barriers for female 
users to join political online discussion are not just the know-how of the online 
language pattern and online communication skills.
Taking care of the household rather than talking politics in public is still culturally 
accepted as the woman’s role in Chinese society. When a woman goes online, the 
socially and culturally defined gender stereotype encourages women to engage in 
issues concerning domesticity rather than other more ‘serious’ issues in the ‘public’ 
life.
Female users are addressed by Internet service providers and content producers as 
representatives of the ‘category of women,’ defined in terms of embodied difference 
(menstruation, pregnancy, maintenance of femininity), the gendered division of labour 
(child care, housework, home decoration, cooking) or interests (relationships, fashion, 
beauty, romantic fiction) (Paasonen, S. 2002: 30).
For those women who do post on political bulletin boards, they have to make the best 
use of their time between work and taking care of the household. One female user said 
she usually visits QGLT whilst cooking supper every evening. She has to rush back to 
attend dishes on the stove while reading and posting. Though never discouraging her 
explicitly from ‘arguing on the Internet bulletin boards’, her husband ‘laughed at’ her 
for being such an ‘aggressively fighting chicken’ and tried to talk her into ‘reading 
without making comments’ (19/04/2004).
Under all the pressures from both online and offline environment, most Chinese
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women are actually excluded from the electronic deliberation. Dale Spender (1995) 
argues that the socio-culturally accepted gender identity negates women’s connection 
with machines or digital technologies. I want to add that the socio-culturally accepted 
gender identity in China also negates women’s connection with political debate. 
Chinese women’s socialisation leads them into the belief that debating politics in 
public does not fit with their notions of themselves as virtuous women. Even when 
they are online, they would rather choose some light-hearted topics on which to chat, 
as female user Jieyu commented (interview 24/08/2004).
Gendered inequalities will not be eradicated by women changing their behaviour 
alone. The exclusion of women from electronic deliberation is rooted in the offline 
administrative inequality of genders. Seyla Benhabib believes that the traditional 
modes of drawing distinction between the public and the private have been part of a 
‘discourse of domination that legitimises women’s oppression and exploitation’ 
(1992:93). The silence of women online has to be changed because ‘the silence that 
goes with women not being able to get a word in ... [will prevent them from] raising 
the topics that are of concern to them’ (Spender 1995:197). Otherwise, women will 
not be liberated from the ‘patriarchal-capitalist-disciplinary bureaucracy’ (Benhabib 
1992:98) that disempowers them in the public sphere.
3.3 Editorial Control over the Construction of Online Identities
Users’ construction of online identity within QGLT is under full supervision. When a 
user fills in the online form to register as a QGLT member, he/she has to wait for 
approval from the QGLT moderators. Those who register “inappropriate” pennames 
or signature files will receive an email from QGLT staff suggesting they should create 
another online identity as the one they applied for will not be activated. So before they 
create an online identity that does not challenge the status quo, newly registered 
QGLT users will not be able to post within this community.
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Interestingly, there are no specific newsroom regulations concerning the gate-keeping 
of the construction of online identity. It is rather censorship practiced by moderators. 
Moderators can decide which pennames should be permanently blocked, then record 
this “offence” in the internal forum. The reason for blocking out a penname 
permanently (equivalent to life imprisonment in an offline context, as one user says) 
is usually only ‘being inappropriate’. For example, the following two messages were 
found within the internal forum:
Guanyuan ai fubai, renmin ai zaofan (which literally means ‘Officials love to corrupt and 
people love to rebel’) is permanently blocked. Inappropriate penname.
Bupafeng, bupasha, bupatankeche (which literally means ‘Not afraid of being blocked, 
not afraid of being killed, not afraid of tanks’90) is permanently blocked. Inappropriate 
penname (QGLT internal forum 11/08/2004).
One side effect of this editorial control over the construction of online identity is that 
QGLT has become a more and more self-contained community. Before going through 
QGLT moderators, the newly registered pennames are ‘dead’ names as they do not 
allow the user to post. Therefore a large number of new members in QGLT are forced 
into lurking before they can finally ‘speak’. Because QGLT has a limited number of 
staff, a huge number of pennames registered, but not activated, have been 
accumulated during the past years. I was shocked to find out that among the 330,000 
registered users up till July 2004, almost 160,000 were not activated. To solve this 
problem, QGLT administration assigned a new moderator to inspect all these 
pennames and activate those harmless ones. However, he only activated about 2,000 
pennames before he was assigned another task to moderate online postings. When I 
finished my ‘internship’ in September 2004, there were still more than 150,000 
pennames not activated.
For those QGLT users who have already had one (or more than one) online identity, 
they can send internal messages to the moderators asking them to activate their new 
pennames. But for those who registered for the first time, they have to wait and lurk
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unless they contact the QGLT office by other means. When I first registered in 2003,1 
was not able to post for a few months before I made a phone call to QGLT director to 
complain. Thus, censorship in QGLT not only blocks out the voices challenging the 
authority, but also contains the online community to a self-cloning one. It is well 
known within QGTL that most new pennames are actually new identities from 
existing members.
However, this “seamless” censoring system has loopholes through which extremist 
voices can slip. Online identities constructed within QGLT can also be used to convey 
non-progressive discourse. During my participant observation, I found the following 
signature files from a user Yongyuan de Monggu (Forever Mongolian):
I must arouse those mobs that are cruel and irritable 
Riding the wind 
Drinking the dews 
I must bum down your houses
Made your wives and daughters suffer from cold and starvation 
So that you will know what to regret91
I sent this user an internal message asking: ‘you have a very unique signature file’.
He replied: ‘These are my ancestors’ words. I dare not to forget even for a moment.’
Then I followed: ‘Who are your ancestors? What are the ancestors’ words? Who are 
“you”?’
I did not get any further reply.
As John S. Dryzek comments, the wider public domain consists of contesting 
subordinated groups in the society, which may involve non-progressive forces such as 
‘fundamentalist religious movements, nationalists, or anti-abortion groups’ (Dryzek 
2000:23). Apart from the civil society organisation, non-progressive activities can also 
find the Internet an ideal venue for assembling and organising. The fluid character of
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Internet-based interaction, and the ease of joining and withdrawing make it ‘really 
difficult to estimate what portion of the citizenry is actually involved’ (Dahlgren 2004: 
xiii).
4. Strong Publics? Weak Publics?
Worth exploring is also the question whether users from online political bulletin 
boards constitute an antagonistic public, that is, an online equivalent to a strong public. 
‘Strong publics’, as Nancy Fraser argues, refer to ‘sovereign parliaments’ which are 
the sites ‘for the discursive authorization of the use of state power,’ while ‘weak 
publics’ refer to the ‘publics whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in 
opinion formation and does not [...] encompass decision making’ (1992:134). QGLT 
users’ online activities prove that CMC can cultivate a sense of ‘citizenship’ among 
people and bring about ‘publics’ in the virtual space debating over issues concerning 
public interest. However, the translation of online public opinion into offline policy 
making is still dictated by the offline polity.
Statistically, China has the world second largest online population. The official CINIC 
Report XVII shows that up to December 31, 2005 mainland China had 49.5 million 
computers connected to the Internet, and the total number of Internet users92 reached 
111 million. Chinese Internet users show great interest in obtaining news and 
networking with each other online. As shown in the following figure, reading news 
(67.9%) and sending and receiving Emails (64.7%) are two major online activities for 
Chinese users. Online interactive communication facilities enjoy great popularity as 
well: 41.9% of users use Instant messengers, 41.6% use Internet forums, bulletin 
boards, discussion groups, and 23.1% of the users use web-based chat rooms. These 
figures show that Chinese users are keen to get news from the Internet and ready to 
contribute to online discussion.
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Figure 6.1 Chinese Internet Users’ Online Activities
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Source: CINIC Report XV: Statistics on Internet development in China (Jan. 2006)
What ‘issues’ are the Chinese users talking about on bulletin boards overall? A 
commercial search engine www.anvsneak.com grouped the bulletin boards according 
to their topical discussion into the following 22 categories (accessed: 26/04/2005):
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Table 6.2 Topical discussion on Chinese bulletin boards from www. anvsveak. com
Topical discussion Number of Bulletin boards
IT 758
Education 696
Computer games 668
Society and politics 518
Automobile 366
Literature 358
Arts and pop culture 350
Music, film and TV 349
Economy 306
Romance and emotion 285
Sports 259
T elecommunication 251
Careers and profession 194
Photos and cartoons 192
Life style 187
Cities 153
Media 139
Military 104
Property 82
Traveling 79
Health information 64
Industry 22
Total 6380
As we can see, non-political discussion on IT, education and computer games are the 
top 3 discussions. Nevertheless, political discussion bulletin boards (categorised as 
Society and politics) rank fourth. Topical discussion in this category covers issues 
relating to ‘society’ (187 bulletin boards), ‘current political affairs’ (134 boards),
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‘history’ (50 boards), ‘legislation’ (43 boards), academic (40 boards), environment 
protection (23 boards), ethnicity and religion (14 boards), charity (13 boards), 
international relations (9 boards), science and technology (4 boards) and government 
(1 board). Meanwhile, as I have argued in Chapter 1, it would be over simplistic to 
assume topical discussions under ‘nonpolitical’ categories are always ‘apolitical’. 
Public discourse on gay rights, consumers’ rights, drunken driving, and air pollution 
appears on bulletin boards under the category of ‘Romance’, ‘Automobile’ or 
‘Property’. The autonomous nature of the Internet enables users to play a role in 
agenda-setting through their communal decision on what issues are debated in 
contemporary China. Interactivity associated with the Internet thus brings about a 
sense of empowerment to users as ‘interactivity, at some level, transforms the relation 
between consumer and producer’ and users are closely involved in ‘mixing or 
producing their screen media experience’ (O’Regan and Goldsmith 2002: 103). 
Chinese individuals who have no authority, celebrity or expertise in the offline world 
can now give their opinions to the whole nation.
For most of the Chinese public, this channel of access into citizen debate through 
online discussion is also the prime means to practice freedom of speech. Users 
frequently mention “press freedom” as one of the major motivations to join QGLT. 
One user said he came to QGLT: ‘to satisfy the desire of getting [my ideas] publicised. 
Only through this, can I make my voice heard and viewpoint known’. (Weibu 
31/05/2004). What QGLT users want to ‘publicise’ is usually the public concerns over 
‘people’s livelihood’ and ‘people’s right’ as one user summarised (panhh 26/05/2004). 
Only in the virtual space of bulletin boards, one QGLT says, can he forget the 
hierarchy in real life. All the users are treated as ‘ordinary Chinese’ no matter whether 
they are top officials or beggars on the streets (Teda Tanguan2 20/04/2004).
QGLT users believe that through their online discussion and debate, solutions to 
social problems in China might be reached, so that the public debate online can help
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to build a strong nation offline. Public debate on healthcare; corruption; education; 
environment; economy; Taiwan; sustainable development; crime and legislation; 
international relations and other issues will, as Lishilaoren (12/05/2004) believes, 
promote democratisation in China. For that reason, QGLT is regarded as a 
‘democratic city hall’ and online discussion within this online political community is 
compared to ‘the parliamentary debate from some other countries’ (Wanyusu 
28/05/2004).
Some users believe that because of its partisan nature (QGLT belongs to the 
Communist Party’s organ the People s Daily), public opinion formed on QGLT has far 
more political influence than its commercial counterparts and might be reflected in 
policy making. To a certain degree online public opinion from QGLT, as long as it 
does not challenge the Communist Party’s governance, can have a positive effect on 
decision making. QGLT user Woweiyikuang was given an audience by the Shenzhen 
municipal government for his constructive suggestions on sustainable development in 
the city; user Ji'nan Li's analysis of the capital accumulation and the shortage of 
resources in Southern China drew attention from the State Council’s think tank. 
However, with the lack of deliberative social institutions offline, these cases of online 
opinion integrated into policy-making are irregular, sporadic, and without legislative 
guarantee. These cases of translating citizens’ voices into policy making are no better 
than the practices of lobbying and nepotism. From this sense, in spite of its great 
potential, the public formed within QGLT still needs time to form a strong public in 
China.
5. Summary
This chapter examines the construction of online political identities within QGLT 
bulletin boards in China. Findings suggest that Internet bulletin boards enable 
ordinary Chinese to have their identities as politically activated citizens constructed in 
cyberspace.
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A consistent enthusiasm for political participation can be found in users’ pennames, 
signature files, political clusters, and online behaviours. Though patriotism is still the 
theme of QGLT users’ identity, humanism and a critical view of social problems such 
as corruption and social injustice are also displayed. Meanwhile, public longing for 
freedom and democracy, often kept underground and regarded as a challenge to the 
authoritarian administration, also finds its place in the virtual public sphere. Online 
debate among different clusters reflects a variety of ideological preferences in 
contemporary China. Women users, though small in number, also participate in the 
online political discussion.
However, this emerging ‘public’ online has its limitations in terms of inclusion and 
autonomy. The construction of a ‘public’ is subject to political control and vulnerable 
to non-progressive discourses. The online public formed within QGLT still limit their 
deliberative practice within opinion formation in cyberspace, and do not have the 
access to channel this public opinion into policy making on a regular basis.
Fluidity of online identity could thwart the stability in political engagement (Poster 
2001 [1995]; Dahlgren 2004). Nevertheless, when a democratic polity is still remote in 
China, the strong sense of political participation actually fosters a group of users who 
are fairly stable with their identities and political beliefs. Though QGLT users cannot 
be viewed as a strong public, the formation and expression of online public opinion 
maximises the democratic potential of the Internet bulletin boards and contributes to 
the democratisation in China.
Thus, this online ‘public’, rooted in well-educated intellectuals, emerges from the 
social background of economic development, urbanisation and digital globalisation. 
Their enthusiasm in constructing political identities as active citizens is reflected in 
their voicing of the alternative and oppositional political concerns. QGLT postings
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during the SARS crisis proved that the online public opinion could enrich the political 
discourse, has the potential of leading to tensions between people and the government, 
and might eventually reshape the political culture in China.
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Chapter 7
Case study of SARS
The deliberative nature of Internet bulletin boards could be best illustrated through 
‘Internet media events’ in China. This is the term Chinese users have created to refer 
to news stories first ‘reported’ by Internet media, (that is, originating from bulletin 
boards, chat rooms, new groups, etc.), discussed online, and generating online public 
opinion presses the authority to take action offline. Online discussion about Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is one of the ‘Internet media events’ through 
which both the potential and limits of online deliberation has been displayed.
SARS hit China in November 2002 and became one of the biggest international media 
stories in 2003. The coverage of SARS in Chinese official media went through four 
stages (Xia and Ye 2003) characterised by the administrative control of public health 
information. During these stages, Internet bulletin boards demonstrated their potential 
as an alternative media in constructing deliberative public discourse and pushing the 
limits of press freedom that the Chinese government could tolerate. Nevertheless, 
rumours and non-progressive discourse were also built up within cyberspace, which 
shows the limitations of online deliberation.
In this chapter, I mainly evaluate 355 postings from QGLT In-Depth containing 
(Atypical Pneumonia) or ‘SARS’ in their titles from February 8 to April 30, 2003, and 
will examine:
•  whether online discussion about SARS brought forth transparency in public 
health information;
•  whether online discussion about SARS set an alternative public agenda and 
constructed antagonistic public opinion;
•  what limitations are associated with online discussion about SARS.
177
SARS postings on QGLT demonstrated the dual-nature of computer mediated 
communication in constructing the public sphere. On the one hand, CMC created an 
alternative means to enhance citizens’ participation in political discussion. QGLT 
users actively explored alternative information resources during the SARS crisis to 
resist, negotiate or reinforce official interpretations of the incident. Active interaction 
among users generated a type of publicity through which public interest was aired, 
and state activity was held to the scrutiny of public opinion. However, there was also 
a lack of rationality in QGLT SARS discussion, which contributed to the spread of 
rumour, false notions and panic. Meanwhile, the virtual public sphere was still not 
free from official surveillance and journalistic management which aimed to maintain 
the boundaries of ‘acceptable’ political discourse in China.
1. China’s Official Media Coverage on SARS: Policies and Framing
The Chinese media’s coverage on disasters cannot be analysed without looking into 
government media policies concerning ‘the Party Principle’ and ‘the People Principle’. 
‘The Party Principle’ (dangxing), according to Lei, requires the media to be the eyes 
and ears (to report what they see and hear), and the throats and tongues (to instruct the 
‘masses’) for the Party (1997:183). ‘The People Principle’ (renminxing) refers to the 
‘relationship between people and media’ and ‘people’s expectation from media’ (Lei 
1997:184). Media can never use the people’s interest to deny the Communist Party’s 
leadership, because ‘the Party’s interests accord to the People’s’ (Lei 1997:184), as 
expressed in this official document:
[Mass media in China] must be subordinate to the Party’s leadership. Mass media must 
subject their newsroom policy to the Party’s decision on any report that relates to the 
Party’s route, guiding principle, and policy. They must keep in step with the party on the 
coverage of major political and theoretical issues and have no autonomy. If media staff 
hold a different opinion from the Party’s route, guiding principle and decision, they can 
consult the upper Party administration or even the Central Committee. Certain news can 
only appear on the internal publications within the Party, and cannot be publicized 
openly [to the masses] without the consent from the upper Party administration. All in all, 
mass media cannot have their own say and can not preach opinion antagonistic to the
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Party’s {Decisions on Guiding Principles on Media’s News Report from the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China 1981, cited and translated from Lei 1997: 
183).
When it comes to disaster coverage (such as earthquakes and severe traffic accidents), 
the Party requires media to report the news from a positive perspective, otherwise 
they have to remain silent. Media coverage needs to focus on rescue works from the 
government rather than death or economic losses incurred in the disaster, so that 
social stability and China’s ‘good’ image can be maintained. Chun Liu, a veteran 
journalist who used to work with China Central Television, said, ‘I participated in the 
coverage of the 1998 flood, but I haven’t known exactly how many people died till 
now!’ (Liu, C. 17/01/2006).
However, the Internet media make it difficult for the Chinese government to hoard 
information by pushing the boundaries of ‘acceptable reportage’, as Shanthil Kalathil 
comments:
Chinese web portals have been encouraging competition between news organizations. 
This competition means that small, local news organisations are increasingly pushing the 
boundaries of acceptable reportage, pressuring larger national organisations to follow. 
News often appears on the Internet either exclusively or before traditional media outlets 
can publish it (Kalathil 2002).
The SARS crisis became an example of how the Internet could break through the 
‘Party Principle’, and bring about grassroots information concerning public health. By 
providing a platform for the public to exchange information and viewpoints, the 
Internet played an important role in fostering critical public opinion that finally 
pressured the government into admitting the severity of SARS and taking active 
countermeasures against the epidemic.
The first SARS case, diagnosed as Atypical Pneumonia (ATP), occured in Guangdong 
province on November 16, 2002. This was not reported till January 5, 2003 when a 
local commercial newspaper the New Express {Xin Kuai Bao) covered this case of
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‘virus infection’ (Zhang, Z. 2003:37).
Mobile phone text messages broke the SARS silence in an unexpected way. A text 
message ‘fatal flu seized Guangzhou (the capital of Guangdong Province)’ started to 
spread among Chinese mobile phone users on February 8, 2003 (Xia, Q. and Ye, X. 
2003). Lack of SARS information from the mainstream media boosted the prevalence 
of grassroots communication through text messages , phone calls, and the Internet. 
With the news also came rumours: bird flu, plague and anthrax were all used to 
explain the cause of this disease. Steaming vinegar indoors and drinking Chinese 
herbs were said to prevent catching SARS, which led to panic buying of vinegar and 
herbal medicine in Southern China (Yu, X. and Zhang, J. 20/02/2003).
SARS coverage started cautiously in February in some local media in Guangdong 
province. Nanfang Wang (www.Southcn.com), Yangcheng Evening, Southern Daily, 
Guangzhou Daily, Southern Metropolis and a few others had published in total 603 
stories from February 10 to 20 (Zhang, Z. 2003). However, media coverage was under 
strict administrative control. News about SARS was only carried by local media 
rather than the national media, and reports were rather belated94. Meanwhile, a 
simplistic optimism was displayed in media’s coverage: ‘ATP has been put under 
control’ (iSouthern Daily 12/02/2003); ‘ATP could be prevented, cured, and controlled’ 
(Yangcheng Evening 14/02/2003). The national media was silent over the SARS crisis 
until March 26 when Xinhua News Agency released an article under the headline ‘the 
imported ATP case in Beijing is under effective control’, which was the first SARS 
report from Beijing (Zhang, Z. 2003:38).
It was governmental control that led to the media’s collective silence over the SARS 
outbreak. Journalists from People’s Daily and other official media received 
instructions that the coverage of SARS should be under tight control of the 
Communist Party’s Propaganda Department. 95 This systematic hoarding of 
information reached its climax when the then Minister of Health held a press
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conference on April 3 and claimed there were only 12 SARS infected cases and three 
had died in Beijing.
Jiang Yanyong, a retired surgeon from a military hospital in Beijing, was furious at 
the lies from the Ministry of Health and disclosed the truth of the SARS infection in 
Beijing. His testimony was first carried by Time on April 8 and later by numerous 
Internet bulletin boards. In his testimony, Jiang disclosed that at least 60 SARS 
patients were reported in one hospital on April 3 and seven had died. Jiang also 
disclosed that in early March, the Ministry of Health notified hospitals at all levels 
that SARS cases were found in Beijing but as a strict discipline, this news could not 
be released to the public. The concealment was said to serve the purpose of creating a 
secure environment for the annual convention of the National People’s Congress and 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee96.
Over the following days, according to CNN’s report SARS Closing Beijing Schools,
China’s leaders had been stung by international criticism that they covered up the spread 
of the disease and say such tough measures are essential to both contain the virus and 
repair the country’s image. [...] China’s leaders have pledged full cooperation with the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and say any further officials found to be covering-up 
SARS cases will be severely punished (22/04/2003).
Then the new Prime Minister Wen Jiabao requested the Chinese media to ‘report the 
truth (of SARS) as it is’. Li Changchun, the Minister who was in charge of the 
Propaganda Department, also vaguely expressed his permission of SARS reports 
within national media on April 8. Yet it was not until April 15 that mainstream official 
media received this confirmed permission to cover SARS: ‘Media should discard the 
practice of creating a peaceful image of social stability and report the truth as it is now. 
Must not lie. Do not boast [of putting SARS under control]’.97 This internal decision 
finally reached all levels of governmental institutions in a written form on April 17: 
‘Get correct information of the plague (SARS), report as it is, and publicize to the
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society at regular time, must not delay or cover up in reporting’ (Zhang, Z. 2003:38).
The third SARS press conference on April 20 showed a promising development in the 
new government’s policy towards information transparency. The number of SARS 
cases soared to 1807 nationwide compared with a mere 37 confirmed cases declared 
previously (the Economist 26/04/2003: 19). From then on, news coverage on SARS 
became much more open, honest and balanced marked by the sacking of the Health 
Minster and the Mayor of the Beijing Municipal Government.
Xia and Ye (2003) thus categorise the coverage of SARS by the Chinese media into 
the following four stages:
•  From November 22, 2002 to February 7, 2003: information vacuum stage. 
During this stage, only one local newspaper in Guangdong Province reported 
the first few SARS cases.
•  From February 8 to April 2, 2003: information scarcity and inadequacy stage. 
Local media in Guangdong Province (including the prestigious Southern 
Weekend) started covering SARS, but their information sources were limited 
and the coverage was optimistic. Internet and mobile phone text messages 
started playing roles in informing the public, but rumours also spread and led 
to public anxiety, panic buying and mass storage of food and Chinese herbal 
medicines.
•  From April 3 to April 19: information cover-up stage. National media started 
to cover SARS stories. However, SARS reports from the mainstream media 
were mainly over-optimistic and moral-boosting. While online discussion 
about SARS started to develop criticism of the government for its hoarding 
of information concerning public health.
•  After April 20: information openness stage. After two top officials were 
sacked, mainstream media’s coverage started to be transparent and honest. 
Online discussion on bulletin boards demonstrated more consistencies with
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the official media, and morale boosting postings account for a significant 
share of online discourse.
Positive reporting and an optimistic tone prevailed in the official media’s SARS 
coverage before the information openness stage. People’s Daily had in total 131 
editorials, headline news, and feature stories about SARS from April 4 to April 19, 
while all these articles were used as outlets for the government to release reassuring 
information or ideological instructions to the people. Domestic news pages were filled 
with statements of governmental confidence, and detailed effective measures for 
fighting SARS. Headline news and feature stories portrayed doctors and nurses as 
brave altruistic heroes, while health pages featured advice from medical authorities, 
such as telling people to air rooms and wash hands thoroughly. Ordinary citizens were 
depicted as an active and calm collective, carrying on their normal life in the capital, 
whilst the panic shopping in Beijing never appeared in the official media’s coverage. 
Meanwhile, the WHO officers’ visit to Beijing was reported as evidence of China’s 
active international co-operation.
Marked by the sacking of the Minister of Health and the Mayor of Beijing on April 20, 
the Chinese official media started to report SARS in a more open and honest way. 
Official media started to release the gruesome daily figures of SARS infection. From 
April 20 to April 30, People’s Daily had 191 stories about SARS. To address the 
severity of the epidemic, phrases like ‘disaster’, ‘ATP wreaks havoc’, ‘a battle without 
gunfire’, ‘a sudden catastrophe’, and ‘national jeopardy’ were repeatedly used. 
However, ATP, rather than SARS, was still the term used to refer to the epidemic. The 
language of propaganda was still prevalent within the official media. Morale boosting 
slogans could be found in key phrases like ‘people’s warfare’, ‘highly responsible’ 
[new government], ‘national spirit’, and ‘millions of people all of one mind’. Heroic 
medical workers were called ‘angels in white’, ‘soldiers in white’, ‘remarkable 
soldiers’, ‘remarkable heroes’, and ‘martyrs’ for those who died on their posts. 
Meanwhile, the official media also highlighted the Communist Party members’
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positive images in their news coverage such as: ‘I’m a Communist Party member, let 
me do it’ {Peoples Daily 23/04/2003 p.4) and ‘Communists party members always 
rush to the frontier’ in combating SARS {Peoples Daily 21/04/2003 p.l). As Bai and 
Xiong summarised:
Aside from the grim daily statistics, the coverage has ranged from news items on 
governmental and grassroots efforts to contain the spread of the disease in various parts 
of China, to reports on the medical research into the nature of the virus and the hunt for a 
vaccine. Stories of heroic medical workers saving lives have also become a common 
news item in the Chinese print and broadcast media. Talk shows and newspaper features 
focus on how to prevent the disease (Bai and Xiong 24/04/2003).
Worth noting in the Party’s media policy is the difference between traditional media 
and Internet media. Even though Tying is endemic in China’s bureaucracy’ {the 
Economist 26/04/2003:20), Internet media (especially those affiliated to the traditional 
media) have a special position in the whole media strategy of the Communist Party. In 
the early stage of the SARS outbreak when the Propaganda Department prohibited 
SARS coverage in traditional media, the Internet media had a ‘privilege’ in their 
reporting. People s Daily released on its website a special channel on SARS coverage
QO
in February. Framed as ‘Atypical Pneumonia’, 11 stories about SARS and the panic 
buying it triggered in Guangdong province were put online from February 11 to 19. 
When traditional media were allowed to cover SARS in April, the Propaganda 
Department also emphasised the important role of the Internet in disseminating news, 
and required online reporting to be ‘objective, at the right time, and to the right 
degree’99.
2. QGLT Online Public Opinion Constructed an Alternative Public Discourse
When the Chinese government tried to hoard SARS information, an alternative public 
discourse developed outside the official media’s range. As statistics show, in January 
2003 China had 59.10 million Internet users, with 53.1% of them identifying their 
primary goal of accessing the Internet was ‘to get information’ (CINIC Report XI). At
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the same time, China had around 250 million mobile phone users. The flow of 
information between the Internet and mobile phones constitutes a grassroots network 
of interpersonal exchange of information. When news about SARS first started with 
mobile phone text messages, it soon spread online and developed into a heated public 
discussion.
The following chart shows the comparison between QGLT In-Depth board and 
People’s Daily in terms of publishing SARS articles in April 2003. The data shows 
that when the official media was silent on SARS crisis before April 4, there was 
public discussion about SARS on the bulletin boards; when the Chinese government 
concealed SARS information, the online discussion was heavily censored; when the 
SARS information became more transparent after April 20, online discussion became 
very active.
—♦— QGLT
People's Daily
Figure 7.1 SARS articles on QGLT bulletin boards and in People’s Daily, April 2003 
SARS articles on QGLT bulletin boards and in People's Daily in April 2003
—♦— QGLT
People's
date
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This section will demonstrate how the online discourse challenged the government’s 
framing of SARS, and aimed to gain transparency in information concerning public 
health from alternative information sources. QGLT users showed resistance towards 
the official interpretation of the crisis by offering their own suggestions, and were also 
critical about counter-measures against SARS. QGLT users also raised calls for press 
freedom and used humour as a form of political engagement. The sharing of 
information, emotion and humour created a community bond among the Chinese 
Internet public. As BBC journalist Holly Williams suggested, the new technology 
allowed ordinary Chinese people to circumvent state-controlled media, and to reach 
out to each other during the SARS crisis (08/04/2003).
2.1 Terminology of the Epidemic
SARS was first diagnosed as atypical pneumonia (ATP). This terminology (in Chinese 
translation: fei dianxing feiyan abbreviated as: feidian # H )  was used
worldwide until the end of February 2003 when the late WHO epidemiologist Carlo 
Urbani renamed it as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which the WHO 
officially announced on March 28. The Chinese translation of SARS (yanzhongjixing 
huxidao zonghezheng or sasi S6^?) started to appear on the
WHO Western Pacific Region Chinese-language website www.wpro.who.int/ and 
international media like BBCChinese.com.
The difference in these terminologies is obvious. ATP as a general term refers to 
common pneumonia-like respiratory diseases, and this term has long been in use. The 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome is a respiratory disease caused by an etiological 
agent, the SARS coronavirus, which is believed to be ‘an animal virus that crossed the 
species barrier to humans’ and enables human-to-human transmission for human 
exposure to the virus and virus adaptation (WHO 10/2004: 6). As a ‘new’ disease in
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the 21 Century, laboratories around the world are continuing to work on the 
epidemiology and ecology of SARS coronavirus infection (ibid).
However, official media in China used ATP as a substitute for SARS in their news 
coverage. Using ATP as a substitute for SARS ignored the high rate of infection and 
the mutating nature of SARS, which consequently downplayed the challenges it 
imposed. Among all Peoples Daily's coverage on SARS in April 2003, there are 322 
articles with ‘ATP’ in their titles. SARS (and its Chinese translation) was never used 
on any page. Such framing of the SARS crisis reflected a legacy of the Communist 
concept of news that still reverberates in official media in China. As Lenin maintained, 
news and information were useless and could be more damaging than useful if they 
only informed for the sake of informing (Buzek 1964: 169). To serve the purpose of 
‘educating’ and ‘informing’ the masses, one method used in Communist Regimes was 
to suppress some news and delay others until a more ‘suitable moment’ for 
publication (Buzek 1964:173). The social production of official news of ‘atypical 
pneumonia’ in the SARS crisis carefully manoeuvred public opinion from the more 
serious public health threat, and aimed to maintain social stability under the 
Communist Party’s governance.
Although within QGLT In-depth in April 2003 there are 83 out of 370 postings that 
contain ‘SARS’ as a key word in their titles, the remaining 287 postings use the word 
‘feidian (ATP)’. The borderless Internet offered Chinese users an opportunity to get 
access to information sources other than the official media, and develop their 
knowledge of the epidemic.
Yet these figures still do not provide a complete picture of SARS postings. To go 
through the stringent online words filtering system (Internet portals in China, 
including the commercial ones, are required to install software filtering politically 
forbidden words in postings), experienced users employed different Chinese 
characters with similar pronunciation to ATP and SARS to circumvent the
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surveillance. When postings containing (Chinese for ATP) could not get
through the filtering system, ‘SlL'S’, ‘M M ’, ‘FD’, and
were used; when postings containing ‘SARS’ were blocked, ‘^ 9 t’ or were
used. The online words filtering system created a proliferation of almost limitless 
versions of the same concept, which demonstrates the resistance from the users in this 
online information ‘guerrilla warfare’.
2.2 Online Postings Filled in the Information Void Left by the Official Media
During the SARS information scarcity stage (Feb. 8 -  April 2), postings revealing this 
crisis and calling for information transparency concerning public health gradually 
appeared in QGLT. The first article about SARS was posted on QGLT In-Depth on 11 
February 2003. Yushanmoke, a user from Guangdong province, revealed the public 
panic over ‘ATP’ in his city and expressed his concerns over the lack of management 
of the crisis by the government. This article was viewed 380 times and triggered 
replies from others echoing the need for information transparency:
Have those leaders ever heard of the story of Yu taming the flood100? Why do they only 
want to block up [information]? (Shuyin 11/02/2003)
News of this epidemic should be publicised through the official channels. {Huajiang 
11/02/2003)
On the following day, Yushanmoke posted another article calling for the official 
press’s immediate intervention into the ‘ATP’ crisis. This posting was viewed 293 
times, and triggered further discussion on the relationship between the media and how 
crisis were reported. The Chinese government’s control of the media was also 
questioned in these postings:
The government has to adapt to the information age and change their old way of 
administration. (Xiaofengyun 12/02/2003)
It’s proven that the old propaganda policy doesn’t serve the contemporary audience both 
at home and overseas. (Xishanyeren 12/02/2003)
Do media have the right to intervene [in the ATP crisis]? Did they ignore the crisis or 
were they forbidden from reporting by the government? {Shuyin 12/02/2003)
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During online discussion, follow-up postings can be as informative as the main 
postings. The above follow-up postings developed the argument in the main posting, 
implying that information was controlled by government, and suggesting changes in 
official ‘propagandapolicy’.
Before People’s Daily had its first SARS (ATP) story published on 4 April, postings 
about SARS had disseminated adequate information about the epidemic and triggered 
discussions within QGLT. The silence from official media was in contrast to a growth 
in online public opinion requesting ‘information transparency’. The table below 
demonstrates that when the traditional media failed to provide information concerning 
public health, discussion on the bulletin boards filled the void.
Table 7.1 QGLT In-Depth SARS postings (Feb. 8 -April 2)
DATE Key Words Click
rate101
Replies
102
11/02 ATP, panic, early warning system, emergency (social) 
mechanism
380 3
12/02 ATP, panic, media’s intervention 293 3
13/02 ATP, social panic, Humane concerns 613 12
14/02 ATP, panic, the local government, health network; 149 0
ATP, prescribed (Chinese herbal medicine) recipe 205 1
20/02 ATP, sputum, snivel, cough, sneeze 71 1
31/03 ATP, quarantine, atypical news coverage, Western media 132 0
02/04 ATP, USA, immunity 216 2
ATP, antibody 259 2
ATP, USA, 69 SARS cases 209 8
SARS, worries, government, measures 353 17
Total ATP: 10; SARS: 1 2880 49
11 long articles (more than 500 Chinese characters) from QGLT In-Depth provided
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the public an alternative source of information about SARS. These postings informed 
the public of the SARS explosion, and urged Chinese government to take urgent 
measures to publicise the truth and control the epidemic (see Appendix 5 for an 
example of SARS postings). As an alternative information source, online postings 
about SARS came from users’ personal experience and sources, or overseas media 
(this included overseas Chinese media, Chinese language websites, and foreign 
language media).
One topic QGLT users talked about from their personal experience and sources was 
the cost of SARS treatment. As The Economist claims, the medical welfare system 
and the networking of rural clinics in China collapsed after the economic reform: ‘As 
many as 70% of country people cannot afford to pay for medical treatment’ 
(26/04/2003: 20). Because the cost of SARS treatment is far beyond the reach of 
ordinary families in China, this topic was avoided by the official media. User 
Shuangchenggushi gave an estimation of medical expenses for SARS treatment on 28 
April 2003.
Personal information sources from QGLT users also exposed scandals in covering up 
SARS information from the local government:
Seven [SARS patients] were delayed six hours for treatment in Inner Mongolia {dammos 
21/04/2003)
Even the concealing of truth is not the worst. The most fearful thing is when some Big 
Brother in Guangdong province warned the journalists rigorously that they would face 
the consequences in reporting [SARS], which intimidated journalists from reporting. 
(Xuantiezhongjian 17-04-2003)
‘Overseas media’, especially the Western media in foreign languages, are not 
accessible to most ordinary Chinese.103 The Internet makes it possible for those who 
have access to foreign media sources to share the information. ‘Overseas media’ were 
commented highly by QGLT users in that they played an important role in informing
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Chinese the Chinese government’s hoarding information about SARS:
It is overseas media that first reported the concealment of this plague by the Chinese 
government, exposed the covering up of SARS reporting in Beijing. Also it is overseas 
media that published the true story of a physician from 301 military hospital in 
Beijing...we can see clearly that overseas media has played a vital role (yiminweiben 
22/04/2003).
SARS coverage from the New York Times, for example, had been referenced to 
evaluate the economic cost of SARS to China as 210 billion RMB Yuan (Fulaibin 
29/04/2003).
2.3 Online Public Opinion as Suggestions and ‘Constructive Criticism’
QGLT users also raised suggestions regarding countermeasures against SARS, and 
criticised the Chinese government for concealing the truth. Deliberative democracy 
theorist Dryzek points out that authentic democracy requires public communication 
that ‘rules out domination via the exercise of power, manipulation, indoctrination, 
propaganda, deception [...] and attempts to impose ideological conformity’ (2000:2). 
By posting suggestions and criticism regarding SARS control, QGLT users in fact 
discounted the indoctrination and manipulation of information from ‘above’. 
Recognition and responsiveness were observed among active users, which contributed 
to the quality of online opinion.
Suggestions on fighting SARS within QGLT mainly focused on the following detailed 
issues:
‘compulsory quarantine’ (Zhenzhaoji 15/04/2003);
‘free treatment for [SARS] patients’ (dammos 15/04/2003), (Koushixinfei 
22/04/2003), {dammos 21/04/2003);
preventing SARS from spreading (especially to the rural area) during the May Day
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vacation which is usually the peak time for mass transportation around the country 
CShutielong 14/04/2003), (dslhb 22/04/2003).
These online postings touched on the core problem in the commercialisation of 
China’s health system which, according to John Chan (03/05/2003), is ‘one of the 
victims of economic restructuring’. Since the early 1980s, the proportion of health 
care funded by the government’s budget has fallen to less than 20%. The poorest 
seven provinces in western China received only 5% of the total national health budget. 
‘In the last 10 years, health costs for ordinary families have jumped by 600%.’104 One 
QGLT user said that the state-owned medical institutions ‘changed from a disease 
preventive organisation to a money-making machine’ {daoluanshibai 
zaidaoluanzaishibai zhidaochenggong 21/04/2003). If refused free medical treatment, 
most ordinary Chinese SARS patients would wait to die and might spread the 
epidemic to people around them. Therefore, preventing SARS from hitting the poor 
rural areas and the free treatment of patients were the main concerns of QGLT users. 
Meanwhile, other suggestions for counter-measures against SARS were also aired:
- forbidding restaurants to serve wild animals as dishes {nanzhuce 20/04/2003)
- launching a nationwide SARS prevention and treatment online information service 
system (Dazhi 20/04/2003)
- stopping outwards transportation from SARS-stricken areas (.Huanghai2000 
24/04/2003)
- preventing the SARS virus from contaminating food supplies (dammos 28/04/2003)
- treating SARS patients or SARS suspects in quarantine with humane measures (qqy 
25/04/2003)
- taking measures to deal with public panic (zhiyanle 28/09/2004)
The above suggestions from users mainly dealt with the specific issues concerning 
prevention of the epidemic, so that they were more or less well received by policy 
makers at different levels. Regulations on banning the consumption of wild animals 
came into effect quickly at different administrative levels. On May 23, 2003, National
192
People’s Congress decided to revise the Law o f the People's Republic o f China on the 
Protection o f Wildlife (1991). The emphasis of this revision was to forbid eating all 
kinds of wildlife, and stop the practice of hunting wild animals for food. SARS 
consultation hotlines were set up in Beijing’s major hospitals in April 2003. 
Volunteers who had psychological or medical knowledge started to answer questions 
from the public and tried to calm the panic-stricken Beijing residents. 105 A 
spokesperson from the Ministry of Health said on Dec. 16, 2003 that the Chinese 
government had provided free treatment for SARS patients. The Chinese government 
also planned to legalise free medical treatment for pandemic patients106.
Mild criticism of the Chinese government for its mis-handling of the SARS crisis 
could also be heard on the QGLT bulletin boards. Users Shuangcheng gushi 
(03/04/2003) and Shangqiongbiluo (28/04/2003) pointed out the lack of international 
cooperation from China during the SARS crisis. Shangqiongbiluo also criticised the 
‘show’ elements in the government’s ‘opening up’ SARS information in the official
107media’s coverage .
2.4 Radical Political Discourse Calling for Press Freedom and Democracy
QGLT users’ criticism of the government’s concealing of SARS information dug into 
the political relationship between the ‘Party’ and the ‘People’, and put this issue in the 
social context of the rising civil society in China. Calls for press freedom and 
democracy were again raised on the Internet, even within the official bulletin boards 
of QGLT. A real problem exposed in the SARS crisis, according to QGLT user 
Shengdongyouqu, was the lack of press freedom, because ‘press freedom is the best 
way for media to express public opinion’ (28/04/2003).
LovelyChina used the term ‘dark box practice’ to describe Chinese government’s 
concealing of SARS information, and suggested that such practice facilitated the
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spread o f  the epidemic:
I will never believe the ‘dark box practice’ works better than the open policy in dealing 
with epidemics like SARS. I will never believe dark box practice serves social stability, 
maintains national credibility and builds a positive international image of China 
(03/04/2003)
The consequence of concealing SARS information, as one user Qiangguoluntan 
kanke pointed out, would be: ‘chaos, the spread of disaster, and angry youth of 
xenophobia’ (07/04/2003). He fervently requested QGLT moderators: ‘please don’t 
delete postings of the plague [SARS]. People have the right to know!’ (07/04/2003). 
Even when the government gave permission to the mass media to cover SARS, online 
criticism pointed out that official media’s coverage of SARS was still delayed 
{Shangqiongbiluo 28/04/2003).
To explain the reason that the Communist Party hoarded SARS information, 
Koushixinfei said in his/her posting:
They [the Communist Party officials] view their own positions, their own ‘face’ as more 
valuable than people’s lives [...] Another reason is that [the officials] view people as 
‘masses’, as the object of being governed [...]. These are acts of behaviour from an 
authoritarian government. (21/04/2003)
Protesting voices calling for press freedom usually appeared as follow-up messages in 
one line such as:
When can journalism be free!!!!!!!!! (Xuantiezhongjian22/04/2003)
SARS demands a radical change in China {Fulaibin 24/04/2003)
2.5 Online Humour as a Political Engagement
‘Every joke is a tiny revolution,’ says George Orwell. ‘Whatever destroys dignity, and 
brings down the mighty from their seats, preferably with a bump, is funny’ (1968: 
284). Humour has long been used as a means of political engagement in both Western
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societies and China. Haiqing Yu argues: ‘Chinese culture has a long tradition of using 
jokes, parodies and rhymes as a semiotic game to engage with politics’ (2004: 37). 
During the SARS crisis, parody was employed by users to ridicule the incompetence, 
corruption, deception, and bureaucracy of the government.
Though humour seems to appeal more to an emotional rather than a rational response, 
Kavita Kulkami (2004) argues that humour is an effective method for initiating 
political engagement and resistance, ‘the use of irony and parody promotes negation, 
critical thinking, and scepticism, all of which are important tools for invalidating the 
ideological dominance of those in power’ (2004: 17). The following examples are 
only two out of many satirical folk ballads from the Chinese bulletin boards:
SARS folk ballad 1.
The Party can’t solve the problem of officials eating and drinking at public expense, but 
SARS did!
The Party can’t solve the problem of officials travelling on public expenses, but SARS 
did!
The Party can’t solve the problem of mountains of red tape and vast oceans of futile 
meetings, but SARS did!
The Party can’t solve the problem of officials deceiving their superiors and subordinates, 
but SARS did!
The Party can’t solve the problem of prostitution, but SARS did!108 
SARS folk ballad 2:
SARS prevailed in Guangdong and Beijing was contaminated;
The government loosened its strict control, so the media dares to clamour;
SARS victim are many and the hospitals are full
Doctors and nurses work really hard and risk their lives on the front line;
The masses are scared out of their wits,
Everyone wears masks covering their faces,
International organisations have come to supervise,
SARS will soon be brought under control.109
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This playful use of folk ballads shows public engagement with politics in a humorous 
way. Dudden argues ‘humour on the topic of politics has been a familiar vehicle for 
popular disdain or even opposition’ (Dudden 1985: 51). The online laughter 
surrounding the SARS crisis was more cynical than destructive or antagonistic. By 
pointing out the supposedly positive side effect of the SARS crisis, it distrusted the 
government officials who were incapable of handling domestic problems such as 
corruption. Humorists focused on ‘the indigenous resources at hand to poke fun at 
foolish or knavish political figures’ (Dudden 1985: 51). By ridiculing the incompetent 
officials and shortcomings in the bureaucracy, Chinese users laughed and expressed 
their contempt.
Humour can also bond those who share the laughter together. ‘Scepticism always, and 
cynicism often...[binds] these comic practitioners together with each other and their 
audiences’ (Dudden 1985:53). By ridiculing the incompetent officials as ‘them’, 
online humour confirmed the status of Chinese public as being ‘us’, which 
differentiates the public from the state.
2.6 Online Community Bonding
During the SARS crisis, Internet bulletin boards such as QGLT served as a virtual 
sphere for public bonding based on shared emotion and communal support. Since 
democratisation ‘can be viewed as the increase and growth of autonomous public 
spheres among participants’ (Benhabib 1992: 87), the new form of publicity and 
community bonding online forms the basis for deliberation.
When the true number of SARS infections in Beijing was revealed in late April 2003, 
measures to prevent a pandemic were adopted. Most companies encouraged their 
employees to work at home. Densely populated institutions like universities were put
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in quarantine to prevent students from going home and spreading the epidemic to 
others.
The Internet started playing a significant role of community bonding from then on. 
The Internet has been used for online donations (www.bivdf.org.cn) for medical 
facilities for SARS victims since April 28; charity networks had recommended public 
books to read at home since April 29110; starting from campus based bulletin boards, 
postings of mutual support brought in a new understanding of community into 
Chinese people’s life.
A posting from a postgraduate student sharing her thoughts about staying on the 
densely populated campus was cross-posted among major bulletin boards and 
received a warm response:
If you stay in Beijing, there is a higher possibility that you will be infected; but if you go 
back to your hometown, there is the possibility you start a new area [of SARS 
contamination]. If you think nothing’s more important than your personal safety, I can’t 
say anything. When I have to choose between putting myself or others in danger, I 
choose to risk my own safety (Aini Yiwannian 25/04/2003).111
The SARS crisis meant most Beijing residents halted their work or study, which gave 
people some time to reflect and share their thoughts. Reader s Digest-style postings, 
as some users termed them, emerged online and were characterised with poetic 
sentences and a humane touch. These postings appeared on major Internet bulletin 
boards including QGLT as a grassroots means of showing mutual support to each 
other:
SARS reminds us of the unpredictability and the vulnerability of life [...] SARS tells us 
to be grateful, appreciate the friendliness and peace in the crisis [...] SARS encourage us 
to be sympathetic and empathetic to fear and anxiety [...] SARS provides us a chance to 
[...] be more mature and more rational, to show more trust in other people and less 
complaints [...] to have more tolerance and understanding [...] (BigTall 28/04/2003)
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The abbreviation of the epidemic -  SARS, was appropriated by Internet users into 
‘Show Active Real Support’, ‘Smile, And Retain Smile’, and ‘Sacrifice, Appreciation, 
Reflection, and Support’ on bulletin boards. A letter to those who suffered from SARS 
(dengxiong 22/04/2003), and photos of lovers kissing each other with facial masks 
{aichitang 14/04/2004) also appeared on QGLT.
Interactivity associated with the new media can break down the alienation of audience 
in the mass communication age (Marshall, D. 2004). Scholars (Jones, S. 1998, Baym, 
N. 2000) argue that ‘shared interest’ works as the social bond within online groups. 
‘Sharing’ has been regarded as the primary value within online communities. What is 
shared within online communities is not only ‘interest’, but also information, 
knowledge, expertise, mutual support, and wisdom. The new form of community 
bonding online re-constructs the sense of identity among users in China and has the 
potential to detach citizens from the control of the state. Such community building can 
pave the way to citizen deliberation. As John Gastil (2000) suggests, citizen 
deliberation enhances democracy in that ‘interaction among citizens develops political 
knowledge, the sophistication of public judgments, political efficacy, and stronger 
habits of civic participation’ (359-60).
3. QGLT Public Opinion Fitting into the Official Media Agenda
The Internet has been regarded as a grassroots media form of expression for usually 
socially inhibited selves (Turkle 1995). However, a significant number of QGLT 
online postings conformed to the official media’s discourse of boosting public morale, 
praising the new government, and singing medical staff’ praises. Internet users’ 
echoing of the mainstream official media’s agenda could also be detected from their 
practice of employing the official media’s language pattern, such as ‘people’s warfare’ 
and ‘united in heart and soul in combating SARS’, in their online writing.
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This strange phenomenon of using official discourse to express socially suppressed 
selves might be explained through the framing effects on audience reception. Framing, 
as explained by Robert Entman involves selection and salience:
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described (1993: 52).
One key procedure in framing is suggesting remedies. The Chinese government 
employed the media discourse of ‘the government’s central role in maintaining social 
stability’ as the main remedy in tackling the SARS crisis. Supporting this core concept, 
public morale boosting, confidence in the new Hu government and appraisal of 
doctors and nurses appeared in state-controlled media texts. The selection and 
highlighting of such meaning-making in official media had its impact on users’ 
construction of their own interpretation of the SARS crisis within QGLT.
3.1 Morale Boosting
Headline news about SARS from the mainstream official media featuring highly 
propagandised language was found within QGLT. Buzek notes that two 
characteristics of Communist propaganda are ‘simplified, preconceived, schematic 
images and selection and slanting of all information to suit the needs of the party line’ 
(1964:18). Such a practice still characterises the Chinese Communist Party’s organ 
and extends into cyberspace:
The leaders and the masses have the same aim in fighting the plague [SARS]; we are 
united in heart and soul combating ATP (Wuchenzi 22/04/2003)
People’s warfare and iron discipline are the prerequisite for combating SARS 
(.Fengyunxiao 23/04/2003)
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Even Laobenniu, a user who holds a Canadian passport and has been living in North 
America for over 15 years, slipped comfortably into the political vocabulary he had 
been familiar with from Communist propaganda:
[I] hope our country, our nation, under the central government headed by Chairman Hu 
will win this victory in combating the disaster, and stride to bright future. What makes 
me happy now is that our country, our nation, didn’t have a catastrophic situation as 
some people expected. The unfavourable situation is under effective control, the spread 
of the plague is slowing down. Facts proved again that the Chinese nation is a great 
nation; P. R. C. is a strong country. We as a nation experienced too many national and 
manmade disasters, but our country grew stronger from the hardship of the disasters. I 
feel proud of being one member of Chinese nation! (28/04/2003)112
During my interview with Laobenniu, he proclaimed himself a nationalist and 
acknowledged that he still bore ‘the imprint of Communist China’ from his life 
experience. As scholar who writes in English, he shows a distinct character in 
following propaganda language patterns in his online political postings. Shan, the 
director of QGLT (1999-2004), estimated the average age of QGLT users was 33 in 
2001. Users at this age in China had been fed a diet of political slogans from 
Communist press during their school years. Stalin wrote the Communist press was 
‘the strongest instrument with which, day by day, hour by hour, the party speaks to the 
masses in their own essential language’ (Buzek 1964:39). Under such daily cultivation, 
the party’s indoctrination became the people’s key glossary. For many of the QGLT 
users, the rigid political vocabulary became the only resource available for them when 
they talk about politics.
3.2 Appraisal of the New Hu Government
SARS hit China during a politically sensitive period when Jiang Zemin stepped down 
and Hu Jintao emerged as the new national leader. The Chinese public witnessed for 
the first time in the Communist Party’s history top officials being sacked for their
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incompetence under the new government. Meanwhile, the new President Hu Jintao,
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and the Deputy Prime Minister Wu Yi actively tackled the
SARS crisis. These facts won high praise for the Hu government on Internet bulletin
boards. University students started to use endearing names for the national leaders
such as Tao Ge (Brother Tao), Xiao Bao (Little Bao), and Wu Jie (Sister Wu) on
campus-based bulletin boards, and this endearment soon spread among most Chinese
users including QGLT users:
Telling people the truth [about SARS] demonstrates our government’s confidence 
{Yundanshuinuan 03/04/2003)
Brother Tao and little Bao raise us hopes for the victory [over SARS] (Xuantiezhongjian 
21/04/2003)
Pay tribune to Ms Wu Yi who shouldered the solemn task in the time of jeopardy! 
(yingxiongyiqufanhuajin 28/04/2003)
Brother Tao you stride forward without fear [dedicated to President Hu Jintao] 
(Baihualin 28/04/2003)
Apart from the state-controlled official media giving credit to the new Party leaders, a 
proportion of online postings showed favour towards the national leaders. When 
talking about pluralism, Chantal Mouffe says that ‘what is really at stake is power and 
antagonism and their ineradicable character’ (1996: 247). What is lacking in 
contemporary political culture in China is the key element in Mouffe’s ‘radical and 
plural democracy’ - the establishment of a set of institutions through which the 
dominant power can be limited or contested. Without such democratic institutions, 
Chinese people who can be compared to their ancestors in feudal society in this sense 
can only expects a wise ‘emperor’ to eliminate all the wrongdoings from the previous 
emperor and brings the ‘masses’ good policy. The ‘grateful’ masses singing the 
national leaders’ praises was found in QGLT. Chixiannongfu stated in his posting that 
the new leaders ‘have already found the key to the glorious future for the whole 
nation’ (21/04/2004); Xuebu asked Deputy Prime Minister Wu to ‘take a good rest’, 
because she looked ‘very tired on TV’ (29/04/2003).
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These postings of gratitude towards the national leaders exposed a major problem for 
online deliberation in China. Online censorship leaves little space for political 
dissidents to express their opinion but gives much liberty to those who post messages 
that do not challenge the authority. Complimentary postings to the national leaders 
become a ‘play safe’ strategy for some QGLT users who are eager to get their names 
(or usernames) known for their own interests113. At the same time, since QGLT has 
been regarded as a very important means for the expression of public opinion,114 
complimentary postings towards national leaders help the Communist Party to 
legitimate its governance. Nevertheless, these postings from the ‘grateful masses’ 
impair the Internet’s potential to cultivate a critical public antagonising the dominant 
totality in China. Therefore, it is possible to see that despite endeavours by civil 
society to hold the state in check, this attempt has not succeeded.
3.3 Complimentary Articles on Medical Staff
When they were allowed to cover SARS news, the official mass media devoted a 
good proportion of their coverage to touching stories of how medical staff sacrificed 
their lives to combat SARS. These complimentary articles on medical staff, mainly 
cross-posted from the official media’s online service, flooded QGLT and other 
bulletin boards.
This story of how doctors in Guangdong treat ATP patients is really touching... 
(Manchengjinchuanhuangmajia 25/04/2003)
[This is an article I would] strongly recommend: ‘Her beauty stays in my heart: 
memories of the nurse in Guangdong who sacrificed her life in combating ATP 
(Laobenniu 28/04/2003)
As a result of this cross-posting, the traditional media’s rhetoric such as ‘soldiers in 
white’ and ‘our most lovable people’ also appeared in QGLT users’ postings as a
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tribute to the doctors and nurses. The traditional media’s focus was on the medical 
staff who worked ‘on the frontline combating SARS’, while SARS patients were only 
reported as a collective group and most of them had ‘almost come back to health’ 
{People’s Daily 13/04/2003 p.2). This difference in weighting medical staff and SARS 
patients in traditional media coverage was also reflected in online postings.
The Internet media in China are not given the right to gather their own news yet, and 
the traditional media’s news feed is still the lifeline for online media. Therefore, the 
dominant role of the official media in setting the agenda for public discourse has not 
been challenged in many ways. When amateur online writers fall back upon the 
‘formal’ and ‘authoritative’ report from official media to add credibility to their 
postings, they actually reinforce the dominant influence of mainstream media in the 
virtual sphere.
Delivered in day-to-day news coverage and embodied in concrete persona, the official 
media’s ‘morale boosting’, ‘positive reporting’, and ‘hero making’ on SARS coverage 
became the dominant public discourse. QGLT users were unavoidably under this 
influence and some of them showed sympathy with the official media’s rhetoric on 
government policy:
I believe Chinese government’s counter-measures are correct (Tuzhuantou 08/04/2003)
However, the response to this posting was not very enthusiastic -  one sarcastic 
follow-up message reads: ‘now the government just need people like you to reassure 
the public!’ (zhumozhai 09/04/2003).
4. Rumours of SARS as a Biochemical Attack from the USA Targeting China
During the SARS crisis, a rumour that ‘SARS was a biochemical attack from the USA 
targeting China’ spread on QGLT. This rumour, rooted in the offline social political 
environment, formed a collective communication transaction among QGLT
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participants. The dissemination of political rumour revealed the vulnerability of the 
Internet to non-rational public discourse. As Tamotsu Shibutani believes, when a 
rumour is passed on, a person repeats the rumour can speak without assuming full 
responsibility for what he says. Such practice provides an avenue for ‘releasing 
repressed impulses’ (Shibutani 1966: 6). The Internet, because of its anonymous 
nature and its potential of releasing social suppressed selves, becomes an ideal media 
for spreading rumour and creating panic and xenophobia. Manipulation of rumour on 
bulletin boards -  the government suppressed some beliefs that were inconvenient for 
the regime in power and permitted others -  poses a further danger to electronic 
deliberation. Apart from its deliberation potential, online discourse can also be 
manipulated to legitimate the authoritarian government’s hegemony in political life.
4.1 Starting a Rumour
The rumour that SARS was a biochemical attack from the USA started in QGLT In- 
Depth on 31 March, 2003. In his/her posting entitled: ‘Atypical quarantine policy and 
the atypical coverage [of SARS] from the Western media’, Niunaijiakele carefully 
sowed the seeds of doubt within QGLT by asking these questions: Why was Western 
(especially the USA’s) media so hysterical in reporting SARS in China? Why were 
they ‘framing China’? This posting received 132 viewings, but did not attract any 
follow-up.
Skipping April Fool’s Day, the same user posted his/her second article on April 2: 
‘The editor of the Wall Street Journal in the USA has the strongest immunity to ATP’. 
This article reads: the Americans seemed to be immune to SARS and the USA 
government seemed to have effective anti-dose for SARS infections in its country, 
which implied SARS was a biochemical weapon originated from the USA. This 
rumour received 216 viewings. Two follow-up messages linked this rumour to the 
USA’s political hegemony: ‘Terrible genetic weapon!’ ‘US-Iraq war is at its peak, the
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whole East Asia is seized by ATP. If this were part of the military strategy, it would be 
so perfectly complete!’
Box 7.1 Discussion triggered by SARS as biochemical attack rumour within QGLT 
(03/04/2003)
Main posting: The American newspapers confessed without being pressed: 69 ATP patients in 
the USA! Suggest US government to quarantine [ATP patients] in California (03/04/2003)
Follow-up 1 Are there any white people [as SARS] patients?
Follow-up 1.1 What a question! Do you think the 69 patients are all Asian? That would be 
interesting - white people are immune to any toxin.
Follow-up 1.1.a I’m so afraid of [SARS being] bio-weapon experiment...
Follow-up 1.2 Yes, there are white people cases. But I still suspect SARS is strategic 
biochemical attack.
Follow-up 1.2.a Nothing wrong with cautious prevention. But some of our government 
institutions have been playing ostrich -  they think they hide their heads and cover their eyes 
and ears, then there will be no danger!
Follow-up 1.3 Because it was an experiment, there must have been mistakes. But there is no 
point to debate this question. The important thing is [to heed] the result of this experiment and 
its improvement.
Source: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=17&pn=3&avar=2&aval=ffiM 
p. 8 o f 9 pages; accessed: 06/05/2003
As shown in the above box, when this same rumour from the same sender revisited 
QGLT In-depth on April 3, (s)he developed further ‘evidence’ to justify her/himself. 
This posting claimed that there were 69 SARS patients in the USA, but nobody died 
from SARS. Therefore, SARS must have originated there, and the SARS virus could
205
have been a virus leak from a biochemical experiment in the country. Though there 
existed no substantive evidence linking the SARS cases and the biochemical attack, 
this posting attracted 209 viewings. Follow up postings dwelled on the consequences 
of biochemical attack and how China should react, rather than questioning the nature 
of the rumour.
This development of discussion showed a four-level communication among QGLT 
users, as shown in the following chart:
Figure7.2 Four-level communication in SARS rumour
Comment 1
Fear o
biochemical attack 
(the agitator)
Answer 1
Vaguely confirmed 
the rumour (the 
protagonist)
Comment 2
Counter-measures 
towards biochemical 
attack (the agitator)
rumour
protagonist)
Answer 2
Confirmed the
(the
Answer 3
Strongly confirmed 
the rumour (the 
protagonist 
+the interpreter)
Rumour: SARS is a biochemical attack from the USA targeting China 
(the messenger)
A question: asked for a detail in the rumour and confirmed the binary 
opposition: White people vs. Asian (the Sceptic)
Such a communication process for spreading rumours constitutes ‘a collective 
transaction, involving a division o f labour among participants, each of whom makes a 
different contribution’ (Shibutani 1966: 13). Shibutani’s role allocation in rumour
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communication can be detected in examining the roles played by QGLT users as 
shown above.
On the first level, the rumour was started by the messenger who brought the news to 
the group;
On the second level, there were no challenges to the rumour. A question was raised by 
a Sceptic expressing doubt over the authenticity of the report and demanded details 
(whether all the SARS patients were white). This question, however, confirmed the 
xenophobic binary oppositions in the rumour - ‘USA’ vs. ‘China’, ‘White people’ vs. 
‘Asian’. These binary oppositions fit well into the long tradition of anti-American 
sentiment within QGLT;
On the third level, three answers were given by three protagonists to the question in 
level two. Each of them positively sponsored and confirmed the rumour;
On the fourth level, comments from two as-if-agitators on the answers given at level 
three (the confirmation of SARS as biochemical attack). Fear and worries regarding 
counter-measures against the ‘biochemical attack’ in these postings look as if the 
‘biochemical attack’ had already happened and affected the posters personally.
The spreading of the online rumour that SARS was a biochemical attack confirmed 
Das’ (1998) argument on the characteristics of rumours and explained it in terms of an 
online environment. Language used in rumours is ‘communicable, infectious, causing 
things to happen almost as if they had occurred in nature’, which creates ‘mounting 
panic ’ (Das 1998:117). The anonymity of source and ‘its capacity to build solidarity’ 
(Das 1998: 116) often make rumours well received by public. Within QGLT, the
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anonymous online environment, public panic during the SARS crisis, and the users’ 
‘solidarity’ in protesting USA’s military action in Iraq during the same period all 
contributed to the reception of this rumour. Moreover, in the decentralised online 
environment where everyone speaks, the openness of online discourse makes the 
public vulnerable to rumours. It is difficult for users to orient their attention among 
various information sources, and it is even more difficult for them to question the 
authenticity of any information they receive. Within QGLT, when the average number 
of daily postings is more than 10,00c),115 users tend to pay attention to postings that 
keep appearing and attract enough attention. The economy of attention online sadly 
works in favour of sensational, odd, or repetitive information. With a gradual build up 
of readership and replies, rumours ‘naturalise [...] the stereotypical distinctions 
between social groups and hides the social origins and production of hate’ (Das 
1998:117). One has to admit that the openness of the online communication 
environment creates a favourable condition for the spread of rumours.
4.2 Xenophobic Nationalism Behind the Rumour
Online mmours are rooted in offline social contexts. The xenophobia and nationalism 
displayed in the rumour of ‘SARS being a biochemical attack from the USA’ reflects a 
long-held ‘wounded nationalism’ (Chang, M. H. 2001) in modem Chinese history. 
Rumours ‘are not isolated reports but phases of a more inclusive adjustive process, 
and the analysis of symbolic content alone is not likely to yield adequate 
understanding’ (Shibutani 1966: 24).
China has been invaded and colonised by technologically advanced Western powers 
and Japan for more than one hundred years. Maria Hsia Chang explains that this 
history of colonisation left a legacy of collective insecurity, ‘wounded pride and 
resentment’ among its people (2001:26). This feeling of defeat renders the nation 
vulnerable to reactive nationalism and view Western powers as hostile and unreliable
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(ibid.). ‘China has had to accept the West as a mentor of modernisation and reject it as 
a hostile oppressor’ (Huang and Lee 2003: 42). Thus an ambivalent attitude towards 
developed western countries, especially the USA, has developed in modem Chinese 
history. Yu Huang and Chin-Chuan Lee argue that the USA has been regarded as a 
symbol of advanced technology and liberal democracy among Chinese intellectuals116, 
but on the other hand the USA has been regarded as an ‘opponent’ on issues such as 
Taiwan’s independence. A survey conducted by the China Youth Daily on 4 July 1995 
reveals that 87% of Chinese respondents considered the USA to be the ‘most hostile 
country to China’ (Huang and Lee 2003: 46).
In such an offline social political context, the rumour of ‘SARS as a biochemical 
attack from the USA targeting China’ revived the ‘wounded nationalism’ and 
xenophobia towards American hegemony among Chinese users. Details to support the 
rumour were also gradually added. A user claimed that this ‘news’ was released by 
Russian experts on Russian media (Lintan 18/04/2003). ‘Rumours tend to build on 
each other. Once a plausible start is made, it is supported through a variety of other 
material’ (Shibutani 1966: 68-9). QGLT witnessed continuous development of this 
rumour and xenophobia towards USA. The following postings are examples on 22 
April 2003:
- HIV, SARS, BSE, Ebola, all these are bacteriological experiment from the USA! These 
are rehearsals of the real battles! [The USA] has been testing their feasibility!
- Shameless USA! If the pro-America cliques in China didn’t leam lessons [from this 
biochemical attack] and still followed those pro-America cliques holding [USA] Green 
Cards, they could kill themselves without knowing it.
- Damn it! As long as there exists this source of trouble [USA], the whole earth weeps.
- China always strikes its enemy back later. Now [China] must be gathering evidence.
- This issue is worth investigating. Why didn’t USA report [its SARS cases] to the WHO?
- The Chinese government should put every effort in investigating. The USA is really 
worth resenting! (22/04/2003)
This rumour of conspiracy received criticism from some other users, though in limited
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numbers. Protesting messages denounced this rumour as ‘shameless’ (genyuan 
28/04/2003), having ‘shaky evidence’ (hanyangzao 30/04/2003), while other users 
called for ‘a stop to the rumour of SARS as biochemical attack!’ (shengdongyouqu 
23/04/2003). However, in the name of patriotism, this rumour encountered less 
restraint from the newsroom censorship and government surveillance, and was kept 
alive till the SARS panic finally died down in China. The SARS rumour postings 
revealed that in spite of the conflicting ideas presented on QGLT, the degree of 
interactivity or rational debate among users was rather weak among a limited number 
of users. By not voicing their opinion, the majority of bulletin board users can turn the 
Internet into another traditional media form which are used as ‘bastions of the 
powerful where the relatively powerless have remained silent and silenced’ (Mitra 
2004: 507)
4.3 ‘Harmful Rumours’ and ‘Harmless Rumours’
Rumour is a natural response from an insecure public which has an unsatisfied need 
for information in times of crisis, and when the routine of organised life has been 
disturbed (Shibutani 1966). Officials can control or even suppress rumours by 
eliminating false beliefs, eliminating beliefs that are inconvenient for the regime in 
power (Shibutani 1966: 200). On the other hand, officials can also neglect, or even 
promote rumours that can potentially consolidate its governance. In this sense, the 
Internet is still a vulnerable public sphere to political manipulation in China.
In moments of crisis, as Shibutani (1966: 47) argues, rumours usually flourish when 
discontent arises among under-privileged persons who feel that they are deprived, 
insecure, alienated, and restless. Such disadvantaged groups lack adequate 
information to explain their situation. They usually ‘become responsive to anything 
that might identify the source of their discontent or any object or program that is 
likely to bring relief’ (Shibutani 1966: 47).
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During the time when SARS information from official sources was scarce, rumours 
such as ‘Beijing will be sealed off’, ‘martial law will be imposed at the airports, train 
stations and motorways’, ‘medicines will be sprayed from helicopters’, and ‘one 
employee from Hailong Building [who died from SARS] disappeared mysteriously’ 
spread through Internet bulletin boards, and chatrooms to mobile phones until, in the 
last case, the employee who ‘disappeared mysteriously’ came out in public on 
YNET.com to prove that she had not died from SARS (Pu, H. 25/06/2003).
QGLT also accommodated one rumour concerning SARS in Beijing on 22 April 22 
2003. User Yuconger posted the following message on QGLT Current Affairs:
Internal news about the ATP: There have been around 7,000-8,000 people infected
117[SARS] in Tongzhou District in Beijing, more than 300 died.
This message came online at 10:49:39 Beijing Time and was deleted (along with nine 
replies to the postings) within an hour. On the following day, China Central Television 
announced that Yuconger had been detained for spreading rumours online (Sima 
29/04/2003). Apart from the capital, several provincial and municipal governments 
issued similar notices warning Internet users who ‘distorted facts’ or ‘spread rumours’ 
about SARS would face criminal prosecution.118 In Foshan city, Guangdong Province 
alone, seven cases of spreading SARS rumours online were investigated by the local 
public security bureau, and the people who ‘spread the rumours’ were detained119. 
During the SARS crisis, more than one hundred people were detained, fined, warned, 
or educated in the name of spreading SARS rumours through the Internet and mobile 
text messages since April 2003 (Kuang 26/05/2004).
Forming a contrast was the fact that users who spread rumours of SARS as a 
biochemical attack from the USA remained unpunished. I asked Mr. Shan (Director of 
QGLT 1999-2004) why Yuconger was detained for spreading rumours whilst others
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were not. He said, ‘these two kinds of rumours had different natures. The first rumour 
[of exaggerating SARS infection in Beijing] caused great public panic; while the 
second rumour did not cause similar consequence’ (Interview 01/09/2005). Shibutani 
argues that politicians often exploit already established rumours for their purposes 
(1966: 212). The Chinese government showed permissiveness towards the 
‘biochemical attack’ rumour, which served the purpose of corroborating the 
Communist Party’s governance in ‘protecting’ Chinese people from ‘invasion’.
Different ways in handling rumours is just one of many examples of the Party’s 
manipulation of public attention on online discussion. From February 20 to March 31, 
there was no single article about SARS posted in QGLT or any online news coverage 
of SARS from www.people.com.cn. This time span ‘coincided’ with the annual 
convening of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee and National 
People’s Congress. Both media administration and newsroom censorship were 
tightened during that period to filter out any ‘negative’ news no matter how vital they 
were to the public interest. At roughly the same time, contrasting to the scarcity of 
SARS information in February and March, heated discussion on the Iraqi war started 
on February 27 (almost one month ahead of the actual breakout of the war) and anti­
war postings flooded QGLT and other bulletin boards.
Indeed, technology and media are by nature ‘neither automatically democratic nor 
demagogic’ and ‘both their democratic potential or demagogic potential can be 
consciously tapped’ (Grosswiler 1998:149). Technology and media can empower 
ordinary people to express their opinion, discuss and debate issues of common 
concerns, whereas at the same time they can also be used by political and business 
interest groups to control public thought (Chomsky 1989). Internet bulletin boards in 
China have been pushing the limits of the Party’s political tolerance through online 
discussion on current affairs. However, the freedom of online discussion is more 
plausible on international issues than domestic issues to the Party. When online 
discussion on taboo issues such as SARS was raised at the ‘wrong’ time, the Party
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will control the online discussion through censorship, diverting public attention and 
other various means. Furthermore, as scholars point out, Internet use can even 
cultivate xenophobia and nationalism, which serves the communist party’s need to 
legitimate its own hegemony (He 2000; Hughes 2002; Huang and Lee 2003).
5. Summary
Based on dialogic forms of communication across national borders, Internet bulletin 
boards have created an alternative publicity outside the official agenda in China. In 
spite of all the newsroom censorship and government control, online discussion on 
Internet bulletin boards has a certain degree of autonomy and is characterised by 
contesting political viewpoints. Through the case study of SARS online discussion 
within QGLT, I conclude that a multi-tiered virtual public sphere is in development. 
Though the official discourse is still dominant, the subaltern publics are expanding 
and constructing alternative and oppositional political voices, which enriches the 
content of political communication and extends the forms of political participation in 
China.
However, the many-to-many communication model online leaves Internet users 
exposed to all kinds of information, including non-progressive and non-deliberative 
political voices. ‘Citizens’ in the networked public sphere had to wade through a 
series of rude and sometimes nasty messages; speculation even more wild than that on 
the television (Kramer 03/02/2003). There are both great potential and pit-falls for 
public deliberation on Internet bulletin boards.
5.1 QGLT as an Alternative Online Discourse: Between the Media Silence and 
Media Hype
Although Chinese media have gained some autonomy in reporting since the media 
reform in 1978, Kalathil (2002) argues that Chinese media are still far from
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functioning as an impartial observer and commentator even as they are struggling to 
keep pace with the economic development and globalisation sweeping the country. 
Their ‘collective silence’ in the early stage of SARS coverage becomes another 
example of how much control the authoritarian government can have over mass media.
However on the other hand, the Western media’s coverage of SARS has been 
criticised by scientists as ‘media hype’. Nobel Prize winning virologist David 
Baltimore accused journalists of spreading hysteria: ‘a media-transmitted epidemic of 
concern for personal safety outpaces the risk to the public health from the actual virus’ 
(Ricchiardi 2003).
Online postings within QGLT have reflected a range of perspectives in contemporary 
public opinion in China. The way in which information is disseminated online has its 
autonomy in setting its own agenda. This was the case when SARS postings first 
appeared. On the Internet bulletin boards, there is a snowballing effect in terms of 
postings being viewed. Postings receive more viewing rates and follow-up messages 
tend to attract more users later. SARS online discussion proved that it was users’ 
autonomous selective attention decides and prioritises online topical discussion. 
Public opinion formed from this discussion reflects a parallel public discourse 
contrasting, challenging, or antagonising the official agenda of hoarding information 
concerning public health.
A survey conducted by Yu et al. on March 22-23, 2003 in Beijing revealed that the 
Internet (24.6%) ranked the third primary information source among 396 Beijing 
residents (the first two are television at 80% and newspapers at 57.5%). Among these 
respondents, people who get SARS news from the Internet have an average age of 
31.31, and 85.5% of them hold a university degree or above. They are younger and 
better educated compared with other audience groups (Yu, Guomin et al. 20/12/2005).
My study of QGLT SARS postings finds that: a group of well-informed Internet users
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first voice out SARS news and their opinion based on their personal information 
source such as overseas media, personal experience, or other channels. This group of 
well-educated university graduates mainly in an urban setting derive pleasure in 
writing and debating online. They actively seek and disseminate truth that few official 
media venture to voice. By doing so, they provide others with an alternative media 
discourse alongside the official one. They played the role of opinion leaders in the 
anonymous online environment and actively contributed to the forming of public 
opinion online.
As discussed in previous sections, a words filtering system (see more in Chapter 5) 
was used in QGLT to filter public discussion about SARS. However, when ‘SARS’ or 
was blocked, users found other words to replace them; when talking about 
SARS was controlled on domestic bulletin boards, overseas bulletin boards became 
popular among users; when bulletin boards were under strict supervision, internal 
communities messaging, QQ120, MSN messenger, emails, mobile phone texts, news 
group and mailing list were used to communicate ideas. Thus, Kuang (26/05/2004) 
argues that the ‘avalanche of information’ effect of online information dissemination 
makes any efforts in shielding out information eventually impossible. The 
authoritarian government will face a dilemma in information control online: the 
control of one Internet communication means will trigger other information 
communication technologies. The banning of certain topics will arouse curiosity from 
users and so ironically produce more information.
5.2 SARS is not China’s Chernobyl
The Economist compared the outbreak of SARS in China with the explosion of a 
nuclear reactor at Chernobyl in that ‘a leader of just a few months’ standing in power 
[and] political uncertainty reinforced the tendency of party apparatchiks to conceal 
bad news’ (26/04/2003: 9). Chernobyl in April 1986 has been acknowledged as ‘a 
great accelerator’ of openness and restructuring which helped, ‘just three years later,
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to bring down first the Soviet empire, then the Soviet Union itself and the Communist 
Party’ (The Economist 26/04/2003: 9)
Three years have passed since SARS broke out in China and we can tell that SARS 
has not become China’s Chernobyl. There are various reasons that contribute to this. 
Though online postings about SARS in China displayed a deliberative potential, they 
also demonstrated intrinsic limitations associated with Internet media at the same time. 
Meanwhile, behind the illusion of free, open and autonomous online political 
discussion, the Chinese government has been controlling online public opinion in 
various ways to serve its own administration.
Internet bulletin boards are vulnerable to irrational, derogatory, and non-progressive 
discourse. American foreign policy expert David J. Rothkopf used the word 
‘infodemic’ to describe the media hype over SARS which ‘made the crisis harder to 
control, especially as panic and rumours spread via chat rooms, bulletin boards and e- 
mail worldwide’ (Ricchiardi 2003). The Internet, particularly, had been rife with 
rumour of SARS as a ‘Chinese Plague’ and bioterrorism. There were online postings 
blaming Asian food for the spread of disease (Ricchiardi 2003) or linking SARS to a 
global conspiracy. In spite of the deliberative potential of information technology, the 
virtual public sphere is not all necessarily democratic in its nature.
The rumour of ‘SARS being a biochemical attack from the USA’ as spread on QGLT 
boards was disguised as patriotism and nationalism. The Communist Party has 
propagated the idea of ‘China as subject to hostile external and internal predators’ 
(Renwick and Cao 2003:62). This long-term brainwashing paved the psychological 
basis for the reception of rumour regarding SARS as a conspiracy from the USA. The 
enthusiasm from QGLT users in responding to this rumour reflects the cultivated 
‘wounded nationalism’ among Chinese public.
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Behind the online nationalism presented in QGLT SARS postings is the Communist 
Party’ manipulation of online political discussion to serve its own governance. 
Legitimating the political power became more significant for the Communist Party 
after the 1989 pro-Democracy Movement. Nationalism thus became a handy reason to 
justify the Party’s hegemony under the Party’s sole leadership; China can unite and 
resist marginalisation and exclusion from Western powers (especially the USA for its 
intervention over the issue of Taiwan).
This anti-USA discourse had in fact started before the breakout of SARS. In mid 
February 2003, more than one month before the war in Iraq broke out, major official 
media in China were instructed to: ‘make full use of the variety of news sources from 
foreign news agencies and giving the war a comprehensive report as soon as it breaks
191out’ . From then on, heated anti-war discussion prevailed on Internet bulletin boards 
and denunciation of USA’s military hegemony was echoed among users.
The heated discussion of a remote war in Iraq forms a sharp contrast to the 
suppression of online discussion over SARS that took place at home. By diverting 
public attention on international issues and away from domestic affairs, the 
Communist Party granted the Chinese public a selective freedom of political 
expression of opinion. The Chinese public can feel free to debate the issues permitted 
by the Party but not necessarily the issues of their concerns. This fact seemed to prove 
what Zaller (1992) believes, that an elite framing effect is still a central power in the 
democratic process in that it determines public opinion.
This strategy of diverting public attention to the Party’s preferred issues was also 
applied when SARS information became ‘open’ and ‘transparent’. Users were not 
restrained from praising the new government, or of giving credit to medical staff. 
They were also allowed to give constructive suggestions and mild criticism 
(especially when the criticism was targeted at local government). By consciously or
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unconsciously displaying a certain level of consistency to the official agenda in their 
postings, QGLT users reinforced the official agenda.
However, James Druckman and Kjersten Nelson’s (2003) recent study shows that the 
elite framing has only a short-term effect and can be limited by interpersonal 
conversation and individual heterogeneity. In this sense, the decentred and non- 
hierarchical cyberspace can be an ideal tool in promoting interaction between 
heterogeneous individuals, which prevents any individualised social actor from 
representing him or her self in totality. Public deliberation displayed during the SARS 
crisis further pushed the Chinese government towards press freedom and 
democratisation. When SARS revisited Guangdong Province in 2004, both the 
government institutions and official media immediately revealed the news to the 
public and put SARS under effective control122. This changed attitude in dealing with 
the same issue is largely due to the active role Internet media played in 2003. As some 
scholars believe, China’s new leader may have learned valuable lesson from SARS:
In the era of instant global communication, cover-ups become almost impossible. While 
state-controlled media may tamely follow government orders, the proliferation of 
Internet and other new high-tech information sources signal an end to government 
chances of remaining the sole provider of information -  or even the most listened-to 
source (Yuan J-D. 03/06/2003).
Seyla Benhabib gives three reasons as to why deliberative processes help to improve 
the practical rationality of collective decision-making processes: a) deliberative 
processes impart new information; b) deliberative processes help individuals to order 
their preferences coherently, and c) deliberative processes impose a certain reflexivity 
on individual preferences and opinion, forcing participants to adopt an ‘enlarged 
mentality’ (1996: 71-72). Through the case study of SARS communication within 
QGLT, we can tell that the embryonic deliberative procedure online improves the 
quality of the outcome of decision-making. Though SARS did not bring profound 
changes in China’s politics as Chernobyl did to the former USSR, Internet bulletin
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boards and other online facilities did present competing publics in the political 
landscape. An alternative political discourse ‘may have fostered the growth of a 
public critique that, over time, the party will be hard put to ignore’ (Brookes, A. 
24/06/2003). The public sphere constructed online gives voice to the alternative and 
oppositional political groups to air their concerns, which enriches the political 
discourse and may eventually reshape the political culture in China.
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Chapter 8
Cyber-Greater China: Bulletin Boards in the Mediated Global Public 
Sphere
Computer mediated communication builds up online communities extending beyond 
geopolitical boundaries (Castells 1996, 2001). The intrinsic global nature of the 
Internet makes it an ideal tool for creating an autonomous association among people 
who share the same culture but live in dispersed geopolitical regions. For that reason, 
the Internet opens up the public discussion over China’s issues to Chinese people all 
over the world and constructs a virtual public sphere in Greater China123 hardly 
anticipated before. Public discussion over the virtual public sphere in Greater China 
has been viewed as a new approach to solve regional conflicts along the Taiwan Strait, 
and also assist progress towards democracy in the Mainland (Copper 2003).
In this chapter I am going to explore the global nature of Internet bulletin boards and 
examine how online public opinion as an alternative public discourse concerning 
China-related political, economic, cultural, and human rights issues, is formed within 
Greater China and influences the official agenda in the Mainland. Using QGLT as an 
example, my study suggests that QGLT and other bulletin boards based in China serve 
as a tool for deliberation in Greater China through the following means:
a) Bulletin boards, as a grassroots media form, bridge the information gap 
between the Chinese users both in mainland China and those overseas so that 
a common ground for further political discussion is formed;
b) Bulletin boards provide Chinese users with a platform to interpret news from 
mainstream media sources, and forms an alternative public discourse within 
the online community;
c) Bulletin boards attract scholars both from Mainland China and overseas, 
contributing to studies on China-related issues;
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d) Bulletin boards bond Chinese people together all over the world into online 
civil protests during significant political events;
e) Bulletin boards are also used as a tool for organising individuals into online 
civil rights groups.
Finally, this chapter will discuss the limitations of this virtual public sphere in Greater 
China and concludes that the “horizontal civic communication” (Dahlgren 2004: xiii) 
on bulletin boards and web forums contributes to the construction of a virtual public 
sphere in Greater China.
1. Bulletin Boards as an Alternative Information Source
Internet bulletin boards, as an autonomous media form, can disseminate grassroots 
information, thus providing an alternative public voice in parallel with the dominant 
media discourse. This person-to-person sharing of information helps to bridge the 
information gap between the Chinese users in mainland China and those overseas, so 
that a common ground for further political discussion can be found.
One fatal weakness of modem journalism is its extreme selectivity in making news 
(Rucht, D. 2004:34). Modem journalism provides little space for citizens who have no 
authority, celebrity or expertise to give their political opinions. Lewis et al. argue that 
‘the traditional top-down structure of political reporting’ (2004: 163) excludes active 
citizen access to the media, and mass media in general are ‘focused on the doings of 
the powerful’ (2004:154). However bulletin boards, as Rheingold argues, can turn an 
ordinary person anywhere in the world into ‘a publisher, an eyewitness reporter, an 
advocate, an organizer, a student or teacher, and potential participant in a worldwide 
citizen-to-citizen conversation’ 124. This ‘citizen-to-citizen conversation’ on the 
bulletin boards plays a very important role as an information source in China where 
the media are largely government controlled, media content is under partisan
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125surveillance and established foreign media are banned from direct public access . 
Many QGLT postings contain news which otherwise would not be carried by the 
official media in China. By posting on Internet bulletin boards, Chinese users inside 
the country and overseas become each other’s information source. The traditional 
power relation between the exchanging of information and sharing of news has 
created a common ground for individuals to develop topical discussion.
Avoiding the stringent censorship in the official media, overseas news can always find 
a place on Internet bulletin boards. This overseas news ‘feed’ includes cross-posting 
of news from overseas Chinese media, users’ translation of news in foreign languages, 
and original eyewitness ‘reports’ from overseas users. Overseas information has 
played an important role for breaking news events like the September 11 attacks. 17 
minutes after the first airliner crashed into the World Trade Centre, when the official 
Chinese media were still silent, a message about it from Hong Kong, coded in 
traditional Chinese (Big5), was posted on QGLT (Guo 2003). Similar examples could 
be found in postings from Taiwan regarding the earthquake in 2001 and the general 
elections.
When virtual proximity in cyberspace creates a sense of locality, overseas Chinese 
users become information sources from their host countries to their home country. As 
well as heavily regulating the use of satellite TV in China, the Chinese government 
also has blocked most international media organisation’s websites (such as bbc.co.uk) 
from personal computers within its border. Negative news about China reported by 
foreign media is largely blocked out from the Chinese public. However, QGLT users 
from the USA, Germany, Australia, Singapore, and other countries can convey news 
concerning China from international media sources into their postings (though mostly 
in a subtle way). For example the following paragraph, taken from a posting 
contributed by QGLT user Zhiyanle from the USA, revealed a piece of negative news 
about China. At the same time, the Chinese official media had been downplaying the 
severity of the AIDS situation in the country:
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Reuters and New York Times (July 7): The UN gave warning that AIDS cases are on 
sharp rise in Asia. There was one out of every five AIDS patients from Asia last year. 
While this year, one out of every four AIDS patients are from Asia. [...] The increase 
in AIDS cases in China is catching up that is in Thailand. UN public health 
representative gave the above report on the 15 International AIDS Conference and 
gave warning especially to Asia and China (Zhiyanle 07/07/2004 author’s translation)
The informational role of bulletin boards can also be illustrated in domestic users’ 
posting their personal accounts of social changes and problems in developing China. 
This individualized perspective of social news would be regarded as too 
‘insignificant’ or too ‘negative’ to appear in the traditional media. In January 2004, a 
posting containing stories and photos of the miserable livelihood of peasants, migrant 
workers, beggars, prostitutes, the homeless, and the unemployed got ‘published’ on
19 f\QGLT . These images on the Internet, with 640 click rates within four hours in 
QGLT, made a sharp contrast to the images of economic prosperity and social 
harmony presented in traditional media. As such, they convincingly construct an 
alternative public discourse.
Also within QGLT, Jieyu, who comes from a village herself, frequently contributes 
articles on the equal rights of peasant migrant workers in the city (15/05/2002) and 
legal protection for their civil rights (16/05/2002). William* has started to write about 
the lack of social welfare and the poor condition of the pension system for migrant 
workers since 2003. His articles were later adopted by Southern Weekend and several 
other media in China before it appeared on the website of an overseas labour rights 
organization based in the USA.
A survey conducted by the CINIC reveals that 39.1% of Chinese Internet users 
identify their primary goal for going online is ‘to get information’. Among all the 
online sources obtained and browsed, overseas Chinese sites count for 7.0 % and 
overseas English sites 5.6 % (Report XV 2005). The informing role of bulletin boards 
has started to affect the traditional media agenda. As Bennett observes, the Internet is
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becoming more and more an information source for traditional journalists (Bennett, W. 
L. 2004: 141). Thus the validity of the online information might flow from the virtual 
space into the macro mass media. Meanwhile, the increasing importance of the 
informing role of Internet media also reflects a growing public awareness of press 
freedom in mainland China. The ‘loss of the right to speak’, as a QGLT user wrote in 
his signature file: ‘will eventually endanger the right to live’.
Bulletin boards and other interactive online communities create a new sphere for 
public meeting and discussions, which demonstrates the potential for reunifying 
people and remapping the political constituencies in a global sense. By sharing 
information among isolated individuals, Internet bulletin boards reunify people and 
cultivate a well-informed public ready for public discussion. The decentralised nature 
of the Internet has the potential of thawing the hegemonic control over public 
dialogue and bringing about empowerment of citizens.
2. Interpreting the Dominant Media Discourse
Internet bulletin boards enable Internet users to create a secondary text of current 
affairs based on their reception of mainstream media coverage. By interpreting news 
received from mainstream media, users can integrate their own knowledge, 
understanding, experience, and critique into a ‘negotiated’ alternative public discourse. 
The active audience in the mass communication era have already shown their 
resistance in how they decode media messages. The audience can selectively accept, 
resist, engage with or propose their own ‘oppositional’ reading of the encoded values 
in television programmes (e.g. Morley, D. 1980). The Internet offers a greater 
opportunity for the resistant audience from the mass communication age to make 
known their decoding of the culture they receive from ‘above’.
One notorious feature of Chinese journalism before the media reform started in the
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late 1970s is that traditional media always shed positive light on their coverage of 
even the most disastrous media events. For example, an earthquake report will be 
covered from the perspective of national leaders’ visit to the earthquake stricken area, 
or the People’s Liberation Army’s rescue efforts. This practice was a ‘principle’ of 
newsroom policy, and has not been totally eradicated within the official media. 
However, Internet bulletin boards have provided Chinese users with a platform to 
interpret news from mainstream media sources and construct their own narratives of 
the current affairs, which forms an alternative public discourse within the online 
community.
Audience studies have long revealed a two-way relationship between audience and 
texts in media reception. Audiences can resist, engage with and create their own 
meanings from the messages received (Morley, D. 1980; Fiske, J. 1989; de Certeau, 
M. 1984). This role of the audience in the semiotic ‘guerrilla war’ with the media 
producers becomes more important with the arrival of the Internet. The Internet 
provides the audience (users) with both material for producing, and space for 
publishing their interpretation, snatched from the mass media feed.
The power relationship between information sending and receiving has been 
challenged, if not totally reversed, on Internet bulletin boards. Based on the text 
obtained from the traditional mass media, Chinese users interpret the news and create 
new meaning within their framework of knowledge and experience, which adds 
complexity and plurality to the original media text. Internet bulletin boards provide a 
platform for users publishing their negotiated interpretation of the current news, 
which might influence the official agenda.
CINIC’s 2005 survey reveals that 62.0% of the mainland users browse the Internet for 
news and 20.8% of them also use the bulletin boards and online communities for 
discussion. Within the officially administrated QGLT, comments and analysis by users 
on current social political events provide an alternative reading to the news from the
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mainstream media. In an attempt to write out their own news stories, QGLT users rely 
on multi-textual information and personal experiences before approaching news 
stories from a critical perspective. By doing so, the traditional ‘passive audience’ gain 
their right to construct and publish their own news narratives.
Tianjiali, a retired employee from a state-owned enterprise, frequently posts his ‘news 
analyses’ on QGLT. From my interview with him, I found that his media consumption 
includes television (watching headline news and investigative stories from China 
Central Television), newspapers (reading both local and national broadsheet papers), 
and Internet media. This intertextuality in media consumption provides materials and 
helps to cultivate his critical thinking when he writes his own news comments. One 
example is his news analysis of a ‘touching’ story that appeared on Chongqing 
Evening in July 2004. The local news reported a 6-year-old girl selling newspapers on 
the street and earning money for her father’s medical operation. The local paper 
focused on the little girl’s filial duty to her parent and people’s kindness in donating 
money, but for Tianjiali it raised questions about the social welfare system:
I’m happy for the little girl for her receiving the attention of the media as well as the 
help from the society. However, who can support the other victims suffering from 
similar accidents? [...] Prestigious writer Liang Xiaosheng says, if we want to judge 
the rationality of a social system, we should look at how the poorest live their lives 
rather than how the richest spend their money [...]. We saw these people in need 
failing to get social support in time, so we know there must be something wrong with 
contemporary social mechanism (Tianjiali 31/07/2004 author’s translation).
Most QGLT users’ interpretation of news offers a critical approach, written in plain 
conversational language. This writing style differs sharply from the mainstream 
official media’s opinion page which is characterised by the ideology of ‘instructing 
the masses’, and written in rigidly structured political cliches. Overseas Chinese users, 
because of their free access to media sources, special knowledge of China, and the 
fact that they do not need to fear the authorities, can become the most eloquent and 
daring news commentators within QGLT.
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In July 2004, UNESCO urged China to take measures in protecting the ancient 
buildings surrounding the Forbidden City in Beijing. But Beijing municipal officials 
argued that tearing down the old buildings for new roads is to make ‘a central axial 
line’ for the Capital city127. An overseas user Zhiyanle interpreted this news based on 
her/his knowledge of the corruption in China. (S)he argued the real reason behind 
building new roads in Beijing is ‘to benefit the real estate business’. He/she also
challenged the authority to expose ‘the connections between relevant government
128organisations to the real estate companies to the public’.
The impact of users’ interpreting current affairs on bulletin boards is the breaking 
down of uniformity in public opinion (Min 2001; Li and Qin 2001, Chen and Deng 
2002). The capacity of the Internet media to harbour different political beliefs is 
owing to the “ideologically thin” (Bennett 2004:134) communication within the civil 
network online. Bennett believes that due to the lack of “common ideological or issue 
frames”, online communication may reduce conflicts and harbour intellectual 
contradictions (2004: 134-5).
The intellectual contradictions within QGLT users could be best exemplified by the
1 90Special Discussion Channel on Strategic Development (2001-2002) . Obtaining
permission from the people.com.cn administration, 12 users volunteered to select 
topics, organise and moderate online discussions on development problems facing 
China. This was a response to QGLT users’ enthusiasm for debating China’s future 
and desire to search for solutions through public discussion. This one-year practice 
involved 69 users who actively participated and consisted of 134 articles of original 
writing about the development problems in China that were posted on the site. Up to 
April 2002, 25 topical discussions were put on the agenda, ranging from domestic 
issues like ‘Education and Social Welfare’, ‘Reform on Governmental Administrative 
System’, ‘Anti-corruption and Balance of Power’, ‘Reform of State-owned 
Enterprises’, to the Taiwan issue and international relations.
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However, when key members gradually withdrew from the volunteer group, this self­
initiated in-depth analysis was taken under the control of QGLT and transformed into 
an online panel meeting. This new edition of in-depth public debate over policy 
making was launched in 2003 during the sessions of the annual National People’s 
Congress Assembly and the Political Consultative Conference Delegation. Top 
officials and people’s delegates were invited to QGLT online panel ‘meetings’ with 
users to answer questions. There is clear evidence that common concerns from 
Internet users, like policies regarding education and agriculture, were later embodied 
in national delegates’ proposals. With a growing tolerance towards politically 
‘constructive’ suggestions, it seems that the Communist Party’s tight control over 
public opinion has relaxed through online dialogue between citizens and government 
officials, mediated by official media such as QGLT.
3. Scholarly Studies on China-Related Issues
QGLT attracts scholars from both China and overseas who contribute their studies on 
Chinese-related issues. QGLT provides its users with a platform for intellectual 
conversation through independent, and sometimes even oppositional, scholarly voices. 
Scholarly research, ranging from history studies to international relations studies, is 
presented on the bulletin boards to trigger dialogue, discussion, and even debate. To 
better understand their interlocutors, participants of the online academic debate 
‘reflexively modify their pre-discursive positions in response to better arguments’ 
(Dahlberg 2001c: 167). Through such processes, rational critical discussion within the 
online community engages Chinese intellectuals in a discursive interaction.
For non-professional researchers in China who usually have difficulty in getting 
access to mainstream publishers and academic institutions, Internet bulletin boards 
and other online communities become an ideal place to ‘publish’ articles, debate 
viewpoints, challenge ideas, and derive inspiration. As one QGLT user said, there has
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been an atmosphere of ‘learning from each other and progressing through the 
interaction and communication within this community’ (Fanzi 04/03/2004).
Describing himself as a ‘plebeian scholar’, Gaomu has a university degree in 
Business Economy and has worked with three state-owned enterprises. QGLT has 
been his ‘publisher’ since 1999. He has constantly posted articles concerning 
problems in the process of corporationalisation and privatisation of the state-owned 
enterprises (27/08/2004). He also calls for a more appropriate ‘social mechanism’ in 
the economic reform to best serve the basic interest of the majority public 
(11/08/2004). As an amateur scholar, he has to rely on his own income and family 
help for research work. Despite the fact that he contacted a few big publishers, he 
failed to get his work published. Only by posting on Internet bulletin boards can he 
challenge the mainstream economists whom he believes ‘engage too much with 
Western Micro Economics theories and stray far away from the economic reality in 
China’ (Interview with Gaomu: 03/09/2004).
QGLT also attracts mainstream researchers such as Hairui2000 whose professional 
title is a Senior Researcher specializing in Employment Studies. Though admitting it 
is not easy to form an ideal rational critical debate around topics like ‘Civil Societies 
and Socialism’ (Hairui2000 06/02/2002) on bulletin boards, Hairui2000 still finds 
‘meaningful’ discussions going on within small subgroups in QGLT community.
Within QGLT, there are also overseas scholars like Zhuliu who post on behalf of 
China Strategic Research and Development Institute (CSI), which consists of Chinese 
scholars and post-graduates students in the USA. Registered in California in June 
1994, CSI, as it claims, is devoted to:
research and designing Chinese-including Mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong- 
development strategy worldwide, to set into action, so China can improve its 
democracy and human rights, to promote its people quality, to realize China's 
modernization and its potential for world peace and human development (available at:
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http://members.tripod.com/csrdi/index.html. accessed: 26/11/2004)
Some academic works were abstracted, edited, or integrated into postings before they 
appeared on bulletin boards. The following piece appearing on QGLT is taken from a 
Sociologist Zhong Dajun’s book on the implication of ‘national treatment’ after China 
joined the WTO. National treatment, as a WTO principle, implies that both foreigners 
and locals should be treated without discrimination. This principle applies to imported 
and locally-produced goods, foreign and domestic services, trademarks, copyrights
1 I P
and patents within WTO member countries . Zhong uses the concept of national 
treatment to argue that although China became a WTO country, discrimination against 
the rural population such as the deprivation of free migration could be found within its 
own territory. This unequal treatment of its own citizens results in a widening gap 
between the city and countryside, and the rich and poor. It is hard to imagine that this 
severe criticism of the official census registry system could be found on any other 
media than Internet bulletin boards:
This is a forced deprivation of the citizen rights of free migration and free choice of 
profession. This census registry system with Chinese character is more brutal than the 
racial segregation in the South African [...] It can be compared only to the Nazi’s 
concentration camp in some sense. (06/05/2003 author’s translation)131
All QGLT users I interviewed, no matter whether it was the amateur researcher 
Gaomu or the senior researcher Hairui2000, refused to label themselves as ‘elite 
intellectuals’. They believe that ‘elite intellectuals’ are those who hold important 
positions within the government or derive benefits from western powers. The growing 
distrust of government and government-supported experts helps the growth of a 
confrontational intellectual group online.
4. E-protesting
Bulletin boards have bonded together Chinese all over the world into online civil 
protest groups during significant political events: from the 1998 May Riot against
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ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, to human rights abuse in Mainland China. Though some 
of the civil protests, such as the online protest against NATO’s bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, are in the Communist Party interest, one cannot deny 
that an antagonistic public has also displayed its oppositional political opinion in 
Mainland China. As Yang (2003) argues, online civic participation among Chinese 
worldwide has had visible influences on transnational politics through problem 
articulation, civic association and the mobilisation of activism.
Tay (1998) uses the term ‘global Chinese community’ to describe the communal 
formation through online gathering of dispersed Chinese worldwide during the
1 “XOIndonesia Riots of May. This online protest within a global Chinese community
started in May 1998 when an anti-Chinese riot arose in Indonesia (before the
formation of QGLT). The World Huaren Federation (http://www.huaren.org) based in
the USA launched its ‘Yellow Ribbon’ campaign, and fervently condemned the
violence targeting the Chinese community in Indonesia, especially the raping and
killing of Chinese women. The ‘Yellow Ribbon’ campaign urged users around the
world to spread the news through emails and other forms of online communication,
and harnessed international public opinion to press the Indonesian government into 
1
taking action . A protest thus spread like wildfire across cyberspace, disregarding 
geopolitical boundaries. Online condemnation and protest later triggered offline 
actions. Demonstrations were held in the USA, Canada, the UK, Peru, Hong Kong, 
the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, mainland China, and Taiwan134. 
Under the pressure of international public opinion, Indonesian President Habibie 
admitted that the gang-raping and killing of Chinese women was ‘the most inhumane 
incident in Indonesia history’ and an independent committee was set up to investigate 
the riot.
During the online protest against the May Riot in Indonesia, Zaobao Luntan (ZBLT), 
the web forum affiliated to the United Morning Post in Singapore, played a significant 
role in welding together a Chinese community worldwide. Most Chinese users turned
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to ZBLT to seek information and voice their condemnation (Lin and Zhao 
06/06/2003). As one user recalled:
[T]hrough ZBLT, Chinese all around the world showed their attitude towards the 
Indonesian government that atrocities targeting at Chinese people couldn’t end with no 
answer; through ZBLT, Chinese all around the world learnt the living situation in 
Indonesia and learnt viewpoints and attitude from other Chinese fellows. It is the Internet 
that connects the Chinese all around the world together, and form a online wave of 
outrage135 (Author’s translation).
In the following year, in a similar political context, QGLT emerged in Beijing when 
protests against NATO’s bombing went online. The online protest against the USA 
was not a threat to the Chinese Communist Party and was even supported by them 
because the nationalism displayed during these events served the Party’s interest. 
However, once the public was awoken to their civil rights, they started to use this 
right in other aspects of social life, which made it almost impossible for the 
authoritarian government to avoid the rising publics.
The idea of a separation between civil society and the state came from the eighteenth- 
century Enlightenment when the state came to be viewed as the antithesis of ‘free 
association’ or of a ‘community of interests’ (Hassan 2004:101). Though QGLT is 
still mainly state-financed and administrated, confrontations between civil society and 
the state can still be found in online protests, as the Internet brings domestic issues to 
an international level. Publicity in a global sense thus furnishes a ‘universalisation test 
for global norms by opening up those norms to the critical scrutiny of a diverse 
international community’ (Chambers 2000:193). This universal publicity functions as 
a democratic watchdog ‘overseeing the actions and policies of the state’ (Chambers 
2000: 193-4), which guarantees that the public sphere could not be completely 
colonized by arbitrary political power (Chambers 2000:194). Online protest within the 
global Chinese community over Sun Zhigang’s death in 2003 was directed at the 
Chinese government, and pressed it to abolish the notorious Regulations o f Custody 
and Repatriation o f Wanderers and Beggars in Cities136. Online protest in Sun’s case
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proves bulletin boards can gather scattered marginal political voices, and serve as 
venues for civil rights movement in cyberspace.
Sun, a 27-year-old migrant worker in Guangdong province, was detained on his way 
to an Internet cafe on 17 March, 2003 by the local police. Because he failed to 
produce an ID card and a Temporary Resident Permit, and he ‘answered back’ when 
questioned, he was detained in the local custody and repatriation centre for migrant 
labourers. Sun was found dead 72 hours later from a ‘heart attack’ in the detention 
medical centre, but the later anatomy report showed that he was beaten to death! 
Local Chinese paper Southern Metropolis Daily first reported Sun’s case on 25 April 
both in its print media and its online service. Within hours, this news was spread 
online all across the country, and ‘tears were shed and protests rose all over the 
Internet during one night’ (Lin and Zhao 06/06/2003). Thousands of Internet users 
forwarded the article about Sun’s death to their friends by emails or posted it to 
bulletin boards. Hundreds of thousands of protest messages appeared on popular sites 
such as sina.com and sohu.com. In decrying Sun’s death and denouncing the social 
injustice, Chinese users also shared their own experiences of being abused by
117police. A memorial page to Sun (www.cn.netor.com) was set up and received 
hundreds of thousands of outraged messages within days.
Similar tragedies had been covered by media before. However, the global nature of 
the Internet made this single case known within the Chinese community worldwide. 
Public denunciation of the Communist Party’s practice of deporting migrant workers 
was echoed on bulletin boards based in many different countries. Chinese Internet 
users aired their voice on Beijing-based QGLT, Singapore-based ZBLT, USA-based 
Boxun BBS at www.peacehall.com, and oppositional bulletin boards such as 
Humanity and Human Rights in China (HRIC) based in Hong Kong.
First they came for the Jews / And I did not speak out -  / Because I was not a Jew. / Then 
they came for the communists / And I did not speak out -  / Because I was not a 
communist. / Then they came for the trade unionists / And I did not speak out -  / Because
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I was not a trade unionist. / Then they came for me -  / And there was no one left to speak 
out for me. --Pastor Martin Niemoller, Berlin (1939)
The translation of the above poem has been posted across Chinese Internet bulletin 
boards, to call for public unification in fighting against inequality, discrimination, and 
abuse of human rights. By spreading this poem on bulletin boards, Chinese users are 
passing a message to each other: if you are not speaking out for Sun Zhigang, you 
might end up as the next victim of social injustice.
Within QGLT, public discussion gradually went beyond the outrage and raised
questions challenging the system: How can the public supervise the police if the
police failed to perform their duties legally? The Temporary Residents Registry
System discriminates against the rural population and shows no respect to humanity,
but why is it still in existence?138 On 20 May 2003, a special channel ‘the death of
Sun Zhigang - public opinion - legal problems concerning the custody practice’ was
set up in QGLT. Later it changed its name to ‘The death of Sun Zhigang questioning
the Custody and Repatriation system’, which indicates that online public opinion
1 ^ 0shifted its focus from the media event to the relevant legal system . On 6 June, 
Professor He Weifang from Peking University hosted an online panel meeting with 
QGLT users140. As a distinguished legal scholar in China, Professor He requested a 
revision of the custody and repatriation regulations from the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress. 141 During the two-hour online interaction, 35 
questions were raised. Comments on the custody system, the media’s responsibilities, 
and the legal procedures for revising the administrative regulations against the 
Constitution were fervently discussed among users:
The aim of legislation is to limit the power of the state, because the power of the state 
has its intrinsic nature o f being invasive. If we failed in limiting the state power, the civil 
rights will be at danger. Sun’s Case is a new proof. (Laoxin 06/06/2003 author’s 
translation)
The weakness in legal education in China is: we are never told the civil rights of 
citizens!!! (Zhenna zhuce ayiyou 06/06/2003 author’s translation)
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In China’s Constitution, there are articles protecting citizen’s lives, properties and 
freedom. [...] But various administrative regulations deprive our civil rights entitled by 
the Constitution. Meanwhile, the administration of justice in China is not independent, 
which leads to incidents of civil rights invasion in the real life. This is particularly 
obvious in [administrations’] invasion of public rights... (He Weifang 06/06/2003 
author’s translation)
On 9 June, it was announced that 18 police officers involved in Sun’s death were 
sentenced. In September 2003, the migrant detention centres in China changed into 
‘voluntary service centres’, and ‘a revised administrative regulation allows any 
homeless person the right to refuse help from the government.’142
Politics ‘from below’ is how the domains of social movements are sometimes 
characterised. Increasingly, innovative uses of communication and information 
technologies are seen as essential to this politics (Calabrese 2000: 66).
During the online protests over the Sun case, a strong sense of public awareness of 
civil rights could be detected from online postings. QGLT users also demonstrated an 
eagerness to question the social injustice in policy-making through rational critical 
public debate. Thank to the ‘empowering’ and ‘emancipatory’ digital technologies, 
Internet bulletin boards nurture a sense of political equality among Chinese users, 
which is central to the deliberative ideal.
5. E-organising
China has seen a continuous growth of grassroots interest groups originated from 
bulletin boards. Environmentalists, nationalists, animal rights groups, gay rights 
groups, and professionals such as journalists or lawyers start to find their peers in 
online communities and co-ordinate activities of common interest. The group bond 
formed online quite often, if not always, extends into the offline world. The potential 
of mobilising the public makes bulletin boards a new terrain for civic participation
235
and the Internet a type o f  ‘tactical m edia’ in political organising.
‘Tactical media’, as David Garcia and Geert Lovink (1997) explain, have a do-it- 
yourself nature which makes them accessible to almost any groups and individuals:
Tactical Media are what happens when the cheap ‘do it yourself media, made possible 
by the revolution in consumer electronics and expanded forms o f distribution (from 
public access cable to the Internet) are exploited by groups and individuals who feel 
aggrieved by or excluded from the wider culture. Tactical media do not just report 
events, as they are never impartial they always participate and it is this that more than 
anything separates them from mainstream media. (Available at: 
http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9705/msgQ0096.html. accessed:
16/08/2003)
QGLT user Gordon* is an Internet cafe owner in Shenzhen, southern China. Since the 
Communist Party’s control over the free flow of online information usually starts by 
closing down Internet cafes, private business owners encounter great difficulties and 
risks. Governmental institutions such as police have the right to come and inspect 
their business, and some corrupt officials use this power to blackmail the Internet cafe 
owners by threatening to close down their business. From March 2004, Gordon 
started posting articles questioning the Administrative Regulations Over the Internet 
Access Service Business (the Regulations) which is notorious for blocking online 
information, closing down ISPs and Internet cafes, and triggering corruption. During 
the first 6 months of writing, Gordon was contacted by Internet cafe owners from all 
parts of the country. A loose organisation, the National Internet Cafe Owners League, 
was set up in the summer of 2004. Keeping contact with each other in cyberspace, this 
League launched its first nationwide non-violent action in July 2004. They sent a 
petition letter with collective signature to the National People’s Congress asking for 
reviewing the Regulations and ‘protecting’ their ‘Constitutional rights’ to run legal 
business.
Alongside the grassroots organisations such as the National Internet Cafe Owners
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League, NGOs in China have also actively explored the Internet bulletin boards in 
pursuing public interest and co-operating with other international organisations. 
According to the latest statistics, the number of NGOs in China reached 283,000 up to 
April 2005 143 . Non-government environmental protection organisations have 
encountered comparatively less restraint from the Communist Party than other social 
groups. Well-established environmental NGOs like the Friends of Nature 
(www.fon.org.cn/) and the Green Earth Volunteers (www.chinagev.org) all employ the 
Internet to network their members and promote environmental protection education. 
Members from these environmental NGOs learn from the bulletin boards about 
coming events such as tree planting, debate about better environmental schemes, or 
even participate in the governmental audition on controversial civil engineering 
projects.
One of the most significant steps in the Chinese environmental NGOs’ civil 
participation was their efforts to stop the Yunnan provincial government from building 
13 hydro-electricity dams on Nujiang River, known as Nujiang Action. Nujiang 
(Upper Salween) River, running through the Three Parallel Rivers Basin world 
heritage area in Southwest China, is ‘one of last free-flowing international rivers in 
Asia’144. The proposed dam project will cause irreversible damage to the endangered 
flora and fauna in the area, at least 50,000 local people would need to be relocated, 
and will also affect the lifestyle of those who live along the lower Salween in 
Thailand and Myanmar. When Wang Yongchen, the founder of the Green Earth 
Volunteers and also a journalist with the national radio, learned of the hydro­
electricity dam project in August 2003, she started a campaign against it. Chinese 
environmentalists have networked and explored all media, including the Internet to 
campaign against the Nujiang project since then. They recruited international support 
from more than 60 countries in November 2003 when the Second International 
Meeting of Dam-Affected People and Their Allies was held in Thailand. In a 
collective movement, a petition letter was sent to UNESCO requesting its intervention
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on the issue. In the following February, the Chinese government announced that the 
hydropower project on Nujiang River had been postponed after UNESCO expressed 
‘grave concern’ over the dam project145. This has been acclaimed by the national news 
agency Xinhua as ‘the first time that NGOs in China changed plans made by a local 
government’146.
Robert Hassan (2004:135) argues that ‘the forms of struggle will have to change’ in 
the digital age when the relationship among citizens, space and technology changes. 
Chinese NGOs’ Nujiang Action proved that coordination among Chinese and 
international environmentalists enhanced the civil participation within China, and had 
a positive influence on the outcome of policy making. ‘If not for NGOs involvement, 
the hydro-electricity dams would have been built in 2003’, Wang said. She pointed 
out Nujiang Action could be a step towards democracy in China:
Chinese NGOs attached much importance to the procedural justice and public 
participation in their environmental protection campaigns. [...] I would say, 
environmental protection could be regarded as the breakthrough in the democratisation 
process in China. In protecting Nujiang River, we call for the protection of the local 
people’s rights as well. (Interview with Wang 09/04/2005)
She also pointed out the importance of communication in the Nujiang Action:
We also became more aware o f the important networking role o f media, especially, the 
Internet in coordinating our action. A Chinese-English website Our Attachment to 
Nujiang River (www.nuiiang-river.neo.cn) was set up in March 2004 to arouse public 
awareness o f ecology protection with an online forum devoted to discussion about river 
reservation and ecology protection. We also plan to hire a part-time professional to 
monitor the bulletin boards on the Green Earth Volunteers website. (Interview with Wang 
09/04/2005)
‘The public in a democracy should have opportunities [...] to participate directly in 
them, through channels of access’ (McNair 2000: 105). Cross-national Chinese 
dissident associations also extended their activities into cyberspace. Human rights 
associations such as Human Rights in China (www.hrichina.org ) focuses on current
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human rights abuse cases in Greater China; a ‘Virtual Democracy Wall’ 
(http://books.dreambook.com/read/tiananmen.html) set up in cyberspace to 
commemorate the 1989 pro-democracy movement by international Chinese activists; 
Tibet Net (www.xizang-zhive.org) aims to promote Tibetan independence; and the 
religious Falun Dafa forum (www.creader.org/cgi-bin/falun.cgi ) has been used to 
preach its religion and draw attention to the Communist Party’s prosecution o f  Falun 
Dafa practices in China. Though these online organisations have different goals, John 
Bray noticed that both in the PRC and abroad, Chinese dissidents groups have ‘begun 
to make common cause’ with each other by cross-posting articles and offers links to 
each other on their websites (2004:169).
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6. Limitation of the Virtual Public Sphere in Greater China
Construction of the virtual public sphere in Greater China is still hampered by a 
variety of obstacles. The ‘Golden Shield’147 project launched in 2000 has banned most 
oppositional overseas sites (including traditional media sites) from public access 
within China. Before they can appear on mainland China-based bulletin boards, 
dissident voices face strict online monitoring from the government and moderation 
from the ICPs. In the meantime, commodification of the public sphere is also taking 
place at an international level. Multinational media corporations have joined the 
authoritarian government in quenching dissident opinion online. Non-progressive 
voices such as those advancing extreme nationalism are spreading within the virtual 
public sphere in Great China, and undermining the embryonic rational critical public 
debate.
6.1 Nationalism
Online public opinion is under the threat of being manipulated by the authorities. 
QGLT user Dave* says his experience shows that when online public opinion 
coincides with the Communist Party’s interest, the government usually use public 
opinion to justify their course. However when online public opinion goes against the 
Party’s interest, public opinion will be silenced by the Party in cyberspace. One 
example is the Chinese government’s tolerance towards nationalist rhetoric online. 
The Chinese public has turned to bulletin boards to vent their nationalist anger over 
the Japanese government’s denial of the Nanjing Massacre and Japanese top officials’ 
annual visit to the Yasukuni shrine commemorating the WWII War criminals. The 
Chinese League of Resisting Japanese Commodities and other civil organisations 
posted their notices on the most popular Chinese sites, and called on all Chinese to 
join the action by ‘never buying Japanese commodities and spreading this notification 
on all bulletin boards’.148 In August and September 2004, several distributions of anti-
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Japanese commodity leaflets were organised in Shenzhen, Hong Kong and other cities. 
Details of actions were communicated mainly through bulletin boards.149 Apart from 
the civil activities such as the call for a boycott of Japanese commodities, online 
nationalist discourse can go beyond rationality, and turn into hostility against Japan 
and jingoism over unification with Taiwan. Hughes thus claims that the Communist 
Party has been using information communication technologies to ‘mobilize 
nationalism to legitimate its own claim to power’ (2002: 218).
Extreme anti-Japan postings such as ‘we have a wolf as our neighbour! We can’t feed 
it with our own blood!’150 become the mottos for nationalist bulletin boards. Any 
current issue regarding the clash of economic interests or cultural values between the 
two countries can trigger a new wave of hatred between the two peoples. The Asia 
Cup Final in 2004 was contested between the Chinese and Japanese teams. When a 
Japanese footballer scored with his hand, which proved to be the winning goal, this 
sports event developed into a diplomatic issue. Anti-Japan posts suddenly flooded all 
bulletin boards, including the official QGLT:
Keep Japanese’ hands off our high-speed railway between Beijing and Shanghai... (Zheli 
Shimian Maifu 08/08/2004 author’s translation)
Here I post several photos o f Japanese Army’s atrocities [during the WWII]. Those who 
cheer for the Japanese team need to have a look... (Bushi Wo Shuode 08/08/2004 
author’s translation)
Nationalist fervour can also be detected from online discussion about the Taiwan issue. 
Unification with Taiwan is one of the never-failing themes within QGLT. Chinese 
nationalists believe in using military power for the unification along the Taiwan Strait, 
and display an aggressive attitude towards those supporting Taiwan’s independence.
Nationalist fervour can often flare up among users and thwart the rational critical 
political debate. The different opinions of nationalists have been labelled as ‘betrayal’. 
Users who post pro-Japan or pro-USA opinions are called ‘running dogs’ and ‘boot-
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lickers’ of foreign powers, and even receive threatening messages, virtual stalking and 
hacking.
As discussed before, nationalist fervour has been a major trigger for online flaming 
within QGLT and has turned cyberspace into a rude and lawless battlefield. Extreme 
nationalism online impairs ‘people’s public use of their reason’ (Habermas 1989: 28) 
in deliberation and, as Christopher Hughes (2002) argues, helps to legitimate the 
Communist Party’s claim to power. Though the use of ICTs in the Greater China 
public sphere can potentially solve regional conflicts, extreme nationalism online 
might in fact ‘destabilise foreign relations’ in the Asia Pacific region (Hughes, C. 
2002:218).
6.2 The ‘Great Firewall of China’ and Global Capitalism
I have already discussed in the previous chapter the detailed measures the Chinese 
government has adopted to control online public opinion. The Chinese government 
has explored the information communication technologies for the country’s economic 
development but in the meantime, it is fully aware of the Internet’s potential for 
subversion, and tries to contain what it regards as the malign influence of the Internet 
(Bray 2004:170). As a result China has become one of the countries witnessing the 
fastest Internet growth, yet also has the strictest control over the Internet at the same 
time.
The Chinese government’s Golden Shield Project, widely known as the ‘Great 
Firewall of China’ to the rest of the world, is the ‘most sophisticated and extensive in 
the world’ according to a report by the Harvard Law School scholars (Zittrain, J. and 
Edelman, B. 2003b). This filtering system shields out dissident server IPs, domain 
names and keywords so that the import of Internet content is ‘sanitised’ before it 
reaches the Chinese users. A recent report from Reporters Without Borders presents
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China and another 14 countries as ‘enemies of the Internet’ who ‘crack down hardest 
on the Internet, censoring independent news sites and opposition publication, 
monitoring the Web to stifle dissident voices, and harassing, intimidating and 
sometimes imprisoning Internet users and bloggers who deviate from the regime’s 
official line’ (Reporters Without borders 17/11/2005151).
As overseas Chinese dissident sites are banned in China, dissident opinion has to find 
its way, sometimes under disguise, to reach the bulletin boards within the Communist 
regime. For example, one QGLT overseas user used ‘Liu si’ Willow branch) 
when he referred to ‘Liu si’ (7\ PS Chinese short form for the 1989 Tiananmen 
crackdown). Though this strategy of using different Chinese characters is common 
among users to dodge the filtering system (see Chapter 7), the depth of the original 
posting is usually largely sacrificed.
The opening up policy in China invited foreign multinational media corporations such 
as News Corporation and Disney to invest. The emerging public sphere in Greater 
China faces the risk of degradation, and cross-national media tycoons and Internet 
companies have been criticised for ‘agreeing to China’s strict rules governing the 
Internet, which Communist Party leaders fear could be a tool to spread dissent’152. 
Microsoft was criticised in June 2005 for censoring Chinese bloggings. Yahoo Hong 
Kong has been accused of supplying information to the Chinese government, which 
led to the jailing of a journalist153.
The development of the Internet suggests that it is quickly turning toward the 
intensified commercialisation model that has characterised the traditional media 
(Patekis 2000). For that reason, ‘digital capitalism’ which has strengthened the present 
power domination (Schiller, D. 2000: 209) can pose a serious danger to electronic 
deliberation. Thus, there is great urgency to develop a public sphere at the 
international level (Gamham 1995 [1986]:251).
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7. Conclusion
Online discussion facilitated by the CMC is bringing Chinese people across the world 
closer together to share information, political discussion, and coordinate action. At 
this early stage, one has to admit that the virtual public sphere in Greater China is 
more a conceptual development than a reality. It will take some time to predict 
whether this global virtual public sphere will vanish or flourish.
In this chapter, I have discussed factors that might contribute to the decline of this 
global Chinese public sphere. Extreme nationalism or cross-national jingoism has 
been displayed on QGLT and other Chinese bulletin boards and might trigger 
xenophobia among the Chinese community worldwide. Online surveillance from the 
Chinese government, such as a blockade of online traffic, has seen administrative 
intervention into the rational critical public discussion across borders. The prevalence 
of global capitalism also poses a looming danger to the new public sphere, which 
might eventually delay the fulfilment of deliberative democracy in cyberspace.
However, in spite of all these limitations, with the worldwide flow of information and 
culture, globalisation has generated a kind of social bonding (Beck 2000). The 
Chinese diaspora’s participation in Mainland-based bulletin boards has created a 
spiritual bonding, which might contribute to solving problems like environmental 
crisis or human rights abuse at the global level. A virtual civil society mediated 
through Internet bulletin boards in Greater China has a positive influence on the 
democratisation in the Mainland China. To be more specific, the contribution of 
Internet bulletin boards to the construction of a virtual public sphere in Greater China 
lies in the following aspects:
Firstly, overseas Chinese participation in the global rational critical discussion over
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China-related current issues is breaking down the Communist Party’s strict control 
over press freedom. The Internet bulletin boards have been used to ‘upload’ grassroots 
opinion at an international level and have a revolutionary implication of setting a non- 
ofificial political agenda in the mainland.
Secondly, QGLT and other Internet bulletin boards are regarded by users as venues for 
exchanging ideas and contesting viewpoints. Online discussion based on equality 
promotes a gradual shift from the media’s function as the Party’s ‘mouthpiece’ to a 
public forum where rationality in political debate will pave the way for deliberation.
Thirdly, a virtual-real interactive community has brought about an alternative to 
peaceful protest that is still lacking in the real political life in Mainland China. The 
public power demonstrated over Internet media events (see chapter four) such as the 
Sun Zhigang Case constructed a contesting public power in the virtual sphere, which 
has a great impact on the relationship between the state and the civil society in the 
Mainland.
Finally, Internet bulletin boards have been used to organise Chinese individuals across 
geopolitical bounders. Cyberactivism is demonstrated in the active exploration of 
bulletin boards by social movements groups, research bodies, NGOs, and so on across 
the geopolitical region of China, which might eventually reshape the political culture 
in the Mainland.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
By enlarging the scale of civic participation, advancing alternative public discourses, 
and tackling problems at a global level, Internet bulletin boards can construct an 
alternative public sphere representing divergent political views. Focusing on the 
QGLT community from www.people.com.cn. this PhD project explores whether 
Internet bulletin boards contribute to the construction of the public sphere in post- 
Communist China. Based on an approach of production, reception, and content 
studies, I examined the gate-keeping process within QGLT, the autonomy of users, 
online postings during the SARS crisis, and the global nature of the bulletin boards. 
Here I draw the following conclusions:
Internet bulletin boards have been used as an alternative media form in 
constructing alternative, oppositional and marginal public discourses in post- 
Communist China;
Though still elite in nature, the virtual public sphere is characterised by 
inclusiveness in participation and multiplicity in composition, which 
represents divergent political views offline;
By fostering antagonistic public opinion, the virtual public sphere has the 
potential to regulate agenda-setting and check on government policy-making 
in offline life;
- The virtual public sphere is constructed beyond national boundaries. A trans­
national Chinese public sphere is formed by deliberating over Chinese-related 
issues at a global level;
The Internet public sphere faces surveillance from the government and 
obstacles in achieving rational debate. Under the joint forces of 
commercialisation, democratisation, and globalisation, the virtual public 
sphere in China sees the forces of degradation and democratisation in tension
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with one another.
It has to be acknowledged that the use of the Internet in constructing the public sphere 
in China faces many constraints. The study of QGLT shows that bulletin boards are 
still far from being ‘online dissident avenues’ without administrative surveillance or 
self-censorship. The analysis of QGLT postings also shows that the nature of Internet 
bulletin boards is still quite elitist. The online debate is dominated by well-educated 
and propertied intellectuals who are already politically active in the offline world. In 
addition, the lack of a democratic ethos in the online environment weakens the 
rational critical public debate. Furthermore, the commercialisation of the Chinese 
media industry imposes a danger of the commodification of public interest which can 
undermine and degrade the public sphere in formation.
However, it is fair to say that the Internet allows for the growth of public engagement 
in online debates about domestic and international current issues that are otherwise 
banned from public discussion. In this regard, the Internet does facilitate short and 
long-term active civic engagement. Non-localized and dialogic forms of 
communication among users has created an alternative form of publicity outside the 
government-controlled media’s agenda, and could potentially provide a check on the 
authoritarian government’s policy-making. By providing real-time worldwide 
communication, the Internet is well established as a global medium coordinating non­
organised Chinese citizens worldwide and facilitating the expression of public opinion. 
The Internet opens up opportunities for Chinese, both inside and outside of China, in 
the realms of informal political mobilisation, to tackle issues concerning the public 
interest. Thus, under non-democratic social circumstances such as in China, the 
Internet provides an emancipatory technological structure for public deliberation, 
which makes it a more central factor in constructing and consolidating the public 
sphere than it does in a democratic society.
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1. Limitations of the Virtual Public Sphere
Though the Internet is viewed as an emerging public sphere, it is a problematic virtual 
space filled with conflicts and contradictions. Firstly, the Internet is vulnerable to 
extremist and non-progressive discourse such as aggressive Nationalist fervour within 
QGLT. The lack of democratic control procedures online can create a ‘mediated 
anarchism’ and undermine digital deliberation. Secondly, the Internet bulletin boards 
in China are not free from administrative surveillance and self-censorship. On the 
contrary, technology can even be used to facilitate online censorship and control. 
Furthermore, the Internet will not necessarily bridge the gap between the information- 
rich and the information-poor. The elitist nature of Internet bulletin boards makes 
online discussion more of an advantage to those who already have specialised 
knowledge of empowerment offline and parity of political participation might even be 
undermined by the digital divide. Finally, the trend of commercialisation and 
globalisation in the Chinese telecommunications industry might combine the interest 
of those politically powerful with that of economically powerful, which exposes the 
online public sphere to the danger of degradation and disintegration.
1.1 The Aggressive Nationalism in the Virtual Public Sphere
Despite the deliberative potential of the Internet, the online virtual public sphere is not 
always democratic in its nature. Online public discussion on bulletin boards can 
degrade into a mediated chaos when non-progressive discourses such as extreme 
nationalist and xenophobic voices lead the public debate off the rational track.
One distinct feature of the QGLT community is the aggressive nationalism or 
jingoism displayed in its users’ postings. This extremist rhetoric diverts public 
attention from reasoned discussion and encourages hatred and xenophobia. The ease 
of joining and withdrawing on the bulletin boards augment the possibility of hatred
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flaring up towards Japan and the USA, and increasing the diplomatic tension with 
Taiwan. Because of the anonymity and fluidity associated with online identities, it is 
even difficult to estimate the proportion of such non-progressive discourses.
The rumours about SARS as a biochemical attack from the USA in 2003 triggered 
irrational xenophobia against the USA within QGLT. This proved that bulletin boards 
can be vulnerable to the amplification of offline non-rational rhetoric through 
collective online activities. Rather than exposing and criticising contemporary social 
evils within China, some QGLT users explore cyberspace to denounce the imagined 
‘injustice’ from an outsider ‘enemy’, and ‘justify’ it with a variety of disinformation. 
The aggressive nationalism presented within QGLT diverts public attention from 
problems concerning public interest within the country (such as the privatisation of 
health care) and unites minds in the name of safeguarding the nation’s sovereignty, 
which, to a certain extent, serves the Communist Party’s dominance.
1.2 Administrative Surveillance, Newsroom Censorship, and Self-Censorship
QGLT, along with other Internet bulletin boards in China, is under an omnipresent 
censorship from the Communist Party. Administrative surveillance, newsroom 
censorship, and self-censorship are all gradually transforming QGLT from a 
previously ‘online dissident avenue’ into an affiliate of the giant Chinese bureaucratic 
system.
QGLT is subject to regulations from the Ministry of Information Industry, the Party’s 
Propaganda Department, the State Council Information Office, and other government 
organisations such as the Public Information Administration Division of Beijing 
Municipal Government. Editorial autonomy is limited by administrative surveillance. 
By punishing those who have the courage to voice antagonistic opinion online, the 
Communist Party reins in online public speech and silences dissidents.
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The daily gate-keeping routine for QGLT moderators involves agenda-setting for 
online discussion, moderating bulletin boards and managing users. By highlighting 
certain news for topical discussion while downplaying others, agenda-setting within 
newsroom can guide public attention away from views that might challenge the status 
quo. This practice is further guaranteed by the practice of moderating bulletin boards 
which involves encouraging public discussion on certain topics, banning discussion 
on others, and punishing the ‘offenders’ who venture to break the editorial regulations. 
Managing users involves the similar procedure of censoring users’ pennames which is 
an indicator of their politically constructed online identity. Through such gate-keeping 
practices, QGLT moderators, playing a similar role to traditional journalists, mediate 
people’s knowledge of the world by prioritising certain meaning-making in their daily 
practice.
Self-censorship works in a long-term and covert way compared with the short-term 
and overt censorship from both government and media. As a ‘proactive’ control 
measure from the grassroots, self-censorship encourages peer censoring and works 
indirectly to promote state authority. Self-censorship muzzles public voices online, 
impairs the independent role of Internet media, and curbs the democratic potential of 
the Internet.
Online surveillance measures adopted in China prove that in spite of the 
democratising drive, technology can also be used to facilitate online censorship and 
control. The Chinese government actively explores the technological potential of the 
Internet in retaining its authority. On the one hand, it actively promotes regime- 
sponsored web programs and e-govemment services; on the other hand, it uses 
technological means such as the Internet Filtering Software Products to ban the online 
appearance of black-listed words (most of which are politically sensitive). In this 
sense, information technology shows again it is intrinsically neutral in its nature and 
can be used for both good and evil purpose. It is the social exploration of technology
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that decides whether it is autocratic or democratic.
1.3 Elitism in the Virtual Public Sphere
The elitism associated with the Internet in China might weaken the parity in online 
political participation, which undermines the basis for public deliberation. 
Observation of QGLT reveals that the elitist nature of the Internet privileges the 
information rich and socially active groups in offline life. Underprivileged groups in 
economic terms and political terms tend to have limited access to the Internet.
The study of QGLT users demonstrates that Internet bulletin boards are firmly 
established among some classes of Chinese society, but remain out of the reach of the 
majority of the population. In general QGLT users are gathered in cities and socially 
embedded among well-educated intellectuals. Compared with the majority of the 
population, these online intellectuals are more inclined to accept humanist ideas such 
as equality, freedom, and justice. However, ‘the intellectual is living proof that all 
individuals are not equal’ (Kellner 1995). The intellectuals presented on QGLT 
bulletin boards, though they are not necessarily propertied, are privileged compared to 
the subordinate classes who have not received adequate education. The intellectual 
skills give them better abilities than their fellow Chinese to access, interpret, adapt, 
and create knowledge of empowerment.
Hence, the digital divide in China does not only manifest itself in the physical 
availability of computers networks, but also in people’s intellectual ability to use and 
create knowledge using information and communication technologies. This is not 
denying the fact that a significant proportion of the whole population in China are 
excluded from the digital deliberation because of their lack of financial means. 
Nonetheless, there is a strong concern that a large part of China’s Internet population 
lacks social capital and web literacy which can help them actively explore the 
potential of the Internet for meaningful social practices.
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The Internet bulletin boards are still selective media. The Internet’s potential for 
expanding civic participation and motivating the socially underprivileged and 
politically latent has been under-explored in China. The Internet is used more to 
reflect the existing power relationship and favour the elites in the offline life. The 
divide between the information-rich and the information-poor in the mass media era 
cannot necessarily be bridged by digitalisation.
1.4 The Looming Danger of Degradation of the Public Sphere
With economic reform quickening its pace, and the opening-up of the country’s 
markets to foreign capital, China is witnessing commercialisation in its 
telecommunication industry and media field. As a consequence, the current virtual 
public sphere is now exposed to the danger of decline and disintegration.
The commodification of the Internet bulletin boards is dictated by the political 
economy of the Internet. The digital media environment in China disadvantages 
citizen-based networking and it favours corporately organised communication from 
commercial Internet portals and the state-subsidised media online section.
Multi-national capital bought up the first generation of Chinese Internet portals such 
as sina.com and sohu.com in the late 1990s. In the post-Intemet bubble era, 
commercial Chinese portals were keen to gain profit from their investment and the 
popularisation of entertainment became the major business model. International 
corporations such as Yahoo and Google are also eager to share the booming market 
economy in China. Self-censorship over online content is a price these commercial 
Internet companies are prepared to pay for the privilege of exploiting the Chinese 
market. Official Internet media such as www.people.com.cn are partly subsidised by 
the government but fully under the Party’s surveillance of its online content.
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The commercialisation of the macro media environment and the low level of web 
literacy among the general public do appear in topical discussions on the bulletin 
boards. On most commercial Internet portals, consumerism and sensationalism are 
reflected in topical discussion about computer games, fashion, lifestyle, (soft)- 
pomography, horoscope, celebrities, etc. Even on QGLT, some users improperly use 
the bulletin boards as their own free advertisement boards. A false feeling of 
‘empowerment’ in expressing ‘opinion’ online (though it is rarely critical political 
opinion) creates an illusion of freedom in expression, which weakens the political 
significance of meaningful civic discourse and results in political apathy.
Commodification imposes a serious danger of deteriorating the virtual public sphere 
that is currently under construction. The majority of the Chinese population, 
pigeonholed into a world market by both domestic and international capitalists, have 
the potential of losing their power of deliberation under the flooding of entertainment 
and disinformation online.
2. The Internet in Constructing the Public Sphere in China
In spite of all the restraints, Internet bulletin boards allow Chinese citizens to 
construct an alternative public discourse as an expression of direct political 
participation, which potentially inhibits the state’s hegemonic control over ideology.
The Internet, as the alternative public sphere, is firstly characterised by multiple tiers 
in its composition. Chinese from various social classes can construct their identity as 
politically activated citizens online. Divergent political standpoints, ideological 
preferences, and class interests are reflected within QGLT community.
Secondly, the SARS crisis proved that in a non-liberal society where other democratic 
devices such as parliamentary debate are not obtainable, the bulletin boards are used 
as public forums for the expression of divergent grassroots voices. Public opinion
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formed online can be integrated into informal political procedure and affect policy­
making.
Thirdly, as a novelty grassroots media form, the Internet provides a potential for 
citizen-based networks; a new concept in Chinese political life. Internet bulletin 
boards can circumvent the hierarchy and bureaucracy in offline life, and provide an 
ideal venue for cyberactivists to coordinate civic activities.
Furthermore, by ‘eliminating’ the boundaries in an offline context, the Internet helps 
to build a virtual Chinese public sphere based on shared language and culture. Current 
issues relating to China are brought to global attention along with calls for 
international collaboration to solve problems.
2.1 Multiple Tiers in the Virtual Public Sphere
The Internet consolidates and expands the alternative public sphere offline by 
reflecting the complexity of political beliefs, ideological preferences and class 
interests in offline political contexts. The Internet amplifies the divergent public 
grassroots voices which have previously been neglected by the mainstream media. All 
of this can potentially attenuate the Party’s ideological hegemony in China.
In general, QGLT users’ identity is constructed in such a way that their offline 
suppressed political selves are expressed online. A strong sense of civic participation, 
which is socially suppressed in offline life in China, can be detected from QGLT 
users’ pennames, signature files, and the political clusters formed online. Though it is 
well noted that the economic, political, and cultural biases in which the culture of 
cyberspace is embedded prefer those possessing social capitals, the revolutionary 
potential of the Internet in cultivating a different environment for civic participation 
should not be underestimated. QGLT users come from different social strata, different 
incomes and education levels. Suppressed social groups, such as female users, show
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their capacity to express political opinions.
At the same time, the construction of an online political identity is closely connected 
to offline social realities. Signs were carefully chosen by QGLT users for their 
political connotations in demonstrating individuals’ ideological preference. In their 
pennames and signature files, QGLT users demonstrated patriotism and nationalism 
which, to a certain extent, fitted into the Communist Party’s discourse. However, 
manifestations of humanism - like concerns over corruption, injustice, and inequality - 
are also aired. Furthermore, a public longing for freedom and democracy, which had 
not been publicly advocated before and was regarded as challenging the authoritarian 
administration, are also displayed within QGLT users’ profiles.
QGLT users’ political viewpoints are categorised into five clusters in this research: 
Far Left (Maoist), Neo-Left, Right (Liberalism and centre-left), Far right (Extreme 
Liberalism), Centralism (a mixture of via media and no-attitude). The differentiation 
in ideological preference, shown in users’ postings and interactions, is rooted in the 
offline political contexts and reflects the divergent political standpoints in 
contemporary China. Difference in political belief triggers flaming among QGLT 
users, which resembles the offline conflicts between political camps. Multiple 
identities are found among QGLT users in such circumstances. Transforming a 
singular physical being into multiple identities, users can show their respective 
political attitudes in different topical discussions. Multiple identities are also an 
escape when disagreement in political debates leads to flaming.
The public sphere in offline life in China emerged from the anti-feudalism and anti­
colonisation struggle and evolved into the digital age. It has never existed in a 
singular comprehensive form. In contemporary China, the rising middle-class liberal 
intellectuals play a key role in fighting for civil rights. Intellectuals have been rising 
since the economic reform in the late 1970s, and their identities are rooted in the 
proletariat class. Meanwhile, subordinated social groups such as the working class,
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women, ethnic minorities, and their representatives, also construct discourses to 
reflect their identities and interests. The virtual public sphere is characterised by 
competing publics and consists of conflicts and contesting meanings. Different 
interest groups, such as environmental protection NGOs, human rights groups, and 
trade-union grassroots organisations, are fashioning their own ways into public 
discussion online. The Internet has been used as a tool for enlightenment, petition, 
protest, and self-organising. The public online moved from strategies of ‘giving a 
voice to the voiceless’ (Hamelink 1995:141) to strategies by which people speak for 
themselves through ‘people’s media’ (Hamelink 1995:146; Downing, J. et al. 2001: 
206). Voices ‘loud, coarse, and [...] abrasive’ (Ryan 1992:286), banished from the 
official public sphere, have taken different forms to make themselves heard.
By enhancing the emancipatory potential of the competing publics in the virtual 
public sphere, Internet bulletin boards can dismantle the symbolic environment 
created by the state’s absolute control of the communication process. When exposed 
to such divergent political voices, citizens are less likely to accept the state’s political 
propaganda as legitimate. This poses a challenge to the authoritarian regime.
2.2 Antagonistic Public Online
QGLT SARS postings displayed the growth of a public critique that ventured to touch 
upon a taboo issue that the Communist Party originally prohibited from public 
discussion. When other democratic institutions such as Parliamentary debate are still 
not obtainable in post-Communist China, bulletin boards are used as public forums 
for divergent grassroots voices, which largely expands the scope of public debates and 
enhances the depth of political discussion. Online public opinion developed around 
the SARS crisis showed its potential to challenge, or even check, the authoritarian 
government’s policy-making over public health.
The Internet offered an incomparable autonomy which enabled users to actively select,
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gate-keep, and prioritise information during the SARS crisis. Grassroots voices broke 
the collective silence in the mainstream media on the SARS issue and this evolved 
into online public debate. SARS postings replaced the public health information void 
in the mainstream media with non-official sources and grassroots interpretation of 
official information. Being a ‘time-space compression’ (Harvey, D. 1989) 
technological device, the Internet changes the spatiality of information dissemination 
and thus changes the way that ‘we represent the world to ourselves’ (Harvey, D. 1989: 
240). Users were exposed to media narratives constructed by domestic official media, 
overseas Chinese media, foreign language media, personal testimonial reports and so 
forth. The breaking down of official media hegemony helped the public to be aware of 
the SARS explosion, and paved the way for further critical debate.
Paralleling the official discourse of patriotism and morale-boosting, the virtual public 
sphere gives voice to alternative and oppositional political groups that raise concerns 
rarely heard before. Online discussion about SARS raised suggestions on policy 
concerning public health and welfare, criticised the government’s measures to combat 
SARS; and called for press freedom and democracy. The development of the online 
SARS discussion finally pushed the government into taking effective 
countermeasures. Meanwhile, online postings also united the non-localised public in 
the virtual space and bonded them together in a virtual community through the 
sharing of emotion and humour concerning SARS.
Internet bulletin boards in China are used as a substitute for real-life democratic 
institutions such as Parliament or an independent media. Bulletin boards, still the least 
censored media format in China, provide a venue for political discussion among 
ordinary citizens when other public forums are not available.
This is not to deny the fact that the Communist Party practices stringent online 
surveillance. However, the character of information flow on the Internet makes the 
traditional censorship hard to perform. The bulletin boards feature users’ contributions
257
from a variety of sources, including overseas media outlets and testimonial reports 
from users themselves. This variety of sources challenges the hegemonic control of 
information from the traditional media and broadens Chinese users’ awareness of the 
rest of the world. Users can contribute to the bulletin boards from home, their work 
places, Internet cafes, or even post through overseas proxy servers. This makes 
tracking down and punishing of the ‘offenders’ much more difficult. Meanwhile, even 
though major bulletin boards in China are forced to install word-filtering software, 
there are always ways to circumvent this censorship. New words are created among 
users to replace the sensitive words blocked, so that the discussion over taboo issues 
can get through the word filtering system. Most important of all, attempts to control 
online information will divert users to other communication means, thus leading to a 
proliferation of channels and content. Thus, in the limitless cyberspace, the free 
speech frontier can always be exploited (Bryan & Tatam 1999: 161-168).
From the study of QGLT, one can conclude that a public based among urban 
intellectuals is emerging in cyberspace in China. The rising critical public are ‘critical 
and insurgent intellectuals’ (Kellner 1995) who are specialists in critique and 
negotiation. As a collective, they construct their identities as enlightened citizens and 
representatives of the working class and people from lower social strata. By reflecting 
critical and oppositional discourse on the Internet bulletin boards, they devote their 
online activities to putting social issues up for debate and discussion. By raising 
criticism and negating authority, they show the potential of influencing the outcome 
of policy making. Under certain circumstances this online public can directly criticise 
the authorities by linking their debates to social actions triggered by such social issues 
as human rights abuses (as in Sun Zhigang case). However, it is still too early to say if 
this antagonistic public online has the potential to subvert the existing order.
2.3 The Internet Media Event
As a horizontally structured grassroots media form, the Internet connects citizens
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through networking. This feature makes the Internet bulletin boards an ideal venue for 
coordinating civic activities and mobilise activists during ‘Internet media events’ such 
as protests against human rights abuses.
‘Internet media events’ is the term coined in this dissertation to capture the media 
events involving the following elements: a) news stories first reported by Internet 
media -  testimonial reports originating from bulletin boards, chat rooms, newsgroups, 
or online reports from traditional media; b) news stories mostly discussed within 
online communities before they are well known offline; c) news events which firstly 
attract large online audiences before attracting wider public attention offline; d) public 
opinion that originates from online discussion of such news stories triggering social 
unrest or civil action; e) the expression of public opinion exerts pressure on the 
authorities and urges them to tackle such problems; f) during the progress of such 
Internet media events, space and time are conquered by the decentralised social 
structures online.
Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz coin the term ‘media events’ to describe the television 
live broadcasting of spectacular events such as ‘epic contests of politics and sports, 
charismatic missions, and the rites of passage of the great’ (1992:1). The live 
broadcasting of media events has great effect on viewers and public opinion. Through 
their experience of watching (or ‘attending’) media events at the same time, viewers 
develop a ‘shared membership in a national or international community’ (1992:197). 
By stirring up public attention, media events ‘focus public opinion and activate debate 
on a given issue or set of issues’ and ‘may affect public opinion by encouraging or 
inhibiting the expression of preferences, values, or beliefs’ (Dayan and Katz 
1992:199).
‘Internet media events’, to a certain extent, are ‘media events’ in mass media age 
extended in cyberspace. Internet media events have been a unique media phenomenon 
in China where the mainstream media still lack the autonomy to expose social
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inequality and injustice. Bulletin boards and other Internet facilities are crucial in 
circulating news information and mobilising public opinion during events such as the 
SARS crisis and the Sun Zhigang Case. Online public opinion formed during such 
events demonstrates Chinese users’ consciousness in exercising their civil rights and 
engaging in policy making. The anonymity associated with online identity increases 
the audacity of users under an authoritarian government. The shared concerns over 
public health and human rights bond users to co-ordinate which courses of action to 
adopt. In the Sun Zhigang Case, this action turned out to be nationwide online protest, 
which contributed to the abolition of the administrative regulations discriminating 
against migrant populations. In this sense, Internet use in China is not confined to 
mere opinion-formation. Instead, it has the potential of affecting policy-making.
The Internet opens up many opportunities for informal political processes and the 
organisation of social movements. The radical public sphere online expands the 
spectrum of political discussion and alleviates the single event to an administration 
level. As Downing et al. describe, the Internet, when used as a radical medium 
‘expresses] opposition vertically from subordinate quarters directly at the power 
structure and against its behaviour’ and ‘to build support, solidarity, and networking 
laterally against policies or even against the very survival of the power structure’ 
(2001 :xi). These features of the Internet make it a revolutionary medium in a Post- 
Communist country in terms of broadening the sources of communication among 
people, levelling the ground of civic participation, and defying symbolic manipulation 
by the privileged.
‘People’s control’ of the Internet (Castells 2001:165) enables an alternative multi­
tiered public sphere that is antagonistic towards the abuse of people’s will in the 
offline sphere. In this sense, Internet bulletin boards can be compared with other 
radical media forms such as underground literature and press, subversive artwork and 
music in that they augment essential means of mass organisation. It is not a substitute 
for these media, but offers an alternative means for traditional radical media.
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This radical use of Internet bulletin boards is still sporadic in social life and has not 
forged its way into formal legislation. Nevertheless, by amplifying the direct 
participation from organised and non-organised citizens, Internet bulletin boards can 
re-orient the public agenda, having a profound impact on the notion of citizenship and 
political culture in China (cf. Yu, Haiqing 2006).
2.4 The Internet and the Global Chinese Public Sphere
The Internet has the intrinsic nature of being global. By ‘eliminating’ the boundaries 
in the offline context, the Internet helps to build a virtual public sphere for Chinese 
people worldwide based on their shared language and culture. Current affairs, ranging 
from domestic issues to international affairs, are brought to global attention, 
deliberation, and collaboration when searching for solutions.
Findings from the study of QGLT suggest that online communities based in Mainland 
China are constructed beyond the geopolitical boundaries of the nation state. Shared 
language, culture, and concerns can bind Chinese together worldwide. Diasporic 
Chinese actively seek participation within the Mainland-based bulletin boards such as 
QGLT. Diasporic users, as mediators between China and the world, can pass on their 
knowledge and experience of the world to domestic users and ‘upload’ domestic 
issues in China to a global level for deliberation. Civic communication among the 
global Chinese population creates a political interest in Chinese-related issues. From 
the online protest against the anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia in 1998 to the Sun 
Zhigang case in 2003, horizontally connected citizen networks played a significant 
role in distributing information and knowledge to Mainland China, and conversely 
receiving and publicising information from mainland Chinese users. Affinity based on 
same concerns was built up and online actions were coordinated on issues such as 
protecting the environment, fighting against SARS, and safeguarding civil rights 
across the political territory.
261
The global Chinese public sphere has a potentially great influence on the Mainland at 
different levels. International public opinion formed within this communicative civic 
space can pressure the authoritarian government into taking measures to curb 
problems such as human rights abuse. Meanwhile, to the Internet users based in the 
Mainland, actively participating and being exposed to civil debate beyond national 
boundaries has fundamental consequences in their thought processes and mind-set, 
which can help to cultivate the concepts of citizenship and democracy. Finally, being 
exposed to a variety of ideas within this public sphere mediated between the home 
countries and host countries, Chinese diasporic users have an opportunity to ‘exercise 
critical judgement in granting credibility to sources or assessing situations from many 
points of view’ (Downing, J. et. al. 2001: 205). The sense of belonging to a global 
community can help to eradicate barriers between political entities and tackle 
problems at a global level.
The diasporic Chinese virtual public sphere is just one example of how the Internet 
can be used as a powerful medium in a global civil society. The Internet allows 
streams of non-localized and dialogic forms of communication among people so that 
alternative forms of publicity can be formed. The international participation in civic 
dialogue concerning Chinese-related issues demonstrates that public knowledge 
shaped outside of the mainstream media’s framework can develop public opinion. 
This new public opinion can impact on the mainstream media’s agenda and policy­
making worldwide.
This global Chinese public sphere, largely bounded by language and culture, is 
becoming more interactive with other international organisations in facilitating 
transnational civic participation. The global Chinese public sphere in cyberspace can 
circumvent the hierarchal structure for political engagement in offline life and opens 
up a totally new vision of the world for Chinese users.
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3. Concluding Remarks and Suggestions for Further Research
The Chinese government is attempting to reap the economic benefits of the Internet 
while avoiding the ‘pitfalls’ of democratisation. The Communist Party has been 
actively encouraging the application of interests for economic prosperity while it has 
also struggled to rein in online political deliberation. However, this does not mean 
that the Internet is politically irrelevant or futile in terms of digital resistance. Instead, 
freedom of speech in China has expanded significantly and official limits of political 
toleration has been tested, pushed, and re-negotiated since the arrival of the Internet. 
There is little reason to believe that Internet use will trigger a digital revolution or 
political movement in China in the near future. Nevertheless, the Internet plays a far 
more significant role in catalysing socio-political changes than traditional media.
This study also suggests the following areas for further investigation.
A major concern remains in whether online political discussion participants constitute 
‘strong publics’ or ‘weak publics’ (Fraser 1992). In post-Communist China, the 
government body for opinion formation such as the People’s Congress still has yet to 
fully translate public concerns into legislation. On the other hand, synchronous online 
chat-group software encourages rapid exchange rather than rational critical discourse. 
Under such circumstances, it is hard to evaluate to what degree online public opinion 
can be translated into authoritative decisions or supervise the conduct of governments. 
This quest becomes harder to pin down at a global level. Scholars predict that online 
civic participation among Chinese worldwide can influence transnational politics and 
civil society (Yang 2002, 2003). Whether the combined forces of technological 
advances and developments of transnational organisations may empower Chinese 
publics still needs further study.
Another area that remains under-researched is the composition of online publics in 
China and the social capital required for digital deliberation. The wider public domain
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online consists of contesting sub-groups, which may involve marginal social groups 
such as ethnic minorities, gays right advocates, religious groups, etc. The nature of 
such subaltern publics is still largely unknown in terms of the extent and means they 
help to expand the discursive virtual space. Closely related to this is the social capital 
required for digital deliberation. Communicative practice online develops its own 
rules, norms, culture, and netiquette. Attention should be paid as to how access to 
rational critical debate can be increased for subaltern groups -  those who are 
traditionally denied or deprived access. Technology, netiquette, and the type of forum 
management need to be modified to draw out rational critical discourse from online 
interaction (Dahlberg 2001b). These proposed solutions need further exploration to 
maximise the deliberative potential of online political discussion.
This study substantiates the theoretical argument that the rational critical discourse in 
the public sphere will be extended in cyberspace, and verified this argument in a 
computer-mediated communication environment in a non-liberal society. This thesis 
compares existing online discourse in China with a set of requirements of the public 
sphere, and concludes that the democratising rhetoric and practice on the Internet 
bulletin boards constructs deliberative spaces for Chinese people. The Internet may 
undermine deliberation by perpetuating inequalities of access, fragmenting public 
discourse, and accommodating non-progressive rhetoric. However, by enlarging the 
scale of civic participation, advancing alternative and oppositional public discourses, 
and tackling problems at a global level, Internet bulletin boards construct a public 
sphere with divergent political views represented. This alternative public sphere 
online has the potential to free civil society from state control, and cultivates critical 
public opinion that is able to check on an authoritarian government’s policy-making. 
In this sense, online deliberative forums play a more important role in non-liberal 
societies in extending the public sphere than their counterparts in democratic societies.
*To protect my interviewees’ from any possible political interference in their online 
activities, I have replaced some QGLT users’ pennames with common English names.
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1 In Chinese, Qiang can be used as both an adjective and a verb. Thus Qiang Guo can be 
understood as either ‘Strong Nation’ or ‘to strengthen the nation’.
2 For example, The Civic Practices Network http://cpn.ioumalism.wisc.edu/cpn/cpn.html: 
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www.aubum.edu/tann. UK Citizens Online Democracy: http://www.democracv.org.uk/ (cannot be 
opened now); E-democracy national Project: http://www.e-democracv.gov.uk/default.htm: UK 
New Citizen: http://www.uknewcitizen.org/: and BBCi Schools: CitizenX:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/ citizenx/index. shtml.
3 See item ‘Internet forum’ from Wikepedia, the online free encyclopedia at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intemet forum 16/05/2006.
4 ‘China, Egypt join WTO's Information Technology Agreement’, WTO News, 24 April 2003, 
available at: http://www.wto.org/English/news e/news03 e/news china egypt 25apr03 e.htm. 
accessed: 29/04/2006.
5 The Ministry of Information Industry after March 1998.
6 For example, state-controlled media are allowed a low connection fee to use the 
telecommunication resources provided by SOE China Telecom.
7 China Central Television’s site www.cctv.com was launched in December 1996; People’s Daily's 
site www.peopledailv.com.cn was launched in January 1997; Xinhua News Agency's site 
www.xinhua.org was launched in November 1997; China Radio International's site 
www.cri.com.cn (now http://gb.chinabroadcast.cn/) was launched in December 1998; and China 
Daily's site www.chinadailv.com.cn was launched in December 1995.
Set up by the Ministry of Public Security in August 1998.
9 This argument has been developed by various scholars and social activists, see for example, the 
thesis collection in Hughes, C. R. and Wacker, G. (2003) China and the Internet: Politics of the 
Digital Leap forward. RoutledgeCurzon. Thompson, B. (2006) ‘Looking for change in China’, in 
Free Press, No. 151, (March/April). P. 1.
10 One example is China’s three state-sponsored ‘Golden Projects’ which started in March 1993. 
The three ‘Golden Projects’ -  the golden bridge, golden gate and golden card projects- aim to 
build an information infrastructure for economic information networking, online banking, and 
digitalised customs declaration for imports and exports.
11 It was launched by a government-sponsored research institute, the National Research Centre for 
Intelligent Computing Systems, in Beijing.
12 ‘Major Event in China’s Internet Development: 1986-1993’, China Internet Network 
Information Centre, available at: http://www.cnnic.com.cn/html/Dir/2003/10/22/1002.htm.
accessed: 17/02/2006.
13 In terms of Internet use, the CINIC questionnaire allowed multiple choices for Chinese users. 
Therefore, there are overlaps in using web messengers, Internet forums, bulletin boards, 
discussion groups and chat rooms.
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14 Reuters (17/10/2001) ‘China Closes Scribe BBS’, Wired News, available at: 
http://www.wired.eom/news/politics/Q. 1283,47645.OO.html. accessed: 12/04/2003.
15 Rheingold, H. (1993) The Virtual Community (electronic version), available at: 
http://www.rheingold.eom/vc/book/4.html. accessed: 24/08/2006.
16 Interview with Mr. Baishun Mei, Jetta driver in Beijing (01/07/2004).
17 Such as the Chinese government in the SARS case and the UNESCO in Nujiang Action: as 
discussed in Chapter 8.
18 The concept of Greater China emerged in the 1980s and has bome different economical and 
political implications ever since. In this paper, it is used to refer to a cultural sphere that bonds 
together global Chinese with shared culture and language, which roughly includes Mainland 
China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and other major Chinese-speaking communities in 
Southeast Asia, Europe and North America.
19 For example, Cisco helped the Chinese government to design online word filtering software for 
monitoring political online discussion. In January 2006, Google launched its Chinese version 
Google China and agreed to practice self-censorship. Google China as a search engine will 
automatically filter out politically sensitive content that might offend the Chinese government. 
Another example is the Shi Tao Case in 2005. A Yahoo branch in Hong Kong passed on 
information from its discussion groups to the Chinese security ministry, which led to a Chinese 
journalist Shi Tao’s imprisonment in the name of ‘leaking national security information to the 
foreign sources’ (BBC News (07/09/2005) ‘Yahoo “helped jail China writer’”, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/4221538.stm, 21/04/2006.
20 Gurak uses this word to refer to a group quality, i.e. the cultural and moral tone of a community.
21 The full name lis Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion 
Nacional, EZLN). It is an armed revolutionary group based in Ciapas, Mexico, representing the 
indigenous people’s interests. The Zapatista movement came to International attention in 1994 
with its original aim of overthrowing the Mexican government. After a short aremed skirmish, a 
ceasefire between the Mexican government and the EZLN has been observed since January 12 of 
that year. The Zapatista uprising is regarded as the first ‘post-modern’ revolution in that ‘an armed, 
yet non-violent (despite this uprising in the early 1990s) revolutionary group that incorporates 
modem technologies like satellite telephones and the Internet as a way to obtain domestic and 
foreign support’. The EZLN considers itself as part of the worldwide anti-globalisation and anti­
neoliberalism movement (source: Wekipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EZLN).
22 For example, Teledemocracy Action News +Network (www.auburn.edu/tann) launched by Ted 
Becker and Christa Slaton from the University of Alabama in 1995.
23 Wall newspapers are hand-written tabloid news-sheets that express political preferences or 
grievances, and are posted on walls for public reading. Mao Zedong believed the wall newspapers 
cost almost nothing in production, but were simple and accessible to anyone, and therefore should 
be encouraged for their ‘classless’ nature. Wall newspapers started to emerge in the 1950s and 
were most popular during 1960s and 1970s in China. For more discussion on wall newspapers, 
please refer to page 76.
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24 The bourgeois Reformists in this dissertation refer to the bourgeois intellectuals who emerged in 
the late 19th Century China, with Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao as their leaders. The Reformists 
arose when feudal China declined under colonisation from Western powers and Japan. They 
promulgated Western Enlightenment ideas and believed the only way of national salvation was to 
learn advanced science and technology, and political governance from Western countries. The 
Reformists won sympathy from the court especially from the emperor Guangxu himself. With 
backing from the Emperor, a reform was launched on 11 June 1898 involving reforms in the 
political, economic, military, educational aspects. The Reform failed when the Royal Dowager 
Cixi launched a coup on 21 September 1898 and detained the Emperor. Kang and Liang fled 
China and six other main Reformist leaders were capitulated. After the failure of the Reform, the 
exiled Kang and Liang carried on their Reformist ideas. However, their personal loyalty towards 
the Emperor made them advocate the Constitutional Monarchy system and disapprove of the idea 
of a bourgeois Republic.
The bourgeois revolutionists in this dissertation refer to the bourgeois intellectuals who emerged 
by the end of nineteenth century with Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1844-1925 CE) as their leader. The first 
bourgeois Revolutionists organisation was set up in 1894 by Dr. Sun who was regarded as the 
founding father of modem China. As a Chinese expatriate, Sun began his political career by 
organising reform groups of Chinese exiles overseas. The bourgeois Revolutionists’ ideal was to 
overthrow the feudal Qing Empire and set up a Chinese Republic. Sun’s concept of the Three 
Principles of the People (Nationalism, Democracy, and Livelihood) became the guideline for 
bourgeois revolution. In 1911, the Bourgeois Revolutionists revolted in Wuchang and overthrew 
the feudal government. In 1912, the first bourgeois Republic was set up in China with Sun as the 
acting president.
25 Confucianism in China consists of mainly two philosophers’ works - the analects from 
Confucius and Mencius. This argument ‘^'L>#VnA> n T A ’ is found in The Works of
Mencius (translated by James Legge) Clarendon Press, 1895. Book III, Part I: T'ang Wan Kung 
(cont.), available at: http://nothingistic.org/librarv/mencius/mencius 1O.htmh accessed: 18/08/2006.
26 Annotations (literally meaning: ‘writing down comments on the blank margins of the book’) is a 
unique way of expressing people’s contemporary reflections over current issues under the disguise 
of historical or literal criticism in ancient China. The person who made annotations might be 
imprisoned or even sentenced to deatch if he dared to criticise the authorities.
27 The first primitive form of ‘newspaper’ in China, ‘Di Bao’, appeared in Tang Dynasty (618—  
907 AD) and carried official news. Di Bao were written by, read by and distributed among 
government officials. There were also ‘Xiao Bao’ run by private and read by intellectuals 
emerging in Song Dynasty (960-1279 AD).
28 The Chinese Press and Publishing Network (04/01/2006) ‘Qiang Xue Bao’, available at: 
http://press.gapp. gov. cn/news/wenb.php?val=news&aid=9220, accessed: 10/03/2006.
29 n‘Sun Yat-sen’, in The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia. © 2000-2005 Pearson Education, 
publishing as Infoplease, available at: http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/people/A0847255.htmk 
accessed: 10/03/2006.
30 In 1906, Royal Dowager Cixi decided to ‘change the laws and practice new governance’ (5^ /i 
iff®). The Qing Government decreed the Constitution which imitated the British and Japanese 
Constitutional Monarchy system and included 14 items concerning the power of the Monarch, and 
the 9 items concerning the rights and obligations of the citizens. The intention of the composition 
of the Constitution was to save the declining Royal governance of the Qing Empire. The first item 
of the Constitution concerned the ultimate power of the Qing monarch: ‘The Qing Emperor 
governs the Qing Imperial. The Royal governance comes from a single origin and lasts for ever’
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Monarchy was designed to be 12 years and later changed to 9 years. The bourgeois revolution 
aborted the constitutional monarchy attempts.
31 The Chinese Press and Publishing Network (04/01/2006) ‘Qiang Xue Bao\ available at: 
http://press.gapp. go v.cn/news/wenb.php?val=news&aid=9220, accessed: 10/03/2006.
32 ‘The history of modernisation: Jingshi Da xuetang opened the door for leaning from the West’, 
available at: http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/ch-vuwai/167848.htm. accessed on 14/02/2006.
33 The New Culture Movement in 1915 in China was a movement of Enlightenment and 
liberalisation. During the New Culture Movement, bourgeois radical intellectuals enthusiastically 
promulgated the ideas of democracy and science among the general public, introduced and 
translated various Western philosophical thoughts into Chinese (including Marxism), and 
denounced superstition, ignorance, and feudal authoritarianism. Major figures during the New 
Culture Movement such as Chen Duxiu later became founders of the Chinese Communist Party.
34 Consisting of China’s eight democratic parties -  Revolutionary Committee of the Guomindang, 
China Democratic League, China Democratic National Construction Association, China 
Association for Promoting Democracy, Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democractic Party, China 
Zhi Gong Dang, Jiu San Society, and Taiwan Democratic Self-Government.
35 The Gang of Four refers to the four chief members within the Communist Party who played a 
key role in directing the brainwashing and purging during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in 
China. This Partisan clique included Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, 
and Yao Wenyuan. The Gang of Four was accused of trying to seize power after Mao’s death. 
When the coup failed, they were arrested and later publicly tried and found guilty of treason in 
1980.
36 Fang, Hanqi. (25/07/2002) ‘One Hundred year history o f Journalism Communication in China’, 
from China Dominant-journalism Development Centre, available at: 
ahttp://www.cddc.net/shownews.asp?newsid=501. accessed: 14/03/2006. Another figure is: 2,089 
from ‘The General History of the Print and Publishing in China’, available at: 
http://www.cgan.net/book/books/print/g-historv/gb 12/20 1 .htm, accessed 14/03/2006.
37 Editorial Board of China Broadcasting Yearbook (1997) China Broadcasting Yearbook 1996. 
Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Institute Press. P. 623.
38 This magazine programme has a few segments. Among them, the Oriental Figure (dongfang 
zhizi) features distinguished scholars, officials, or news figures; the Ordinary People’s Story 
(Baixing Gushi) tells the story of ordinary people’s life with a human interest perspective; Horizon 
Investigation (Shikong Diaocha) is an in-depth investigative report that usually exposes social 
problems or scandals such as corruption.
39 The reason I registered a few usernames was quite accidental. I registered my first QGLT 
username in February 2003, but quickly found that I could not post under this name. I thought this 
was a technical problem such as the failure to submit the online registry form. I tried registering a 
few others usernames, but only found these were invalid as well. Then I emailed Mr. Shan, the 
director of QGLT, asking for help. I got his replies in March simply telling me that those 
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users’ pennames. Usernames registered online will be examined for potential ‘inappropriate’ 
political implication or sexual innuendo before they can be activated (so that users can post under 
such names). Due to the lack of staff, around 160,000 registered usernames had not been activated 
up to July 2004.
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40 The other two boards moderated by volunteers are Yueguang Lianyi and Qinggan Shikong. 
These two boards are designed for discussion on music, arts and romance, rather than on current 
affairs
41 ‘Volunteers’ refer to QGLT users who obtained permission from QGLT administration to 
voluntarily moderate bulletin boards. More discussion about QGLT volunteers can be found in 
Chapter 5.
42 Its equivalent in former Communist regimes would be: Prada in the former USSR; Trybuna 
Ludu in Poland; Rude pravo in Czechoslovakia; Nepszabadsag in Hungary; Rabotnichesko Delo 
in Bulgaria; Neues Deutschland in East Germany, D. R.; Scinteia in Romania; and Zeri i popullit 
in Albania.
43 ‘Development’, available at: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/1018/22259/29814/index.html, 
accessed: 16/05/2006.
44 They are: the People's Daily, People's Daily Overseas Edition, East China News, South China 
News, Market Daily, Jinghua Times, International Financial Daily, Jiangnan Times, Global Times, 
and Securities Times.
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46 These weekly, bi-weekly and monthly journals are The Earth, News Front, Global People, 
People s Digest, Listed Companies, Motor Trend, Security Today, Times Trend, Information Weekly, 
Greenlife, Chinese Economic Weekly, and People Forum.
47‘Introduction to People’s Daily’, available at:
http://www.people.com.en//GB/other7018/7019/20011213/626152.html. accessed: 02/03/2003.
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http://www.people.com.cn/GB/50142/50458/index.htmL accessed: 18/05/2006.
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http://www.people.com.cn/GB/other7018/7019/20011213/626152.html. accessed: 12/02/2003.
51 Interview with Mr. Chengbiao Shan, the QGLT Director (1999-2004) on 15/04/2004.
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safety-valve theory can be found in Coser, L. (1956) The Functions of Social Conflict. Glencoe, 
111: Free Press. Pp. 33-48.
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territorial airspace. The Chinese plane plunged into the sea and the pilot went missing. The 
American spy plane was forced into an emergency landing in China. After two-week bilateral talks 
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56 Source: China IT Law, available at: www.chinaitlaw.org, accessed: 06/06/2006.
57 Such as the ‘Measures on Administrative Protection of Internet Copyright’ publicised on 9 April, 
2005.
58 See Item 2 and Item 3 of Article 9, Administrative Provisions for Electronic Bulletin Services on 
the Internet ( T l I & N  ^  'f; iA Wl 51 M ^  ), available at:
http://www.cnnic.com.en/policv/21 .shtml and http://www.chinaitlaw.org/7p l=search, accessed: 
22/04/2003.
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available at: http://www.cnnic.com.en/policv/21 .shtml, accessed: 22/04/2003.
60 On 8 May, 1999, Chinese Embassy in Sarajevo was bombed by NATO’s missiles during the 
Kosovo Conflict. The American Ministry Of Defence later admitted they mistakenly bombed the 
wrong target, but most Chinese believe it is a conspiracy rather than accident. This incident 
triggered nation-wide protests against the USA in China.
61 ‘China ICPs Need Approval, License Before Posting News’, China Online (18/02/2000)’, 
available at: http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/Intemet policv/currentnews/open/c00021851 .asp, 
accessed: 20/03/2000.
62 ‘China Strengthens the Secrecy Management of Computer Information Systems Attached to the 
Internet 26/01/2000’, available at: http://www.chinanews.com.cn/2000-l-26/26/16782.html. 
accessed: 16/05/2006.
63 It is said among QGLT staff that Guan was assigned ‘from above’ to replace Jiang Yaping, the 
founder of QGLT. Jiang, a more liberal veteran journalist who used to encourage his staff to keep 
the dynamics of the bulletin boards, was not regarded as suitable for the Party to keep QGLT in 
rein. Jiang was later assigned the task of self-financing www.people.com.cn while the more 
conservative Guan was assigned to take charge of the content.
64 See for example, Wahl-Jorgensen, K. (2002) ‘Understanding the Conditions for Public 
Discourse: four rules for selecting letters to the editor’, in Journalism Studies Vol.3, No. 1. pp.69- 
81.
65 The four basic principles include four ‘must stick to’s of the Chinese Communist Party’s 
leadership, Socialist System, Proletariat Dictatorship and the Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong 
Thoughts.
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mistakes in launching the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution; Deng Xiaoping for his 
‘going against the proletariat dictatorship’, and Jiang Zemin for his ‘leading the nation to 
corruption’. Source: QGLT internal document ‘YiDuBao Gao’ (Field notes: 18/08/2004).
67 The corresponding Chinese characters are ‘ pf/KTTH’, ‘i&Bi’, ‘ifrL’, ‘M ^ ’, ‘£B
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Wu Er Kai Xi (Urkesh Davlet), Chai Ling and Dai Qing are three leading dissidents during 
the 1989 pro-democracy movement.
68 The corresponding Chinese characters are ‘ 0  0 b # !t^ \
69 The corresponding Chinese characters are ‘ ‘ n  The Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) is the party in power in Taiwan and has been promulgating the idea of Taiwan 
independence. Annette Lu Shiu-lian is the chairwoman of the DPP.
70The corresponding Chinese characters are: ‘SARS’, ‘IftPIJlfrjj'J’, ‘M mW
Fa Lun Gong is a spiritual group in China which 
has been proclaimed as ‘cult’ by the Communist Party. Li Hongzhi, who lives in the USA now, is 
the leader of Fa Lun Gong.
7,The corresponding Chinese characters are
72 The corresponding Chinese characters are: ‘ T ' ^  I I ’. The Beijing
University Triangle is a triangle area on the campus and has been renowned for the posters that 
promulgate liberal ideas here. ‘The stainless steel mouse’ is the online identity of a young female 
dissident who was detained by the Communist Party in 2001. Her detention aroused fervent online 
public opinion condemning the Communist Party, which finally led to her release.
Jiang Yanyong is a retired surgeon from a Beijing military hospital. He exposed the real number 
of SARS infections in early 2003. He was later detained and questioned by the government for his 
online articles that give a personal account of death and injury during the 1989 pro-democracy 
movement
74 BBC News (07/09/2005) ‘Yahoo “helped jail China writer’”, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/4221538.stm. 21/04/2006.
75 See for example, ‘Beijing Internet Media Association Recruiting 200 Web Superintendents’ 
(15/05/2006), available at: http://news.sohu.com/20060515/n243238828.shtml. accessed 
15/05/2006.
76 ‘Beijing Internet Media Association Recruiting 200 Web Superintendents’, available at: 
http://news.sohu.com/20060515/n243238828.shtml. accessed: 15/05/2006.
77 Available at: http://www.qglt.com.cn/bbs/ReadFile?whichfile=486798&typeid= 17 accessed: 
25/08/2004.
78 Available at: http://www.qglt.com.cn/bbs/ReadFile?whichfile=486798&tvpeid= 17 accessed: 
25/08/2004.
79 For example, all postings on the QGLT In-Depth board have to be more than 1,000 bytes (500 
Chinese characters) and all postings will go through QGLT moderators before they can appear 
online.
80 For example, users have been using!!!; ???; • • • ;  AAAA; A A A for emphasis. A_A for a smile 
face and for a surprised or confused reaction.
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81 See Note 55.
82 A series of mini-questionnaires regarding the demographic features of its users was put on 
QGLT from June to August 2004. The result of this survey has only been used as an internal 
reference among moderators however. I got a copy of it by virtue of being an intern moderator.
83 Interview with QGLT moderator Hank (02/09/2004) when he commented on Laobenniu: 
‘Laobenniu is a problematic user’ because ‘he sometimes speaks for those who have been 
prosecuted during and after the June 4 Incident [1989 pro-democracy movement]’.
84 Source: http://www.qglt.com/bbs/GetGuestInfo?GuestID=89810 accessed 16/04/2004.
85 Interview with Chengbiao Shan, Director of QGLT (1999-2004), 06/05/2003.
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http:// bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/ReadFile?whichfile=6321 &tvpeid=42, accessed: 31/07/2004.
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90 During the crackdown of the 1989 pro-democracy movement, the Chinese government 
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According to the China Internet Network Information Centre’s definition, a ‘Chinese Internet 
user’ refers to any Chinese citizen who uses the Internet at least for one hour per week on average.
93 According to Guangdong mobile communication statistics, the flow of mobile phone text 
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million on 10th. (Xia and Ye 2003).
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Jiang, Hua (13/02/2003) ‘Guangzhou is fighting an unknown virus’, in Southern Weekend. 
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in China, foreign media have to apply for a registry number from the government-controlled the 
China National Publications Import and Export (Group) (CNPIE). CNPIE and other government 
organisations are also responsible for signing selling contracts on behalf of foreign press with 
news agencies in China.
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Appendix 1
An example of Semi-structured Interview questions for QGLT users (31/07/2004)
You have been a QGLT member for 3 years. Before joining this online community, 
did you use the Internet? Did you participate in online discussion?
How did you start to know QGLT?
Why did you register as a QGLT member?
Compared with other Internet bulletin boards, what is the unique character of QGLT? 
Is there anything about QGLT that you are not satisfied with?
Your postings on QGLT In-Depth (specially your postings about migrant workers 
from rural areas) triggered a lot of debate. Among the follow-up postings, there are 
usually both agreement and disagreement. What’s your opinion of these follow-up 
postings? What would you say to those who replied to your postings?
What is your opinion about the online interpersonal relationship?
What postings are good and what are bad? Can you give me some examples of both 
good and bad postings from QGLT?
Why did you choose this penname? What is the implication of it?
What do you think is a good online discussion (i.e. the exchange of opinion in 
follow-up postings triggered by one main posting)? Can you give me an example? 
Apart from QGLT, do you post on other Internet bulletin boards?
You expressed a positive attitude towards China’s future development in politics, 
economy and other areas. Do you think Internet bulletin boards such as QGLT can 
play a constructive role in achieving these goals?
A lot of your postings are in-depth analysis based on news stories from traditional 
media. Most of your postings expressed your sympathy with the socially 
disadvantaged groups such as the migrant workers. What is the motivation for writing 
these articles?
Do you communicate with QGLT moderators?
Is QGLT a left-winged community? Why do you think there is the lack of 
‘objectivity’, ‘rationality’, and ‘seeking for truth’ in QGLT discussion?
Do you think you are politically Right (who advocating democracy) in QGLT? What 
is your opinion of the political clusters within QGLT?
Will you describe yourself as middle-class? Do you think you are one of the 
intellectual elites in contemporary China?
You said that almost a quarter of your postings were deleted by QGLT moderators. 
For what reasons? Can you give me an example?
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Appendix 2
Survey questions to QGLT users:
Part III Your use of the Internet and the QGLT
How often do you daily 3-4 times per weekly 2-3 times per occasionally/
Use the Internet week month rarely
How often do you daily 3-4 times per weekly 2-3 times per occasionally/
Visit the QGLT week month rarely
Others:
How often do you daily 3-4 times per weekly 2-3 times per occasionally/
Visit the QGLT week month rarely
In-Depth
Others:
How often do you daily 3-4 times per weekly 2-3 times per occasionally/
Post on bulletin week month rarely
boards
How often do you daily 3-4 times per weekly 2-3 times per occasionally/
Post on QGLT week month rarely
In-Depth
How long have 5 years 4 years 3 years 2 years 1 year of less
You been a Than 1 year
QGLT member
Others:
How long have 5 years 4 years 3 years 2 years 1 year of less
You been with Than 1 year
QGLT In-Depth
The majority of cross-posted cross-posted cross-posted translated self­
Your postings from Chinese from Chinese from overseas from overseas composed
are traditional Internet Chinese media (from
media media media foreign
languages)
Others
307
Have you had almost all you most of your half of your a quarter of it rarely or
Your postings postings postings postings your postings never happens
deleted in QGLT to you
What is your Ultra-Left Left Mid-of the Right Ultra-Right refuse to
political road be
affiliation in grouped
QGLT community
Your opinion about the political affiliation within QGLT:
Do you find very friendly moderate not friendly very
QGLT a friendly friendly unfriendly
community?
Have you had contacts or communication with other QGLT members offline? Please indicate 
in the following form:
frequently often sometimes occasionally rarely/never
Telephone
Mails
Emails
Meeting up
Work
relationship
Friendship
Others:
Please describe the theme of your postings (including the articles you cross-posted 
from other media):
frequently often sometimes occasionally rarely/never
Headline News
Investigative
journalism
Online petition
Literature
History
Politics
Economy
Military studies
Personal experien<
Others:
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Which of the following adjectives best describe the language used in your postings?
very
appropriate
appropriate not sure inappropriate very
inappropriate
Patriotic
Concerning (abou 
the country & 
the people)
Passionate
Sarcastic/cynical
Objective
Truthful
Rational
Logical
Others
What’s your impression of other QGLT postings?
very
appropriate
appropriate not sure inappropriate very
inappropriate
Patriotic
Concerning (abou 
the country & 
the people)
Passionate
Sarcastic/cynical
Objective
Truthful
Rational
Logical
Others:
Among the following list of possibilities, what will happen to China in the coming 20 years?
highly
possible
possible don’t know impossible highly
impossible
Continuous economic 
development
A strong military power
Unification with Taiwan
Democracy
Compulsory education 
for all children
Better international 
relations
Improvement in
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environmental protectioi
Improvement in 
protecting
rural population’s rights
Further privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises
No census registry 
system
Effective control of 
corruption
Progress in legislation 
system
Others:
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Appendix 3
Selection of 22 QGLT informants for intensive interviews (2004)
C ategories D em o g ra p h ic  D istr ib u tion  o f  In terv iew ees
Gender Male Female Refuse to reveal
17 4 1
Age 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 N/A
2 13 5 1 1
Education High school 
Diploma
Bachelor’s
Degree
Master’s
Degree
PhD N/A
1 17 2 1 1
Place o f  
origin
Village
/town
Cities (provincial)
capital
Overseas N/A
10 4 6 1 1
Place o f
Present
living
Village
/town
Cities (provincial)
capital
Overseas N/A
2 9 9 2 0
Profession Self-
employed
Researcher
/Professor
Teacher Administrator Student
5 3 1 2 1
State-owned
enterprise
employee
Foreign
/private
company
employee
Medical
Staff
Retired N/A
4 3 1 1 1
Political
affiliation
Communist
Party
Communist 
Youth League
Other parties No political 
affiliation
N/A
4 1 1 15 1
Join QGLT 
since
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
3 6 3 6 4
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Appendix 4
A List of 35 QGLT Bulletin Boards (up till August 2006)
- ^  0  i&iz: domestic current affairs; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=14.
- in-depth analysis of current affairs;
URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=17,
_ anti-corruption; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=108,
~ China-Taiwan relations; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=92.
~ 41 0  ifeizi; China-Japan relations; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=92,
- [HP# foJISi&fs international relations; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=40.
- military issues; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=38.
- ELfeifciz, agriculture policies, rural area development and rural population;
URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=42.
-  the economies; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=41,
- law and legislation; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=3 9.
~ science and education; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=43.
_ women; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=24.
_ film and television; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=114.
~ music: URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=85.
~ science and technology; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=l 12.
~ W ifcis education; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=l 11,
~ is  environmental protection; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=l 10.
~ media; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=:104.
~ ifcis culture; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=107.
~ academic debate; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?^ 106.
~ book reviews; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=l 3.
~ health; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/mlbrd?to=60.
-  travelling; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=89.
-  ffcfs sports; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd7to-5.
- is  local issues; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/mlbrd?to—83,
-  automobile; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=T05.
~ friendship and liaison; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=21.
~ romance and emotions; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=26.
-  IT LtifcE; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=45.
- #1^/^$1 overseas (non-political) current affairs;
URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to:=96.
- electronic appliances; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to= 109.
-  feedback from users; URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/mlbrd?to=103,
- 51^ ® picture gallery. URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=93.
- China Forum board for current affairs discussions in English.
URL: http://bbs.people.com.cn/bbs/chbrd?to=15,
- M MWP a n e l  Meeting with Guest Speakers is an online version of a television panel 
programme. UR:: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/32306/54155/index.html.
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Appendix 5
An example of SARS postings on QGLT In-Depth [author’s translation]
Title: My deep concerns over the [Chinese] government’s dealing with SARS
Username: lovelychina
Posting time: April 2, 2003 16:39:11
My deep concerns over the [Chinese] government’s dealing with SARS
The full name of SARS is Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. Translated into Chinese, it is 
Yanzhong Jixing Huxixitong Zonghezheng. This disease was previously called Atypical 
Pneumonia in our country. The first case of SARS was found in Guangdong province on 16 
November 2002 before this epidemic quickly spread across the globe. There has not yet been 
any effective medical measure in preventing this highly contagious and lethal pneumonia 
[from spreading]. There has not yet been any effective measure in treating [SARS patients]. 
This disease is highly infectious. It is widely believed that it can spread through saliva and 
close contact, but it is not yet confirmed that if it can spread through air or faeces. SARS 
patients will develop fever before they pass on the disease to others. Most SARS infected 
cases can self-heal. When patients recover from the disease, they carry antibody in their blood 
serum, which sheds hope for further medical breakthrough in SARS treatment.
The Chinese government denied the accusation of its mishandling of SARS crisis from 
international public opinion, and emphasised that ‘it is not necessary to conceal the truth [of 
the SARS crisis]’, and the government ‘is going to publicise updated data of this epidemic 
very soon’. However, I am extremely worried over the development of this plague in China. If 
you know the respective consequences in Singapore and Hong Kong due to their different 
approaches in dealing with SARS crisis, you will understand my worries. QGLT moderators: I 
hope you all regard public health as the first priority, and treat my posting of worries with a 
long-term vision. Please let more users know the truth! I thank you all in advance!
The first [3 SARS] cases in Singapore were imported from Hong Kong. 3 people caught 
SARS when they stayed in a Hong Kong hotel in February, and they passed the disease to 
doctors and nurses in hospitals [in Singapore]. When the number of infected [SARS] cases 
reached 30ish, the Singapore government decided to employ corresponding legislations to 
control the epidemic through practicing compulsory quarantine. The number of [SARS 
infected case] rose sharply for two days before it dropped drastically. More recently, only 1 or 
2 new cases emerging every day, and the disease has been under effective control. The 
Singapore government also practiced strict examination of international travellers (especially 
those who travelled from high-risk regions such as Taiwan or Hong Kong) at Changi 
International Airport. At least one passenger who carried SARS virus was detected. These 
measures guaranteed the effectiveness of the quarantine control and prevent the epidemic 
from disseminating further.
It is said that SARS infection in Hong Kong started from the same hotel. The Hong Kong
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government tried its best in controlling [the epidemic]. Nevertheless, a fear that revealing the 
truth [of SARS] would affect the economy in Hong Kong resulted in concealment [of SARS 
information by the Hong Kong government]. Though the Hong Kong government adopted 
similar measures in controlling SARS in the later stage, the previous reluctance and lateness 
[in dealing with SARS] led to a different situation today [from what is in Singapore]. The 
highly infectious nature of this epidemic led to almost 700 infected cases [in Hong Kong]. 
Unless there is a suspension from work on the whole island, to quarantine all [SARS] patients 
and those who had close contact with [SARS] patients seems impossible. (One infected 
patient was found in a Motorola workshop, which involved a quarantine of more than 500 
workers from the same workshop). To effectively prevent the disease from spreading, 
quarantine is both necessary and compulsory.
From the above comparison, we can have a clear picture. It was around the same time (about 
a month ago) that first [SARS] case was found in both Hong Kong and Singapore respectively. 
Both regions have close connection with Mainland China, and there are a large number of 
people travelling between China and these regions every day. For both Singapore and Hong 
Kong, tourism industry is the pillar industry in their economy. However, due to different 
measures adopted in dealing with SARS crisis, [there come different consequences in these 
regions]. Singapore had 95 infected cases and has rarely new cases coming up. In Hong Kong, 
everyone on the street wears a hygienic mask and worries about their safety. While in 
Singapore, you seldom see anyone wearing hygienic masks. We have to admit that, quarantine 
maybe be the best (even the only) measure in preventing this disease from spreading before 
the vaccine can be developed. Worse than what happened in Hong Kong, there have been no 
quarantine measures at all in China since the first case of SARS was diagnosed.
Let’s take a look of the development of this epidemic in China. Since the first SARS case was 
found in Guangdong Province on November 16, 2002, the government admitted only 5 deaths 
and 300 infected cases [relating to SARS]. The government is so determined to insist that the 
epidemic has been put under effective control. What confused me is that the Health Division 
of the Guangdong government recently announced that 792 infected cases and 31 deaths were 
found in Guangdong province by the end of February. Among them, 680 infected cases and 
24 deaths were in Guangzhou city. [While at the same time], the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
recently announced that ‘A few imported cases of Atypical Pneumonia in Beijing and Shanxi 
Province were put under control. There is no mass infection. There are no cases of Atypical 
Pneumonia in other provinces.’ When I learnt to this news, news from Singapore confirmed 
that one Chinese citizen from Fujian province who travelled to Singapore for family 
reunification was found infected with SARS. I also knew that tourists or businessmen who 
recently travelled to Guangdong Province caught SARS. We all know that Guangdong 
province has a large mobile population. SARS exploded before migrant workers coming back 
to their hometowns [for the Chinese new year]. How could [SARS] only infect those from 
Hong Kong, Taiwan or other countries?
After telling you all these, you can deduce a horrifying number [of SARS infection in China] 
by yourself. Rumours stop only when [SARS information becomes] open and truthful. I
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definitely disagree with the accusation that China has concealed [SARS information]. 
However, no matter how much the government explained, no matter how much the 
government did in dealing with this crisis, there is still room for reflection. Without seeing 
persuasive factual evidence, foreigners and ordinary people like me may still estimate the 
development of [SARS infection in China] based on the information we obtained.
Certainly, it is also possible that the government has been dealing with SARS crisis in such a 
casual manner because [they know] the high self-healing rate of SARS. Nevertheless, the high 
rate of self-healing of SARS is a double-blazed sword. On the one hand, this fact [high rate of 
self-healing] can alleviate [psychological] pressure on those who unfortunately caught SARS; 
on the other hand, many poor families who cannot afford seeing doctors in China might lead 
to an uncontrollable massive explosion [of SARS]. The government needs to make efforts in 
publicising information [concerning SARS], and guaranteeing all those who develop [SARS] 
syndromes can seek medical treatment! The most horrible thing about SARS is not its 
lethality, but its high rate of infection!
[SARS] is a significant test for the Chinese government in dealing with crisis. It will affect 
China’s economy and reputation greatly in a long run. What we have seen so far is only the 
tip of the iceberg -  some international sports games and conferences scheduled in China were 
cancelled. Let all of us wait and see how things are going to develop.
Updated news: It is officially confirmed that SARS cases were found in Hunan Province. This 
fact proved that my worried are not unnecessary or based on mere assumptions.
